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SIR SAMUEL BAKER

Walker & Boutall Ph. Sc.

Samuel Baker

SIR SAMUEL BAKER

A MEMOIR

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AND

A. SILVA WHITE, Hon. F.R.S.G.S.

AUTHOR OF 'THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA,' ETC.

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

HER . MOST . GRACIOUS . MAJESTY

VICTORIA

QUEEN . OF . GREAT . BRITAIN . AND . IRELAND
EMPRESS . OF . INDIA

THIS MEMOIR

OF ONE . OF . HER . MAJESTY'S
MOST . LOYAL . AND . PATRIOTIC . SUBJECTS

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VEGETATION MAP
OF
THE NILE BASIN
with
SIR SAMUEL BAKER'S ROUTES
SCALE, 1 DEGREE OR ABOUT 1 INCH TO 69 MILES
CONVENTIONAL SIGNS
Caravan Roads
Stream Beds
Rivers
Villages
Deserts
Prairie-Lands
Steppes
Forest-Lands
Baker's route
Baker's stations
Tropic of Cancer
LOWER EGYPT
UPPER EGYPT
NUBIA
ABYSSINIA
MARODE
NYANZA
THE GREAT FOREST
Longitude East 30° from Greenwich
London: Macmillan & Co.

CHAPTER I.

BIRTH AND ANCESTRY.

[1821]

SAMUEL WHITE BAKER was born in London on the eighth of June, 1821, a few weeks before the coronation of George IV. He was the second-born of a family of eight children—five sons, the eldest of whom died in youth, and three daughters. His mother was the daughter of Thomas Dobson, Esquire, of Enfield, in the County of Middlesex.

Shortly after their marriage, his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Samuel Baker, settled at Enfield, in a house called 'Ridgeway Oaks.' Mr. Baker was the youngest of seven brothers and three sisters. On the death of his father, Valentine Baker, of Bristol, he had succeeded to the family estates. He possessed large properties and sugar-plantations in Jamaica and in the Mauritius; whilst, for purposes of trade, he maintained a fleet of his own vessels. A very active and enterprising man, he was constantly occupied with public business; and spent much of his time in London,

where he owned a house in Whitehall Yard. Later in life, he became a Director of the Great Western Railway and Chairman of the Gloucester Bank.

Valentine Baker, the paternal grandfather of Samuel White Baker, was a noted citizen of Bristol. Following the example of his father and grandfather, he entered the Royal Navy as a youth; but he subsequently abandoned this career, in order to take the independent command of a privateer. Born in 1737, he lived in the stirring times that witnessed, among other notable events, the Seven Years' War, the conquest of India, and the War of American Independence.

It was during the last-named period, so disastrous for the prestige and colonial success of our country, that Captain Valentine Baker chiefly distinguished himself. Having taken-out 'letters of marque,' he equipped the *Cæsar*, a sloop of 18 guns, which he fought in a very gallant action against a French frigate of 32 guns. This was in the year 1782, when Great Britain had been engaged for four years in a desperate maritime struggle against France, Spain and Holland; and was carrying-on hostilities, not only in North America, against the Colonists, but also in the West Indies, in the English Channel, and in India.

Valentine Baker's action resulted in a hard-won victory: the French frigate struck her flag; but the *Cæsar* was herself so badly crippled,

that, in the absence of boats, all of which had been shot into splinters by the enemy's guns, she was unable to take possession of her prize. The French vessel, seizing this opportunity of escape, re-hoisted her flag and sailed away. She was, however, captured on the following day by an English frigate, and taken into Portsmouth. To this port also Captain Valentine Baker had sailed his ship, to be re-fitted: and it is said, that the French Commander, on seeing at closer quarters the comparatively small size of the *Cæsar*, became so despondent, that he committed suicide.

In recognition of the part borne by Captain Valentine Baker in this action, the merchants of Bristol presented him with a silver vase bearing the following inscription:


Presented
to CAPN VALENTINE BAKER
by the Merchants & Insurers of Bristol
for gallantly defending the Ship Cæsar
against a French Sloop of War
greatly Superior in Force to his own Ship
and beating her off
on June 27th 1782

For many generations the Bakers were sea-rovers of the type of Hawkins and Frobisher,

owning and commanding their own ships, and fighting them whenever an opportunity presented itself. The immediate ancestors of Samuel White Baker possessed large estates in Dorsetshire and Kent, at Poole and Deal, where the maritime traditions of the family were in harmony with the active life of those sea-ports. It may be assumed, therefore, that Baker inherited that marked independence of spirit, love of roving, courage and enterprise, which are and have been so characteristic of his family. Baker, as we shall see, was himself conspicuous among his contemporaries as an 'Elizabethan Englishman'; and possessed many of the characteristics of that vigorous and enterprising age which built-up the British Empire beyond the Seas. In fact, the Story of his Life might almost have furnished the subject of a medieval epic.

But, it is needless to remark, Baker's ancestors were not all men of action. The branch of the family to which Samuel White Baker belonged traces its descent in a direct line of male-issue from James, a brother of Sir John Baker, Recorder of London, Chancellor of the Exchequer to Henry VIII., Attorney-General (1539), Speaker to the House of Commons, Historian, and described as a 'faithful Councillor and Servant to Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Queen Mary.' A son of Sir John Baker entertained Queen Elizabeth at the family-seat of Sissinghurst Castle, near Cranbrook, in Kent, which is now in ruins.

Lloyd, in his *State Worthies*, says of the eminent Sir John Baker:

'There is one of this name remarkable in every king's reign since the Conquest. There is one now renowned in this: I. For integrity, to be neither awed nor corrupted; II. For a spirit public as nature, neither moved with particular respect, nor terminated in a private design.'

He died in 1558, a few days after the accession of Queen Elizabeth. His grandson, Sir Richard Baker, may still be remembered among book-collectors as the author of *A Chronicle of the Kings of England, from the time of the Romans' Government until the death of King James, whereunto is now added in this Third Edition* [1660] *the Reign of King Charles the First;* and of *Meditations and Disquisitions upon the First Psalm, the Penitential Psalms, and Seven Consolatory Psalms*, first published in 1639–40, and republished, with an introduction, by the Rev. A. B. Grosart, LL.D.

The Baker baronetcy became extinct upon the death of a later Sir John Baker (eldest son of Sir John, third baronet) who was buried at Cranbrook, in 1661, leaving issue four daughters. According to Grosart, the heiresses 'sold each their share in the Sissinghurst estates to Sir Horace Mann, of Linton, in the county of Kent: and so ended the direct line.'

The son and descendants of the aforementioned James Baker left Kent and settled in Dorsetshire, where they remained for generations, until Captain Valentine Baker, who was born at

Poole in 1737, took-up his abode at Bristol, and defeated the French frigate in the action already recorded. He had issue seven sons and three daughters; but only two sons married and had descendants. The eldest, James, left an only daughter; and his youngest son, Samuel, was the father of the subject of our Memoir.

CHAPTER II.

CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH.

[1831–1841]

BAKER'S earliest years were spent at Enfield. One who knew him at this period of his life describes his personal appearance and character in the following terms:

'He was of the Saxon type: a noble-looking boy, with a very fair complexion, light hair, and fearless blue eyes. He was enterprising, mischievous, for ever getting into scrapes and leading others into them; but he was never known to tell a lie nor to do a mean thing. He was very affectionate, and fond of his home; always tearful at leaving it for school; but a plucky little fellow, ready to fight much bigger boys than himself on the slightest charge of home-sickness, or for any infringement of his rights. Early in life, he was a bold explorer into Nature,—cutting open everything that puzzled him, to see how it was made; filling his pockets with living insects; fishing drowned kittens and puppies out of ponds, to exercise his skill at restoring them to life, and, after inevitable failure, burying them with honours.'

The earliest letter in our possession is one which Baker, at the age of eleven, addréssed to a lady who was probably the first to inculcate in him that love for Nature which afterwards became the leading impulse of his life:

'Rottingdean,
'25th March, 1832.

'MY DEAR AUNT,

'I have not been very well since I last came from home, which is about a week ago, but I am now much better. Tell me in your next letter whether you forgot to take that piece of metal that I found with a piece of flint in the middle to London, because since you left us I have found several bits of the same sort in the house, which I suppose had been broken off the same lump. We have not had the chest yet, because Grandpapa says there are no lobsters at Billingsgate. Give my love to Aunt Maria and Grandpapa.

'I remain,
'Your affectionate nephew,
'SAM. W. BAKER.'

Although his interest in the lobsters was not strictly scientific, it is evident that a collection of mineralogical specimens occupied his attention at that time.

Our former authority says: 'In the lessons learnt at his mother's knee, the instincts of the explorer were sufficiently evident. Geography was his delight; and as a mere baby he had learnt the names of all the countries then known, and had acquired some knowledge of their capitals and their special characteristics. From the time of his first school (at Rottingdean, from whence the foregoing letter was sent) till he reached man's

estate, there was little of general interest to distinguish him from others of his age and class, beyond a growing independence and impatience at the restrictions of life in cities.'

On one occasion, when Baker was very young, and apparently ignorant of the elementary laws of physiology, he planted one of his sisters up to her neck in the ground, in order to try whether she would not grow faster by this natural process. But the experiment does not appear to have been allowed sufficient time to produce the desired result.

Somewhat later in life, during one of his visits to his grandfather, Mr. Dobson, the enterprising youth undertook the manufacture of fireworks. A heap of gunpowder lay on the kitchen-table, from which he was compounding a squib-mixture. Having wrapped some of it in brown-paper, he tried the effect of contact with a lighted candle. The squib ignited and spluttered sparks in all directions, some of which fell upon the gunpowder. The resulting explosion rang all the bells in the house, smashed all the crockery and every pane of glass in the kitchen, and deposited young Samuel at the far-end of the room. As he had been working with his coat off, his bare arms were most severely burnt; and, in addition to other injuries, he nearly lost his eyesight. The younger children, who had been watching the experiment, were happily saved from the effects of the accident through the presence of mind of a servant.

In 1833, when Baker was twelve years old, his parents removed to Highnam Court, which was rented from Sir John Guise.

Highnam Court, situated about two miles from Gloucester, is surrounded by a beautiful park of about 56 acres. The house is a large and commanding building of stone, planned somewhat in the style of a French château. Attached to it are about 2,000 acres of land, over which there is excellent shooting: and here Baker learnt the use of the gun.

When Mr. and Mrs. Baker first settled at Highnam Court, they had five children, of whom Samuel White was the eldest,—Thomas having died in the preceding year. The children were greatly attached to their home and to their parents. Samuel, living a healthy and contented life, developed into a youth of powerful physique. His home-training nurtured all those qualities of mind which make for manliness. The daily association with parents whom he loved and respected, with brothers and sisters old enough to be his companions, an out-door life that offered ample opportunities for sport and field-games—these were the main conditions under which Baker's early youth was passed.

Between 1833 and 1835, he attended the College School at Gloucester, boarding in an adjoining house, which accommodated fifteen boys. The school-house, an ancient stone building, now much in the same condition as it was in Baker's youth, is close to the Cathedral.

Fifty-five years later, Baker referred to his experience of the College School at Gloucester, in these words: 'My reminiscences of the College School are not agreeable. I believe that I was the only boy who never received corporal punishment, as an exception among 96 individuals. The solitary exemption of myself from the cane, or birch, was not the result of any superior merit on my part: I was only a size too big and strong.* Geoffrey St. Aubyn represented the school, by election, as the Liberal Member; I represented the Conservatives, by the same election.'

The boys appear to have been treated with unnecessary severity; and, so far as one may judge, Baker derived little profit from the school-curriculum. His parents, being dissatisfied with the result, removed him from the College.

In the year 1838, Mr. Baker secured the services of a private tutor, to whose care he entrusted the further education of his son. This gentleman was the curate of the Parish Church, at Tottenham: the Rev. H. P. Dunster, who has been good enough to supply the following account of his charge:

'In the spring of 1838, I had an interview with Mr. Baker, who told me how disappointed he was at the backward state of his son Samuel's education. He men-

* As an illustration of his exceptional strength at that time, or somewhat later, it may be mentioned that, whilst at a fair in Gloucester, Baker, who was a capital fencer and boxer, interfered to protect an innocent citizen from a notorious and powerful bully, whom he struck to the ground with a single blow.

tioned, that he had extensive and valuable estates in the Mauritius, which would form an excellent provision for his two eldest sons; and said, that he wished his son, Samuel, to go out as soon as possible and take-over the management of the property.

'The result was, that the future Sir Samuel Baker came to me as my resident pupil. He was at that time a strong, well-made lad, with a very gentlemanly bearing, a florid complexion, bright auburn hair, and an open, honest countenance, full of life and animal spirits. We took to each other from the very first; and continued fast friends to the day of his death.

'My pupil was certainly deficient in subjects of general education. I tried him in Latin and Greek: with the former he was fairly conversant, but the latter was new to him. He was much interested, I remember, with Xenophon's stirring narrative of the retreat of the Ten Thousand. He also read *Cæsar* and *Livy* with me.

'It was the dull process of school-routine that had discouraged him. My chief aim was to cultivate in him a taste for reading and to make the acquisition of general knowledge as easy as I could.

'My father had an excellent library, containing works by the best English authors—History, Travels, Fiction, etc. Here my pupil and I worked together. He was much interested in scientific subjects, some of which we illustrated by actual experiments. But the books in my father's library pleased him most, chief among them being, curiously enough, Belzoni's *Travels in Egypt and Nubia*, and two volumes of Dr. Madden's *Travels*, one of which described *A twelve months' residence in the West Indies, during the transition from slavery to apprenticeship*.

'Sam. Baker had plenty of natural ability, and had been well-grounded in earlier years. He read fluently, spelt correctly, wrote a good hand, and could express himself well and easily.

'In our neighbourhood, there was a Circulating Library, containing some three thousand volumes, from which he kept himself supplied with books, selecting Travels, tales of adventure, and the best works of contemporary Fiction. There was little in the way of sport or out-door amusements. Occasionally he took his gun on the Tottenham marshes, with a fine old English spaniel of ours,—a most excellent water-dog and high in favour with him. Sometimes, in open weather, he had a run with a pack of beagles belonging to a friend in the village. In the summer, his chief amusement was bathing in the river; and he soon became a strong swimmer.

'During the two years that Sam. Baker was with me, he was more my companion than my pupil. His education consisted in the development of that which was in him, rather than in the acquisition of book-knowledge.'

Baker's own views on education, in the decline of his life, may be briefly referred to in this place. On the occasion of the presentation of prizes at Newton College he addressed the boys in a speech, of which the following are excerpts:

'The close of the last year at school recalls to our remembrance the days of boyhood; and in regarding you, I can fully sympathize with the emotions which such a period must inspire. . . . We must remember that school is a little section of the world which represents a young society, governed, like all societies that are incapable of self-government, by a despot: therefore, a well-conducted college or school should be a model of paternal government. The Head Master is your despotic monarch. The common object of the ruler and subjects is to prepare for the struggle when boys shall become men, and enter upon the competition for success in this great world.

. . . 'In former times the despotic Monarch of the School forced down unwilling throats volumes of classical literature, to the detriment of other more use-

ful learning; and we found in society men of high renown as classical authorities, who could not have ordered their own dinners in modern languages, if they happened to be travelling on the continent of Europe. It has been remarked by an eminent orator of our own time, that "nothing is so humiliating to a man of supposed education as to feel himself both deaf and dumb the instant he leaves the shores of England."

'The knowledge of living languages is an absolute necessity. At the same time, the classics should not be neglected: as they may be termed the mental dumb-bells of our youth, which exercise and train the mind to a refined line of thought, and lay a solid foundation for future knowledge.

. . . 'To form a calm and accurate opinion of the future, we must have a thorough knowledge of the past (history). . . . Great Britain is a Power which embraces every quarter of the globe. . . . The future of many of you now present may be cast in some parts of the world where your forefathers conquered and added distant lands to the vast colonies of England. The same spirit of enterprise and determination to surmount all difficulties must be your guide and your ambition. We are so peculiarly the Ruling Power in various portions of the earth that geography becomes a science most important to ourselves. The study of physical geography is absolutely necessary to Englishmen, as we are the great freight-carriers and merchants of the world.

. . . 'We may safely assume, that a sound education should comprise a certain knowledge of classics, mathematics, geography, living-languages, history, geology, and astronomy. The vast progress that has been made in the various sciences within the last century necessitates a corresponding advance in general education; and no exertion should be spared to enable you to meet the requirements of the future.

. . . 'The character of the man is formed when a boy. I do not believe in great moral changes, as a rule.

If I knew the character that a man bore when he was a boy at school, I should regard him accordingly: and you may depend upon it, that the lad who is respected by his masters and school-fellows for upright and honourable conduct will bear with him that noble reputation throughout his life.

. . . 'To enable you to perform your part on the great stage of the world, you must receive a thorough education; but, in addition to book-learning, you must possess a special individual character which is comprised in the English word "gentleman." That word expresses all.'

These views, though in no sense original, are given as the best index we can find to Baker's personal experience. His school-education had been fitful and fragmentary. But self-education began early in his life; whilst the salutary influence of public-school discipline was scarcely missed by one who either inherited or by his home-training acquired those qualities of mind and bearing that conduce to manliness, self-restraint and honourable conduct.

It will be noted, that Baker laid great stress on the value of acquiring living-languages. He spoke from experience. On leaving his private tutor, he went to Frankfurt (*am-Main*), where he attended lectures and studied German. A banker of that city, Herr Berens, exercised a nominal supervision over him; but, otherwise, he was independent.

His education, so far as tuition and college-life were concerned, concluded with his stay at Frankfurt.

CHAPTER III.

MANHOOD.

[1842-1846]

On the return of his eldest son from Germany, in the early part of 1842, Mr. Baker purchased Lypiatt Park, in Gloucestershire, which is situated on the eastern slope of the Cotswold Hills, in a charming and picturesque country.

The large mansion-house, built in stone and battlemented, with its Gothic chapel adjoining, is erected on Bisley Hill, at the edge of a plateau overlooking the valley of Stancomb. It is approached from Stroud, which is about two miles distant, by the steep ascent of the Bisley Road. The house is sheltered by a well-timbered park, and is surrounded by an open, rolling country, close to 'the Golden Valley.' From the neighbouring heights, and especially from Frocester and Randwick, one of the finest panoramic views in England may be obtained: that of the broad and gleaming waters of the Severn, with the Forest of Dean and the Welsh hills in the far distance. The interior of the house is elaborately decorated, and is filled with works of art; in the great gallery, there are sculptured stone figures of the twelve Apostles, of ancient

workmanship. The house itself appears to date back to Henry VII.; and has been altered and improved by its successive owners. The present proprietor, Sir John Dorington, to whose father Mr. Baker sold the property in 1847, married a sister of the late Captain Speke, the discoverer of the Victoria Nyanza: so that Lypiatt possesses a double claim to be associated with the leading discoverers of the Nile-sources.

The year in which Mr. Baker and his family were installed at Lypiatt Park was notable, from our point of view, for two events. The first was the conclusion of the three years' war between Great Britain and China by the Treaty of Peace signed before Nankin, which secured to Great Britain not only access to five 'Treaty-ports' in China, but also the cession of Hong-Kong, one of our most important footholds in the Far East. The second event was of a strictly personal and domestic character: the Coming of Age of Samuel White Baker.

Lypiatt Park was the scene of probably the happiest years in Baker's early life, when his character was in course of formation. Re-united to his family, and surrounded by the happiest conditions, he stood on the threshold of his career in that greater world which now claimed his services. What those services were to be, and what the nature of his future work, must have been the thoughts that accompanied his frequent rambles over the hills. The alluring character of the beautiful country, which was

now his home, must have appealed to him as a lover of Nature, and have suggested, by its historical associations, many scenes and events in the lives of his immediate ancestors.

In one of Baker's works, *Cast Up by the Sea*, where, doubtless, he recalled the memories of his youth, the following passage occurs: 'Ned Grey would gaze at the boundless horizon, and his boyish impulse yearned to wander far beyond.' The broad Severn, in its passage to the sea, was the pathway to the Far West and to distant lands which awaited the advent of the discoverer or the colonist,—lands, too, which were the paradise of sportsmen.

This and the adjacent counties were, as we know, the home of many pioneers and bold seamen. Charles Kingsley, in *Westward Ho!* remarks: 'It is to the sea-life of Bideford and Dartmouth, and Topsham, and Plymouth (then a petty place), and many another little western town, that England owes the foundation of her naval and commercial glory. It was the men of Devon, the Drakes and Hawkins, Gilberts and Raleighs, Grenviles and Oxenhams, and a host more of "forgotten worthies" whom we shall learn one day to honour as they deserve, to whom she owes her commerce, her colonies, her very existence.' The port of Bristol, too, was equally famous, not only as the birthplace and port-of-departure of Sebastian Cabot (the first Englishman to land on that part of the American continent now called the United States,

and thus to pave the way for English colonization), but also as the first city in the kingdom to establish regular steamship-communication* with the American Colonies.

That Baker wrote poetry at this time we know; and that he built many 'castles in the air' was to be expected, at his age. It was, therefore, not a matter for surprise, that he failed to realise the practical expectations of his father, who, as Mr. Dunster informs us, had destined his son to a commercial career.

The first step in the realization of this prospect was to place Baker in his father's office in Fenchurch Street: but the experiment failed utterly. The routine of office-work was powerless to fetter Baker's restless and adventurous spirit, which clamoured to carry him into distant lands.

Meantime, however, an interesting episode in Baker's life held him captive at home. This was his marriage, on the 3rd August 1843, with Henrietta Biddulph Martin, a daughter of the Rev. Charles Martin, rector of Maisemore.

The parish of Maisemore adjoins Highnam Court; and it was here that Baker and his brother, John, first met their future wives. The two brothers married two sisters, on the same day; and each carried-off his wife, in a carriage and four horses, to Clifton. Thus, the brothers, who

* In 1838, by the *Great Western*, which was built at Bristol. The first steamboat built at Bristol was in 1827.

were devoted to one another, were drawn even closer together by this mutual tie.

During the period of their courtship, which lasted for over nine years, and began in the days when they were mere boys and girls together, it is recorded, that they met by the banks of a small stream separating their respective homes; and that our future explorer, being dissatisfied with the intervention of this stream, which was a barrier to conversation, contrived to float a tub with an arrangement of pulleys by which, one after the other, the brothers could haul themselves across the water. We fancy, though we do not know, that Sam. went first.

Shortly after his marriage, John, accompanied by his wife, went to the Mauritius, in order to look after his father's property. This was a mission that should have been carried-out by the elder brother; but Samuel remained behind for a few months longer in England, when he also, accompanied by his wife, went to the Mauritius, and assisted John in the management of the estate. He spent several months there, and also visited the neighbouring island of Réunion. His stay in the Mauritius was, however, saddened by the death of his first-born, an infant-son.

In 1845, or two years after his marriage, he says of himself, that the 'spirit of wandering' had seized him. The accounts that he had read of sport and elephant-hunting in Ceylon exercised over his mind a fascination from which he was unable to escape. He therefore determined to

spend twelve months in the jungles of Ceylon; and at once set-about making his preparations.

No sooner had he started on his voyage to the enchanted island, than his third-born infant, a girl, sickened and eventually died on board ship. This was in the year 1846;—a year that was memorable for the repeal of the Corn Laws, following on a great commercial panic, when Baker had little inducement to stay at home and attend to business.

CHAPTER IV.

AN ENGLISH VILLAGE IN CEYLON.

[1846–1855]

WHEN Baker first went to Ceylon, his object was merely to engage in sport and the big-game shooting for which the island was justly celebrated. During the thirty years that Ceylon* had been under the complete sovereignty of Great Britain, little progress had been made in the development of its natural resources: so that, when Baker first arrived, he was unfavourably impressed by its value as a British possession.

After the 'bustling activity' of Port Louis, in the Mauritius, his first impression upon landing at Colombo was disappointing in the extreme. In his work, *Eight Years' Wanderings in Ceylon* —which he published in 1855, two years after his first book, *The Rifle and the Hound in Ceylon*,— he noticed the 'peculiar dulness throughout the town,—a sort of something that seemed to say, "Coffee does not pay,"' and the apparent absence of any commercial enterprise. The rush into coffee, accompanied by speculation in land, did, in fact, bring-about a financial collapse, to be

* First ceded in 1802, by the Peace of Amiens, but only lightly held till the year 1815.

followed later by the failure of cinchona cultivation. But, at that time, his mind was set upon sport, not upon stirring-up stagnant British Colonies; and so we find him at once fixing his head-quarters at Colombo, from whence he was best able to make trips into the Interior.

Several months were spent in shooting, both big game and small; until his second child, Lindsey, a son to whom he was deeply attached, was taken suddenly ill, and died whilst Baker and his brother were absent with a friend on a distant expedition. On hearing of his son's illness, he hastened back by sea: this being the quickest route to his home. The small boat in which he sailed was upset; and Baker, having neglected to change his clothes, arrived seriously ill with fever. The death of his child, which greatly depressed his spirits, and his own illness, necessitated his removal to the mountain health-resort of Newera Eliya, where he recovered his normal state of health, in spite of rough fare and lodgings, after a residence there of only a fortnight.

Newera Eliya, which has now a railway from the coast, was then reached from Colombo by a carriage-road of 115 miles in length. It is situated at an altitude of over 6,000 feet above sea-level. When Baker first visited this station, it was in a state of utter neglect, the only substantial house being that built by Sir Edward Barnes, when Governor of Ceylon, and to whom the creation of this sanitarium, as well as the construction of the road thither, were due. The

last thirteen miles of the road are through the Rambodde Pass (6,600 ft.), from whence a descent of two miles brings the traveller to Newera Eliya. 'The station,' says Baker,* 'then consisted of about twenty private residences, the barracks and officers' quarters, the Rest-House and the Bazaar; the latter containing about 200 native inhabitants. Bounded upon all sides but the east by high mountains, the plain of Newera Eliya lay like a level valley of about two miles in length, by half-a-mile in width, bordered by undulating, grassy knolls at the foot of the mountains. Upon these spots of elevated ground most of the dwellings were situated, commanding a view of the plain, with the river winding through its centre. The mountains were clothed from the base to the summit with dense forests, containing excellent timber for building-purposes. Good building-stone was procurable everywhere; limestone at a distance of five miles. The whole of the adjacent country was a repetition of the Newera Eliya plain, with slight variations, comprising a vast extent of alternate swampy plains and dense forests.'

That such a spot, enjoying an exceptionally fine climate, should lie idle and uncultivated, simply for want of enterprise, struck Baker as being incomprehensible. 'How often,' he exclaims, 'have I thought of the thousands of

* This and other quotations, the sources of which are not explicitly stated, in the present chapter, are taken from Baker's work, *Eight Years' Wanderings in Ceylon.*

NEWERA ELIYA, CEYLON.

starving wretches at home, who here might earn a comfortable livelihood!' And pursuing this thought, he goes on to say, 'I have scanned the vast tract of country; and in my imagination I have cleared the dark forests, and substituted waving crops of corn, and peopled a hundred ideal cottages with a thriving peasantry.'

This ideal picture made an indelible impression upon his mind, which he carried with him on his return to England. The experience of his *Wanderjahr* in Ceylon, and especially his brief visit to Newera Eliya, 'upset all ideas of settling down quietly at home. Scenes of former sports and places,' he remarks, 'were continually intruding themselves upon my thoughts; and I longed to be once more roaming at large with the rifle through the noiseless wilderness in Ceylon.' Nor was there much to attach him to England, beyond the happiness he always felt in being with or near his own people. The country was, moreover, passing through a social revolution, culminating in the Chartist riots and the march of twenty thousand men upon London. But at that time Baker was not specially interested in Home politics: his thoughts were fixed upon Ceylon, and were occupied with the realization of his project.

Carried-away by his love of sport and of an independent, unshackled life under simpler and brighter conditions than those demanded by 'the People's Charter,' he determined to become a settler at Newera Eliya, and to make an attempt

to create there an 'English Village,' with the whole of Ceylon for his 'manor, and no expense of gamekeepers.' His ideas in those days were somewhat feudal in character; and, fortunately for himself, he was able to realise them. Needless to say, they were wholly shared by his brother John, who, with his wife and children, had accompanied him to Ceylon and had returned home with him.

The two brothers and their wives having finally determined to establish an English settlement at Newera Eliya, preparations were commenced upon a large and generous scale. Their father had, in the meantime, sold Lypiatt Park, and, accompanied by his family, had taken a house in London, for the benefit of his wife's health. Here his wife died, after prolonged illness. [In 1851, Mr. Baker married again; and spent the remaining years of his life at his wife's place—Thorngrove, in Worcestershire—where he died, in 1862.]

One thousand acres of land at Newera Eliya were purchased from the Government, at the rate of twenty shillings per acre. The emigrants then got-together all necessary farming implements, a bull, a cow, three rams, and a thorough-bred stallion. Poultry, pigs, and carriage-horses were not forgotten. Added to this live-stock were a pack of hounds which Baker had carefully selected.

Whilst Baker himself went out over-land to arrange for the reception of the party, his wife,

his brother Valentine, Mr. and Mrs. John Baker and their children, a bailiff and twelve other emigrants, sailed from London, in September 1848, on board the *Earl of Hardwicke*, which had been specially chartered for the occasion.

Their embarcation had been a sight to behold, and is thus described by an eye-witness:—'Young men and wives; babies and nurses; the bailiff and his wife and daughter; the groom with the horses; the animals, two of every kind —reminding one of the toy-figures in the Noah's Ark of one's childhood; the cackle of the poultry; the sad lowing of the cow; the plunging of the bull in mid-air, as he was hauled-up; and, last of all, the pack of hounds scrambling on board over the ship's side.'

Thus laden with her precious freight, the good ship sped on her way to Colombo, and was favoured by wind and weather during the long passage.

Such an enterprise recalls 'the spacious days of Queen Elizabeth'; and was carried-out in a manner that was characteristic of the race from which these modern emigrants sprang. It was of such stuff that many of our early voyagers and pioneer-colonists were made—men who, by their enterprise and courage, have built-up the British Empire.

Baker chose the site of the settlement in a fashion, too, that was quite his own. He says: 'I wandered over the neighbouring plains and jungles of Newera Eliya; and at length I

stuck my walking-stick into the ground where the gentle undulations of the country would allow the use of the plough. Here, then, was to be the settlement.' This was at the eastern extremity of the plain, on the crest of an abrupt descent, about two miles and a half from the station of Newera Eliya, where the land was comparatively level and not too much shut-in by the mountains.

Eighty men were hired to make a clearing—in spite of the monsoon rains that then (October) swept the country. Neat white cottages were run-up; and sufficient accommodation was provided for the whole party, by the time that they arrived, in excellent health, at Colombo.

The initial difficulty of bringing up the live-stock, heavy machinery, and farming implements was overcome; but not without loss.

The first of many subsequent accidents is recorded in the following letter, which is well worth preserving, from the English groom:

'HONORD ZUR,

'I'm sorry to hinform you that the carrige and osses has met with a haccident and is tumbled down a preccippice and its a mussy as I didn't go too. The preccippice isn't very deep bein not above heighty feet or therabouts—the hosses is got up but is very bad—the carrige lies on its back and we can't stir it nohow. Mr. —— is very kind, and has lent about a hundred niggers, but they ain't no more use than cats at liftin. Plese Zur come and see whats to be done.

'Your Humbel Servt.,

'H. PERKES.'

This letter is not quite authentic, being quoted* by Baker from memory. Baker bore his loss of a new carriage and a pair of fine Australian horses with that new-born philosophy which afterwards had ample opportunities for expression; though he does not record the language which he used on the occasion. Other mishaps followed in quick succession; and some trouble was at first experienced with the emigrants.

Employing about 150 natives, it cost about £30 per acre to clear the land and prepare it for the plough. The soil,—a sandy loam, about eighteen inches in depth, with a gravel sub-soil—was far from rich; and required a deal of manure. A very sagacious elephant, which the English groom eventually rode to death, was used for ploughing, harrowing and rolling, and for other useful purposes on the farm.

It is unnecessary to follow the colonists further in their experiences than to state that, after exemplary patience, perseverance and skill, Baker's farm was eventually consolidated, and throve fairly well, though at first it was a financial failure. The live-stock increased in number. 'The fields were green; the axe no longer sounded in the forests; a good house stood in the centre of cultivation; a road of two miles in length cut through the estate: and the whole place looked like an adopted "home." All the trials and

* In *Eight Years' Wanderings in Ceylon.*

disappointments of the beginning passed away, and the reality was a picture,' says Baker, 'which I had ideally contemplated years before. The task was finished.' Moreover, a church, a public reading-room and a brewery were established, in order to meet the requirements of the Nineteenth Century.

Two thousand feet above Newera Eliya, the summit of Pedrotallagalla, the highest mountain in Ceylon, attains an altitude of 8,280 feet. From this lofty stand-point, Baker looked down upon his work; and was satisfied. 'How wonderful,' he exclaims, 'the alteration made by man on the face of Nature! Comparatively but a few years ago, Newera Eliya was undiscovered,—a secluded plain among the mountain-tops, tenanted by the elk and the boar . . . How changed! The road encircles the plain; and carts are busy in removing the produce of the land. Here, where wild forests stood, are gardens teeming with English flowers; rosy-faced children and ruddy countrymen are about the cottage-doors; equestrians of both sexes are galloping round the plains; and the cry of the hounds is ringing on the mountain-side! And,' he adds, 'the church-bell sounds where the elephant trumpeted of yore.'

Baker himself had turned his hand to everything. Among other duties of his position, he freely doctored all the natives and colonists who came to him for medical advice. Nor did he shirk surgery or dentistry, if need be. On one

occasion, for instance, an Irish nurse complained of a toothache. Baker immediately volunteered to extract a double-tooth. She consented. He fixed the pliers on the tooth, and gave a wrench. With his powerful wrist, something had to give way: out came the tooth and a bit of the jaw. 'The Lord be praised!' exclaimed the patient, 'yer Honour did it iligant; but it's the wrang tooth.'

Whilst he had been engaged, with the assistance of his brother and their respective wives, in the serious work of founding a settlement, the allurements of sport and hunting had not been disregarded. John, like his other brothers—of whom we shall have occasion to speak further on, was a first-rate sportsman, and, like them also, remarkable for his cool courage in positions of danger and for his skill as a horseman. With the hounds in full-cry, they had many a glorious day's run, through dense jungle and over every physical obstacle of mountain and valley. More than once, each brother saved the life of the other, by decisive service at a critical moment. This occurred, for example, on one memorable occasion, within the space of five minutes, when the brothers were hunting in dense jungle. Each of them shot a Rogue elephant in full chase of his brother and when an ineffectual shot would have resulted in their being trampled to death.

With his hounds, Baker explored this difficult country in every direction. For many miles

round, every path was familiar to him; and where no paths were visible, he plunged boldly into the unknown jungle and discovered new ones. It was this early experience that developed in him the instincts of the explorer and discoverer; moreover, it trained his faculties, and hardened his frame, to that end. Even at this early period of his life he possessed, without special education, the essential qualifications for the work of exploration in unknown and savage lands. 'From sunrise to sunset,' he remarks, 'I have often ploughed along through alternate jungles and plains, listening eagerly for the cry of the hounds, and at length discovering portions of the country which I had never known to exist. There is great pleasure in thus working-out the features of a wild country.' He had also his fixed encampments, and would sometimes bury himself alone in the wilderness, carefully watching the habits of wild beasts or other animals—none were too formidable nor too insignificant—and communing with Nature, which he studied and loved in her every mood, as his admirable and sympathetic descriptions prove. Of the big-game that fell to his gun we shall speak in another place.

At last, broken in health, from attacks of fever contracted in the jungle, he decided to leave Newera Eliya, though not without deep regret. He sailed for England in the early part of 1855, with his wife and the four children who had been born to them in Ceylon. Mr.

and Mrs. John Baker and their children accompanied him; and the settlement was left in the charge of a bailiff.

Before concluding this section of our subject, we may, in a few words, complete the story of an English village in Ceylon. John Baker eventually returned to Newera Eliya; and remained there until his death in 1883. Mrs. Baker still resides in the old house, now much enlarged and improved. Baker himself, some years ago, gave-up his share of the property (which is now called Mahagastotte) to his two nephews, Julian and Arthur. On the death of the latter, this share fell to the present head of the Baker family, Captain Julian Baker, R.N., to whom subsequent reference will be made. The settlement is now flourishing; and remains as it was when Baker left it, except for various improvements. In the year 1893, the owners had the satisfaction of seeing the price of their teas quoted at the 'top of the market': so that the experiment of founding an English settlement in Ceylon appears to have been ultimately rewarded with success.

CHAPTER V.

IN QUEST OF A MISSION.

[1855–1861]

SHORTLY after the return of Baker to England, when he had seen his book, *Eight Years' Wanderings in Ceylon*, through the press, the state of his wife's health and his own need of a life of activity and movement led him to the Pyrenees, where an occasional shot at a bear was not to be despised.

His intention had been to spend the winter in those parts: but, on the 29th December, at Bagnères-de-Bigorre, his wife died of typhus fever. For a fortnight, during the greater part of which she had lain unconscious, he had never left her side; and when at last death supervened, his letters of the following days show how deeply affected he was by the loss of the loved companion of his youth.

He returned to England with his children; but for him there was no rest nor peace to be found in the familiar scenes of his early home. To distract his mind, and above all to escape his own thoughts, he undertook a journey to Constantinople and the East. This was to-

wards the close of the Crimean War, in which his brothers, Valentine and James, had been serving. The attraction to the seat-of-war was thereby enhanced for him.

Valentine Baker had first entered the army as an ensign in the Ceylon Rifles; and subsequently had taken part, with the 12th Lancers, in the Kafir War of 1852–53. In 1856, he was in the 10th Hussars, serving as Captain of the Troop which formed the escort of the Commander-in-Chief. He had been present at the defeat of the Russians at Chernaya and at the siege and fall of Sevastopol, for which services he received medals and clasps. Not only did he take part in the final assault, but during the night he was one of the first of the Allied Army to enter Sevastopol. His brother, James, was then serving in the 8th Hussars, and had also been present at Chernaya and the fall of Sevastopol.

On Baker's arrival at Constantinople, in March 1856, a few days before the Treaty of Peace was concluded at Paris, — though the Allies did not actually evacuate the Crimea until the 9th July following, — he was accompanied by his brother, Valentine, and Colonel Tottenham. Together, they took a house at Skutari; and remained there for a month. Life at Skutari, on the beautiful shores of the Bosporus, raised Baker's spirits. At least, it changed his intention of joining the Turkish Contingent, 'which, from all I see,' he says in

a private letter, 'is a sort of refuge for the destitute.' And he adds:

'Our troops are in fine health and condition. The French, on the contrary, are in a bad state—45,000 in hospital!! If the war should last—and not an hour passes without some fine steamer coming in full of troops, which looks very like war, although everyone says that we are certain of peace—Old England will come out strong after all. But I believe peace is certain. I shall make a tour through Circassia, and judge of the facilities for a Russian attack upon India. This may be of use in the event of a future struggle, which this premature peace goes far to ensure.'

In the absence of a companion, however, Baker gave-up his more extended expedition, and contented himself with ten days' shooting in the Interior. He returned to England shortly after,—his mind still unsettled, and his plans for the future uncertain.

Writing from London, on 26th February, 1857, to a very intimate friend, he confesses the current of his thoughts at that time:

'Death has indeed been hard upon you and your family; but, as you justly observed, in your last letter, afflictions serve to wean us from the world and draw us to more sacred things.

'No one has felt this more keenly than myself: but you may nevertheless be astonished at my future intentions—*to enter the Church*, if the difficulty of age can be got over, which I think will be no great obstacle.'

But the obstacles, combined with other causes, defeated this hastily-formed project. For over a year Baker spent an aimless life, constantly

moving about from place to place, and settling in none.

At the age of thirty-five, in the prime of his manhood, he was without a career or any special incentive to work. The war with China and Persia, which followed close upon the conclusion of the campaign in the Crimea, failed to draw him from his seclusion; even the Indian Mutiny, in which he felt a deep and painful interest, did not rouse him to take part in any private enterprise, on which he was at most times ready to embark. Shooting and fishing in Scotland were the chief means he employed for working-off his superfluous energy.

It was not until March, 1859, or over three years after his wife's death, that we again find Baker engaged upon a serious undertaking. This was the construction of a railway connecting the Danube with the Black Sea, across the Dobruja.

In a letter to his daughter, dated from Bucharest, 11th March, 1859, he explains himself as follows:

'I had a great struggle with myself as to whether I should accept my present appointment; for, of course, it will detain me for some time out here and away from you all. But I felt sure that, though away, you would not forget me; and, as man was not made to be idle, I thought it advisable to undertake the present work.'

Then he goes on to give, as he always delighted to give his children, a description of his surroundings.

To Lord Wharncliffe he is more explicit. After describing his journey down the Danube,

from Pest to Vidin, in a small row-boat that he had rigged-up to accommodate a few passengers.—the steamers having ceased to run for the winter season—and the journey across Wallachia to Bucharest, he goes on to say:

'Kustenje: 30th March, 1859.

'When I left England, I fully expected to have returned in the spring; but on arrival at Bucharest, I found the Railway Company's contract for sleepers had not arrived; and, as no one was there to arrange matters, I took-over the reins at once. I have now accepted the post as Manager-General of the Company.

'I do not know whether you are aware of the proposed line of railway out here. It runs through Trajan's Wall, from Cernavoda (on the Danube) to Kustenje (on the Black Sea). The distance is only forty miles; but it saves the immense round *viâ* the Sulina [mouth of the Danube] and the dangers of that passage. We shall take the whole traffic of the Danube on our line, and ship it at Kustenje, where we are now constructing a port.

. . . 'I shall be obliged to remain here for two years, after which I shall return to England.'

A few days later, Baker wrote to his sister:

'We are progressing rapidly. The earth-works of the railway are advancing daily; the necessary buildings have been commenced; and 1,200 workmen, hard at it, give a new life to these barren shores, and much disturb the quiet rest of the ashes of Constanta, which we are excavating in forming our quays, and of the skulls and bones of heaps of dead. . . . I turn my attention solely to the coins of past ages, which are very numerous in the *débris* that we turn over: and the impression left upon my mind is, that the ancients were wonderfully

addicted to "small change," as my trophies hitherto have been confined to "coppers."

. . . 'My staff will soon be organised. My office is being built as fast as possible; and I am daily expecting the arrival of book-keepers and clerks. Imagine my being anxious for the completion of the Office! I hear you say, "Saul also among the Prophets!" or, in modern phraseology, "Sam. also among the clerks." So it is, nevertheless. I mean to make this a model concern, if I can, and to have all the arrangements in very perfect order.'

Baker's work consisted chiefly in organization and supervision, for there were engineers to carry-out the technical requirements of the undertaking; and the experience gained by him in the management of large bodies of men of various nationalities subsequently stood him in good stead. Moreover, this led to his first practical intimacy with the Oriental mind, the character of which he was able to study, to his eventual profit.

A very gallant act is recorded of him, whilst he was residing at Kustenje. A vessel was wrecked on the coast, during a heavy storm that prevented any boats being launched. Being amongst the spectators on the sea-shore, he saw a man clinging to a floating spar. In spite of the high sea and low temperature, Baker swam out to his rescue, and succeeded in bringing him safely ashore.

Though he attended closely to the work of his office, Baker found leisure to roam over the marshes with his gun. There was plenty of wild-

fowl shooting and fishing, and the neighbouring country was not deficient in game. Occasionally, he went farther afield, and visited some of the most interesting cities and towns in South-Eastern Europe.

It was at this time, during his travels in Hungary, that he first met the daughter of Herr Finian von Sass, to whom he was subsequently married.

The completion of his railway enterprise set Baker free to roam again, and led him to undertake a tour in Asia Minor. In the forest-clad mountains round Sabanga, Baker found plenty of game—bears, boars, wolves, red-deer and roe-deer—and spent several months in this neighbourhood, towards the close of 1860 and during the early part of 1861. From Ismid and Sabanga we first hear of Baker's intention to visit Africa; but the project had for many years previously been agitating his mind.

Writing from Ismid, on 3rd December, 1860, Baker says:

'I intend to be in Alexandria the first week in March. I am going up to Khartum, and from thence, God only knows where, in search of the sources of the Nile. I shall very likely meet Speke, who is working up that way from Zanzibar. . . . You know that Africa has always been in my head.'

To Lord Wharncliffe, a fellow-sportsman, he remarks, a few weeks later:

'I cannot tell you with what pleasure I am looking forward to this journey [up the Nile]. It will be new

ground; and the diversity of animals, with the chance of discovering new species, will be a source of additional interest.'

Finally, to one of his sisters, he writes, somewhat apologetically, as follows:

'Sabanga: 26th January, 1861.

'You will all think me very mad; but every man has his own peculiar monomania. For the last few years my dreams have been of Africa; and for some time past I have cherished a secret determination to make a trip into the Unknown. Thus, I hope to be in Alexandria in a few weeks from this time, and *en route* to Khartum, from which place I shall trudge on into Central Africa, ever pushing for the high ranges from which the Nile is supposed to derive its sources.

. . . 'A wandering spirit is in my marrow, which forbids rest. The time may come when I shall delight in cities; but at present I abhor them. Unhappy the bird in its cage! None but those who love real freedom can appreciate its misery.

'*Chacun à son métier:* the parson to the pulpit; the soldier to his regiment; the race-horse to the course; the hunter to the field; the cab-horse to the stand. May the time be long distant till I come to "the stand"! . . . Thus, my magnetic needle directs me to Central Africa.'

But he little guessed, at the time of writing, what that Nile journey would lead to. Love of adventure for adventure's sake and the ambition of shooting big-game appear to have been the leading motives of his first expedition into the Unknown. It was only later that he discovered his true vocation, and devoted his energies to the development of Africa. In fact, almost without seeking, Baker stumbled upon his mission in life.

Moreover, he had found a fitting companion and counsellor. But for the devotion of his wife, the present Lady Baker, who supported him at every step of his subsequent career and shared every peril and privation, he might never have achieved his purpose or have emerged from Africa with his life.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MYSTERY OF THE NILE-SOURCES.

[1861]

'In the year 1861,' Baker writes in his *Journal*, 'I determined to commence an expedition to discover the sources of the Nile, with the hope of meeting the East African Expedition under Captains Speke and Grant somewhere about the Victoria Lake. I had not the presumption to make my intention public, as the Nile-sources had hitherto defied all explorers. But as the insignificant worm slowly bores its way into the heart of the oak, even so did I hope to reach the heart of Africa.'

Baker entered Africa at a most interesting period of geographical discovery and exploration. For ten years previously considerable progress had been made in laying bare the hydrography of the Nile and the Zambezi, and in the exploration of the Sahara and the Sudan. The Niger problem had been settled for thirty years; and the supposed connection between that river and the Nile no longer exercised the ingenuity of geographers.

In the early part of the Nineteenth Century (1805–1848) Mohammed Ali initiated a bold and

enterprising policy, in the wake of which numerous travellers and adventurers flocked into the Nile valley. After the conquest of Kordofan, in 1823, the exploration of the Eastern Sudan was vigorously undertaken.

The prospect of finding gold lured the Turks and Egyptians farther and farther into the Sudan. But the climatic barriers, the physical obstacles of the long river-journey, and the jealous hostility of the barbarous tribes of the Upper Nile, were among the chief causes of the *Caput Nili* remaining a mystery for over two thousand years, until its solution was seriously and systematically undertaken by the Royal Geographical Society of London.

Up to about 1760, cartographers had regarded the Blue Nile as the true source-stream, and frequently associated the Lake-region of the White Nile with the Niger-system. But D'Anville sharply dissociated the two arms of the Nile, and brought the 'Mountains of the Moon'* to the north of the Equator.

From 1772, when Bruce left Abyssinia, having discovered the source-reservoir of the Blue Nile, up to 1830, only British expeditions had visited that country. After 1830, however, the exploration of the Abyssinian highlands steadily progressed, arising largely from the

* Claudius Ptolemy, in the second century of our era, described the Nile as issuing from two lakes—the one in 6° S. and 25½° E., the other in 7° S. and 33° E.—and (according to Agathodæmon) its tributaries as flowing from the 'Mountains of the Moon' in 12½° S. and between 25° and 35° E.

jealousy of France and Britain for political and commercial supremacy on the Red Sea.

The modern exploration of the White Nile commenced, in 1827, with the travels of Linant de Bellefonds, an agent of the African Association (which was absorbed, in 1831, by the Royal Geographical Society). M. de Bellefonds reached 13° 6′ N. latitude; and attested that the White Nile, from the nature of the deposits held in solution, must issue from a large lake, the latitude of which, however, was regarded as in about 7° N. The parallel of 13° N. was not passed in 1839, when Mohammed Ali fitted-out two expeditions; the first of which, in 1840, reached 6½° N., and the second, in 1841, penetrated to 4° 42′ N. The supposed locality of the 'Mountains of the Moon' was consequently entered; but opinions continued to be diverse in regard to the precise course of the river. As the ivory-trade was pushed westwards along the White Nile, a portion of the Bahr El Ghazal became known. Petherick's journey in the Upper Nile region (1858) carried our knowledge up to 4° N. latitude: but the discovery of these western tributaries served only to confuse the main question of the true course of the Nile proper.

The existence of a vast inland lake behind the Zanzibar Coast-lands was credited from 1518 onwards; but it was in turn associated with the hydrographical systems of the Nile, the Congo, and the Zambezi. This mysterious sheet of water was made to expand and contract, in

order to accommodate its position to the views of geographers.

The missionaries in East Africa, and especially those at Mombasa, had collected valuable information from Arab traders and slave-hunters, all of which tended to confirm the existence of a large inland lake, the designations of which were so various and the descriptions so vague, that for a long time it was supposed there was only one lake in that region. The discovery, in 1849, of the snow-capped mountain of Kilima-njaro by Rebmann, and of Kénia by Krapf, together with the information these missionary-explorers elicited as to the surrounding lands, gave an impulse to the decisive journey, in 1858, of Burton and Speke, under the auspices of the Royal Geographical Society. Having together reached Tanganyika, and Speke alone the southern shores of the Victoria Nyanza, it was ascertained that there were two lakes, in place of one. Speke, with his limited resources, was unable to follow-up his discovery; though he was sure of the Victoria Nyanza being the chief source-reservoir of the Nile* : and he therefore returned to England, in order to organise a strong expedition.

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* Whilst at Kazé, both on his way out to, and on returning from, the discovery of Lake Tanganyika, Speke received from Sheikh Snay, who had visited Uganda, and from other Arabs and Waswahili traders, remarkably exact information regarding the Ukerewe (Victoria Nyanza) and even of the 'Little Luta Nzigé' (Albert Nyanza), as well as of the surrounding countries and rivers. From this information he compiled a map, which he subsequently found to be correct in its broad features.

When Baker arrived at Cairo, on 21st March, 1861, Speke and Grant had been absent for five months on their memorable journey, which was to establish, once and for all time, the outflow of the White Nile from the Victoria Nyanza; whilst Livingstone had been away for three years on his expedition to East-Central Africa, during which he discovered Lake Shirwa and for the first time made known and accurately mapped the Nyasa.

Baker's knowledge of the Nile-system, before he started on his expedition, was therefore fairly complete. The Blue Nile and its tributaries were known. Lake Tanganyika was dissociated from the Nile-system, except by a few dissentients whose pet theories were thereby upset. The Victoria Nyanza had been discovered, and its connection with the White Nile assumed, if not theoretically proved. There remained, therefore, for further orientation, all the western tributaries of the Bahr El Ghazal—of which only the vaguest information then existed—and, in particular, the second source of the Nile, over which there rested an impenetrable haze of mystery. To clear-up these unknown points was a task equal in importance to that which had been undertaken by Speke and Grant; and this was the mission which Baker set himself to perform.

He set-out with the hope of meeting Speke and Grant, who were not expected to reach the White Nile before the beginning of 1863; and he trusted that he might be with them in time to

bring them valuable succour and perhaps to share their laurels. The difficulty of his enterprise was, however, greatly increased by the fact that he approached the Nile-sources from the north, from whence every previous expedition had failed to reach its objective.

It is a remarkable fact, that, in the exploration of Africa, all the great hydrographical discoveries have been made, not by the more obvious process of tracing the river-systems from their mouths to their sources, but in precisely the reverse way. Theories formed at home, native reports neglected for centuries, or sheer luck, have each in their turn helped the explorer towards his discoveries: and these accidental aids were not wanting in the final solution of the Nile problem.

CHAPTER VII.

A RECONNAISSANCE TOWARDS ABYSSINIA.

[1861–1862]

BAKER was well aware that, in order to ensure the success of his expedition, it would be necessary for him to be thoroughly equipped, respecting both his personal capacity as leader and the efficiency of his followers. On such a long and hazardous journey, it was essential for him to make every provision against failure. He had had little or no practical experience of exploration in a wild and difficult country, such as the Sudan; but his training in the jungles of Ceylon and his rambles in Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula had prepared him for the work which by nature he was so well fitted to carry-out. His complete self-confidence led him, very wisely, to embark upon the enterprise single-handed, if we except the valued co-operation of his wife; and his private means enabled him to dispense with the pecuniary aid which would have involved also the dictation of a public body or Government.

He started on his perilous journey, as he himself expressed it, with a '*firman* from the

Viceroy [of Egypt], a cook and a dragoman. The *firman* was an order to all Egyptian officials for assistance; the cook was dirty and incapable; and the interpreter was nearly ignorant of English, although a professed polyglot.' This difficulty of language was, in fact, the chief cause of his not making a dash for the Nile-sources, which would have been more to his taste. He foresaw, that to exercise proper control over a large caravan, which was essential to his need, it was necessary that he should master Arabic, so as not to be placed at the mercy of his interpreter.

"The first task he set himself, therefore, was to learn the language. This, no doubt, he might have done rapidly at Cairo; but he chose the wiser course of making a reconnaissance in the direction of his quest, thereby acquiring experience of African travel. He also was eager for an introduction to the many wild animals abounding in the Sudan. In the result, it appears, from his published narrative, *The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia*, that his time was chiefly occupied with hunting, which proved an irresistible attraction and was really absolutely essential for the maintenance of his party.

Starting from Cairo on the 15th April, 1861, it took him twenty-six days to reach Korosko, by boat. At Korosko he disembarked, and, obtaining 16 camels, plunged into the dreaded Nubian Desert. This was during the hot season, when the travellers had to face not only the

terrific heat, but also the parching blast of the simoon and the entire absence of water, saving only that which they carried and that which was to be found at Murat,—a well of bitter water, situated in the heart of the Desert, at about half-way between Korosko and Abu Hamed. The distance between these two Nile stations is about 230 miles, and occupied ninety-two hours of actual marching. Continuing along the desert-route on the right-bank of the Nile, Berber was reached in another fifty-seven hours of forced marches. This was pretty rapid progression for novices in desert-travel, and entailed considerable personal suffering, especially on Mrs. Baker, who was seriously ill at Murat. The camels had averaged 25 miles per day, with loads of 400 pounds; and the cost of transport amounted to only 5*s*. 6*d*. per 100 lbs.

At Berber, Baker found himself upon the threshold of his career as an explorer. The river Atbara, the Blue Nile, and their numerous tributary-streams, which flow from the highlands of Abyssinia and join the Nile between Berber and Khartum, were then known with a tolerable degree of accuracy: so that Baker could not hope to add very much to the general knowledge of those regions by his hasty exploration of the country. The important function of the Atbara, which carries the alluvial deposits that alone have built-up the fertile Delta of the Nile, was a subject in which Baker took great interest; moreover, his experience in Ceylon

had led him to make a practical study of artificial irrigation. In Ceylon, he had seen the remains of a vast system of irrigation which had in ancient times enabled the land to support a dense population, at a high degree of civilisation. He knew that, as the Nile is the parent of Egypt, a future of immensely increased prosperity must accrue to that country by restoring its old reservoirs or otherwise creating the means of artificial irrigation, thereby extending the area of land-cultivation. Water being the life-blood of Egypt, he was interested in examining one of the chief arterial systems.

When, after leaving Berber with a few attendants and ascending the dry bed of the Atbara, he met the rolling flood, he felt that he had received his baptism as an explorer, although willingly foregoing the right of immersion. This is how he describes the scene:

'At about half-past eight I was lying half-asleep upon my bed by the margin of the river, when I fancied that I heard a rumbling like distant thunder. . . . Hardly had I raised my head to listen more attentively, when a confusion of voices arose from the Arabs' camp, with the sound of many feet; and in a few minutes they rushed into my camp, shouting to my men in the darkness, "*El Bahr! El Bahr!*" (the river! the river!)

'We were up in an instant. . . . Many of the people were asleep on the clean sand on the river's bed; these were quickly awakened by the Arabs. . . . Hardly had they [the Arabs] descended, when the sound of the river in the darkness beneath told us that the water had arrived; and the men, dripping with wet, had just sufficient time to drag their heavy burdens up the bank.

All was darkness and confusion. The river had arrived like "a thief in the night." *

On the morning of the 24th June, at break of day, the entire party stood on the banks of the noble Atbara river, which flowed deep and boisterously through the dreary desert.

At Gos Rejeb, they finally quitted the domain of the Nubian Desert, and, leaving the river, entered a fine level country of rich soil, which, at that season of the year, was covered with excellent pasturage and enlivened by herds of antelopes. After a short stay at Kassala, where camels and extra attendants were engaged, the Atbara was again struck, and crossed, at Korasi; and the journey was continued up a deep valley scored in every direction by rapid denudation. All was fertility and life: a land of plenty lay before the travellers.

At Sofi, a few days' journey to the south, Baker fixed his head-quarters, until the cessation of the rains should permit him to travel further afield. This spot, which is situated on the Atbara above the confluence of the Setit, was well adapted for a permanent camp; and here Baker determined to stay for five months.

He purchased for two shillings a 'neat dwelling' in the village, the roof of which was transported on the shoulders of thirty men, and the sticks that formed the walls carried by a crowd

* This and other quotations, the sources of which are not precisely indicated, in the present chapter, are taken from Baker's work, *The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia.*

of willing helpers, to a spot chosen for the camp:

'In the short space of about three hours,' says Baker, 'I found myself the proprietor of an eligible freehold residence, situated upon an eminence in park-like grounds, commanding extensive and romantic views of the beautifully-wooded valley of the Atbara, within a minute's walk of the neighbouring village of Sofi; perfect immunity from all poor-rates, tithes, taxes, and other public burdens; not more than 2,000 miles from a church; with the advantage of a post-town at the easy distance of 70 leagues. The manor comprised the right of shooting throughout the parishes of Abyssinia and Sudan, plentifully stocked with elephants, lions, rhinoceros, giraffes, buffaloes, hippopotami, leopards, and a great variety of antelopes; while the right of fishing extended throughout the Atbara and neighbouring rivers, which were well stocked with fish ranging from five to a hundred and fifty pounds, and also with turtles and crocodiles.

'The mansion comprised entrance-hall, dining-room, drawing-room, lady's boudoir, library, breakfast-room, bedroom and dressing-room (with the great advantage of their combination in one circular room, fourteen feet in diameter). The architecture was of an ancient style, from the original design of a pill-box surmounted by a candle-extinguisher.'

Two additional huts accommodated Baker's retinue. Thus, the party were comfortably installed for the long period of enforced delay; and leisure was afforded for the painful study of Arabic.

Baker regretted at that time that he did not smoke; but he enjoyed the encampment at Sofi none the less. His wife nearly succumbed to a severe attack of gastric fever; he, however, enjoyed excellent health.

At the cessation of the rains, Baker explored the Setit river, a perennial stream which drains the northern slopes of Abyssinia; and penetrated into the dreaded Bazen country, visiting also the turbulent torrent of the Royan, a tributary of the Setit. Some months were spent in hunting, without incurring any act of molestation on the part of the natives; after which he paid a long-desired visit to the Hamran Arabs.

With these brave hunters Baker cordially fraternised: together, he and they went upon many an exciting chase. The Hamran Arabs, armed only with a sword, and mounted, hunt the elephant and all large game with an intrepidity and a dexterity that excited Baker's admiration. He, himself, with his fine battery of guns, was, of course, the wonder of his companions, and soon became a hero in their eyes. Lions, elephants, hippopotami, giraffes, buffaloes and antelopes were killed in large numbers, and helped to support the native population of the district.

The famous Arab chief, Meg Nimr, or 'Tiger King,' who was constantly at war with 'the Turks,' received the mighty English hunter kindly and treated him well.

Subsequently, Baker explored the Bahr Ez Salâm, the Angareb, and other tributary-streams of the Atbara. He then entered the Tukruri country. From Matamma, he struck westwards to the river Rahad, which he followed to its confluence with the Blue Nile, visiting also the parallel affluent, the Dinder. At the junction of

the Blue and White Niles, he entered Khartum, on the 11th June, 1862.

In his journey of fourteen months, Baker had thus explored and mapped all the chief Nile tributaries of Abyssinia, and had gained some valuable experience as an African traveller, besides being rewarded with excellent shooting. In the words of Sir Roderick Murchison, President of the Royal Geographical Society: he 'had placed in a clear light the relations of the Atbara and Blue River to the main stream of the Nile, and had shown, by actual observation, that it was to these affluents the great river owed the rich sediment which, deposited by inundations, was the source of the fertility of Egypt.'* He had, moreover, fixed many important geographical positions in the basin of the Blue Nile.†

* *Proc.*, R.G.S., Vol. x., p. 295.

† In consulting Baker's original map of the Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, attached to this chapter, the reader will find that the spelling of place-names does not conform to that of the text. The orthography of place-names, etc., in this book and on the other maps is in accordance with the system adopted by the War Office and the Royal Geographical Society. Thus: vowels are pronounced as in Italian; consonants as in English; and every letter is sounded.


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

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CHAPTER VIII.

FAREWELL MESSAGES FROM KHARTUM.

[1862]

Six tiresome months were spent by Baker at Khartum, waiting for the rains to cease, and for the setting-in of the north wind. His preparations were pushed forward as rapidly as possible, but were hampered in every way by the vexatious restrictions and obstacles placed in his path by the local authorities.

At that time, Khartum was a nest of slave-traders and the chief resort of all the black-legs in the Sudan. Musa Pasha, the Governor-General, did all he could to prevent Baker from proceeding up the White Nile: for he feared—and doubtless his fears were shared at Cairo—that, should an English explorer of Baker's stamp pass through the slave-preserves on the Upper Nile, and witness the iniquities of their hateful Traffic, it might lead to disastrous revelations in Europe. Baker was therefore regarded as a possible spy, whose every movement was to be watched; and no means were left untried to prevent his getting-together an expedition strong enough to force its way through the country. His *firman* was set aside by the Governor-General, as not being applicable to the Upper Nile regions. But hard cash was dear in those days, being lent

out at ruinous interest, at Khartum: so that, in the end, Baker's persistency was sufficiently, if not suitably, rewarded.

Beset by harassing difficulties on all sides, and surrounded by a degraded population whom his soul abhorred, it was not surprising that occasionally he questioned the wisdom of his choice. But opposition served only to strengthen his resolution to proceed. The nearest approach to the defeat of his plans was caused by a letter which he received from his eldest sister, announcing the death of his father. To her he replied as follows:

'Khartum: 20th October, 1862.

'For weeks I have been anxiously expecting letters from some of the family; and, on searching through the various papers and letters as they arrived at the native agent's house, I have yearned for an address in my dear father's handwriting. Alas! I now know that he writes no more. Your letter of 17th August arrived yesterday, breaking the sad truth so gently, that I longed to be with you again, away from this wild land, and to share together our common grief. I cannot write of this great loss. It breaks my heart to think that I was his only child absent, at the hour when his children must have been his comfort. So like a dream, so impossible does it seem that I shall never see his loved and honoured face again! God rest his soul!

'I watched the stars last night as, one by one, they set beneath the horizon; and I thought, how all those so dear to us have sunk within the last few years: how father, mother, wife and children have left but a recollection of their worth and love, and how sad the world is when these dear ties are severed. . . .

'Nothing but death shall prevent me from discovering the *Sources* of the Nile . . . under God's guidance I shall succeed . . . full of gratitude to Him for a

share of health unnatural in this climate, and for a success up to this time of which I am not worthy. I shall resolutely push on; and I trust that I shall return to you all with the distinction of being the "discoverer" of the long-hidden mystery of the "Nile Sources."

'In Bulwer's striking essay on "Life, Literature, and Manners," there is this passage: "We are placed on earth for a certain period to fulfil, according to our several conditions and degrees of mind, those duties by which the earth's history is carried on."

'You know what I always was,—made up of queer materials, and averse to beaten paths; unfortunately, not fitted for those harnessed positions which produce wealth; yet, ever unhappy when unemployed, and too proud to serve: thus, the latent ambition to do what others have not been able to perform directed me to this difficult undertaking. I say *difficult*, but I do not believe in what are generally called difficulties: they dissolve like spectres when faced. If you read Bruce's travels in these parts, you will shudder at the mere idea of living in such a country. I did so myself, when I read his narrative; but, on travelling over the same ground, although his descriptions are wonderfully accurate, I found no difficulties worth mentioning. The imagination is always more powerful than fact; and the truth always *reads* more insupportable than the event itself proves to be.

'I have all the requisite astronomical instruments. I learnt the use of them before I started: thus, when I return, my maps will not be those of a simple wanderer, for all exact latitudes and longitudes shall be determined. The chart of my last year's travels I have already sent to the Royal Geographical Society.

'In my intended journey I leave all the well-known elephant-haunts on the White Nile untouched, as I push direct for Gondokoro, stopping only for a day at the junctions of the rivers Sobat and Ghazal to take observations.

'My expedition consists of three boats and about sixty men, half of whom will be Government troops, for which I have applied as escort. On the boats I take three horses, four camels, and fifteen donkeys, as transport-animals. The donkeys of this country travel with a load of 200 lbs.: they are wonderful creatures. Money being unknown among the native tribes, 200 lbs. of heavy copper-rings for bracelets, and about 800 lbs. of glass-beads of peculiar colours are necessary for means of barter. The great weight of the beads and copper, together with the large amount of ammunition necessary, are the chief difficulty, as there are no transport-animals in the countries beyond Gondokoro. I shall procure a large number of cattle from the natives and have them driven with my party, strapping empty sacks on their backs, and putting in a few stones every day until they learn to carry a weight, when I shall load them with corn, etc., as required. Gondokoro, the farthest limit that can be reached by boats from here, is between 4° and 5° north latitude: thus, there are literally only 350 miles of land-journey from thence to the Equator; and the Nile Sources are either *on* the Equator or on this side of it. Forty days' travelling, allowing for deviations from the direct route, should bring me to the Equator from Gondokoro. I have a German carpenter as my right-hand man: he is a good sportsman, who has before been to Gondokoro; therefore, I shall have some one to depend upon, always at hand, which I had not during my last journey. The north wind has commenced; and the thermometer has fallen from 100° to 90° Fahr., in the shade; it will shortly be down to 84°, which in this country sets people shivering.

'I am only waiting here for a reply from the Government at Cairo, respecting soldiers, etc., etc.'

The Khedivial Government, however, refused the request for an escort.

Baker, therefore, although possessing no faith in 'the cut-throats of Khartum,' had to make

the best of existing circumstances. He purchased 29 transport-animals, including camels and horses, but chiefly donkeys, which he hoped would render him independent of porters. With three vessels, a force of 45 armed men as an escort, 40 men to manage the boats, servants, and all necessary supplies, his party, numbering 96 souls, was in a short time made ready to start.

The following was a farewell message to one of his brothers:

'Khartum: 3rd November, 1862.

'Your few lines were most welcome. You will see in my letter to ——— my intention to push on. Many and many a time the Tempter says, "Return from this Will-o'-the-wisp hunt"; and hard is the fight sometimes to resist the temptation: but I *will* succeed.

'This country is no paradise, be assured: it is exactly the other place, without one redeeming point. Both morally and in its natural features, it is hell itself, in plain English. But as I approach the Equator, I hope to find an improvement, certainly in the natives, as they will be simple savages; whereas here they are savages cursed with every European vice, exaggerated, and not one virtue of their race.

'On my return to England, I shall have so much to tell you of the extraordinary, that far from wishing you were here, you will thank God you remained at home. I wish I were there, with all my heart; but having once commenced the task, it were craven to shirk it.

'I shall not touch upon my dear father's death: you will know how it must have distressed me. When I first heard of his illness, it was a struggle whether I should risk a return, on the chance of seeing him, and give-up this exploration. Had I done so, I should have lost both. God's will be done! If He leads, I have no fear.'

CHAPTER IX.

MEETING WITH SPEKE AND GRANT.

[1863]

BAKER left Khartum for the Upper Nile on the 18th December, 1862.

The *personnel* of the Expedition consisted of ninety-six individuals, of whom forty-five formed an escort and forty acted as sailors. The men of the so-called escort were well-armed, and, in order to inspire a sense of discipline, were dressed in a simple uniform; but a more rascally company it would have been difficult to get-together, outside of Khartum. They were capable of any devilry under a weak leader; and, as we shall see, gave Baker as much trouble as he had reason to expect.

In place of porters, who were not to be had for love or money, four camels and twenty-one donkeys were taken, in addition to four saddle-horses. Four hundred bushels of corn were carried, partly for the relief of Speke and Grant, and partly to form a depôt at the most advanced base.

The entire Expedition and its impedimenta were accommodated on two *nuggars*, or sailing-barges, and one *dahabia*. The latter was fitted

with cabins, for the use of Baker and his wife. One *nuggar* was placed in charge of Johann Schmidt, the German hunter and carpenter, whom Baker had enlisted upon his Abyssinian journey, and whose assistance at Khartum, in spite of his ill-health, had been of the greatest value; the other *nuggar* was under the *wekil*, Saati.

Some trouble was experienced in getting away. The Expedition was on the point of starting, when Musa Pasha, the Governor-General, sent on-board to claim the newly-instituted poll-tax on all Baker's men, amounting to one month's wages per head. Baker's reply to this request, with which he indignantly refused to comply, was to hoist the British flag over his three vessels. A Government boat, apparently by design, then bore down upon them, and, in the collision that ensued, broke several long sweeps, or oars, thereby crippling the Expedition. The *sais*, or captain, of the Government boat, adding insult to injury, became abusive; and with him Baker had to come to a short and sharp 'physical explanation,' resulting in the delivery of new oars.

The Expedition then set sail, amidst the cheers of the rabble on shore, who had witnessed the scene; but, on rounding the sharp corner into the White Nile, one *nuggar* carried-away her yard, and thus caused the loss of a day whilst it was being repaired. Measures were taken to prevent the men, all of whom had received five months' pay in advance, from escaping ashore; and, once the Expedition got fairly away, Baker made an

effort to reduce his unruly followers from 'wolves to lambs.'

Ten days' sailing brought the Expedition into 'the land of the Blacks,'—the Dinka Negroes on the east bank, and the Shilluk on the west; but the natives, accustomed to be hunted-down like wild beasts, kept well out of sight.

On the last day of the year 1862, Johann Schmidt, Baker's right-hand man, died, and was buried on shore. His last words were: '*Ich bin sehr dankbar!*' To lose a man who was thankful for anything was indeed a loss; to lose a man like Johann Schmidt was almost a calamity: Baker had been much attached to him, and he and his wife had nursed him with unremitting care: his death was therefore keenly felt.

The *nuggar*, *Clumsy*, lost one spar after another, and was continually lagging astern or coming to grief. But, in spite of delays and other vexatious incidents, the vessels made a fair passage to the Bahr El Ghazal confluence.

Then commenced a dreary passage through the marsh-lands of the Nuer country, where the north wind failed them, and they were delayed by baffling breezes or dead-calms. By the time that they reached their destination, on 2nd February, 1863, every member of the Expedition was heartily tired of the long and uninteresting voyage.

Gondokoro had formerly been an Austrian Mission Station; but when Baker, who was the first Englishman to visit it, arrived there, it was used as a depôt by the ivory-traders, and occu-

pied by their men for about two months in the year. His reception was frankly hostile. There were about six hundred men of the various trading parties gathered, at that time, in this desolate settlement; and they one and all regarded him as a spy of the British Government: they refused to credit his assertion that the sole object of his expedition was the exploration of the Upper Nile.

The Bari Negroes had been turned into relentless enemies by the ruthless conduct of the slave-traders. Thus, Gondokoro was, as Baker described it, 'a perfect hell' and 'a colony of cut-throats.' The camps were full of slaves; although most of them were hidden-away until the British 'spy' should be forced to depart. As for the man-hunters, themselves, they passed their time in drunken debauch, and in firing-off guns 'at hazard,' greatly to the danger of Baker, who had several narrow escapes. Moreover, they tampered with his men and made them discontented and rebellious, frightening them with stories of the great dangers that lay before them.

Life under such conditions soon became all but intolerable; and Baker had to exercise considerable tact and patience to frustrate the repeated attempts to wreck his expedition. He had received information regarding two white men held in bondage on the Upper Nile and of a caravan whose arrival at Gondokoro from the south was daily expected. He determined, therefore, to await this caravan, in order to obtain porters to carry his heavy baggage as far as Debono's station

at Faloro, where he proposed to establish a depôt, as a base on which he might fall-back in case of defeat. Meantime, he knew that Speke and Grant might arrive at any moment; and he consequently stored at Gondokoro a large quantity of corn and other necessaries for their relief: for it was possible that he might miss them on the line-of-march.

Gondokoro, at that season of the year, was short of supplies; and it was necessary for Baker to husband his resources. The slave-traders, intent on mischief, set-up his men to organise a *razzia*, or raid, upon the neighbouring natives, on the plea of getting food; but upon this proposed act of brigandage Baker at once put his veto. Thereupon, they broke-out into open mutiny.

Being on his guard, Baker promptly seized and chastised the ringleader; upon which he was himself attacked on all sides. His position was perilous in the extreme: but, at the critical moment, his wife rushed to the rescue, though herself scarce able to stand, owing to an attack of fever. Her sudden appearance on the scene created a diversion; and her cries to some of the men to stand by her, caused them to waver: thus giving Baker an opportunity of which he took instant advantage. Knowing the effect of discipline, even upon such men as his, he called upon them sharply to 'fall-in.' Automatically, two-thirds of their number fell-in to line, the remainder, with their ringleader, holding-off.

At this juncture, Mrs. Baker implored her husband, who was burning with anger, to deal

leniently with the insubordinates: by her advice, he consequently accepted an apology from the ringleader and overlooked the conduct of the others, thereby gaining for the moment loud and effusive protestations of loyalty.

Had Baker received the few disciplined troops which he had demanded from the Egyptian Government, such an incident as this would never have occurred. As it was, he foresaw more danger from his own escort than from the hostility of the natives. By parading the men daily, and by keeping them constantly occupied, he established some degree of order and discipline, and was able to tide-over, without further mishap, the few remaining days during which he was forced to remain at Gondokoro.

At length, on the 15th February, after twelve days of misery and anxiety, the approach of the anxiously-expected caravan was heralded by repeated discharges of musketry, coming from the south:

'My men,' Baker writes in his *Journal*, 'rushed madly to my boat, with the report that two white men were with them who had come from the *sea!* Could they be Speke and Grant? Off I ran, and soon met them in reality. Hurrah for Old England!

'They had come from the Victoria Nyanza, from which the Nile springs. The mystery of ages was solved! With my pleasure of meeting them is the one disappointment, that I had not met them further on the road in my search for them; however, the satisfaction is, that my previous arrangements had been such as would have insured my finding them had they been in a fix. My projected route would have brought me *vis-à-vis* of them,

as they had come from the Lake by the course I had proposed to take. All my men were perfectly mad with excitement. Firing salutes, as usual with ball-cartridges, they shot one of my donkeys,—a melancholy sacrifice as an offering at the completion of this geographical discovery.

'When I first met them, they were walking along the bank of the river towards my boats. At a distance of about a hundred yards I recognised my old friend, Speke; and, with a heart beating with joy, I took off my cap and gave a welcome hurrah as I ran towards him. For the moment he did not recognise me: ten years' growth of beard and moustache had worked a change; and, as I was totally unexpected, my sudden appearance in the centre of Africa appeared to him incredible. I hardly required an introduction to his companion, as we felt already acquainted; and after the transports of this happy meeting, we walked together to my *dahabia*, my men surrounding us with smoke and noise by keeping-up an unremitting fire of musketry the whole way. We were shortly seated on deck under the awning; and such rough fare as could be hastily prepared was set before these two ragged, careworn specimens of African travel, whom I looked upon with feelings of pride as my countrymen!' *

Baker placed his surplus stores at the disposal of his guests, together with his three vessels for their passage to Khartum. He was thus enabled to afford them valuable succour at a time when their own resources were all but exhausted.

Although delighted at meeting the gallant discoverers of the Victoria Nyanza, Baker at first believed that his own expedition, undertaken

* This and other quotations, the sources of which are not stated, in the present chapter, are taken from Baker's work, *The Albert Nyanza.*

at great cost, had nothing left for it to accomplish. He was therefore overjoyed when Speke and Grant, 'with characteristic candour and generosity,' showed him the map of their route, and pointed-out how there yet remained one 'leaf in the laurel' for him to win. They explained to him, that, after passing along the western shores of the Victoria Nyanza and discovering the Ripon Falls (on 28th July, 1862), where the waters of the Lake issue as the White (or Victoria) Nile, they followed the river to the Karuma Falls, but there had left it, to meet it again near the junction of the Asua. At Faloro, they had found Debono's outpost, two hundred men strong, under Mohammed, who had escorted them to Gondokoro. Passing the Karuma Falls, they had seen the river flowing to the west; but they dared not enter the country, because the natives were then at war with their protector, Kamrasi, King of Unyoro, and would have opposed their passage. They had, however, been assured by Kamrasi and other credible witnesses, that the Nile continued westward for several days' journey until it fell into a large Lake called the Luta Nzigé (or Muta Nzigé); that this Lake extended to the south; and that the Nile, on entering its northern extremity, almost immediately made its exit, and, as a navigable river, continued its course to the north, through the Koshi and Madi countries. Speke had laid-down on his map the supposed position of the Muta Nzigé; and he urged Baker to go in search of it.

This proposal was, of course, precisely in accordance with Baker's desire. From what he knew of the drainage-system of the Upper Nile, he was convinced, as was Speke, that the Muta Nzigé existed, and that it would be found to exercise an important function in the *régime* of the Nile-waters: that, in fact, it was 'the second source of the Nile.'

Baker received some valuable advice from Speke as to the best route to take, and the manner of further prosecuting his search. It was essential, above all things, to establish friendly relations with Kamrasi, whose help would be necessary to Baker in the hostile country bordering on the Muta Nzigé: though this potentate had already prevented Speke and Grant from following-up their discoveries in that direction.

Baker made a handsome acknowledgment of the 'true devotion to geographical science' and of the total absence of any petty feelings of jealousy, on the part of Speke and Grant, when they handed over to him the information they had themselves obtained from native reports. He immediately set-about the task of organising his expedition.

On the 20th February, or five days after the arrival of Speke and Grant, Petherick and his party entered Gondokoro. Petherick, the British Consul at Khartum, and an explorer whose work on the Upper Nile was well-known, had undertaken to carry-out a mission precisely similar to that successfully performed by Baker: namely, to bring succour to Speke and Grant on their

arrival at Gondokoro. But, although he had left England even before the departure of Speke and Grant, he had, on account of circumstances into which it is unnecessary to enter, arrived too late to fulfil his engagement. Speke, who had relied upon reaching Petherick's supposed camp, seven days' march to the north of Kamrasi's, and had therefore been somewhat restricted in his movements, was naturally aggrieved at the failure of his plans: consequently, he refused to accept the supplies which Petherick offered him. The unexpected arrival of Baker had, of course, rendered him independent, and now enabled him to proceed comfortably to Khartum.

Mention should also be made of the large expedition organised by Madame Tinné, who, with her daughter and sister, had left Khartum shortly after Baker, intending to bring relief to Speke and Grant. These courageous ladies were, however, obliged to turn-back, on account of illness; and two of them, together with other members of their party, subsequently lost their lives in the exploration of the Bahr El Ghazal.

On the 26th February, Speke and Grant sailed, in Baker's boats, for Khartum. 'Our hearts were too full to say more than a short, God bless you! They had won their victory,' says Baker; 'my work lay before me.'

CHAPTER X.

THE DISCOVERY OF THE ALBERT NYANZA.

[1863–1864]

On the departure of Speke and Grant, Baker moved his camp to higher ground, in consequence of the prevalence of fever, from which all were suffering. There were then gathered at Gondokoro, besides Baker's party, Mr. and Mrs. Petherick and their followers, Dr. Murie, and the two hundred men under Mohammed, who had escorted Speke and Grant from Faloro to Gondokoro (twelve days' march) and had been handsomely rewarded for his services.

Mohammed had brought with him a quantity of ivory, and consequently a large number of porters, who would have to return empty-handed unless another caravan-leader engaged them. Baker, seizing this opportunity, proposed that Mohammed's men should carry his heavy baggage on their return-journey to Faloro, where he intended establishing a depôt before advancing into Kamrasi's country. To this proposition Mohammed gave a ready assent, as Faloro was likewise his most southern station; and he even offered to accompany Baker throughout the Expedition. Baker agreed to this; and told Mohammed that

he would assist him to procure ivory, though by legitimate purchase only.

Whereupon, Petherick offered to join the Expedition. But Baker's men, who were delighted to ally themselves with the strong party under Mohammed, absolutely refused to have any relations with Petherick, who, as British Consul at Khartum, had made himself most unpopular by the measures he had been obliged to undertake for the purpose of checking the Slave Trade. The result was, that Petherick was compelled to abandon the project, and Baker completed his arrangements with Mohammed.

At first, Baker had every reason to rely on the good faith of his ally; but his confidence was short-lived. 'At the very moment,' he says, 'that they were most friendly, they were plotting to deceive me, and to prevent me from entering the country. . . . The whole of the men belonging to the various traders were determined that no Englishman should penetrate into the country: accordingly, they fraternised with my escort, and persuaded them that,' among other things, 'I should leave them to die in a strange land.'*

Baker's men required little persuasion to join the conspiracy; and again became mutinous. Only two of them remained loyal: a Negro named Richarn, who, though an habitual drunkard, was

* This and other quotations, the sources of which are not indicated, in the present chapter, are taken from Baker's work, *The Albert Nyanza.*

honest; and Saat, a lad of twelve years of age, who, being devoted to his mistress, was thoroughly trustworthy.

Saat, having overheard the men concocting their plot, by which 'mutiny, robbery and murder were deliberately determined,' betrayed it to Mrs. Baker, and boldly accused the escort of their complicity. An outbreak was imminent: but, by prompt and decisive action and the exercise of strategy, Baker succeeded in disarming fifteen of the mutineers, who, alone of all his followers, fell-in to line at the word of command.

Meantime, Mohammed and his ruffians had decamped, sending back a message to Baker, that 'if he followed on their road [the route he had decided to take] they would fire upon him and his party, as they would allow no English spies in their country.'

Deserted and almost helpless, Baker was for a time unable to find a way out of his difficulties; but he and his wife were determined not to turn-back at the bidding of the slave-traders. Eventually, after overcoming obstacles that would have proved insuperable to any but a man of iron-will and unwavering courage, he secured fifteen unwilling followers, and boldly followed in the track of another party of ivory-traders who were returning to the Latuka country. It was not the route Baker wished to take; but he had no choice in the matter: once clear of Gondokoro, circumstances might, he thought, enable him to continue his journey to the south.

The slave-traders to whom Baker now attached himself had, as a matter of course, refused to share his company on the march, and had even threatened, like Mohammed, to shoot him, if he persisted in following them: but Baker, hoping to overcome their enmity, should a favourable occasion present itself, treated their wild threats with indifference.

Both parties started an hour after sunset; and, after a night-march, bivouacked close together.

Baker was again warned; but paid no heed. His chief anxiety was to get through the rocky pass between Tollogo and Ellyria before the traders could reach it: for they had undertaken to stir-up the natives against his party. The pass itself was all but blocked by enormous granite boulders, and broken by deep ravines: so that, at the best, it was difficult to get through. In the previous year a strongly-armed caravan of 126 traders had been massacred by the natives at that very spot. It was absolutely essential, therefore, for Baker's small party to reach Ellyria before any organised attempt to stop them could be made.

On their arrival at the pass, after a forced march during the night, the natives proved themselves to be far from friendly, though they were not openly hostile. Progress being slow, Baker and his wife, accompanied by a Latuka guide, rode forward, and awaited the arrival of their caravan on the further side of the last ravine. It was an anxious moment for them.

'At length,' says Baker, 'we heard them in the distance. . . . Looking towards the ravine, I saw emerge from the dark foliage of the trees within fifty yards of us,' not his own caravan, but '*the hated red flag and crescent, leading the Turks' party*. We were out-marched!'

The party numbered 140 men, well-armed, and twice as many porters. They silently filed past Baker and his wife, casting lowering and threatening looks at them. Their leader, Ibrahim, was the last to ride by; and as Baker regarded him, he promised himself the satisfaction of putting a bullet through the fellow's head at the first overt act of hostility.

At this critical moment, Mrs. Baker, with her ever-ready tact, urged her husband to make friends with the Arab, and herself called upon Ibrahim to halt. After a brief but satisfactory discussion between them, it was then agreed that the matter was capable of adjustment, by the usual means —*bakhshish*. 'Had I been alone,' says Baker, 'I should have been too proud to have sought the friendship of the sullen trader; and the moment on which success depended would have been lost. . . . The fate of the Expedition was retrieved by Mrs. Baker.'

On their arrival at Ellyria they mixed freely with the traders' party, not by choice but design; and were shortly joined by the men of their own escort, who were more than astonished at the changed aspect of affairs. They were immediately surrounded by a swarm of low-type natives,

clamouring for presents, to the chief of whom, Legge, an insolent fellow and a thorough rascal, Baker was forced to pay heavy blackmail. At any moment during the remainder of that day and night the slightest error of conduct might have led to general hostilities: but by the exercise of tact and much forbearance a conflict was happily avoided.

The march was resumed on the following day. The traders went in advance, and to them Baker quietly attached himself. His new ally, Ibrahim, formerly his enemy, now warned him against the men of his own escort; but this warning was superfluous, because, before leaving Gondokoro, Baker had been fully aware of the intention of his men not only to desert him at their station in Latuka, but also to commit robbery and murder. Events having turned-out to his advantage, beyond his most sanguine expectations, he now determined to crush the expected mutiny with a relentless hand.

At Latomé, one of the principal settlements in the Latuka country, the rival band of traders under Mohammed Her was encountered. It was precisely with these scoundrels that Baker's men had arranged to fraternise; and Latomé had previously been designated as the spot where the so-called mutiny should break-out. The two companies of traders, however, no sooner met, than they commenced to quarrel among themselves as to the 'right-of-way': for the man-hunters in the Sudan then had their special

'preserves.' Baker's men of course attached themselves to Mohammed Her's faction; and the night was spent in desultory fighting, though a general conflict was avoided.

On the following morning, the long-threatened mutiny broke-out. The men of the Expedition refused to march. Their ringleader insolently confronted Baker, exclaiming: 'Not a man shall go with you!'

'Lay down your gun!' shouted Baker, now fully roused to action.

'I won't!' was the reply.

With one blow Baker struck him to the ground. The next instant, seizing the opportunity caused by the panic that ensued, he rushed into the midst of his wavering men and dragged them, one by one, to the camels. All but three allowed themselves to be coerced; and sullenly set-about their tasks.

Having thus crushed the famous mutiny, almost at its inception, by prompt and vigorous action, Baker rode forward and gained Ibrahim's caravan, which had already started. Five of his men deserted and joined Mohammed Her's party; the remainder, like whipped curs, followed his own leadership.

At Tarrangollé, a hundred miles from Gondokoro, they were well-received by the Latuka. Among these 'fine and frank' savages Baker was forced to remain for a time; and he therefore endeavoured to ingratiate himself with the two brothers, Moy and Komoro, who shared the

chieftainship of the tribe. In a measure he succeeded in gaining their confidence and goodwill; but, on the other hand, he suffered from his association with Ibrahim's company.

Shortly after their arrival, they heard of the extermination, by another tribe of the Latuka, of the entire party under Mohammed Her. The slave-traders had attacked a mountain village, which had proved too strong for them: and but few escaped the vengeance of the natives. This proved to be a reflected triumph for Baker. 'Where,' he asked, 'were the men who had deserted him?' 'All dead,' was the reply; and two guns, covered with blood, were laid at his feet. Baker had said of these men, 'the vultures will pick their bones': and the prompt fulfilment of his prophecy laid strong hold upon the superstitious minds of his followers, as also upon Ibrahim's men. From that moment he was treated with the greatest respect, and even fear.

Ibrahim found it necessary, shortly after his arrival at Tarrangollé, to return to Gondokoro, in order to procure a fresh supply of ammunition. He left thirty-five of his men behind him; and these fellows, by their brutal treatment of the native women, roused the Latuka to such a pitch of fury, that the whole party was for a time in danger of extermination. The destruction of Mohammed Her's caravan had given the Latuka greater confidence in their own prowess: and they consequently assumed airs of

superiority and arrogance. Baker protested, but in vain, that he had no part or lot with 'the Turks,' and no control over them. His own men, who were kept well in-hand, and he himself, were regarded as forming one party with the hated slave-traders. Having gained the benefit of this unholy union, Baker could not now escape its penalties. He did his best to prevent an open rupture; and on one occasion, by his vigilance, thwarted a night-attack by the natives. In the end, however, he found it necessary to camp apart, and to take his chance alone.

When Ibrahim returned with his re-inforcements and an ample supply of ammunition, the slave-traders were strong enough to carry on with impunity their customary ill-treatment of the natives; and made the most of their position. Baker could not, of course, afford to quarrel with them, nor was he strong enough to interfere with their schemes of plunder. Happily, however, he found an early opportunity of escaping, for a brief period, from his equivocal and embarrassing position.

One day a party of natives appeared from Obbo with presents from their chief, not only for Ibrahim, whom it was desirable to conciliate, but also for Baker himself, who had gained the reputation of being a man who wanted neither ivory nor slaves, and was consequently regarded as something more than human. On the return of this party to Obbo, Baker

accompanied them, leaving his camp in charge of five men and under the protection of the Latuka chiefs, Moy and Komoro. Such a golden opportunity was not to be lost: for Obbo lay 40 miles to the south-west, precisely in the direction Baker wished to explore.

After a rough journey through the heart of the mountains, Baker reached Obbo, and was well-received by the chief. Here he found himself in the midst of mountains and table-lands at a mean elevation of from three to four thousand feet, and in a rainy zone that encouraged a dense and tangled vegetation, through which there were few paths. He was assured, that to cross the Asua river during the rainy season, then prevailing, would be impossible: and he therefore decided to make Obbo his head-quarters until travelling became practicable. He, however, did not wish to spend several months in idleness, though the surrounding jungles promised good sport: consequently, he left his wife, with a guard of eight men, under the protection of the chief of Obbo, while he himself, with three men and no baggage, made a short reconnaissance to the south.

On his return to Obbo, he was cordially welcomed, and found his wife had been most carefully attended and protected during his absence. The party then went back to Tarrangollé.

Shortly after their arrival there, sickness attacked both men and animals. Baker and his

wife suffered severely from ague and fever. They lost two valuable horses, five donkeys and two camels. Small-pox broke-out and spread rapidly through the country, causing several deaths among Ibrahim's men; but Baker's camp, being isolated, escaped the scourge.

A native of Obbo and a slave-woman from Unyoro had given Baker some valuable, though somewhat vague, information with regard to Magungo and the great Nyanza (Albert), from which all the cowrie-shells used in Latuka and the neighbouring districts were said to come. This spot, Magungo, situated at the confluence of the White Nile with the Albert Nyanza, was, in fact, regularly visited by Arab traders. Baker therefore determined to penetrate thither as soon as he was in a position to march to the south.

In the meantime, he was practically a captive at Tarrangollé. The Expedition had been wrecked by the mutiny of his men at Gondokoro: for, instead of being able to advance independently through the country, he had, in consequence of the limited number of his followers, been forced to hang-on to the skirts of the slave-traders—a most degrading position and one full of danger to himself. The common practice of these so-called traders, who in reality were nothing but cattle-lifters and slave-hunters, was to attach themselves to a native chief, with whom they might undertake *razzias* upon neighbouring tribes, sharing the spoils. Cattle purchased everything; and therefore were of higher value, as an asset,

than human lives or even slaves. The natives viewed with comparative equanimity the loss of their wives and children, but defended their cattle with the greatest heroism. Wherever the traders went, therefore, they gradually raised the whole country against them; but decamped in time to escape any combined attack, leaving their allies to bear the results of these ravages.

This was precisely the plan followed by Ibrahim. When the time came for retreat, Baker was obliged to follow meekly; although his wife was prostrated with fever, and it was dangerous to move her. Ibrahim had selected Obbo as the next centre for his depredations; and thither the entire party repaired.

Months passed; the rain fell in torrents; and both Baker and his wife suffered severely from fever: but, worse than all, was their intolerable position amongst the slave-traders, who harried the country far and wide. Baker feared that the tribes between Obbo and Magungo would thereby be roused to oppose the passage of his expedition: and he did his best to prevent raiding in that direction. He even proposed to Ibrahim a plan by which, should the Nile be proved to issue out of the Muta Nzigé, lucrative and legitimate trading might be opened-up between Kamrasi's people and the Khartum merchants; and he promised to use his influence with Kamrasi to secure the monopoly of the ivory-trade for Ibrahim's party. But the attraction of the *razzias* was so great to these brigands, that, for a

long period, all talk of a commonplace, legitimate traffic fell upon unheeding ears. Eventually, by dint of persistence, through his open-handed generosity, and his wife's attention to the sick, Baker managed to secure considerable influence over the slave-traders: and he finally induced Ibrahim, not only to promise him porters to Kamrasi's, but also to escort him thither with a hundred men.

A start was made on the 5th January, 1864, in light marching-order. Having lost the last of his horses and all his transport-animals, Baker had purchased and trained three oxen for riding; but most of the journey had to be accomplished on foot. Eight miles from Fatiko, the Expedition lost many men and porters by desertion; and here, Baker, by the exercise of diplomacy, secured the supreme command. Ibrahim, being without beads or other currency to purchase supplies on the march, thus became entirely subservient to his former *protégé*, who alone was able to open a route to the south.

Baker now led the way, steering, by compass, for the Karuma Falls. A guide had been secured to take them to Kamrasi's; but this man had been tampered with, and managed to make a *détour* by which the Expedition first entered Rionga's country.

It appeared, that Debono's party, on their return south from Gondokoro, had joined forces with Rionga and with him had made a raid upon Kamrasi,—these two chiefs being deadly enemies

and constantly at war. Consequently, to approach Kamrasi's through Rionga's country was about the worst possible introduction for the Expedition. Baker had been warned by Speke to avoid Rionga; and he himself suspected the treachery of the guide: but he was unable to escape the trap that was laid for him. The result was, that Kamrasi looked with suspicion upon the approach of another large party, which, though professing friendship, might prove to be enemies in disguise. He therefore placed every obstacle in the way of their progress, until he should be enabled to discover the honesty of their intentions.

After overcoming many irritating delays, a way was eventually found to Kamrasi's residence at M'ruli; but, by that time, Baker had become so worn-out with anxiety and constant attacks of fever, that he was too weak to stand, and had to be carried bodily into the royal presence.

Kamrasi, being propitiated by handsome presents, shewed his good-will by proposing an alliance, for the purpose of attacking Rionga. This proposal was, of course, indignantly rejected by Baker, who stated, that the object of his journey was to find the Muta Nzigé, and not to embroil himself in native disputes. Ibrahim, however, became a willing substitute: and thenceforth he 'belonged to Kamrasi,' and separated himself from Baker. Thus, all parties were satisfied.

It should here be stated, that this man, who represented himself as being the king of Unyoro,

was not Kamrasi, but his brother and deputy, M'gambi. Baker subsequently discovered this fraudulent impersonation—as we shall see in the next chapter—but, like him, we may continue to call M'gambi by the name he assumed, because Kamrasi merely used him as a shield for his own cowardice, and was always close at hand to instigate and watch his actions.

Shortly after, all Baker's porters deserted him. Left with only fifteen men, he was therefore dependent for porters on Kamrasi, who, pursuing the usual tactics of African sultans, squeezed present after present from his guest and made one excuse after another for evading the performance of his own promises. So exasperating did his conduct become, that Baker ended by treating him with open contempt; and called him many bad but appropriate names. At the same time, he satisfied all his demands, until he was robbed of almost everything he possessed. Even to the last moment, when, after endless procrastination, the porters arrived, Kamrasi's extortions had to be submitted to: the very cap—a muslin handkerchief—that Mrs. Baker had on her head was seized by him, though it was the last she possessed.

Not satisfied with what he had already received, Kamrasi had the effrontery to demand that Baker should leave his wife behind him:

'At that moment,' says Baker, 'we were surrounded by a great number of natives; and my suspicions of treachery at having been led across the Kafu river appeared confirmed by this insolent demand. If this

were to be the end of the Expedition, I resolved that it should also be the end of Kamrasi. Drawing my revolver quietly, I held it within two feet of his chest; and looking at him with undisguised contempt, I told him, that if I touched the trigger, not all his men could save him: and that if he dared to repeat the insult, I would shoot him on the spot. At the same time, I explained to him, that in my country such insolence would entail bloodshed; and that I looked upon him as an ignorant ox who knew no better; and that this excuse alone could save him. My wife, naturally indignant, had risen from her seat; and maddened with the excitement of the moment, she made him a little speech in Arabic (not a word of which he understood), with a countenance almost as amiable as the head of Medusa. Altogether, the *mise-en-scène* utterly astonished him. The woman Bachéta, although savage, had appropriated the insult to her mistress; and she also fearlessly let-fly at Kamrasi, translating as nearly as she could the complimentary address that "Medusa" had just delivered.

'Whether this little *coup-de-théâtre* had so impressed Kamrasi with British female independence, that he wished to be "off his bargain," I cannot say; but, with an air of complete astonishment, he said: "Don't be angry! I had no intention of offending you by asking for your wife; I will give you a wife, if you want one; and I thought you had no objection to give me yours: it is my custom to give my visitors pretty wives; and I thought you might exchange. Don't make a fuss about it; if you don't like it, there's an end of it: I will never mention it again." This very practical apology I received very sternly; and merely insisted upon starting. . . . With a very cold adieu to Kamrasi, I turned my back most gladly on M'ruli.'

By his agreement with Kamrasi, Baker received porters who were to take him to the Muta Nzigé, where he was to be furnished with canoes

to convey his party to Magungo. At Magungo, Kamrasi told him, he would see the Nile issuing from the Lake close to the spot where the Somerset (Nile) entered; and that the canoes should take him down the river, and porters should carry his effects from the nearest point to his former station near Fatiko.

Baker trusted that, in the event of this engagement being carried-out, he would be able to reach Gondokoro in time for the last boat to Khartum. He was without quinine: and another year in Central Africa was therefore a daunting prospect. 'It was,' he remarks, 'a race against time: all was untrodden ground before us, and the distance quite uncertain. I trembled for my wife, and weighed the risk of another year in this horrible country, should we lose the boats. With the self-sacrificing devotion that she had shewn in every trial, she implored me not to think of any risks on her account, but to push forward and discover the lake: that she had determined not to return until she had herself reached the Muta Nzigé.'

The escort consisted of 300 men, whom Baker christened 'The Devil's Own,' on account of the horns they wore on their heads and their 'devilish antics.' But their behaviour was such, that, in a very short time, he was glad to dispense with their 'protection': therefore, he sent them back to their master, Kamrasi.

Following the right-bank of the Kafu, the Expedition, now comprising 13 men, struggled through

the marsh-lands until the spot was reached where the river had to be crossed. In accomplishing this passage, under circumstances of great difficulty and danger, Mrs. Baker received a sunstroke. She was carried forward on a litter, in a state of coma, for several days, during which her life 'hung on a thread.' The torpor of body was succeeded by a severe attack of brain-fever. 'For seven nights,' says Baker, 'I had not slept; and although as weak as a reed, I had marched by the side of her litter. Nature could resist no longer. We reached a village one evening; she had been in violent convulsions, successively: it was all but over. I laid her down on her litter within a hut, covered her with a Scotch plaid, and fell upon my mat insensible, worn-out with sorrow and fatigue. My men put a new handle to the pick-axe that evening, and sought for a dry spot to dig her grave.'

Mrs. Baker, however, struggled to consciousness; and the weary march was resumed, after two days' rest. Baker, himself, went forward as in a dream: it was a dream, with a glorious awakening.

On the 14th March, the travellers reached the Lake, at Mbakovia, weary and toil-worn, but sustained by the quenchless enthusiasm that had carried them to the goal of their ambition. 'It is impossible,' says Baker, 'to describe the triumph of that moment. Here was the reward of all our labour, for the years of tenacity with which we had toiled through Africa.' The simple

entry in his *Journal*, describing the discovery of the Albert Nyanza, scarcely gives voice to this gratified ambition; but it is worth reproducing in this place, *verbatim*:

'*Monday*, 14*th* [March, 1864]. Procured milk and fresh butter this morning: the greatest luxury, as a cup of milk is a scarcity throughout the land. Marched at 9.45, and at about 12, the long-sought Lake suddenly presented itself—the long-sought Lutan Nzigé! Far as the eye could reach to the south-west and west, the boundless sheet of water lay like a mirror; while to the north-west it was bounded by a high range of mountains: there, the Lake was not more than about 40 or 50 miles wide. On all sides, where land was visible, the Lake was completely shut-in by mountains. We at length commenced a precipitous descent, where the oxen, even without baggage or riders, could descend only with difficulty; and after a long and toilsome, step-like walk, we reached the flat and large extent of land bordering the Lake. This land is sandy and interspersed with much bush, although there is also much open grass-land. Put-up at hut of the headman. Went to the water's edge directly; drank a long draught; thanked God most sincerely for having guided me, when all hope of success was lost, to this much wished-for end: and I christened the lake the

"Albert N'yanja"

as the second source [or, as it is now called, the third source] of the Nile,—the Victoria and Albert Lakes being the two great sources.'

In the evening, Baker, who, on all suitable occasions never failed to perform his duties as an explorer, took the meridian altitude of 'Canopus,' making his latitude 1° 14′ 3″ North.



and died – They would not eat the flesh as the animal had died for they said he was mine and they would not allow anything of mine large or small to be lost upon the road" –
I must say nothing against their supper after this – they are amongst the best cooks in Parkani
Many heavy rains this morning – Wind South –
Monday 14 (36) Sunday 20 – Procured milk & found better this morning, the greatest luxury as a cup of milk is a rearity there, but to land – –
Tuesday 15 Marched at 9 – 45 and at about 12 the boy caught Lake suddenly formed itself, the boy caught Katan Nyija "! – For as the ox could not [illegible] the lake was bounded by a high ridge of mountains – Here the lake was not more than about 40 or 50 miles wide. On all hills where land was visible the lake was completely shut in by mountains – the at length commenced a precipitous descent where the river even without baggage & tides could descend with difficulty and after a long and tedious step like walk we reached the flat and large tract of land bordering the lake – The land is sandy and interspersed with rounded rock although there is also much fine rich land – Put up at the foot of the headmans – Went to the native village directly drank a long draught, thanked God most sincerely for having guided me safely all the way & much was left to this same village to proceed, and I chickened the lake

"Albert Nyanja"

as the second source of the Nile – The Victoria and Albert Lakes being the two great sources –

In evening got a good sight of Cameroon, Mountain Albert & giving Latitude 1.14.3 North
The natives here are chiefly open fish and Elephants – The scenery of the country is nothing at all – They dig round and fell numerous earthen pots very porous, containing about seven gallons each – Upon these they pour water which filtering through the mud is received in pots beneath – The brine is then boiled and the salt left to crystallize from the [illegible]
The march to day was 8 h 15 m but allowing 1.15 for delay is reckoned the like from 4.22 P.M. to 8 P.M. Miles from Mirabi – – 109
Wednesday 16 – Came over thin beds, and sent out with headmen and Cruzzafo to take bearings and get information
The name of the village is Vacovia – latitude 1.14.3 chief Ubeet of the lake from the point is Wallegga – Kajoro Mark Unit N 20 W Kicanda – Kangogua Ubeet 10° South is – Toro – Toro
East Coast of Lake Nalla and – Ottoshiki –
do – South of above – Mwa – Kaliwa
this forming Kamrasi's frontier
Uzungere } Kamrasi
" – Chopi }
Light rain throughout the morning – Lake looking wild and beautiful – This is no track from West coast of Africa coming down from Karagwe via Tanganyika to Lake now being familiar to many of the natives of Mirabi –
Boiling Point 207° 10 temb 84°3
Wednesday 16 – Great trouble with the guide – Mahoosh ready, and a large present of beads expected before any one start – Look Lunar distances last night but sky cloudy –
The natives throw nothing of the lake beyond Ottoshiki – they say it stands as far as one knows from whence it comes – I believe it springs from the chain of mountains about a degree South of the Equator in the M'fumbiro range – – – They say that from the place Vacovia it is four days voyage across the lake – in canoe boats – – The mountains on West coast are very lofty, and more abrupt in appearance – I should think as far as 6 or 7000 feet – – –
The N.W. corner does not [illegible] from the Nile to the Lake,

CHAPTER XI.

RETURN TO KHARTUM.

[1864–1865]

We have followed Baker somewhat closely during his three years' arduous struggle to reach the Albertine source of the Nile, because its successful issue was in a sense the crowning achievement of his life. With regard to his return-journey to Khartum, difficult as it was, involving hardships and obstacles fully as great as those which he and his wife had already endured and overcome, we need say but little. The experiences of African travel are, after all, very much alike in the case of those explorers who have penetrated into the unknown parts of the continent, the re-iteration of which tends to become monotonous. Much of the interest in Baker's pioneer-travels lies in the fact, that he was accompanied at every step by his wife, whose heroism was equalled by her self-effacement, and who deservedly shares, with her husband, the honour of a great geographical discovery.

Coasting along the eastern shore of the Albert Nyanza, they reached, after 13 days, the embouchure of the Somerset or Victorian Nile;

and entered Magungo. Baker had intended to follow the Nile from its effluence at Fashoro, and to trace the river in its passage northwards; but his boatmen absolutely refused to pass through the hostile riverain tribes of the Madi and Koshi countries, who, they asserted, would murder them on their return.

'The exit of the Nile from the Lake,' says Baker, 'was plain enough; and if the broad channel of dead-water were indeed the entrance of the Victorian Nile (Somerset) the information obtained by Speke would be remarkably confirmed. Up to the present time, all the information that I had received from Kamrasi and his people had been correct.' Nevertheless, it was difficult for him to believe, that the brawling river he had seen at the Karuma Falls was the same which entered the Lake at Magungo as dead-water; though, apart from the great difference of levels between those two spots, their latitude was approximately the same. In order to verify the native reports, which were unanimous in the identification of the river at both places, and to carry-out his promise to Speke, Baker now determined to trace the river from Magungo to the Karuma Falls.

From the Karuma Falls the Victorian Nile passes rapidly over a series of cataracts until it reaches a spot where there is an abrupt cleft, or fall, of 120 feet in the river-bed. These are the 'Murchison Falls,' which Baker dis-

covered on his arrival there, and christened with the name of the President of the Royal Geographical Society, to whom he was greatly attached.

Abandoning the canoes, the journey was continued on foot, until, in obedience to the secret orders of Kamrasi, the party was left, stranded, at a deserted village on the left-bank of the river. Contrary to his promise to send them north to Fatiko, Kamrasi had caused them to be led to a desolate spot, where there was no chance of obtaining provisions, hoping to starve them into accepting a fresh proposal. His desire was, that Baker should join him in an attack on his old enemies, Rionga and Fowuka.

For two months Baker held-out, every day expecting that both he and his wife would succumb to weakness and fever. The unexpected delay was a bitter disappointment, which they had neither the spirit nor the strength to meet. All hope of reaching Gondokoro in time for the last boat to Khartum had, in fact, to be abandoned.

At length, after many failures, Baker gained an interview with Kamrasi, at a place called Kisuna, ten miles to the south of the river; and here, to his astonishment, he discovered, that the man who had impersonated the King of Unyoro was not Kamrasi himself, but his brother, and deputy, M'gambi. The fraud was frankly confessed, and regarded by Kamrasi as an excellent joke.

For some months Baker was detained at Kisuna, and subjected to constant demands for presents, all of which he had to satisfy, to the extent of his means. His enforced stay at this place was enlivened by two events, in which he was obliged to take a leading part. One was a threatened attack by the united forces of Rionga, Fowuka, and 150 men of Debono's party, which Baker thwarted, simply by hoisting the British flag and declaring Kamrasi to be under his protection: thus enforcing the prompt withdrawal of Debono. The other was the approach of an army sent-out by M'tesa, King of Uganda, who had heard that his enemy Kamrasi was detaining Baker against his will, and that the said Baker had rich presents which he was most anxious to bestow on him.

The arrival of M'tesa's warriors caused a panic. Kisuna was hurriedly abandoned; and Kamrasi, accompanied by Baker, made a dash for Fauvera, where they hoped to be re-inforced by 100 men under Ibrahim, who was at that moment absent on business. A conjunction of forces having been effected, M'tesa's army retired, discomfited.

On the 17th November, 1864, after witnessing many stirring incidents, Baker finally escaped from the clutches of Kamrasi, and, in company with Ibrahim's party, started for the north. The caravan now comprised 700 men and 300 followers, a large number of porters being required to carry the stores of ivory which Ibrahim, by his

alliance with Kamrasi, had managed to secure, in return for his services.

The camp at Fatiko was reached in five days; and was made the head-quarters of the united party, until, in February, the march should be resumed to Gondokoro. During the three months that were spent there, Baker received letters from home, and occupied his time by making duplicates of his maps and in performing other useful work.

Gondokoro was entered on the 17th March; but no supplies, no letters, and no boats were there to meet Baker's party, although money had been left with an agent for the very purpose of forwarding them to Khartum on their return from the south. It was, in fact, believed that he and all his followers had perished: consequently, nothing had been done to provide for their return.

A *dahabia* having been secured, the remnant of Baker's expedition embarked; and were most enthusiastically cheered on their departure from Gondokoro. A form of malignant typhus was then raging both at Gondokoro and Khartum; and the *dahabia* being infected, three deaths occurred on-board during the voyage down-stream, including that of Saat, who was most sincerely mourned. Only Richarn now remained of Baker's 'Faithfuls.'

Khartum was reached on the 3rd May, 1865. The Expedition, after an absence of two years and a half, received quite an ovation, the Euro-

peans vieing with one another to do honour to Mr. and Mrs. Baker. 'Nothing succeeds like success!'

One of Baker's first acts, on his arrival at Khartum, was to mete-out righteous retribution. He caused the arrest of the slave-trader, Mohammed Her, who had instigated the rebellion of his men in the Latuka country, and had the gratification of witnessing 150 lashes administered to this scoundrel. Mohammed Her, having escaped the massacre of his party, richly deserved his chastisement.

Two months were spent at Khartum, waiting for the rise of the river (to enable vessels to pass the Cataracts), during which time Baker wrote many interesting letters to his family and friends at home.

At the end of his private *Journal* we find the rough-draft of a letter addressed to Speke; but the letter itself was never sent: because, on his arrival at Khartum, Baker learnt with deep regret of Speke's death through a shooting-accident. He had looked forward to meeting his old friend, with feelings of no ordinary emotion: for he fully recognised the obligations under which he stood to the discoverers of the Victoria Nyanza. The news of his death was, therefore, a great blow to Baker. How generous was his recognition of the assistance rendered him by Speke and Grant, may be judged by the following excerpt from a letter addressed to Admiral the Honble. H. A. Murray:

'Speke, when at Gondokoro, in his hot love for geography, planned this exploration for me, and gave me a map of his route and adjacent countries. I am much indebted to him for that map, which has been of immense service; and I am only happy to have been able to run-down the game he had scented.'

To Speke he had written a full account of the Expedition, so happily concluded, adding these words:

'I cannot tell you how rejoiced I am at having accomplished the work which you had planned. To have failed would have made me miserable for life. My evidence will, I trust, be a weighty addition to yours in confirming the origin of the river. I was delighted to see that you and Grant had received the welcome you so well deserved. Pray remember me very kindly to Grant, whom I trust I may meet again. I gave Kamrasi his portrait and also yours, cut from *The Illustrated London News*.'

This modest valuation of his own achievement Baker repeated over and over again, in almost identical terms, to other correspondents; though few were prepared to accept so slight an estimate of his services to geography.

Of Speke and Grant, personally, he had the highest admiration. Years later, he wrote to Mr. Douglas Murray:

'Speke was a painstaking, determined traveller, who worked-out his object of geographical research without the slightest jealousy of others. He was a splendid fellow in every way. Grant was a *fidus Achates* to him; and Grant himself assured me, that he would have been unable to carry-through their great expedition unaided; and that to Speke alone all honour was due. Grant was one of the most loyal and charming characters in

the world. Perfectly unselfish, he adored Speke; and throughout his life he maintained an attitude of chivalrous defence of Speke's reputation, after the latter's death by a shooting-accident.

'Grant was the most unselfish man I ever met; amiable and gentle to a degree that might to a stranger denote weakness: but, on the contrary, no man could show more strength of character, or determination, when he was offended. As a true friend, Speke was a hero!'

From Baker's numerous letters, recounting the fortunes of his expedition, we make the following excerpts:

'Khartum: 30th May, 1865.

'My work is done. Thank God! is all I can say. Very weary has been the time since I left Khartum, till the day of my return. However hard the task has been, it leaves this satisfaction, that it has been accomplished.

'The Albert Lake is of equal importance with the Victoria as a Nile-source. These two great reservoirs have now been verified as the positive cradles of the Nile—the father and mother of the great river. Both being discovered by Englishmen, it is appropriate they should bear the names of our Queen and the lamented Prince Albert.

'It is a singular fact, that, although the Nile-sources have ever been so profound a mystery—for twenty centuries sought-for by kings and geographers—no Englishman ever started on this mission until Bruce succeeded in discovering the source of the Blue Nile—then supposed to be *the* Nile. Speke and Grant determined the Victoria Nyanza source; and I have discovered the great Albert Lake, the second source. Thus, every Englishman who started on this arduous mission has succeeded; while every other expedition has failed, during 2,000 years.

The anxiety of such an exploration is beyond description. Worse than all fatigues or dangers is the fear of failure; and, at times, there is the apparent im-

possibility of progress. Then, the necessity of patience; the sitting-down for months in one place, almost hopeless, quite helpless, waiting for something to turn-up to enable you to advance: your transport-animals all dead, no porters, yourself ill, the country unknown, the natives distrustful, no provisions, the distance of the Lake unknown—its positive existence uncertain. Then you fret-away your very life; you live worse than any English pig; your baggage must be forsaken; you are exposed to the rains by day and by night, unsheltered often except by a raw bull's-hide: thus, you gradually creep along, steadfastly persevering in the task.

'At last the day arrived! Stretched beneath the mountains, like a sea of silver, far away to the horizon, lay my prize!!

'I was ill and faint; but I grew strong as I sat upon the cliff and looked down, 1,500 feet below, at the glorious inland sea. With the support of a long stick, I tottered down the steep path till I reached the beach. I rushed to the water's edge, bathed my face and shoulders, took a long draught from this great source of the Nile, and thanked God most fervently for having guided me to this success. I at once named it the Albert Nyanza—Nyanza [or, as he first spelt it, Nyanja] being the native name for "lake" or any sheet of water.'

To another correspondent he wrote:

'The natives are throughout very annoying people, throwing every obstacle in your way and asking for everything you possess. It requires great tact and immense patience to avoid coming into conflict with them; but thankful I am to say, that never at any Negro have I pulled trigger: thus, I have no blood on my hands. We have been attacked twice; and the sentry at night was once obliged to shoot a man; but I have always abstained from firing, even when the arrows were whizzing over us. There is very little danger, with good management. I would not condescend to fire at a poor devil of

a savage, except in an extremity. Any good shot with a few spare rifles could beat five hundred of them.

'The Slave Trade is carried-on here to an incredible extent. Our Government is much to blame, as they take no steps to suppress it, although immense sums are wasted on the West Coast of Africa for the avowed purpose of crushing the Traffic. The atrocities in these countries are beyond anything I can describe. Cold-blooded murders are committed wholesale, no matter the sex nor the age: but these acts go unpunished.

'The plague has been raging, and has carried-off 3,500 troops out of the 4,000 quartered here. It is impossible to guess at the mortality among the native population; but they have been regularly swept-out during the last few months.

'My boat will be ready to start in a few days; then adieu to this land of dust and misery!'

Again, writing to one of his brothers, he remarked:

'The combination of the slave-traders against me and the death of all my transport-animals were severe obstacles. To advance, I was obliged to leave all supplies, tent, &c., behind; and to travel without anything but ammunition. Thus, for months I was without tea, coffee, milk, or anything but water; living on wild vegetables, mouldy flour, and about two tough cocks per week. I am now in good health, as the anxiety of the journey is past: the fear of failure was more trying, if possible, than the climate.'

On the 30th June, Baker and his wife left Khartum for Berber, by boat; and, by way of Suakin and Suez, reached England in October, 1865.

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CHAPTER XII.

DISCUSSION OF GEOGRAPHICAL RESULTS.

In view of our present knowledge of the hydrographical system of the Nile, it might be supposed that the geographical discoveries of Speke, Grant, and Baker were sufficient at the time to clear-up all doubts among geographers as to the origin of the Nile and the general character of its source-region. But this was by no means the case.

If we compare the original maps of Speke and Baker, made on the spot, with those of the present day, we find that the former were, of necessity, untrustworthy in many important particulars; though, in their delineation of the leading hydrographical features, they represented a remarkable degree of accuracy. Dealing only with general results, we may roughly estimate the value to geographical science of the pioneer-travels of Baker, Speke, and Grant. At the same time, such an estimate would be imperfect without reference to Stanley's recent discovery of the Albert Edward Nyanza, and to his former work in the Lakes' region, which completed and definitely established our knowledge of the hydrography of the Nile-sources.

Baker followed the common practice in his day of referring to the Albert Nyanza as the second source-reservoir of the Nile; but, after the discovery of the Albert Edward in 1889, this expression became inaccurate. The altitudes of the three Lakes are:

	Elevation, in feet, above the sea-level.
Victoria Nyanza - - - -	3,900
Albert Edward Nyanza - - -	3,307
Albert Nyanza - - - -	2,300

It will be seen, therefore, that their relative difference in level must determine their priority as source-reservoirs of the Nile—at least, in the absence of any precise *data* regarding their cubic contents. Thus, the Victoria Nyanza is the principal reservoir of the Nile, being superior to the others in altitude as well as in area; whilst the Albert Edward Nyanza is the second source-reservoir.

As a geographical expression, the Albert Nyanza discovered by Baker is not a source-reservoir at all, but a lake which receives and unites the waters of both the Victoria and Albert Edward Nyanzas, and out of which the White Nile flows as an entire river. It is not, and cannot be, a source, strictly speaking, because it receives the waters of a higher and more southerly reservoir through the channel of the Semliki river.

All confusion in geographical terminology would be removed, if accredited writers were to unite in calling things by their correct names.

Stanley, having finally settled the whole matter, leaves us in no doubt as to the question of terminology. He designates the Victoria Nyanza and the so-called Somerset Nile by its proper distinctive title of Victorian Nile-source; while the Albert and Albert Edward Nyanzas, together with the Semliki river which unites them, he christens the Albertine Nile-source. By this euphemism, the Albert Nyanza may be regarded as forming, with its southerly connections, the second source of the Nile; but in no other sense. Consequently, its original discoverer may still enjoy his distinction in name, though in fact its discovery was superseded, rather than complemented, by that of the Albert Edward Nyanza.

The truth is, that all the discoverers of the sources of the White Nile,—Speke and Grant, Baker, and Stanley,—owe much of their success to the trustworthiness of native reports or to the work of their predecessors in the field of exploration; and not a little to the researches of so-called arm-chair geographers, whose theories, bewildering and contradictory as they were in detail, proved in the main to be based upon sound deductions and governed by geographical principles. In particular, they were indebted to the native reports which they received and collated on the spot, subsequently proving them to be marvellously exact, in spite of some confusion of terms and the inaccuracy of geographical *minutiæ*. The one word 'Nyanza,' which is synonymous

with Nyasa, is, for instance, applied by the natives to any sheet or large body of water,—inland sea, lake and river, alike,—and was productive of a good deal of the confusion into which explorers and geographers fell, in their efforts to discover and lay-down the precise hydrographical features of the source-region of the White Nile. Thus, it is tautology to speak of 'Lake Nyanza,' or 'Lake Nyasa': though until quite recently this terminology was persisted in; and is still, in the case of the Nyasa.* Moreover, all three Lakes were called Muta Nzigé by the natives.

It is remarkable, and perhaps natural, that the discoverers of these lakes were inclined to allow them a very liberal geographical area, in accordance with the vague and exaggerated reports of their native witnesses. Thus: Speke ran the north-east corner of the Victoria Nyanza into Lake Baringo (reported by Krapf), which he connected with the upper course of the Asua river; Baker made his Albert Nyanza extend to 1° S. lat.; and Stanley, when in 1876 he sighted† the Albert Edward Nyanza, called it 'Beatrice Gulf,' as forming part of Baker's

* The Nyasa might appropriately be called Livingstone Nyasa (or Nyanza), after the name of its true discoverer.

† This was on the occasion of Stanley's brilliant trans-continental journey, of 1874–77, from East to West, during which he circumnavigated the Victoria Nyanza, proceeded to the Muta Nzigé (Albert Edward), and from thence to Lake Tanganyika, finally laying bare the magnificent waterway of the Congo. M'tesa had given him men to accompany him to the Muta Nzigé; but the disturbed state of the country drove him back.

Lake. Each of these explorers, or at least the first two, fell into these errors by incorporating native testimony with their own actual discoveries. Baker's autograph map was a distinct advance upon Speke's: his latitudes were remarkably correct; and he laid-down for the first time the general physical features of the countries through which he penetrated.



The Albert Nyanza (from Native report), by SPEKE: 1863.

When Speke, on his journey down the Nile, sent his famous telegram to the Foreign Office —'Inform Sir Roderick Murchison that all is

well; that we are in latitude 14° 30′, upon the Nile; and that the Nile is settled'—the geographical world was deeply moved: though the preconceived opinions of geographers were not shaken to the extent that we, with our present knowledge, might suppose to have been the case. It is true, that the White Nile was proved to issue from the Victoria Nyanza, and that the existence of the Muta Nzigé (Albert Nyanza) was foreshadowed. But Speke regarded the Muta Nzigé as a 'backwater' of the Nile; and found many who were prepared to accept his view: since, the occurrence of the Albert Edward in a more southerly latitude was not then anticipated,—except, perhaps, as a vague speculation without any basis of fact in support of it. The great southerly extension of the Albert, after Baker's discovery, was believed in implicitly at the time; and many even supposed it to have some connection with Lake Tanganyika. This was the view held by Livingstone, who had proved that the Nyasa had no important feeders on its northern borders; and it was supported by Burton—the discoverer, with Speke, of Lake Tanganyika,—and by many other authorities. Findlay, the geographer, who shared their opinion, calculated the observations made independently by Speke and Baker at exactly the same points; and found that they differed, on an average, by about 1,000 ft. Arguing from this difference, and diminishing or increasing the elevation of the three newly-dis-

covered lakes, even Sir Roderick Murchison, whose theoretical knowledge of the Nile-system was unsurpassed, inferred that it was extremely



The Albert Nyanza, by BAKER: 1864.

probable that Lake Tanganyika might be 1,000 feet above the level it was supposed to occupy,* or the Albert Nyanza 1,000 feet below.

* The elevation of Lake Tanganyika above sea-level is 2,665 feet.

This hypothesis would, if verified, have made Tanganyika the ultimate source of the Nile; and, consequently, it found several adherents, who were interested in its support. There were even geographers who, in their passion for controversy, denied that the Victoria Nyanza, in spite of established facts, had any hydrographical connection with the Nile, but that it would be found to comprise two or three, or even a larger number of, lakes with a self-contained drainage-system; as there were also some who, like Petherick, believed that the Sobat might really be the river issuing from it; and others again, who, in despair, harked-back to the comfortable theories of earlier times. We mention these points merely to show, how even the brilliant discoveries of Speke and Grant, followed by Baker, failed at first to dispel the cloud of mystery and ignorance that had for centuries hung over the source-region of the White Nile. But, on the return of Baker, with his autograph maps, and with so many facts in confirmation of those of his predecessors, Speke and Grant, no doubt was felt among reasonable and reasoning people that, in truth, the mystery of the Nile-sources was practically solved.

Romulus Gessi, an Italian employed by Gordon, was the first to circumnavigate the Albert Nyanza (in one of Baker's steamers); and his map (published in *The Geographical Magazine*, 1st Sept., 1876) confirmed Baker's statements as regards its great area and southerly exten-

sion: but Gessi's map was utterly inaccurate. 'It is possible,' he says, in a letter (Khartum: 22 August, 1876) to Baker, 'that beyond the Albert Nyanza, there may be marshy places, etc.;



The Albert Nyanza, by GESSI: 1876.

but, so far as I have observed, the Lake had no communication with any river whatsoever; nor was it in connection with any other lake. If this had been the case, the water of the Lake at that spot would not be so shallow and

stagnant. However, as I have said, it is not impossible, that there may be a great marshy


Provinces of the Equator
MAP
of
LAKE ALBERT
according to a reconnaissance made during 1877 by
Colonel Mason, Bey
Note: The numerals thus
Chief Station etc.
Scale
Unyoro
Uganda
Usoga
Madi
Kibero
Kavalli
Kamrasi
Kibiro
Kafa Kavalla
Kafa Kavalla
Ouregibiri
Ouregibiri
Kafa Kavalla
Kafa Kavalla
Kafa Kavalla

In 1877, Mason, an American, circumnavigated and correctly mapped the Albert Nyanza; afterwards, Emin visited its shores and discovered the existence of the Semliki river—as it is now



The Albert Nyanza, by STANLEY : 1887.

called: but it remained for Stanley, during his three visits to the Lakes, between December 1887 and January 1889, to thoroughly explore and define the exact hydrography and functions of the sub-system of the Albertine Nile.

When, on the 13th December, 1887, Stanley, after his painful march through the great forest in the Congo basin, first sighted the Albert Nyanza, from a height of 2,500 feet above it, he thus described the appearance of the south end of the Lake:

'Southward of the Lake . . . extended a low plain, which formerly, but not recently, must have been inundated by the waters of the Lake, but now was dry firm ground, clothed with sere grass, gently rising as it receded south, and finally producing scrubby wood, acacia and thorn, like the terrace directly below us.'

Baker's description of the same scene, though from the opposite shore of the Lake, and still nearer to the south end, being about four miles from the embouchure of the Semliki, reads as follows:

'My men were perfectly astounded at the appearance of the Lake . . . Two of them had already seen the sea at Alexandria; and they unhesitatingly declared that this was the sea, but that it was not salt. . . . At sunrise on the following morning I took the compass, and . . . went to the borders of the Lake to survey the country. It was beautifully clear: and, with a powerful telescope, I could distinguish two large waterfalls that cleft the sides of the mountains on the opposite shore. . . . I could not distinguish other features than the two great falls, which looked like threads of silver on the dark face of the mountains. No base had been visible, even from an elevation of 1,500 feet above the water-level, on my first view of the Lake, but the chain of lofty mountains on the west appeared to rise suddenly from the water . . . The Lake was known

to extend as far south as Karagwé; and the old story was repeated: that Rumanika, the king of that country, was in the habit of sending ivory-hunting parties to the Lake at Utumbi, [meaning the south end of the Albert Edward,] and that formerly they had navigated the Lake to Magungo. This was a curious confirmation of the report given me by Speke at Gondokoro, who wrote: 'Rumanika is constantly in the habit of sending ivory-parties to Utumbi.' . . . They [the guide and the chief of Mbakovia] agreed that the level of the Lake was never lower than at present, and that it never rose higher than a mark upon the beach that accounted for an increase of about four feet. . . . The first *coup-d'œil* from the summit of the cliff, 1,500 feet above the level, had suggested what a closer examination confirmed. The Lake was a vast depression, far below the general level of the country, surrounded by precipitous cliffs, and bounded on the west and south-west by great ranges of mountains from five to seven thousand feet above the level of its waters.' [*Albert Nyanza*, p. 79 *et seq.*]

That Baker should have stood within a few miles of the south end of the Lake, and written this description, may appear strange: but it can be satisfactorily explained, as we shall see later on. It is necessary that it should be explained, in order to clear Baker's reputation as a careful observer, as well as to close an interesting controversy which, even up to the present time, is not entirely settled in the minds of some of his critics. Stanley, than whom there is no more accurate an observer, and whose experience of African travel is perhaps unrivalled, very simply and satisfactorily accounted for Baker's error in description, as also for the still more extraordinary fact that, although Baker, Gessi, Emin,

and Mason had been within easy sight-range of the mighty *massifs* of Ruwenzori, none of these travellers had discovered, what one might think were easily discernible, elevations of from eighteen to nineteen thousand feet above the sea-level. The reason of this oversight is, however, not far to seek: for some three hundred days in the year, the snow-capped mountains of Ruwenzori are buried in dense clouds. It was only on the third visit of Stanley, during his long stay of two-and-a-half months at Kavalli's, that 'the entire length of the range burst out of the cloudy darkness.' * 'Had our stay,' says Stanley, 'been as short as previous travellers', Ruwenzori might have remained longer unknown.' †

And this is how Stanley explains and illustrates the extraordinary difficulty of distinguishing between land and water, when the view of the observer is obscured—as it usually is, in those latitudes and elevations—by the changing effects of atmospheric phenomena:

'Our first view, as well as the last, of Lake Albert Edward, was utterly unlike any view we had before of land or water of a new region. . . . We gazed through fluffy, slightly-waving strata of vapours of unknown depth; and through this thick opaque veil the Lake appeared like dusty quicksilver, or a sheet of lustreless silver, bounded by vague shadowy outlines of a tawny-faced land. It was most unsatisfactory in every way. We could neither define distance, form, or figure, estimate height of land-crests above the water, or depth of Lake; we could ascribe no just limit to the extent of the expanse, nor venture to say whether it was an inland

* *In Darkest Africa*, Vol. ii., p. 291.
† *Ibid.* p. 292.

ocean or a shallow pond. The haze, or rather cloud, hung over it like a grey pall. We sighed for rain to clear the atmosphere, and the rain fell; but, instead of thickened haze, there came a fog as dark as that which distracts London on a November day!'*

It was, then, quite possible for Baker to have mistaken the low-lying, marshy shores of the south end of the Lake for a boundless expanse of water —a resemblance that would be still closer, in a hazy atmosphere, if the sere grass were tossed and flattened by the wind; whilst the indefinite extension of the Lake, reported by the natives living within a few miles of its southern extremity, was wrongly interpreted to mean a continuous sheet of water. Baker, was, in fact, looking up the Semliki valley when he fancied he saw an unbroken expanse of water on the southern horizon; whilst the vague blurr of mountains that bounded his view in that direction—and which he plotted on his map as elevations of '5,000 feet (?)'—were probably the flanks of Ruwenzori.

Stanley ascertained, that the difference in level between the upper and the lower lake was, by boiling-point, 957 feet, for about one hundred and fifty miles of river (Semliki): or, about one in six. The Ruwenzori group, the upheaval of which in past ages formed the trough of the Albertine Nile,† the *détritus* of which has ever since been silting-up the Semliki valley, sends out perennial torrents on all sides—lying, as it does, in a zone of almost constant rains.

* *In Darkest Africa*, Vol. ii., pp. 326–7.

† Now about 250 miles long and 30 miles broad.

Many hundred years ago,—perhaps, as Stanley suggests, during 'the siege of Troy,'—the twin-lakes may have been more closely connected, or even united. 'We should be liable to censure and severe criticism,' says Stanley, 'if we attempted to fix a hard-and-fast date to the period when Lake Albert extended to the forest of Awamba from the north, and Lake Albert Edward extended from the south over the plain of Makara to the southern edge of the forest [—these two points being about sixty-five miles apart]. But it does not need a clever mathematician to calculate the number of years which have elapsed since the Semliki channeled its bed deep enough to drain the Makara plain.'*

It is, in fact, abundantly clear, that the union between the two Lakes was at one time closer than at present; though on the occasion of Baker's visit this could not have been the case to any appreciable extent. Baker was undoubtedly deceived by atmospheric conditions; though he was not at first prepared to deny the evidence of his senses: as the following correspondence between him and Stanley amply proves.

Writing to Stanley, on his return to England, after the discovery of the so-called 'Beatrice Gulf,' Baker says:

'1st March, 1878.

'When we were chatting about Central Africa, you asked me concerning the latitude at which I first met the

* *In Darkest Africa*, Vol. ii., p. 307.

Albert Nyanza; as you mentioned that some American officer [Mason] had declared that the *most southern* limit of the lake is in 1° 10′ north. . . . 'I have written to Sir Rutherford Alcock, begging him to refer to the book containing all my original observations for latitude, longitude, altitude, etc., etc., which, together with my maps, I unreservedly gave to the Royal Geographical Society, on returning from my first Expedition. This gift from me to the Society was spontaneous; as I was not supported or employed by them or by any person, my expedition having been entirely independent and self-supported. The Geographical Society sent all my astronomical *data* to the Royal Observatory at Greenwich, where they were thoroughly examined and checked by Mr. Dunkin. The instruments and observations for altitude were examined at the Kew Observatory.

'My original *data* (astronomical) are still in possession of the Royal Geographical Society; but to-day I have been referring to my old Diary, as kept daily in Africa; and I find the following *data:* [Here follows a transcript of his observations and of entries from his Diary.] . . . 'You will see that Speke's figures agree with mine.

'My instruments were superb; and upon referring to my original Journal, on the day when I discovered the Lake, it is vividly described how the boundless sea-horizon stretched away to the S.S.W.—This view was from an elevation of 1,500 feet above the lake-level. Your "Beatrice Gulf" is, of course, a portion of the Albert; and much remains to be explored.'

Stanley's reply, by return of post, ran:

'March 2nd, 1878.

'Your letter is very clear and satisfactory.

'I am now busy with the observations that were made on my journey to Muta Nzigé,—as the Waganda

called it. They evidently believed that it was the same lake: as they said it went by Unyoro; though they stated that Usongora, south-west of Unyoro, was separated from the latter by a narrow channel: which reminded me, at the time, of your "native merchant's story." * So far, neither Gessi nor Mason have given a single native name which I heard; and, therefore, Mason's despatch does not prove anything wrong or right in connection with what I called "Beatrice Gulf." The natives of Karagwé, Unyoro, and Uganda were all united in declaring, that the lake I saw was Muta Nzigé, which I took to be a portion of Lake Albert.'

Equally prompt was Baker's response:

'3rd March, 1878.

'M'wootan N'zigé is the exact pronunciation of the native name for the Albert Nyanza throughout Unyoro and Uganda. You might spell it M'oota N'zigé or Muta Nzigé; but M'wootan N'zigé gives the exact sound.

'There is no doubt you are right about the Beatrice Gulf, or Bay, or whatever you may call the water, which the Waganda said was the M'wootan N'zigé.

'In my opinion, considering the immense facilities that now exist for the exploration of the Albert Nyanza since my 50-ton steamer and two 10-ton lifeboats have been placed on the Lake, there has been a great lack of geographical enterprise. People are too comfortable on their large vessels, which draw 3 feet 8 inches or 4 feet of water. The way to explore the ambatch and reed-covered inlets, or channels, is by means of canoes that can be poled through narrow passages between the masses of floating canes and vegetation that obscure the view.

'Speke used to call the Albert Nyanza, *L*uta N'zigé, according to his idea of M'tesa's pronunciation; but it should be *M* instead of *L*.

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* *Vide ante*, p. 113.

'I believe *you* will have to finish the exploration yet. If my wife were not too valuable to risk again in those parts, I would go myself, and thoroughly work-out the Lake. At the same time, I would start from Zanzibar; as it is quite impossible to procure carriers from the north of the Equator.'

And again, a few weeks later, Baker writes to Stanley:

'29th May, 1878.

'The error respecting the M'wootan N'zigé cannot possibly be mine. Let us drop the name "Albert Nyanza," and simply take the lake by the native name, "M'wootan N'zigé."

'I came upon it in N. lat. 1° 14'. The weather was clear; the mountains on the west side were perfectly distinct, some forty or fifty miles distant; but they faded away to nothing towards the S.S.W., where the horizon was boundless water. I was upwards of 1,000 feet above the lake-level when I had this view; therefore, I must have seen an immense distance south of lat. 1° 14'. I was several days at Mbakovia (in this latitude); and I was constantly observing, and asking information from the natives respecting the Lake, all of whom declared it to extend for an *unknown* distance south-west. [The natives doubtless referred to the connecting river, which, like the lake, they called the "great water."] There was a very high mountain on the *East* side (*i.e.* my side) apparently about 60 miles distant.

'When you come to see us, I will shew you my original Journal, written on the spot; and you shall see what great pains I took to obtain correct information.

'On the other hand, in your recent journey, M'tesa sent you to the M'wootan N'zigé, which is known by all natives to form the western frontier of Unyoro and Uganda. You came upon it far south of Mason's limit. Of course you did, because there is some error in Mason's observations which will have to be explained. . . .

Either Mason has made an error; or the refraction from the lake-horizon has been excessive; or the horizon has been false, owing to a bank of mist rising from the surface: but, anyhow, I must believe my own eyes; and I can state most positively, that I could see at least fifty miles from my highest point at Mbakovia before I descended to the Lake.

. . . 'I wish you would go and clear it up. There are two steamers on the Lake now, and two steel sailing-boats. If I were a single man I would go out at once; but you are the great African, and you should monopolise the honour.'

Eleven years later, on the return of Stanley from his discovery of the Albert Edward Nyanza and the Ruwenzori mountains, the discussion of this vexed question was resumed. Writing to Stanley, Baker says:

'14th November, 1889.

'The telegrams we have received give hopes that you will soon arrive at *Z*anzibar; and I am more charmed than I can express at the geographical work you have accomplished in the Semliki river-connection with the Albert.

'That explains the meaning of the two native merchants, who described their arrival in canoes from M'Pororo [South of the Albert Edward Nyanza]; which led me and Commander Julian Baker to believe, that Livingstone was right in thinking that some communication existed between Tanganyika and Muta Nzigé.'

Three weeks later, in another letter to Stanley, Baker says:

'5th December, 1889.

'All your work through the Semliki valley is of enormous interest to me, and will be to Captain Baker (H.M.S. *Buzzard*), to whom I have written, as he was

at Masindi with me and heard the native accounts. Their *One Water* of course included *two* Muta Nzigés and the Semliki River, which is, as we now know, correct. The two lakes with the *same name* has been the source of confusion; as I always accepted it as one lake.

'My altitude [in feet] of the Albert Nyanza stood thus:

Baker.	Dunkin.	Kew correction.	Result.
2,388	2,448	272	2,720

I see you make it 2,350 ft. This is a wonderful approximation; as it differs only 38 ft. from my observation. But they will lay hold of your Casella's thermometer when you return, and make all sorts of experiments with it.

'I can't make out why neither Gessi, nor Mason, nor Emin saw the snowy mountains; except that mist may have concealed them. I saw a mountain, which is marked on the map I gave the Geographical Society, situated about 50 or 60 miles south of Mbakovia; but no snow. It is quite possible that the Semliki valley was inundated when I saw the Lake, from Mbakovia; but I will shew you my original sketch and also my Diary, written on the spot, whenever you can give me the opportunity.' . . .

Stanley's reply to the above, somewhat retarded, owing to the pressure of work that overwhelmed him during his sojourn at Cairo, was as follows:

'February 14th, 1890.

. . . 'Regarding Gessi and Mason, I take them to be examples as to how careful men should be when they think they have gained some advantage over their predecessors. And I may venture to add, that I was as great an offender in your case as any. . . . After hearing the *lu-lu-luing* of the Egyptian women and the shouts of the officers, I went to have a look at the grassy plain which they took to be a lake;

and I was at first amazed. I saw that they looked on a grassy plain. Regarded from your Observation Hill, in a peculiar atmosphere, I can well understand the level plain, covered with bleached grass, resembling a lake. Then again, you and I have both been misled by the term "Nyanza," which means any lake or big stream. I have passed over dozens of streams which are known under the same term,—the Semliki Nyanza, the Kitungelé Nyanza, the Kagera Nyanza, and so on. Also, the Albert, Albert Edward, and Victoria Nyanzas are all called Muta, or Luta, Nzigés!'

This interesting correspondence may be regarded as sufficiently illustrating and finally closing the discussion of the points at issue.

CHAPTER XIII.

HOME.

[1865–1869]

On his return to England in 1865, Baker received many flattering testimonies of personal and public appreciation.

The Royal Geographical Society was, naturally, the first public body to formally recognise the value of his discoveries and explorations in Africa. They had already, in anticipation of his return, awarded him the much-coveted Gold Medal of the Society; and it was to them he first reported upon the results of his expedition. He read a Paper before the Society at the Inaugural Meeting of the Session, 1865–1866; and a second, dealing with his Abyssinian journey, at the concluding Meeting. On both occasions, under the Presidentship of Sir Roderick Murchison, he met with a most cordial reception.

The Paris Geographical Society awarded him their *Grande Médaille d'Or*, and, together with other foreign Societies, admitted him to Honorary Membership. A few years later, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society.

The following appreciative letter, from Mr. W. E. Gladstone to Sir Roderick Murchison, will be read with interest:

'July 23rd, 1866.

'Could we not have some Testimonial, by subscription, to her [Mrs. Baker], or to him and to her?

'Baker has done us very great honour in a distant and barbarous land: he has made another great discovery: the lives dearest to him have been imperilled: and he has achieved his work without costing the State a shilling.

'Now, I am afraid the idea, if approved, is too late for the *season* operations. But it might be acted upon in the autumn. Pray think of it. I shall probably be out of England, though not so far as the Albert Nyanza. But my name and subscription will gladly be forthcoming.

'His last twenty pages [of the work, *Albert Nyanza*, published by Macmillan] are, I think, a masterpiece. And I read with much pleasure his citation from you. You are a geographer with a vengeance: for you can travel over and tell about the earth even while you stay at home. [This passage has reference to Baker's remarks on Sir Roderick's theories of the geological structure and hydrography of Central Africa.]

'Pray do not take the trouble to write to me about this, unless I can be useful: but if it be worth while, consult with higher authorities. I know not whether the State can confer some mark of honour: but that need not clash with my suggestion.'

The State did, in fact, a few weeks later, recognise Baker's services, by conferring on him the honour of knighthood; and Mr. Gladstone's kindly suggestion, as to the Testimonial, was not carried-out. The Earl of Derby intimated Her Majesty's pleasure in the following letter addressed to Baker:

'Downing Street: 15th August, 1866.

'I am commanded by the Queen to express to you Her sense of the services rendered to Geographical Science by your laborious researches in Africa; and to add, that Her Majesty will have pleasure in testifying Her appreciation of those services by conferring on you the Honour of Knighthood, should it be agreeable to you to accept it.'

After five years' exploration in Inner Africa, during which he had endured so many privations, and in spirit had died a dozen deaths, Baker's return to his home and the attractions of civilised life were in themselves a sufficient recompense. He rented Hedenham Hall, Bungay, in Norfolk, where he was once more re-united with his children; and for some months appeared to be contented with the repose of English country-life. In the following letter to his eldest sister, he gives a description of his new home:

'7th August, 1866.

'Here we are, settled at last, in a queer old place, with a hall that is now adorned with all my African spoils. There are no greenhouses, nor even melon-frames, as the place is pre-Adamite. The garden is that of Eden; but man has spoiled my Eden by the erection of a pump. No spade or rake appears to have interfered with the arrangements of Nature. The old house stands in a park of very rich grass, with very beautiful oaks and sweet-chestnuts many centuries old, beneath which the children are cutting-about on their pony, as happy as possible. We have our cows, pigs, turkeys, ducks and fowls; and the art of wandering, having taught us the habit of quickly settling-down in a new camp, we are as much at home as though we had lived here since the day the old oaks were planted.'

During the following year, 1867, we find Baker paying a round of visits in England and Scotland, and magnanimously giving-up the best days of his shooting to preside over the Geographical Section of the British Association, at their Meeting in Dundee. In the same year, his eldest daughter was married to the Revd. Robert Marshall, the Rector of the parish of Hedenham.

After his daughter's marriage, he was again seized with the desire of leading a 'more active life elsewhere' than in England. His thoughts were constantly wandering back to Africa. The preparations for the expedition to Abyssinia engaged much of his attention; and he was quite prepared to take part in it, should his services have been required.

This military expedition, it will be remembered, was undertaken for the purpose of releasing certain British subjects and European residents who were held captive at Magdala by the Negus Theodore; and it was being organised in the deliberate and conscientious way in which Great Britain usually fulfils her responsibilities in such matters. Ultimatums had been sent to King Theodore, but had either not been received, or were treated with indifference. A British envoy, Mr. Rassam, accompanied by Lieutenant Prideau and Dr. Blanc, had, on the other hand, been cordially welcomed by the Negus; but had foolishly accepted gifts of money from him, amounting to some £3,000, which had been distributed among the captives for the alleviation of their sufferings.

The usual return-present, however, not being forthcoming, the Europeans, after having at first been released, were again loaded with chains and cast into prison, in company with Mr. Rassam's party.

This conduct on the part of Theodore was very reprehensible. An imposing expedition under Sir Robert Napier consequently left Bombay for the scene of action; and, in January, 1868, landed at Annesley Bay. The sequel is too well known to require description in this place; but it is worth noting, that the Expedition, which cost the country nearly nine million pounds sterling, merely resulted in the release of the prisoners, the suicide of Theodore, and the acquisition of some geographical knowledge.

Baker's plan, had it been adopted, might easily have been carried-out before the British contingent landed in Africa; and, had it proved successful, it would have saved the country a very heavy expenditure. But its very simplicity failed—perhaps, on that account—to appeal to the common-sense of the Government. A high official of the State put it in this way to Baker:

'Are you sure that such an expedition as you suggest is feasible, without a gigantic outlay of men and money? Considering . . . [here the obstacles are enumerated] can you make sure of rescuing the prisoners without employing fifteen, or perhaps twenty thousand, men, and without an expedition that would run up to many millions? And if so, will public opinion justify the resorting to such measures? . . . But the King's answer has not yet been received . . . -and the reports

. . . which would probably be a solution of the difficulty . . . ' etc., etc.

The subsequent conduct of the Abyssinian Campaign is a sufficient commentary on this letter.

Baker explained his plan, as follows, in a letter to Lord Wharncliffe:

'29th October, 1867.

'I am trying to persuade the Government to send a small expedition of 1,000 men *viâ* Suakin to Abyssinia, through my old friend Meg Nimr's country; and to endeavour to release the captives by this means: as he is a great friend of Theodore's. Should he fail, the force of 1,000 British troops (250 cavalry, 650 infantry, and one battery of artillery), supplied with 4,000 old percussion muskets and ammunition, would form a nucleus round which the rebels would collect. These, being armed with the Tower muskets, and organised by some English officers selected for that purpose, would be in the heart of Theodore's country in a few days; and would, in my opinion, settle the affair long before Napier's column could commence the march from the coast of Massawa.'

Baker, himself, in his correspondence with Lord Stanley and Sir Stafford Northcote, offered to go out as British Envoy or Commissioner; and to endeavour in the first instance to effect the release of the prisoners by diplomatic and pacific means. His knowledge of African potentates led him to believe, that Theodore was not superior to the insidious argument of *bakhshish*. Besides, as he said in a letter to Sir Roderick Murchison: 'I think the public will change their minds about Theodore. He may be a savage; but he has

been very badly treated as a King.' Which was true enough, as things go.

Be that as it may, Baker's project was well worth a trial; and would not have prejudiced any subsequent action. As events turned-out, Magdala was razed to the ground in April; the captives were released; and the last troops embarked for England in June, 1868. Still, the little bill had to be paid by British tax-payers, some of whom were dissatisfied with the 'value received.'

Another subject that deeply interested Baker at this period was the fate of Livingstone, with reference to which he carried-on an energetic correspondence with Sir Roderick Murchison, Mr. Webb (of Newstead Abbey), and others.

Livingstone, after his successful Zambezi Expedition (1858–1864), had again returned to Africa, with the purpose, though incidental to his missionary-work, of exploring the region of the great Lakes, and of tearing aside the last remaining shreds of mystery that veiled the ultimate sources of the Nile. He left Zanzibar in March, 1866; and plunged into the heart of the continent, with his customary faith and daring. Reports of his murder near the Nyasa reached the Coast, after the fashion of such reports, uncertainly, in September 1866, March 1867, and at intervals for several years thereafter: but they were one and all disproved by letters received from the great missionary-pioneer himself. Thus, his fate was uncertain in 1867, when the Search Expedition under Mr. Young was sent-out by the Royal

Geographical Society: and returned in the belief of his being alive. It was equally uncertain when another expedition, equipped by the same Society, started, under Lieutenant Dawson, in 1872: but returned on hearing that Stanley had found the long-missing traveller. Stanley having, in fact, met Livingstone at Ujiji, in November 1871, had spent four months of profitable work with him; and, though he returned without his captive, he brought with him the geographical results of the latter's wanderings.

Livingstone finally succumbed to an attack of dysentery, in 1873, worn-out by privations, and yielding his life stubbornly on the field of his labours. Here is Baker's tribute to him, written at a time when he was still alive, at the south end of the Nyasa, though believed in England to be dead. It is addressed to Sir Roderick Murchison:

'8th March, 1867.

'This is indeed a sad close to Livingstone's career: but, after all, it is mingled with the glory of dying in harness, of falling upon the field of his own choice, after the hard struggle of African exploration. I would rather die thus, than be slowly poisoned by a doctor; and the hard soil of Africa is a more fitting couch for the last gasp of an African explorer than the down-pillow of civilised home.

. . . 'Livingstone's fate seems to have cast a gloom over African travel; and the papers appear to taunt African travellers with running Quixotic risks. If England is becoming so cowardly and so soft, that travel shall cease in dangerous countries because some fall victims to it, then it is time to roll-up the English flag and

to admit the decline of English spirit. In all humility, I can only say, that *I* am ready.'

Baker had, indeed, been ready to do his utmost to bring succour to a brave man, who, buried in the heart of Africa, best knew Africa's need, and whose life was valuable to her benighted children. He had drawn-up a carefully-considered plan for ensuring relief to Livingstone, and at the same time for performing useful geographical work by the way. His idea was, to get a strong Anglo-Egyptian expedition together; and to force his way up the Nile to the source-region, where he hoped to join hands with Livingstone. 'If my old acquaintance, Kamrasi, should be obstreperous,' he remarked to Sir Roderick Murchison, 'we would bring him home to exhibit at Burlington House on the opening of the Session, and make him an F.R.G.S.' Circumstances, however, prevented him from carrying-out this plan, either in person or by deputy. But, in 1873, when he was again on the Upper Nile, he enlisted the sympathies of M'tesa, the King of Uganda, who, of his own accord, sent-out two special expeditions in search of the missing traveller, one of which encountered Lieutenant Cameron and delivered to him Baker's letter for Livingstone. Cameron, it may be added, was leading the Royal Geographical Society's Expedition, one object of which was to effect a junction with Livingstone.

The year 1868 was passed by Baker, much as the previous year, in visiting his numerous

friends and in cultivating such tastes as he at that time possessed for the charms of country-life. In the autumn, he published his first attempt at fiction, *Cast Up by the Sea*, a stirring story of adventure, which has had a wide circulation.

In the early part of 1869, he went out, by request, to Egypt, in order to assist in the arrangements for the visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales, and to join the suite of their Royal Highnesses in the journey up the Nile.

Between the First and Second Cataracts, the Prince's party was under the charge, so to speak, of Baker, whose knowledge of Arabic was serviceable, and whose acquaintance with the manners and customs of crocodiles served to introduce his Royal Highness to a new form of sport. The crocodiles, however, proved to be less intrusive than the other riverain inhabitants of the Nile, who constantly clamoured for *bakhshish*.

On their return to the Delta, the Prince and Princess and their suite attended, among other functions, a *bal costumé* at Ismailia, following a dinner at which the visitors and officers of the Suez Canal Company were entertained by M. de Lesseps. It was at this ball that the Khedive Ismail, in the course of conversation, communicated his idea of nominating Sir Samuel Baker to take command of an expedition for the suppression of the Slave Trade on the White Nile, and for the establishment of order in the Sudan.

He had spoken 'with Sir Samuel on the subject,' says Dr. W. H. Russell,* 'but seemed to be in doubt as to the propriety or likelihood of success of the step. No one could hesitate in approving of a measure dictated by a generous and enlightened policy; and, in a country to which France generally lends ideas and agencies in every department of administration [this was written in the year 1869], the choice of an enterprising English traveller, who had shown conduct and courage in his difficult explorations, was peculiarly gratifying.' Dr. Russell, moreover, adds, in a footnote: 'The final arrangement was entirely due to the Prince of Wales, who highly approved of the Expedition, and suggested the conditions of service which the Viceroy proposed to Sir Samuel Baker.'

Whilst the Prince of Wales' party proceeded on their journey to Constantinople and the Crimea, Baker hurried home to make preparations for his new expedition, the official character and the nature of which made it an undertaking of considerable importance.

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* *Diary in the East*, p. 384.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SLAVE TRADE.

OUR knowledge of the conditions under which the Slave Trade is conducted in Africa has so greatly increased since the year 1869, that, in applying general principles to illustrate the task undertaken by Baker, we run the risk of making his efforts appear futile, or at the best misdirected. But, it must be borne in mind that, when Ismail Pasha decided upon the *suppression* of the Slave Trade within the jurisdiction of Egypt, it was believed that this end might be effected by force of arms alone. We now know, and Baker himself afterwards recognized, that to speak of the forcible suppression of the Slave Trade amounts almost to an absurdity: the Traffic itself may be regulated, or it may be checked for a time, but it can never be stamped-out so long as the conditions that give rise to it remain the same. Therefore, in order to alter these conditions, we must remove the predisposing causes.

For the reason that, in physics, 'Nature abhors a vacuum,' so in this matter of the Slave Trade, whatever displacement we cause must be refilled with a more suitable medium. If we de-

stroy a national institution, we must be prepared to establish something better in its stead.

To effect this end, the Slave Trade must first be absorbed by the slow and natural process of *assimilation*. It is a social disease, endemic to all partially civilised or barbarous countries; and is not subject to successful treatment by the empirical and heroic methods of surgery. Livingstone called it the 'open sore of Africa'; and he was right: for, if the blood of the 'body politic' be poisoned, no local treatment of the wound can avail, though it may alleviate suffering.

That Ismail Pasha should have decided on a course of action which, on the face of it, was bound to make him very unpopular with his own subjects, is equivalent to saying, that Ismail Pasha had ulterior objects in view when he entrusted an Englishman with almost unlimited powers to check or suppress a traffic in which Egypt herself was deeply involved. Human motives are proverbially mixed; and, it must be confessed that, Egyptian governors are not above the frailty of humanity. Ismail's ostensible object was the suppression of the Slave Trade; but his real object was, no doubt, the consolidation and extension of Egyptian rule over the regions of the Upper Nile, in furtherance of the programme initiated by his distinguished grandfather, Mohammed Ali. Still, it was to the credit of Ismail, that he was the first Oriental who dared to undertake such a reform; and it spoke much for his intelligence and foresight,

that he had the acumen to entrust the command of his great expedition to an Englishman.*

Baker was, in fact, the first Englishman to fill a high office under the Egyptian Government; and he promoted the future ascendancy of British influence in Egypt by demanding that his successor should also be an Englishman. He made this patriotic provision with full knowledge of its significance and possible results; and thereby assisted in breaking-down long-established precedents by which the exercise of British influence in Egypt was heavily handicapped. That her Majesty's Government failed to take full advantage of this new position, it is scarcely necessary to add; but it was much to be regretted that the Foreign Office should have thought it necessary to ostentatiously disown any responsibility for the personal safety of the British officers of the Expedition, more especially as its main object was the proud mission of Great Britain, upon which, two years later, she despatched Sir Bartle Frere to Zanzibar. Baker was told, that he took his life in his own hands, and need not look to Downing Street to extricate him from

* Throughout the entire Expedition, Baker received most zealous and unwavering support from the Khedive. His loyalty to Ismail led him to repudiate the doubts that were freely expressed in Europe regarding the avowed object of the Expedition; but that there were good grounds for these doubts, which in no wise reflected on the *bona fides* of his Highness, cannot be denied at the present day. Ismail Pasha would have been more than human to have had but the one object in view—that object undermining the entire fabric of social life in Egypt—and was too good a patriot, not to take advantage of every means to advance the interests of his country.

any difficulties into which he might stumble. Baker, being a practical man, declared, that he was quite able to look after his own life, and would be satisfied if Downing Street would take care that the terms of his contract were faithfully carried-out. The Foreign Office agreed to accept this well-defined responsibility; and there the matter ended.

In order that our readers may fully realise the colossal task that Baker so lightly undertook to perform—a task which he himself afterwards compared to that of Sisyphus—it will be necessary for us to explain, in the fewest essential words, what precisely were the conditions that rendered it, *ab ovo*, an impossible one. That incidentally, in the performance of this task, Baker should have served the main purpose of his employer, by annexing fresh lands to Egypt, was a compliment to the astuteness of the Khedive, but by no means a fair test of the relative success of the Expedition. Baker, who had suffered so much at the hands of the slave-traders, and had himself witnessed the iniquities of the Traffic, might well have been carried-away by the prospect of re-entering the land of his sufferings as a Deliverer,—for was he not nominated Governor-General of the Equatorial Provinces, with supreme power, even that of life and death?—but, in the performance of his mission, he really did at the time believe himself capable of extirpating the slave-dealers, and thereby, as he erroneously thought,

suppressing the Slave Trade. It is easy to be 'wise after the event': and Baker had yet to learn that, whatever might be the purity of Ismail's intentions, no Egyptian official would of his own good-will, or except under the strongest compulsion, raise a finger to suppress a traffic upon which he and his kind grew rich and powerful; and that, though you may kill any number of slave-traders, there will always be others to take their place—so long as the principle of demand and supply controls the existence of this hateful Traffic in human lives. That this economic principle does exist in regard to the Slave Trade, and that it is at the root of it, it will now be our purpose to demonstrate.

There is a demand for slaves — eunuchs, women and boys—in all Mohammedan countries.* It is immediately supplied from the sources nearest to hand. The natives who are hunted-down in the Sudan are taken to Tripoli, Egypt, Turkey, Arabia and Persia. Some are retained for home-consumption, so to speak. There is also a demand for slaves on the plantations in the East African islands and on the East Coast. These are openly supplied, partly from the above-mentioned source, and partly

* Baker, writing in 1878, says: 'Every household in Upper Egypt and in the Delta was [in 1870] dependent upon slave-service . . . in fact, Egyptian society without slaves would be like a carriage devoid of wheels: it could not proceed.' Yet, in 1894, an Egyptian Pasha of high rank was prosecuted for buying a slave.

from the Lake-region in the south. With the demand in other parts of Africa we need not concern ourselves in this place.

In regard to the question of supply, we have to emphasize a very important statement, the truth of which has been fully established: namely, that *the Slave Trade in itself does not pay*. It must, in consequence, be made to pay by some other means, because there is a demand. Hence it is that the traffic in slaves and the traffic in ivory have always worked hand-in-hand. We have only to consult a map, to convince ourselves of this fact. The slave-trading preserves coincide with the elephant-hunting grounds. *All slave-routes are trade-routes.*

As ivory is by far the most valuable product of Africa, it is traded in conjunction with the next most valuable product: slaves. If gums were the most valuable commodity of commerce —as they may be some day, when the African elephant is extinct*—they would take the place of ivory. And besides, the only method at present in vogue for transporting goods from the less accessible places of supply to the chief centres of demand is on the shoulders of men. Few commodities in Africa would admit of fair wages being given to these human beasts of burden.

It is obvious, therefore, from a consideration of these facts, that if we wish to extirpate the

* It is estimated that the elephant will become extinct in Africa about one hundred and fifty or two hundred years hence.

African Slave Trade, we must use the weapons of commerce and not those of war, in order to destroy the demand.

The slave-preserves are situated wholly in Tropical Africa, within fifteen degrees north and south of the Equator. The slave-routes follow the line of least resistance to the nearest places of demand, and for the most part avoid traversing the healthy uplands, where the natives are strong and vigorous.

At one time the Red Sea Traffic was satisfied by the supply drawn from southern Europe; but, at the commencement of the present century, this source was cut-off.* Africa, from whence only a few slaves were formerly drawn, then became the source-region of this degrading commerce, the agents of which were, and are, chiefly Arabs from Arabia and the Persian Gulf. A certain amount of the export-trade is, however, carried-on in driblets, as private ventures, by all classes of natives. The hunting-grounds for the Red Sea Traffic are situated in the Central Sudan, the Upper Nile region, and Abyssinia. The chief trade-centres at the present day are Abeshr (Wadai), Fasher (Darfur), Khartum, Galabat and Dongola, from whence the slaves are taken to ports and creeks on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. In Arabia, Jidda is the principal port where they are received, and Mecca and Hodeida are the chief depôts whence they are distributed.

* Four centuries ago, there were public slave-marts at Seville and Lisbon, and even one at Bristol.

At the same time, it should be observed that, all trade-routes and trade-centres, whether for slaves or other commodities of commerce, are subject to alteration and displacement by the inflexible law of demand and supply: consequently, they are not necessarily permanent, and from time to time have been affected by the exigencies of political conditions or through the vigilance of British cruisers. In 1869, for instance, the Slave Trade of the Upper Nile Basin was, comparatively speaking, in its infancy: it required the extension of Egyptian political influence and the corrupt rule of Mohammedan officials to encourage its development into the enormous proportions that it subsequently assumed, until the fall of Khartum shook-off the last hold of Egypt on the Sudan.*

When Baker was created a Pasha and nominated 'Governor-General of the Equatorial Nile Basin,' one of his chief duties was to reconquer Gondokoro, where the slave-traders were established in force, and to annex the countries under his so-called Governor-Generalship. In 1869 their power in the region of the Bahr El Ghazal was so great, that they refused to pay any dues to the Egyptian Government; whilst Khartum itself was a nest of slave-traders, and derived its wealth, fluctuating as this was, from their illicit Traffic. The Egyptian Governors and high officials in the Sudan had the power, whereby

* Emin Pasha was, it is true, an Egyptian official; but he was disowned by the Government at Cairo, and abandoned at Wadelai.

under existing laws they were called upon, to arrest the slave-traders; but they found it more profitable to levy blackmail—corrupt officials as they mostly were—accepting a fee of £2 for each slave that they 'passed.' Orders from Cairo regulating the Traffic were rarely enforced at Khartum: therefore, if for no other reason, their non-observance was either foreseen or connived at. Lower Egypt at that time, before the British Expedition blocked the way, received large numbers of slaves from the Sudan. As Baker himself put it, in 1884, ten years after his return home, a wiser and sadder man: 'The miserable difficulty [of suppressing the Slave Trade] lies in the fact that, if R. is a ruffian whom you hang, B. is a brute in Cairo who employs R.: therefore, you should also hang B. But K. is the Khedive, who probably has had dealings with B. What, then, are you to do with K.?' This was a proposition to which there was no Q.E.D.

Slavery and the Slave Trade, as an indigenous institution, existed in the Sudan long before the arrival of Egyptian conquerors and governors; but it was the Khartum merchants who organised the Traffic, and prepared the ground for its subsequent development.

The methods by which the slave-traders carry-out their *razzias* are simplicity itself. Those who cannot raise capital settle-down near to peaceable Negro communities; and acquire land and ivory by means best known to themselves. Openly, they plant their useful vegetable seeds; but, in

secret, they sow the seed of discord: so that tribe is set against tribe, and individual against individual, while the traders themselves daily increase in public estimation, power and wealth. When the time of their vile harvest arrives—that is to say, when they have collected a sufficient amount of ivory—the blow is struck. Upon some pretext, or upon no pretext, a quarrel is picked; and, either alone or with assistance, an attack is made by them on their inoffensive neighbours. Armed with weapons of precision, their victory is an easy one. The sequel one knows.

This method, involving time and little or no capital, is pursued only by *dilettanti* slave-traders, so to speak. The real 'ruffians,' mentioned by Baker, form *zaribas* with the avowed object of slave-hunting, and are supported by a considerable following of mercenaries; sometimes, too, they attach themselves to the strongest native chief in the country where they happen to find themselves, and espouse his quarrels. They steal cattle and slaves from one tribe to pay for the ivory from another: thus 'robbing Peter to pay Paul.' They also employ nomad and warlike tribes to raid for them; while individual natives, under this demoralising influence, occasionally do a little slave-catching on their own account. Indeed, it is said that liberated or freed slaves are, if not the most zealous, at least the most expert in this kind of desultory man-hunting.

Finally, among other sources of the Slave Trade, we may mention: criminals who are sold

for their crimes, victims of witchcraft, and prisoners of war.

It will thus be seen, that the sources of the Slave Trade are many and varied; that, as an institution, it is deeply rooted in the social life of the natives; and that the most effectual means of checking it, with a view to its ultimate suppression, are—(1) to regulate the importation of arms and munitions of war into Central Africa; (2) to abolish the legal *status* of slavery, and to treat slave-trading as piracy; (3) to introduce some form of servitude, or serfdom, by which manumitted slaves may work-out their complete freedom, and thereby enable the new order of things to imperceptibly take the place of the old; and (4) to introduce legitimate commerce, by which the trade in ivory, which alone makes the Slave Trade pay, shall gradually become a European monopoly, subject to stringent regulations and close supervision. Obviously, too, the patrol of the Coasts and of the great inland Lakes should be maintained, until the export-traffic dies a natural death; and for this purpose 'the right of search' is an imperative necessity.

The process of slowly undermining the Slave Trade must, in fact, be controlled by sound commercial principles, and, consequently, be pacific in its character. A distinction is to be drawn between police supervision and armed opposition. Though the latter be futile, punitive expeditions may occasionally be necessary. A chain of settlements, within touch of one another and of the Coasts—the

prime European base—should be established along the chief highways of commerce, in accordance with the admirable programme of the Berlin Conference of 1884–85. These would give protection and assistance, not only to European travellers and explorers, but also to the natives, who could then rest in some degree of security from the slave-raiders, and have at least a chance of cultivating their own lands, with the added prospect, at present denied them, of reaping where they have sown. Native levies under European command would be quite strong enough, if properly armed and drilled, to protect the stations, uphold order, and keep a careful watch over the Traffic in Slaves.

Such, in conclusion, are the general principles of repression resulting from our present knowledge of the conditions of the Slave Trade. They are now unanimously advocated, though rarely carried into practice, in consequence of international jealousy and the relative impotence of European Powers holding large spheres of influence in Tropical Africa. But in 1869, when Baker attempted the task of Sisyphus, the Slave Trade on the Upper Nile was not sufficiently developed, nor adequately understood, to enable him to form any such conclusions. He, himself, had had more experience of it than any other European; and consequently was well-fitted to grapple with its most flagrant iniquities. Being a man of action, and no theorist, he set-about his task in a characteristic fashion. The slave-traders were then

harrying the countries placed under his command: consequently, they had to be removed. This was quite obvious, admitting of no doubt in his mind. At the same time, he was fully aware that, to extend the power of Egypt in the south, was to extend her latitude for evil practices. For this reason, he stipulated, that his successor should be one of his own countrymen. With such powers as he possessed, both of place and character, and with a confidence in himself that hitherto had broken-down every obstacle in his path, he had reason to hope, that his method of dealing with the Slave Trade, if not directly successful, would at least lay the foundations for its total suppression by his successors in office.

Engraved by C.H. Jeens

Sir Samuel White Baker Pasha.

CHAPTER XV.

ORGANIZATION OF THE EXPEDITION.

[1869]

CAIRO was *en fête* during the winter of 1869–1870. Egypt was enjoying a brief but brilliant period of prosperity. The respective prerogatives, as between the Khedive and his suzerain, having been satisfactorily arranged, Ismail was in the zenith of his career. The Suez Canal was inaugurated by him in November; a network of irrigating canals had been created; and the scheme for his great docks at Alexandria was under consideration;* Imperial and Royal visitors, together with a host of every nationality and every class, were his honoured guests; whilst the splendour of his entertainments and the generous treatment of his friends dazzled the eyes of Europe. Money flowed like water in the parched land of the Pharaohs, and touched the high-water mark of lavish expenditure: was it, cynics may have asked themselves, the natural flood of success or merely the result of artificial irrigation? Royal progresses were then common events in Egypt; and a fleet of vessels was in constant use, carrying Ismail's

* They were commenced in March 1870.

guests upon the Nile. Cairo was a second Paris: palaces, public gardens, promenades, an Opera-house, theatres, and all the attributes of a great town attested the fact.

Under such circumstances, it was not the most appropriate time for Baker to complete the final arrangements concerning his expedition. 'I have had to exercise all my patience,' he says, in a letter to one of his daughters, 'since the arrival of the Empress of the French; as no work has been done, and all our arrangements for starting have been postponed until the fêtes shall have been concluded for the opening of the Canal. Such is Egypt!—all work stopped for the sake of amusement!' Nevertheless, Nubar Pasha was presiding over international congresses, taking part in mixed commissions, and working with indefatigable energy; whilst the Khedive Ismail was ever ready to promote the success of the great expedition that was attracting the eyes of Europe to the comprehensiveness of his reforms.

On his arrival in May, 1869, Baker received the following *firman* from the Khedive:

'We, Ismail, Khedive of Egypt, considering the savage condition of the tribes which inhabit the Nile basin;

'Considering, that neither government, nor laws, nor security exists in those countries;

'Considering, that humanity enforces the suppression of the slave-hunters who occupy those countries in great numbers;

'Considering, that the establishment of legitimate commerce throughout those countries will be a great

stride towards future civilization, and will result in the opening to steam navigation of the great Equatorial Lakes of Central Africa, and in establishing a permanent government . . .

'We have decreed, and now decree, as follows:

'An Expedition is organized to *subdue to our authority* [the italics are ours] the countries situated to the south of Gondokoro;

'To suppress the Slave Trade;

'To introduce a system of regular commerce;

'To open to navigation the great Lakes of the Equator;

'And to establish a chain of military stations and commercial depôts, distant at intervals of three days' march, throughout Central Africa, accepting Gondokoro as a base of operations.

'The supreme command of this Expedition is confided to Sir Samuel White Baker, for four years, commencing from 1st April, 1869; upon whom also we confer the most absolute and supreme power, even that of death, over all those who may compose the Expedition.

'We confer upon him the same absolute and supreme authority over all those countries belonging to the Nile basin, south of Gondokoro.'

Moreover, he was given the rank of Major-General of the Ottoman Empire, and raised to the Pashalik.

On the 19th May, Baker wrote home from Alexandria: 'I have settled everything satisfactorily with the Khedive. All is signed, sealed and delivered; and I have the most absolute power over the southern Nile Basin.' But he was kept waiting at Cairo for some months, until the Egyptian authorities were in a position to carry-out his final arrangements.

In the following letter to Lord Wharncliffe, he gives an account of himself:

'Cairo: 22nd October, 1869.

'We should have been off long ago: but the steel steamers had not arrived from England; and I determined not to leave anything behind me. Thus, as they are now landed in sections at Alexandria, I shall see them off, together with seven English engineers who accompany them; after which we shall start from Suez to Suakin, and reach Khartum by the route through which we returned on our former journey.

'As you and Lady Wharncliffe take so kind an interest in the Expedition, I send you the following plan of our operations:

'The main objects of the enterprise are, after *crushing the Slave Trade* [Baker was sanguine enough to italicise these words]—

'1. To annex to the Egyptian Empire the Equatorial Nile Basin.

'2. To establish a powerful government throughout all those tribes now warring with each other.

'3. To introduce the cultivation of cotton on an extensive scale: so that the natives shall have a valuable production to exchange for Manchester goods, etc.

'4. To open to navigation the two great Lakes of the Nile.

'5. To establish a chain of trading-stations throughout the countries to be annexed: so as to communicate with the northern base from the most distant point in the South,—on the system adopted by the Hudson Bay Company.

'The natural productions are ivory, native flax, bees'-wax, and cotton; but I take seeds of the finest quality of the latter from Egypt. Every tribe will be compelled to cultivate a certain amount of corn and cotton, in

proportion to the population. No wars will be permitted. Each chief will be held responsible for the acts of his tribe. Tribute will be exacted in labour to be performed in opening-out roads, on the same principle as the road-tax in Ceylon.

'To carry-out this plan, I have absolute power, conferred by the Khedive.

'The military force comprises—

		Officers and men.
Infantry :	1st Egyptian Regiment - - -	710
„	1st Sudan „ - - -	500
Cavalry :	Irregulars - - - - -	200
Artillery :	Three batteries mountain-guns -	210
„	Rocket Battery, &c. - - -	80
		1,700

The above force (with twelve months' supplies) has already reached Khartum.

'The Flotilla, sent up the Nile two months ago, (which, I hear, has successfully ascended the rapids,) comprises six steamers, of 40 horse-power each, and thirty large sailing-vessels, in addition to four steamers and twenty-five sailing-vessels ready at Khartum. There is, therefore, a total of ten steamers and fifty-five sailing-vessels, or sixty-five sail of transports, to convey troops and supplies up the White Nile.

'Vessels, constructed of steel, by Samuda Brothers, will be conveyed in sections to N. lat., 3° 32′, and reconstructed at that point, in order to reach the Albert Nyanza by the navigable portion of the White Nile, above the last Cataract [*i.e.* the Fola Rapids, between Dufli and the junction of the Asua river].

'The Lake Flotilla comprises:

			Length (in ft.)	Beam (in ft.)	Tons.	Horse-power.
No. 1.	Steel steamer :	paddle-wheels -	130	20	251	30
„ 2.	„ „	twin-screws -	80	17	107	20
„ 3.	„ „	„ „ -	50	13	38	10
„ 4.	Steel Lifeboat :	sailing-lugger -	30	9	10	—
„ 5.	„ „	„ -	30	9	10	—

'The steamers are all fitted as yachts, and are the perfection of London workmanship. Twenty-five Arab ship-builders accompany us to build wooden vessels on the Albert Nyanza, together with sawyers, smiths, &c., with all materials.

'European Staff:

'Julian A. Baker, Lieutenant, R.N.
'Le Vicomte de Bizemont, R.N. (French Navy) - - - - } *Aides-de-camp.*
'Edwin Higginbotham, Chief Engineer.
'Dr. Joseph Gedge, Chief of Medical Staff.
'Six English Engineers, boiler-makers, &c., from factories of Samuda and of Penn.
'Michael Marcopolo, Head Storekeeper.
'English servant, and Lady's maid.
'My wife, and self.

'We are thus, 15 Europeans. With servants, troops, workmen, &c., the Expedition numbers 2,000 men.

'The Nile has been, and still is, immensely high, which is all in favour of the passage of the Cataracts. The Flotilla is to wait at Berber to re-embark stores, steamer-sections, &c., on their arrival across the Korosko Desert. Eight hundred cases of merchandise passed the Desert two months ago for that point (Berber), at which spot the various branches of the Expedition will meet, converging from Suakin and the Lower Nile.

'I received from the Khedive, together with absolute power, *carte blanche* for all expenses of the Expedition; and I have controlled the outlay in England so carefully, that, including immense supplies of beads, merchandise, &c., together with the steam flotilla of Samuda, steam saw-mills, lathes, tools, spare gear, &c., I have only expended £26,000, all of which has been paid by the Egyptian Government.

'The salaries come rather high, as all the Europeans must have their travelling expenses paid and be provided with food.

'The Khedive requested me to extend my engagement to four years, at £10,000 a year, as Governor-General of the new territory. Six months of this term expired on 1st October; and they paid the first instalment without delay. I have no doubt that the proceeds of next year will repay the Khedive all his outlay; after which he will realize a considerable income from his new empire.

'Although I am no "nigger-worshipper," I have great hopes of effecting a vast improvement among the tribes by the suppression of the Slave Trade, and by the introduction of agricultural and commercial enterprise. I have large quantities of seeds of all kinds that will be well adapted to the climate and soil of Central Africa, and that will confer a great blessing on the country. No man shall be idle under my rule. If I free them from slavery, I shall insist upon their working for themselves. They will then desire to exchange their surplus produce for our manufactures; but, unless by a vigorous authority compelled to work, they would quickly relapse into hopeless apathy and indolence; a desire for slaves would result from habits of idleness, and the Negro would enslave the Negro as before, should the paternal but strong arm be withdrawn from them.

'As I shall establish a regular monthly post on the White Nile between Cairo and Khartum, we shall never be out of hearing.'

This long and detailed letter absolves us from the task of describing the *personnel* and *matériel* of the Expedition. As regards its objects and prospects, it must be borne in mind, that when a man writes to an old and intimate friend he is apt to be expansive. How far the results justified his early prognostications, readers of this narrative will be able to judge for themselves; but Baker could not possibly have foreseen all the obstacles in his path. This letter,

therefore, though more interesting on that account, as disclosing his most sanguine expectations, exhibits a freedom of expression that must not be too closely criticised. Also, on comparing it with published accounts, it will be seen that his arrangements underwent some modifications, both as regards the details of equipment and of organization.

The Expedition was on so vast and imposing a scale that Baker might well have been excused for cherishing the most ambitious projects. Some of the English newspapers compared him to Cortez and Pizarro; and in Cairo he received every mark of distinction as the commander of a military expedition upon the success of which Egypt based the highest expectations. In a word, he was a modern Argonaut.

The Vicomte de Bizemont, mentioned by Baker as a member of his staff, was an explorer of considerable distinction, whom the Paris Geographical Society had entrusted with a scientific mission to the Upper Nile. He himself entertained the ambition, and had imparted to Baker his design, of eventually working his way across the continent, from the Nile-sources to the West Coast of Africa. He was saved from this perilous adventure by the news he received, shortly after his arrival at Khartum, of the disastrous issues to his country resulting from the battle of Sedan, which caused him to hasten back to France in order to place his services at the disposal of his sovereign, from whom in former days

he had received many marks of personal regard. Of the remaining members of the Expedition we shall have occasion to speak in another place.

On the 5th December, 1869, Sir Samuel and Lady Baker left Suez on board an Egyptian sloop-of-war; and sailed for Suakin. After a week's delay at this port, for the purpose of obtaining camels, the desert was crossed to Berber, where a steamer and *dahabia* were in readiness; and Khartum was reached after a journey from Suez of only thirty-two days, including stoppages.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE TASK OF SISYPHUS.

[1870–1871]

In the organisation of his expedition to Central Africa, Baker's chief object was to make it entirely independent of Egypt for supplies, in so far as the *matériel* was concerned, and self-supporting for a period of four years. No detail had been overlooked; and every contingency suggested by his previous experience of the Sudan had been provided for. In equipment, there appeared to be nothing left for him to desire; but in the selection of the *personnel* he was not altogether a free agent: that is to say, though he was allowed to choose his chief officers, the troops were provided for him, and were not personally inspected until his arrival at Khartum. Thus, while the Sudanese regiment included several efficient officers and men who had served for some years in Mexico with the French army under Marshal Bazaine, the Egyptian regiment turned out to be for the most part composed of slaves and of convicted felons who had been transported from Egypt to the Sudan. As for the cavalry, they were more than irregular—no two men were alike, either in their equipment or in the

choice of their mounts: they were, therefore, one and all dismissed as utterly useless. Besides, on his arrival at Khartum, Baker found that, in spite of the most explicit orders sent from Cairo, no transports had been prepared to convey his expedition and its enormous *impedimenta* to Gondokoro. The Governor-General, Jáfer Pasha, an old friend of Baker's and 'a most excellent man,' though not superior to his Mohammedan prejudices or to the disabilities under which every Egyptian official then laboured, had done little or nothing to provide for the needs of the Expedition. On the contrary, Baker soon discovered that every device in the armoury of procrastination was being used against him, in order to delay his preparations or to give time to the slave-traders to render his mission abortive.

With the effective aid of his nephew, Lieutenant Julian Baker—the eldest son of his brother John—he brought the strongest pressure to bear upon the Governor-General; and, by paying exorbitant prices, secured thirty-three vessels, including two steamers, for the purposes of transport. These were by no means sufficient:

'My original programme—agreed to by his Highness the Khedive, who ordered the execution of my orders by the authorities—arranged,' says Baker, 'that six steamers, fifteen sloops, and fifteen *dahabias* should leave Cairo on 10th June, to ascend the Cataracts to Khartum; at which place Jáfer Pasha was to prepare three steamers and twenty-five vessels to convey 1,650 troops, together with transport-animals and supplies. The usual Egyptian delays have entirely thwarted my plans. No vessels

have arrived from Cairo, as they only started on 29th August. Thus, rather than turn back, I start with a mutilated expedition, without *a single transport-animal.*'*

Moreover, the chief engineer, Mr. Higginbotham, who was then at Berber, was dependent on Khartum for vessels to convey a sufficient number of camels to carry the steamer-sections on the departure of the Expedition from Gondokoro and, in addition to the needful supplies, about 350 troops and four guns.

Though the Governor-General had wilfully neglected Baker's orders transmitted from Cairo, he had nevertheless commissioned an expedition consisting of several companies of Regular Egyptian troops, under a notorious slave-trader, Akád, for operations on the Bahr El Ghazal. A squadron of eleven vessels was ready to convey this expedition to the scene of its depredations when Baker arrived at Khartum with a commission from the Khedive to suppress the Slave Trade! No stronger illustration could be afforded of the divergence of views that existed between the humanitarian policy of the Khedive himself and the slave-trading system upon which the Government of the Sudan was based, with the concurrence and connivance of the Cairene authorities. The entire country was, in fact, leased-out to the leading slave-traders, who paid large sums to the Governor-General of the Sudan for the so-called mo-

* This and other quotations, the sources of which are not explicitly stated, in the present chapter, are taken from Baker's work, *Ismailia.*

nopoly of the ivory-trade, or, in other words, for permission to carry fire and sword into countries which did not then belong to Egypt, but which Baker had been commissioned by the Khedive to annex, for the purposes of suppressing the Slave Trade and of introducing legitimate commerce.

'My task,' explains Baker, 'was to suppress the Slave Trade, when the Khartum authorities well knew that their tenants were slave-hunters; to establish legitimate commerce where the monopoly of trade had already been leased to traders; to build-up a government upon sound and just principles, that must of necessity ruin the slave-hunting and ivory-collecting parties of Khartum.'

Truly, Egypt is the land of paradox! But Baker had to take things as he found them, and make the best of his equivocal position. He had no jurisdiction except that which he claimed over the 'high-seas,' so to speak, of the Nile, and over the territories south of Gondokoro; though he had urged the necessity of his commission extending to within a reasonable radius of Khartum. He now knew why his request had not been granted; though he loyally supported the good-faith of the Khedive himself. 'It was,' he says, 'as if the Governor-General of the Sudan had said to the Khartum traders: "Begone, good wolves, behave yourselves like lambs, and do not hurt the mutton!"' The entire country had been depopulated and devastated; even between Berber and Khartum 'there was not a dog left to howl for a lost master': the wolves had driven them away.

From the two regiments of infantry Baker selected a body-guard of 46 men, whom he placed under the command of an excellent and faithful officer, named Abd-el-Kader, holding the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, whose loyalty was such that he earned among his comrades the contemptuous title of 'Englishman.' Baker himself was nicknamed 'the Christian'; but he retaliated by playfully calling his body-guard 'the Forty Thieves—owing to the peculiar light-fingered character of the men,' upon whose discipline, efficiency and courage he, however, always spoke in terms of the highest praise.

Upon the eve of departure, he explained his position in the following letter to his eldest daughter:

'Khartum: 7th February, 1870.

. . . 'Upon arrival here, we found no preparations had been made, although the Governor-General had received instructions seven months ago. . . . We shall have been here a month to-morrow; and I have now 30 vessels equipped and loaded, some of which have already started. We ourselves start this evening.

'Mr. Edwin Higginbotham, my chief engineer, will arrive here in a few days in charge of the Lake steamers built by Mr. Samuda. This gentleman (Higginbotham) is of immense assistance to me; and he deserves great praise for having surmounted all the difficulties of the [Nubian] desert route, with 1,500 camels carrying heavy and unmanageable loads. Six vessels have already arrived here, charged with machinery, &c. We are all in excellent health; and, having plenty of supplies, I have no fear of sickness. Julian [Lieutenant Baker] is picking-up Arabic, and is very energetic and useful.

. . . 'I expect to arrive at Gondokoro about the 3rd March. I must then push on with 200 men to establish a suspension-bridge across the Asua river, to ensure a communication before the rains shall have rendered the river impassable. I have the wire-rope with me, which will be stretched tight from bank to bank and traversed by a basket suspended on running-blocks.

'This season will then be employed in forming a settlement at the junction of the Un-y-Amé river [Khor Unyama] in N. lat. 3° 32′, at which spot the steel steamers will be mounted. During this operation I shall employ all the troops in cultivating the ground; so that we shall be independent of supplies after the first harvest. . . . We shall most probably remain for several months at that station, as I shall have much to do in establishing a government and bringing the country into order before I start further south to the Albert Nyanza.'

It would be tedious to follow Baker step by step in his voyage to the south, or to describe the countless difficulties that obstructed it. His chief obstacle was that curious formation in the bed of the river, called the *Sudd*. The Nile up to the Sobat junction is a noble stream, offering few physical barriers to navigation; but in ascending the river above this confluence, one enters 'a region of immense flats and boundless marshes, through which the river winds in a labyrinth-like course for about 750 miles to Gondokoro.' This is the country, or rather one region of the Upper Nile, where the dreaded *Sudd* bars the way to the free navigation of the river: that is to say, it did when Baker arrived there, on his outward journey, and continued to do so until his return, when measures had been taken to open-up the main channels of

communication. The navigator who attempts to take his vessel or vessels through this ever-changing, chaotic mass of floating vegetation is confronted by much the same obstacles and dangers as those which are found in the ice-packs of the North Polar regions:

'The fabulous Styx,' says Baker, 'must be a sweet rippling brook compared to this horrible creation. A violent wind, acting upon the high-waving plain of sugar-cane grass, may suddenly create a change; sometimes islands are detached by the gambols of a herd of hippopotami, whose rude rambles during the night break narrow lanes through the floating plains of water-grass, and separate large masses from the main body. The water, being pent-up by enormous dams of vegetation, mixed with mud and half-decayed matter, forms a chain of lakes of slightly-varying levels. The sudden breaking of one dam would thus cause an impetuous rush of stream that might tear away miles of country, and entirely change the equilibrium of the floating masses.'

In short, the entire country under the *régime* of the *Sudd* resembles the bed of a desiccated lake, the drainage-waters of which are constantly finding fresh channels of effluence, and therefore cannot be depended on, except for light-draught vessels at the time of the highest floods. That time, unhappily, owing to delays, first at Cairo and afterwards at Khartum, had passed, when Baker attempted the passage of the *Sudd* through the channel of the Bahr Ez Zeráf (not of the main stream, which was choked), between the Sobat junction and Shambeh.

In spite of almost superhuman efforts, with one thousand men at work, it took thirteen days to cut

through and traverse 12 miles of country. It was occasionally necessary to dig-out the steamers, before they could be floated, and frequently to unload, in order to lighten them. Exposed to the dangers of the climate and to constant immersion, a large number of the men suffered severely from fever; whilst all, officers as well as men, were utterly dispirited by the arduous and discouraging nature of their task, in spite of the enthusiasm and pluck of their English leaders. Many deaths occurred, with regard to which Baker observes: 'I think our black doctor assists them in departing from this life, as they die very suddenly when he attends them.'

Eventually, the Expedition, after ascending the river for 300 miles, and taking 32 days to cut a canal 8 miles in length, ran into a *cul-de-sac;* and Baker, to the delight of his men, was then compelled to order a retreat, for fear of being left high-and-dry in the malarious marsh-lands. They, therefore, returned to the Shilluk country, there to await the arrival of Mr. Higginbotham, with the heavily-laden vessels of the Expedition, which, being undermanned, would have had no chance of following in Baker's footsteps.

A large camp was formed near the Sobat junction, and christened 'Tewfikia' by Baker. As a fresh start was impossible for seven months (until December, 1870), the camp was established on a permanent basis. Three large magazines of galvanized iron were constructed to hold the stores. Extensive gardens were laid-out, and

planted with European seeds of all kinds. The land was cleared of bush, for ploughing; and the neighbouring forests were cut down, though the timber was not of the best kind for building-purposes. A workshop was run-up; steam saw-mills were erected; and, in a short space of time, 'the constant sound of the hammer and anvil betokened a new life in the silent forests of the White Nile.'

When Mr. Higginbotham joined Baker, the camp at Tewfikia assumed even larger dimensions. The Dinka country, along the bank where Baker was encamped, had been depopulated by the slave-traders; but from the opposite shores, the Shilluk natives, some of whom were in league with the traders, overcame their prejudices and paid daily visits to the bazaar, which had been established for the purposes of barter.

Baker, in the exercise of his powers, intercepted several suspicious-looking vessels that attempted to pass his station; and thereby was the means of releasing over three hundred slaves. He, moreover, discovered and proved, that the Egyptian Governor of Fashoda was closely implicated in an attempt to pass a large consignment of slaves; and caused him to be dismissed from his post.

After a time, it became necessary for Baker to return to Khartum, for the purpose of completing the arrangements for the Expedition, and, above all, to see after the transports that had been ordered. Needless to say, that, on his arrival, he

found nothing ready: and all had to be commenced afresh.

Here for the first time he heard of the Franco-German war, and of the dynastic disasters that caused his companion, M. de Bizemont, shortly after his arrival at Khartum, to return to France, as has already been mentioned. The following letter was received by him from Colonel Stanton, the British Consul-General, who, moreover, gave him all the news regarding the war between France and Germany.

'Alexandria: 19th Sept., 1870.

. . . 'I have had some conversation with the Khedive and with Sherif Pasha about the Slave Question; and I believe an enquiry has been ordered into the conduct of the Governor [of Fashoda] reported by you. I am also assured that a fresh law is about to be promulgated, touching the confiscation of boats and property when slaves are discovered; as they pretend that at present such confiscation is not legal. I have explained to the Khedive, that, with us, slave-dealing is felony; and have promised to send the Egyptian Government extracts from our Acts of Parliament on that subject. . . . The Khedive was much pleased at the description you give of the Shilluk country; and will, I think, try to do something with it. He has, however, great difficulty in getting proper men to take posts so far off—it being looked upon as a disgrace; and you know well, how few Egyptians are to be trusted in such positions. I hope, however, in time this may be got over, and proper commanders found for the posts on your line of communication.'

Whilst at Khartum, Baker had an interview with the leading slave-trader, Sheikh Ahmed Akád, to whom reference has been made, and with his

'working representative,' or *wekil*, Abu Saúd. His hands were to a great extent tied by the contracts which the slave-traders had entered into with the Governor-General; and he was forced to admit, that, from their point of view, it would have been unjust for the Egyptian Government to take over the monopoly of the ivory-trade until the expiration of these contracts. With Abu Saúd he entered into an arrangement by which this precious scoundrel undertook to supply him with provisions, porters, &c., and, in the event of war, to furnish reinforcements from the 1,800 Irregular troops under his command on the Upper Nile.

Leaving Khartum on the 10th October, Baker arrived at Tewfikia in time to despatch the first vessels south on 1st December, in conformity with his original plan. The camp was struck; and the gardens and cultivated fields were at once occupied by the Shilluk natives.

The same difficulties as those experienced on the previous attempt to cut a way through the Bahr Ez Zeráf arm of the Nile were again encountered; and, for a time, it appeared as if the result would prove the same. We find this entry in Baker's *Journal*, dated 9th March, 1871:

'From Feb. 11 to this date, we have toiled through every species of difficulty. The men had cut one straight line of canal through a stiff clay for a distance of 600 yards. Many were sick; some had died: there appeared to be no hope. It was in vain that I endeavoured to cheer both officers and men with tales and assurances of the Promised Land before them, should they only reach the Nile [the main channel, or Bahr El Jebel]. They

had worked like slaves in these fetid marshes, until their spirits were entirely broken. The Egyptians had ceased to care whether they lived or died.'

To have turned back would have been to acknowledge their final defeat: so they struggled manfully forward. The last obstacle was the greatest; and was eventually passed by constructing a large dam, and thereby floating the entire fleet of 59 vessels, which were for the most part lying high-and-dry. On March 19th all the vessels passed into the White Nile. The 'Slough of Despond' was left behind, as a painful memory; and 'there was great rejoicing throughout the fleet.'

After a voyage of about 6 months, the fleet reached Gondokoro, in detachments, the last straggler being considerably behind Baker, who was the first to arrive. He found that, since his former residence there, the country had been deserted by the slave-traders; and that the Bari, who had been fully prepared for his visit, were openly hostile. Alloron, the local chief, who acted as an agent of Abu Saúd, took measures by which Baker was prevented from obtaining any meat-rations for his troops. Although there were large herds of cattle in the neighbourhood, the natives refused to sell a single cow. At the same time, Alloron formed with the Belinian tribe an alliance against Baker, whom they regarded as their common enemy.

The position of affairs soon became intolerable. On the 26th May, Baker formally annexed

Gondokoro, in presence of Alloron and the headmen of the country, with all the pomp and ceremony that fittingly accompanied an act performed in the name of the Khedive. He then changed the name of the station from 'Gondokoro' to 'Ismailia.' Stringent orders and camp-regulations were issued; and Baker made an earnest attempt to secure the confidence of the Bari in the protection and good-will of the Egyptian Government. Alloron was deposed by his own people, and willingly resigned the cares of office, in favour of Morbé, the rightful chieftain of the tribe: but the same tactics were pursued under the new *régime*. No food being forthcoming, the Egyptian troops began to grumble at the meagre resources of the 'Christian's Promised Land.'

In the end, matters went from bad to worse: the two Bari tribes combined in an attack upon Baker. They were easily driven-off; and their cattle were captured by the 'Forty Thieves,' who gallantly stormed and took their chief strongholds.

Open war had thus broken-out between the Bari and the representative of their suzerain, the Khedive of Egypt, when Abu Saúd arrived upon the scene. He brought with him 8 vessels, which, being lightly laden, had been able to make use of the canals and channels cut through the *Sudd* by Baker's expedition, and so reach the White Nile without much difficulty. His father-in-law, Sheikh Akád, having died—so it was stated—he had become the principal of this redoubtable firm of slave-traders. On his journey to Gondo-

koro, he had found the means of doing a little business for his firm; and arrived with a large herd of cattle that had been taken by force from the neighbourhood of a native chief with whom Baker had entered into friendly relations. With this chief, Baker had left a small detachment of his men; and these the natives had massacred, in the belief that they were in league with the slave-traders.

Baker ordered Abu Saûd and his 500 men to camp on the other side of the river; and was witness to their enthusiastic reception by the Bari. Abu Saûd, although informed of the position of affairs, openly associated with the enemy of his sovereign, the Khedive; and thus became liable to the charge of treasonable conduct. Moreover, he kept-up intimate relations with his friend, Rauf Bey, who held the command of the line regiments; and was the means of promoting dissension and discontent among the men. Baker himself, with his body-guard, the 'Forty Thieves' —who had reached a high stage of efficiency, wore a distinguishing uniform, and were rapidly acquiring *esprit de corps*—camped about 1½ miles from the main body of the troops.

On June 12, 1871, Baker wrote the following letter to Abu Saûd:

'You arrived here with a large number of cattle stolen by you and your people.

'You, knowing that the Bari were at war with the Government, have nevertheless been in daily and friendly communication with them.

'The Bari of this country are rendered hostile to all honest government by the conduct of your people, who, by stealing slaves and cattle from the Interior and delivering them here, have utterly destroyed all hope of improvement in a people naturally savage, but now rendered by your acts thieves of the worst description.

'It is impossible that I can permit the continuance of such acts. I therefore give you due notice, that, at the expiration of your contract [with the Governor-General at Khartum], you will withdraw, with all your people, from the district under my command. At the same time, I declare the forfeiture to the Government of the cattle you have forcibly captured under the eyes of my authority.'

If Baker had promptly sent Abu Saúd, in irons, to Khartum, instead of adopting a lenient policy towards him, he would have saved himself much subsequent anxiety and his expedition from many perils.

The Bari tribes combined with the Longwi, their former enemy, in making almost nightly attacks upon the camp at Ismailia; and Abu Saúd supplied them with some of his ammunition. Every attack was, happily, frustrated, in spite of the negligence of Rauf Bey's sentries; but these constant menaces wore-out the men, who were compelled to be continually on the alert, after their ordinary day's work. Finally, Baker found it necessary to protect the camp by turning it into a strong fort, with a ditch and ramparts on its landward sides.

The following letter, addressed to Lord Wharncliffe, gives some information in regard to his position:

'Ismailia: 26th Aug., 1871.

'We are at the old spot, Gondokoro, now altered to the name "Ismailia," as I have taken formal possession of the country in the name of Egypt.

'A change has taken place since we left this place. Not a brick is standing of the old Austrian Mission-house: the natives have pounded them to powder, to form their much-loved red ointment; and this is the only "outward and visible sign" of a mission having existed. . . . A fine avenue of large lemon trees, thriving wonderfully, although untended, shows, that the hand of civilization sowed some good seed, which the earth—less barren than the native mind—has brought to perfection. The lemons lay upon the ground, as they had fallen from the trees, in tens of thousands: for the natives will not eat them. I have had the ground cleared, and the trees watered and cared for. The avenue now forms the nucleus of the Government garden.

'I have planned the new town of Ismailia with great care to sanitary arrangements. The new fort commands all approaches; and free ventilation within the fort walls is ensured by the absence of large blocks of buildings. The fort is square; but the quarters for troops are in detached buildings—ten to each company, all radiating in streets from the inner circle, in which the Government offices stand. By this plan—which resembles the nave of a wheel, the detached dwellings corresponding to the spokes—a breeze from any quarter must refresh all parts of the camp.

'We arrived here on 15th April; and the rear vessels came up on 22nd May. . . . Formerly, such a voyage would have required about 22 days; but now that the White Nile is closed [by the *Sudd*], we had to take the alternative passage, by the Bahr Ez Zeráf. . . . However, thank Heaven! we are here at last, with two of the Lake steamers, in sections, and all the *matéricl* of the Expedition.

'The fifteen decked vessels that I had ordered two years ago from Cairo could not pass the Cataracts. The six steamers ordered the same time have, I believe, only just reached Khartum. Thus, instead of working upon my original plan, I have had to struggle on with the wretched boats of the country. One of our vessels sank in the White Nile with sections of Samuda's steamers on board! I was 120 miles a-head when the news reached me; and was at once obliged to return, as such a loss would have ruined the Expedition. Well aided by Lieut. Baker and Mr. Higginbotham, I saved the cargo, and both raised and repaired the vessel, which has arrived here safely.

'Before I left Tewfikia, I returned all on the sick-list to Khartum. I have now a force of 1,000 troops, including 10 mountain-guns,—1 battery, Osmanli (Turks). I must be reinforced next year by another regiment; as we are at open war with the Bari, and the troops will have to divide, to occupy the various stations.

'The Bari were formerly notorious on the White Nile: they are now worse than before; as they have been for some years past the allies of the slave-traders, who have made Gondokoro the depôt for slaves and cattle stolen from the Interior. These Bari are the enemies of all, except the traders; as they are employed by the latter in pillaging their neighbours. Such people would naturally abhor any government of law and order, because they are merely robbers employed by robbers; and they fatten on the spoil. They at once ridiculed the idea of annexation to Egypt; and coolly informed me, that "no government would ever be established in their country." Added to this plain declaration, they refused to supply provisions upon any terms or to submit to any authority.

. . . 'My Black troops are excellent, especially those who were under Bazaine in Mexico: they are wonderful walkers, require little physic, and eat anything. The Egyptians do very well to take charge of the camp; but I do not like them for active service. I have a body-guard of 40 men, selected from the two regiments, and

armed with Snider rifles. They are named "The Forty Thieves"; but I have no "Ali Baba."

'I do not look forward to so protracted a native war as our old Kafir war. European military tactics are ill-adapted for the bush. I have already given the Bari a few lessons; and they find that my Black troops are quite as active as themselves, and far more dangerous.

'I hope to move south, with steamer-sections in waggons, when the corn crop is ripe—about next month.

'My six English mechanics are pretty well; but all suffer more or less from fever. I trust the change to mountain air will set them up. The troops are in excellent health. Both my wife and I are always well.

. . . 'We shall have no opportunity of writing for twelve months: therefore, do not let people suppose that we are lost, through silence.'

Ismailia being found sufficiently strong, and capable of defence by a small garrison, Baker detached the greater number of his troops, and undertook a six-weeks' campaign against the Bari of Belinian. In the several engagements that ensued, and in the constant guerilla-warfare, his troops were entirely successful, thereby acquiring a confidence in themselves that they did not before possess. Secretly, they were intent upon bringing about the ruin of the Expedition; and might have succeeded in their purpose, but for the steadfast support of the Forty Thieves, upon whom Baker mainly relied. These men were loyal to their leader, and by their discipline and courage enabled him to control the situation.

Though some cattle and corn had been captured during the campaign, the spoils of war did not compensate for the failure of Baker's crops;

and short-rations produced further discontent among the Egyptians, officers and men, who, too idle and indifferent to second the exertions of their commander, were loud in their complaints at the absence of supplies. When the amount of corn collected by the troops guaranteed only two months' consumption, at full-rations, a spirit of disaffection broke-out among them. Nor were they at all pleased, that the acquisition of slaves, even from among the prisoners of war, was strictly forbidden them. Indeed, at the very outset of the Expedition, some of the Egyptian officers had, unknown to Baker, acquired 126 slaves during the voyage to Ismailia. Then, again, they followed their natural instincts in pillaging the villages of their defeated enemies; and were not at all prepared to accept with equanimity the fifty lashes meted-out to offenders, when caught in this act. Thus, insubordination and discontent grew day by day; until the Egyptians, both officers and men, were ready to mutiny on the first favourable occasion against the discipline that oppressed them. On the other hand, the Sudanese were, for the most part, superior to these feelings, and were subject to the control of their officers, good or bad as they happened to be; whilst, as we have said, the Forty Thieves were always to be depended upon for good conduct, being under the direct and stern discipline of Baker himself.

Under these circumstances Baker was not surprised, though greatly angered, when one day

he received a sort of round-robin * from the entire force—excepting the Forty Thieves—requesting him to return to Khartum, in consequence of the absence of corn in the country. Baker's only reply to this mutinous appeal was to parade the men, and to lead them at once into the 'Promised Land,' of which they appeared to be ignorant.

In the country surrounding Rejaf, a short distance to the south, and especially on the islands, they found rich crops, and all the granaries full of *dhurra* and *sésamé*. Being densely occupied by hostile natives, who refused to sell their corn and cattle or to enter into friendly relations with the Government, it became necessary and vital to the Expedition, cut-off as they were from ready communication with Khartum, to make the most of the advantages of a war that had been forced upon them. A strong position was therefore taken-up: the country was occupied by the troops; the corn was threshed and taken to Ismailia, in the numerous boats belonging to the Expedition; while all attempts on the part of the Bari to frustrate this measure of retaliation and self-help were met successfully with armed resistance.

Baker had done his utmost, but failed, to bring the natives to a reasonable frame of mind, and to make them appreciate his own desperate plight, which left him no choice but to take by force

* Like other documents of its kind, it had an author—Rauf Bey, who dictated a series of letters to his subordinates, and despatched them under a covering-letter from himself.

what was denied to him as a concession of fair dealing. The responsibility of the consequences rested upon the Bari; and did not, after all, greatly diminish the abundance of their resources. Nevertheless, Baker regretted the situation which circumstances had forced upon him. He felt that the greatest obstacle to the success of his expedition was, not the hostility of the tribes, nor even the insubordinate and untrustworthy character of the main body of his troops, but their indirect cause: namely, the physical obstructions in the main channel of the Nile, which practically cut-off all communications with the outer world, and rendered an expedition to his nearest base, Khartum, a task of considerable difficulty and one impossible to be overcome except by a large and well-equipped force. On setting-out he had depended on keeping open his line of communications; and, as he privately confessed, would never have embarked upon such a campaign, had he known beforehand of the terrible obstructions caused by the *Sudd*. His ideal of being entirely independent of Khartum had not been realised, owing to various causes; and he gave-up all hope of aid from that quarter.*

Here is a specimen of the kind of benevolent interest taken in the Expedition by the Governor-General, Mumtaz Pasha, who had succeeded Jáfer Pasha at Khartum:

* The reinforcements for which he had asked reached him on the conclusion of his expedition, and therefore too late to be of any service to him, personally.

[*Translation.*]

'Khartum: 21st December, 1871.

'YOUR EXCELLENCY,

'I am delighted to hear that your Excellency and Lady Baker are well, and enjoy good health. The difficulties of travel in Africa are incalculable, as you know better than anyone; but I hope, that your courage and perseverance will succeed in overcoming all the obstacles to be surmounted; and, like you, I heartily wish success to the Expedition.

'Madame Mumtaz sends her compliments to Lady Baker; and hopes to see her again at Khartum, thoroughly satisfied [*glorieusement contente*].

'Since my arrival here, I have been impatiently expecting tidings of you; and, thank God! I have received them: and am satisfied.

'Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.

'MUMTAZ PASHA,
'Governor-General of the
Southern Sudan.

'To his Excellency, Sir S. Baker Pasha,
'Governor-General of Central Africa,
'Ismailia.'

About the same time, Baker received a letter from his friend, Lord Ducie, in which the following passage occurs:

'I have seen your letter of Dec. 28th to Colonel Stanton, describing the difficulties you have met with, and the worse than apathy of your Oriental associates. *Inshallah!* You will overcome all this; and return an African Bismarck.'

The 'Governor-General of Central Africa,' as Mumtaz Pasha designated Baker, certainly deserved all the encouragement he could get. At the same time, it is only fair to add that, Mumtaz

Pasha did do something in the way of carrying-out Baker's requests, and did not confine his attention to sending him polite missives.

On the 3rd November, 1871, whilst Baker was absent at Rejaf, thirty vessels left Ismailia for Khartum, taking with them 1,100 people of all classes. In spite of the most distinct orders, to send away only those who were invalids, Rauf Bey had, on his own initiative, despatched a large number of troops who were in excellent health; thereby reducing the entire force of the Expedition to 502 officers and men and 52 sailors. He and his friend, Abu Saûd, who was at that time travelling in Latuka, stirring-up the country against the Government of the Khedive in general and against Baker in particular, had planned this manœuvre to cripple the Expedition. But they were sadly mistaken in the result.

Baker had made friends with the Bari chief of Beden; and, having chastised his enemies, was prepared to welcome other native allies: since his mission was one of peace and not of war. His object was attained in a curious way. A herd of elephants happening to pass the spot where he was encamped, he killed two of them, and gave the meat to his friends of Beden. His enemies, who from a safe distance had witnessed the partition of the carcases, yearned to be placed on a footing of equality with their more fortunate brethren; and so came to Baker with words of peace. They were of course cordially welcomed; and, in the conference that ensued, they confessed,

that 'the war was entirely their own fault'; that their losses in corn were a trifle, not to be mentioned among friends; and that, of course, it was to be 'expected that little differences would occur at the beginning' of their intercourse with his Excellency: that was all past now, and they were quite prepared to place themselves at the disposal of the Government.

The campaign against the Bari being, then, nominally at an end, Baker had the satisfaction of returning to Ismailia as the bearer of 'peace with honour,' much to the mortification of those who had counted upon the continuance of the war.

Everything was found to be in order, on his arrival. He remarks:

> 'The natives were at peace; food was abundant; the station securely fortified. . . . All intrigues and opposition to the Expedition had been overcome. Although my force was small, the men were full of confidence, and promised to follow wheresoever I might lead.'

Preparations were at once made for an advance to the south.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE TASK OF SISYPHUS—(*Continued*).

[1872—1873]

UP to this stage, in his campaign against the slave-traders, Baker had, for the reasons that have been stated, succeeded only in reducing the hostile Bari to partial subjection, the permanent results of which depended on his continuance in the country, and in the establishment of a government fort at Ismailia. Abu Saûd, the chief of the slave-traders, was still at large, harrying the country; and until his contract with the Governor-General at Khartum expired, Baker was powerless to deal with him effectively.

Owing to the limited number of troops under his command, and to the practical impossibility of obtaining reinforcements from Khartum, Baker was now called upon, either to court risks which every authority on military tactics would condemn, or to wait quietly at Ismailia until the period of his office expired. He decided to accept the former alternative, rather than to rest satisfied with the barren results of the latter: 'I knew the risks,' he remarks, 'and the responsibility; but if I remained passive, I should be

beaten. I had often got through difficulties; and if risks are to be counted in Africa by ordinary calculations, there would be little hope of progress.' * He never wrote truer words than these.

Leaving 340 men, including 52 sailors, under Rauf Bey, to garrison Ismailia, he started on the 23rd January, 1872, with only 212 officers and men, on his adventurous journey to the far South. Instead of a small army, for which his original plans had made provision, he commanded a flying-column, almost a forlorn-hope. Instead of having a line of fortified posts within three days' march of each other, on which he had calculated, he was obliged to leave his only base, Ismailia, behind him, and to advance with a handful of men into countries which, if not already hostile, might easily be made so by the machinations of Abu Saûd, who was actively engaged in raising barriers along the proposed line-of-march.

Baker relied on the promise of his ally, the chief of Beden, for the supply of 2,000 porters, to carry his steamer-sections into the Interior; and he took with him a large herd of cattle with which to pay for this important service. But, on his arrival at Beden, the chief refused to fulfil his engagement; and tried to take by force what could be less-easily earned by honest

* This and other quotations, the sources of which are not explicitly stated, in the present chapter, are taken from Baker's work, *Ismailia.*

labour: several night-attacks were made by the natives on the cattle *zariba*, but were frustrated by the measures taken for its defence.

The steamer-sections, machinery, &c., had, therefore, to be returned to Ismailia, in charge of the English engineers: since the vessels could not be floated over the neighbouring rapids. In the absence of camels, originally intended for their transport, it was impossible to carry such heavy loads to the Albert Nyanza, without the assistance of a small army of porters. Baker had, consequently, no choice but to return them to head-quarters, and to advance independently along the right-bank of the river.

At the head of 100 men, in heavy marching-order, he reached Laboré; where, as he had anticipated, he was able to secure a sufficient number of porters to send back to Beden, in order to bring up the cattle, sheep and heavy baggage left behind under the charge of Major Abdulla and 145 men. The camp at Beden had, in the absence of Baker, been attacked by the Bari, and nearly captured; but Major Abdulla had, by good fortune rather than generalship, finally beaten-off the enemy.

At Laboré, Baker obtained 500 porters, many of whom subsequently deserted; and the march was continued to the south, both officers and men being in the highest spirits. At the junction of the Khor Unyama, Baker founded a station, which he named Ibrahimia, of which he said: 'This point [now called Afuddo, or

Fashele] is destined to become the capital of Central Africa': but, up to the present, his prophecy has not been fulfilled. Ascending the valley of the Khor Unyama, he entered the Shuli country. His feelings on approaching Fatiko are thus expressed:

'No one could feel unhappy in such a scene. I trod upon my old ground, every step of which I knew; and I felt an exhilaration of spirits at the fact, that I was once more here, in the new capacity of a deliverer, who would be welcomed with open arms by the down-trodden natives of the country.'

In this anticipation he was not altogether disappointed: in spite of the fact, that Fatiko was one of Abu Saúd's stations, and that his *bête noir* was actually there to receive him. Abu Saúd, taken by surprise, had endeavoured hastily to stir-up the natives to oppose Baker's triumphal entry; but, as soon as they recognised their old friend in his new capacity, they welcomed him with effusion.

The Pasha determined to establish a Government station at Fatiko, in order to protect the natives against the slave-traders during his absence in the South. Abu Saúd's oath of fidelity could not, of course, be trusted; nor could he be compelled to respect Baker's prohibition, that all further depredations should cease, now that the Akád contract had all but terminated. Abu had large stores of ivory at Fatiko, which, in the absence of porters, could not be removed: therefore, Baker was unable to execute his threat

of 'turning him out of the country.' So he was, perforce, left behind to breed more mischief and to concoct fresh intrigues.

'Abu Saúd's Fatiko station was,' says Baker, 'crowded with slaves. His people were all paid in slaves. The stations of Fabbo, Faloro, and Fanagiro were a mass of slaves.' Yet, 'the Governor-General of Central Africa' was helpless to deal effectively with the situation, or even to mete-out summary justice to the chief of the slave-traders. Though, nominally, he held 'supreme power' over the country, he had no adequate force to support that power; neither had he the resources to feed several thousand freed slaves, nor the means of returning them to their homes: to have turned them adrift, without making any provision for their sustenance and safety, would simply have resulted in effecting for them a change of mastership, but not of conditions.

Leaving a detachment of 100 men, under Major Abdulla, to form a depôt, at Fatiko, Baker resumed his march to the south across fine prairie-lands that had been depopulated by the slave-traders. At Fauvera, he enlisted some men, formerly in the employ of Abu Saúd, and two *wekils* of the latter, who agreed to enter the service of the Government. This company of Irregulars was left behind, to garrison Fauvera; but no sooner was Baker's back turned, than the *wekils* abused their trust,—one of them, Suliman, murdering a native entrusted to his care. Baker

caused them to be arrested, and punished; and then pushed on to Masindi, the capital of Unyoro, situated about 50 miles from the Albert Nyanza.

Here he entered into relations with Kabréga, who had seized the throne of Unyoro on the death, two years previously, of Kamrasi. Kabréga proved himself to be a second edition of his father: he adopted precisely similar tactics, in his efforts to secure Baker's assistance against Rionga, and to extort as many presents as possible. Baker's position being altered, however, he was better able to control the situation.

On the 14th May, 1872, he took formal possession of Unyoro, in the name of the Khedive, and with the consent of Kabréga, who thought, that it might redound to his advantage to be the recognised ruler of the country under the protection of Egypt, although he was at that moment secretly conspiring with Abu Saúd to destroy the Khedive's expedition.

Meantime, Baker had heard of fresh raids having been made by Abu Saúd on friendly chiefs. He, therefore, obtained a number of porters and auxiliaries from Kabréga to accompany a party of his Irregular troops to Fatiko, 160 miles distant, in order to release all slaves stolen from Unyoro and to carry orders to Major Abdulla, empowering the latter to arrest Abu Saúd for his misdeeds and to forward him as a prisoner to Ismailia. Abdulla was then to join Baker's force at Masindi, which comprised only 100 men.

By taking into his employ the ex-slave-traders, Baker ran the risk of raising the suspicions of Kabréga, who was quite incapable of appreciating an act of clemency. Their mutual relations, at no time very cordial, became more and more strained; until Baker, fearing treachery, at once set about the erection of a fort. His fears were well founded: for, one evening, Kabréga sent seven jars of poisoned *merissa*, or plaintain-cider, as a present to the troops; and thereby nearly succeeded in destroying many lives by this villainous act. The following morning a general attack was made on the fort. Happily, Baker was prepared; and succeeded in driving-off his assailants, subsequently setting fire to the town. But he lost four of his best men, two of whom had been sent as emissaries and had been treacherously murdered. Some six or seven thousand warriors had taken part in the attack on the fort; and quite half of their number are said to have perished. Kabréga pleaded *force majeure* on the part of one of his chiefs, and claimed exoneration from responsibility; but, on Baker sending him a valuable present, as a token of amity, one of his messengers was murdered, and he himself was again attacked in force.

Kabréga's villainy being fully exposed, Baker had reason to fear for the safety of his party at Fatiko, who, on their projected journey, south, to join him, might easily be led into an ambuscade: but he had no means of sending a warning to his lieutenant. His best plan, which he promptly

adopted, was to seek an alliance with Rionga, who from all accounts, was a more trustworthy ruler than Kabréga; and who would be able to send messengers to the north. Accordingly, having destroyed his fort and burnt many valuable effects that could not be transported, Baker left Masindi, on the 14th June, and marched to Fauvera.

From Masindi to Fauvera is a distance of about eighty miles. The path led through a country which, at that season of the year, was specially favourable to the tactics of a savage enemy. Every precaution was taken against surprise; in case of attack, each man knew his place and his duty: the men marched silently in double-file, and there was a strong advance- and rear-guard. For almost the entire distance, the line-of-march was through high grass-jungle: consequently, every mile of the path was stubbornly disputed by Kabréga's hordes.

During seven days, they fought their way through ambuscade after ambuscade, losing very few men, considering the nature of the ground and the open formation of the column; Baker, his wife, and his nephew having several narrow escapes. Load after load, containing valuable goods, was thrown away or burnt; and the cattle were abandoned: in order not to hamper the retreat. A vast amount of ammunition was expended: for the men, fighting for their lives, and harassed at every step by a concealed enemy, fired recklessly into the dense jungle.

It was hoped that, on reaching Fauvera, where Baker had left a detachment of Irregulars, in camp, they would be able to obtain supplies and ammunition. But, on arriving at that place, they found, to their dismay, that 'everything had been destroyed by fire: nothing remained but blackened ashes.' A captured native, who turned out to be an old friend of Baker's, gave him all the news: Kabréga's treachery had been planned from the first, at the instigation of Abu Saúd; the detachment sent to Fatiko had never reached its destination, but had been attacked and scattered by the native escort; finally, Rionga was anxious to see Baker, but was doubtful as to his reception.

On the whole, the news might have been worse: at least, Major Abdulla's camp was intact at Fatiko. Baker at once went to Rionga, whose island-home was not far distant; and entered into an alliance with him and other native chiefs. Rionga was made king of Unyoro, in place of Kabréga, deposed; and cordially accepted the suzerainty of Egypt, entering with enthusiasm into Baker's plans for the downfall of his old enemy.

Leaving part of his forces behind him, Baker then proceeded to Fatiko, eighty miles distant. On his arrival there, he found Major Abdulla and his men, in camp. Everybody supposed that Baker and his entire party had been massacred in Unyoro: consequently, Abu Saúd had carried matters with a high-hand, and was practically master of the situation. In fact, so self-confident had the slave-traders and their native allies be-

come, that, in spite of Baker's sudden appearance on the scene with his Forty Thieves, they delivered a determined attack upon the Government camp.

Major Abdulla's men proved to be of slight service in repelling this attack; but Baker and his nephew led the Forty Thieves in a gallant charge against overwhelming numbers, carrying the enemy's position at the point of the bayonet. The slave-traders and their allies were scattered; and half of their number were killed. Of the Government troops, seven were wounded, but none mortally. The victory was complete.

Abu Saúd fled to Khartum; and subsequently went to Cairo, in order to appeal to the Government against Baker's 'harsh treatment' of him. Though he had had an interview with Baker, prior to his precipitate departure, he nevertheless had the audacity to spread the report, both at Khartum and Cairo, that Baker and his wife had been massacred, and the Expedition broken-up.

This report caused a painful sensation and was widely circulated by the Press. Many of the English newspapers published obituary notices of Baker; and most of them had leading articles, which he afterwards had the satisfaction of reading for himself. From the middle of April to the end of June, 1873, the fate of the Expedition was regarded at Home as uncertain; and many speculations were rife. On the 5th June, telegrams from the late Lord (then Mr.) Vivian, Acting Consul-General at Alexandria, reporting the safety

and partial success of the Expedition, were read in both Houses of Parliament; and relieved the country of much of the anxiety felt on its behalf: but it was some weeks later before letters were received from Baker direct, setting all lingering doubts at rest. Among the many tributes paid to him at this time was an admirable double-page cartoon in *Judy*, of 9th July, 1873, representing Baker as being 'patted on the back' by the shade of Wilberforce.

To return to Baker, at Fatiko. His victory over the slave-traders and capture of supplies and munitions of war placed him in a strong position, which he promptly turned to his advantage. Many adherents flocked to his standard; and thereby enabled him, by the exercise of diplomacy alone, to take definite measures for the consolidation of his rule:

'Without firing a shot,' he states, 'I had thus won the game. All the bad people had found the country too hot for them. The remaining men received certificates, and raised the corps of Irregulars to 312 officers and men. . . . From this date the victory was gained. . . . The slave-hunting was now at an end throughout an immense district; as the slave-hunters had ceased to exist south of Gondokoro. Excepting Unyoro, the days of bloodshed were past. The Forty Thieves, who had so gallantly stood by me through every difficulty, never again had an enemy before them. I was devoutly thankful for days of peace!' The Shuli country was pacified.

Moreover, it should be mentioned, that, in the attainment of this measure of success, Baker had been splendidly seconded by the efforts of

his nephew, Lieutenant Julian Baker, and by the watchful and resourceful co-operation of Lady Baker, who, exposed to all the perils and sharing in the hardships, frequently had acted on her own initiative, and had been left in charge of the camp during the absence of fighting expeditions. As Baker wrote of her, on his arrival at Ismailia:

'For 130 miles she marched on foot. For 78 miles, sometimes marching 16 miles in one stretch, through gigantic grasses and tangled forest, she was always close behind me, carrying ammunition in the midst of constant fighting, lances sometimes almost grazing her. . . . On arrival at Fatiko she was in a storm of bullets. . . . She has always been my prime minister, to give good counsel in moments of difficulty and danger.'

Greatly deserving of credit, too, was Abd El Kader, the Colonel in command of the Forty Thieves, whose tactical assistance, dash and loyalty, were beyond all words of praise. Abd El Kader subsequently fell in action, during the Egyptian campaign; while the gallant Forty Thieves were all but annihilated in a surprise-attack by the Bari of Mugi, during Gordon's Governor-Generalship, and when under the actual command of M. de Bellefonds.

Baker constructed a strong fort at Fatiko, with fosse and rampart; and laid-out extensive gardens. His men were now in excellent condition and under strict discipline. He had 200 Regulars and about 300 Irregulars, some of whom he detached and sent to Rionga and his native allies, to assist in an attack on Kabréga.

Unyoro was invaded from the north, and conquered: Kabréga fled towards the Albert Nyanza; and many of his subjects flocked to the standard of his supplanter. At the same time, M'tesa, king of Uganda, sent an army of 6,000 men to invade Unyoro from the south, and to carry relief to Baker.

Such action on the part of M'tesa deserves more than passing comment. Baker had early recognised the fact, that this powerful and intelligent king was a most valuable ally; and he consequently took steps to secure his support, not only in keeping Kabréga in check, but also in a mission of knight-errantry to Livingstone, whose fate Baker had constantly kept in view. Whilst at Masindi, he had received emissaries from M'tesa, to whom he had entrusted letters addressed to Livingstone, together with a request to M'tesa to seek-out the missing traveller. M'tesa sent-out two expeditions, to seek for Livingstone, one of which, as we have already stated, met Cameron in Unyanyembé and delivered Baker's letter, the reply to which M'tesa actually sent back the whole way to Ismailia. The second letter, despatched by a separate party, reached Lake Bangweolo shortly after Livingstone's death, and came out at Zanzibar with his effects. Such service was quite gratuitous; and fully merited the present which the British Government subsequently sent to him, at the instigation of the Royal Geographical Society, for his assistance to one of Her

Majesty's Consuls.* Had M'tesa's army arrived before the evacuation of Masindi, Baker might have been saved his disastrous retreat to the north; at the same time, he could not very well have employed the troops of his ally without granting them a share in the spoils,—a policy that might have led to complications. M'tesa was angry with his old enemy, Kabréga, for interrupting the free channel of commercial intercourse between Egypt and Uganda: and it was for this reason, rather than one of pure philanthropy, that M'tesa had sent an army to invade Unyoro. On the arrival of the Waganda warriors, Rionga had already gained the upper hand: consequently, Baker sent them back with a polite message to M'tesa, thanking him for his assistance and regretting that the expiry of his commission at a near date prevented him from visiting Uganda in person. In his place, however, he sent an intelligent man, Selim, one of Speke's followers, whom he trusted M'tesa would receive as his representative.

For some months Baker remained at Fatiko, introducing order into the country, and succeeding in a remarkable degree. He secured the good-will of the natives by taking part in their hunting-expeditions; until the entire female population met in solemn conclave, and passed a Resolution, which they submitted to his Excel-

* It was for this reason that Baker claimed to have opened-up a route between Egypt and Zanzibar, by way of Uganda.

lency, requesting him not to risk his precious life at such hazardous exploits, but to preserve it for their own special protection. He had sent to Ismailia for reinforcements, without which he could not advance, and leave a sufficient garrison behind him. When these at last arrived, they told a sad tale of how they had been attacked on their return-journey by the hostile Bari, at Mugi, and lost thirty men; but it was soon discovered, that the cause of the attack, and the disgraceful retreat, was due to the gross mismanagement and cowardice of Tayib Agha, the Colonel in command of the detachment.

'I had now,' says Baker, '620 men: therefore, I reinforced Rionga and the various stations. I then garrisoned, strongly, Fatiko, Fabbo, and Paniadoli (the stockade opposite Rionga's island, in N. lat. 2° 6′). The country of Unyoro was now completely in the grasp of Ali Gennina [whom Baker had known, during his former journey, as a member of Ibrahim's party] and Rionga.'

Leaving Major Abdulla in command at Fatiko, Baker passed rapidly and without molestation through Mugi, and reached Ismailia on the day on which his commission nominally expired—1st April 1873. The station wore an appearance of neglect, though the gardens had been carefully tended; and on the whole, Rauf Bey, in spite of his former conduct, had proved himself worthy of his trust. He had been forced to attack the Belinian Bari, to recover some deserters; and in a hot engagement had lost a good many men.

Mr. Higginbotham, the chief engineer, had died a month before Baker's arrival; but he and his assistants had previously put together and launched the fine new Samuda steamer of 108 tons.

During his absence of about fourteen months in the south, Baker had written several important despatches to the Khedive and to Sherif Pasha, the Minister of the Interior; but had, in return, received no reply. He did not, therefore, feel justified in remaining at Ismailia after the expiration of his *firman;* and at once set-about making preparations for his return to Khartum and Egypt. To some of his correspondents at Home he wrote exhaustive accounts of the Expedition, which now was practically at an end; in many of his letters he expresses satisfaction at having finished his task and at the prospect of returning to England.

After putting everything in order, and having left written instructions for his lieutenants at Fatiko and Ismailia, Baker started, on the 26th May, for Khartum.

The new steamer, the *Khedive*, with twin-screws, was able to slip through the high grass, where one with paddles might have been impeded, in passing through the *Sudd*. The obstructions to the passage through the Bahr Ez Zeráf were, therefore, comparatively slight, the old channels having also become wider and freer. On the voyage, three of Abu Saúd's vessels, carrying 700 slaves, were passed; but Baker did not interfere with them: as the *wekil* told him they could

easily 'square' the Governor of Fashoda, in order to pass the station; and he was curious to see how the matter would end. He, himself, being in advance, interviewed the Governor; and found him to be an intelligent Circassian, new to the post and willing to adopt his advice. The result of the interview was, that the vessels were duly captured and sent to Khartum, together with the responsible agents, as prisoners.

During the governorship of Ismail Eyub Pasha, Baker's old friend, many of the stereotyped abuses had been obliterated; and some steps had been taken to introduce order into the Sudan, as well as to regulate the Traffic in Slaves; moreover, the Khedive had given instructions, in conformity with Baker's recommendation, to break-up the *Sudd;* and the work had already been commenced.* Some good results, too, were observed from the new system of administration, by which the Sudan was divided into Provinces, under responsible and independent Governors.

After an absence of nearly four years, Baker arrived at Cairo, on the 24th August. The following day, he was received by the Khedive, who conferred on him 'the Imperial Order of the Osmanié, Second Class, as a token of his approbation.' The Mejidié, Second Class, had been given to him before his departure; and his nephew, Lieutenant Baker, now received the

* The White Nile was re-opened to navigation in the following season.

Third Class of that Order. Throughout the Expedition, the Topographical Department had been under the charge of Lieutenant Baker: and his astronomical observations, together with the maps which he prepared, were valuable contributions to the cartography of Africa. The Meteorological Register had been carefully kept by Lady Baker, who had also made a botanical collection, which, on arrival at Cairo, was presented to the Khedive. Lieutenant-Colonel Abd-El-Kader and another officer received promotion in rank; and awards were made to the soldiers who had borne the brunt of the fighting. But Abu Saúd, having been arrested at Cairo, at the request of Baker, had yet to receive the reward of his iniquities:

'The Khedive,' says Baker, 'expressed his determination to judge Abu Saúd by a special tribunal, composed of Sherif Pasha, Nubar Pasha, and Ismail Pasha (the Minister of Finance). I handed seventeen documents to Nubar Pasha, together with evidence sworn-to upon the Korán, before witnesses, and properly sealed by Wat El Mek, Suliman, the *sheikhs* of the country, Major Abdulla, and others, against Abu Saúd, charging him with various crimes, including treason, in having given the orders that his Fatiko company should fire at me and the Government troops. I took a receipt for this important document.'

The counts of the indictment numbered seventeen paragraphs; and among the *viva-voce* witnesses were Baker's own officers and several of the Forty Thieves. That the action of this secret tribunal did not advance with the even

tenor of judicial proceedings in European countries, may be judged from the following letter, which Baker addressed to Nubar Pasha on the eve of his departure for England:

'Alexandria: 29th September, 1873.

'There has evidently been some misapprehension of our conversations respecting Abu Saúd. I told you that, "unless Abu Saúd should be judged and severely punished for his treachery, the British Government would never permit a distinguished officer like Colonel Gordon [who had been selected as Baker's successor] to accept such a command as I have now resigned. Neither would the Consul-General, Mr. Vivian, take the responsibility of recommending the Government to grant such permission. Also, I was sure that an officer of Colonel Gordon's experience would decline the command unless his position was supported by justice being done in the case of Abu Saúd."

'Your Excellency replied, "that his Highness was determined that justice *should* be done; and that you, Sherif Pasha, and Ismail Pasha, were appointed for that purpose; and that I might depend upon the prisoner being judged."

'I replied, that, "in that case, neither the British Government, nor the Consul-General, nor Colonel Gordon need have the slightest hesitation in the acceptance of the command of the latter, as his authority would be established."

'A slight misconception might alter the tenor of a sentence; but I am sure you understand my feeling: that my successor should succeed in the undertaking (for the interests of Egypt and for his own reputation), and that this success will depend upon the manner in which he may be supported.

'We leave to-morrow by the French Mail. I feel sure, that if Colonel Gordon should meet me in England, he will learn all that is necessary for his work.'

Considering that Abu Saúd was, from first to last, the prime instigator and cause of all the intrigues and difficulties with the natives, it is not possible to ignore, as we should wish, his influence on the events that have been recorded and on the subsequent relations between Baker and Gordon. The sequel will be given in its proper place.

CHAPTER XVIII.

APPRECIATION OF RESULTS.

THE immediate and apparent results of Baker's efforts towards the suppression of the Slave Trade on the White Nile have been referred to in the preceding chapters. But, in order to appreciate their ultimate and true effect, it will be necessary for us to extend the horizon of our criticism, and to withdraw to the standpoint taken-up by experts of the present day.

Baker had the honour of being the pioneer-agent, employed for the first time by a Mohammedan ruler, to extirpate the most flagrant abuses of an institution that is closely interwoven in the social life of every Mohammedan country; and, as such, he had to confront and overcome prejudices and obstacles the precise character of which had never before been faced: consequently, his successes were less apparent on the surface and more open to question at the time they were achieved than later on, when their effect could be impartially judged. A pioneer in any great undertaking, having no precedents to guide him, must adopt measures the result of which can only be vaguely estimated. Being a man of action and not a theorist, Baker's methods of repression

were, of necessity, forcible rather than persuasive: he had to meet force with force, though his attitude was always one of defence, and not of aggression. Moreover, in his equivocal position, with orders to suppress a Traffic that was secretly encouraged by his employers, it was impossible always to avoid the adoption of means which he would otherwise gladly have escaped. No unbiassed person could possibly misinterpret the integrity of motive and the honesty of purpose that characterised Baker's actions during the continuance of his command. Errors of judgment may be discerned, when the history of this Expedition is viewed in the light of subsequent events: in particular, Baker showed too great leniency towards Abu Saúd, whom he should have crushed at the outset: but, in every incident of the campaign, from first to last, we recognise his earnest purpose, his indomitable courage, and his loyalty to the Khedive. His successes were due chiefly to his force of character and personal attainments; whilst his failures were mainly ascribable to the conditions under which he acted. Briefly summarised, the *net* results of the Expedition may be thus expressed:

Baker laid the foundation of a repressive policy which was elaborated and improved by his successor, Colonel Gordon. He performed the first rough work of opening-up the Equatorial regions to the policy of Egypt; and, by exposing many abuses, he forced the suzerain

Power into the adoption of reforms that might otherwise have been postponed for some years. His territorial annexations between Ismailia and the Equator, and the fortified posts that he established along the line of least resistance, thus opened a practicable path for the introduction of Egyptian administration; while the steamers placed or left in sections along the route made that path easier for his successors in office. His work had been hampered and obstructed by the Janus-faced character of Egyptian rule: but the face that looked blindly at the iniquities of the Slave Trade was, after his revelations, exposed to the cynical scrutiny of Europe. Had he consented to accept the situation as he found it, his Expedition, instead of being a nominal success, must have proved a complete fiasco. Whatever may have been the *bona fides* of the Khedive — and it is impossible to pronounce a final verdict on this question — Baker, as a loyal and fearless Englishman, accepted the letter of his instructions, rather than the spirit of their official support, as a sufficient guarantee for performing a task that admitted of only one interpretation by an honourable man: like Nelson, he turned a blind eye to every signal that he deemed an insult to his manliness and a slur on the integrity of his commission. That he did not succeed in *suppressing* the Slave Trade is an obvious, as it was a foregone, conclusion; but that, towards the close of his campaign, after

the defeat of Abu Saúd's company at Fatiko, he did actually drive all the slave-traders out of the countries under his nominal command, redounded to his credit for overcoming difficulties which would have crushed a weaker man or have rendered him powerless. Had Baker remained on the spot, and been supported by the Government he represented, he would, in all probability, judging from his previous achievements, have succeeded in producing more permanent results; but, his *firman* having expired, he was forced to return, and to give place to his successor, than whom no more competent a man could have been found than Colonel Gordon.

Years after, Baker himself recognised the fact that he had not gone the right way to work in order to effect any permanent results. Measures of forcible repression were all very well for punitive or police purposes; but they did not strike at the root of the mischief: they simply lopped-off vicious excrescences, and left the main supports untouched. In an earlier chapter we have shown, that so long as there is a demand for slaves there is bound to be a constant supply; that, in order to destroy the demand, one must not be content with the forcible ejection of the Traders, for fear of the same conditions producing the same results; and that it is necessary to cultivate a healthier state of things, which of themselves will assimilate the deleterious elements and produce positive results. The following letters addressed to Mr. Charles H. Allen, the Secretary

of the British and Foreign Anṭi-Slavery Society, shew that in after-years Baker had considerably modified his views:

'Sandford Orleigh: 1st January, 1884.

'When I first commanded the Khedive's Expedition, I hoped to avoid the use of force, and to effect the object peaceably. I quite agree with the principle you advocate. I never upon any occasion came to blows with the slave-hunters, until I was treacherously attacked at Fatiko by the companies of Akád [the name of Abu Saúd's firm at Cairo] with 270 men. This action terminated in their destruction; and from that time to the end of my reign I had no further difficulty with the slave-hunters. It will, however, be impossible to suppress the Traffic in its present advanced stage without some examples that shall instil terror into the hearts of the ruffians employed.

. . . 'The British Government is not in earnest; neither did it exhibit the slightest interest in the difficult task that I undertook, nor in that of my excellent successor, Colonel Gordon. If the British Government had, at that time, exercised its immense influence, in support of either myself or Gordon, the slave-hunters would have quickly seen that England was determined; and our hands would have been strengthened. Instead of this, we were left perfectly unsupported, to struggle against a powerful combination secretly aided and abetted by the Egyptian authorities. The dangers and difficulties of the position, which were hardly understood or appreciated at the time by distant England, can now be realized through the disasters that have so recently occurred [annihilation of Colonel Hicks' column, etc.]. Nothing will ever suppress the slave-hunting of the White Nile regions, unless England shall assume the supreme command in Egypt.

'Then—emancipate all slaves, after twelve months' notice; introduce a Vagrant Act, to compel them to labour, otherwise they will become vagabonds; organise

an Institution* for female slaves, from which they may be hired as servants; let a proclamation be issued, declaring slave-hunting, or conveyance of a cargo of slaves, to be piracy; hang about a dozen of the principals (not the little men, who are *employés*) remembering that Hassan Musa Akád, who supplied the royal harems with slaves, was the greatest slaver of the White Nile, Arabi's intimate supporter, and now an exile at Suakin, where he is probably in communication with the rebels.'

'9th November, 1882.

. . . 'If we manage matters with judgment, there will soon be a grand opportunity for a decisive blow at the Slave Trade; but I do not think we should disturb the minds of the Egyptians just at the present moment, before they have recovered from the idea of a British Occupation. If we work carefully, and gain their confidence, we shall be able to act in such a manner as to crush the Trade entirely.

'*The "demand" must cease: we shall then easily check the sources of supply.*' [The italics are ours.]

'21st December, 1883.

. . . 'There can be no doubt that our action against the Slave Trade in the Sudan, commenced by myself and followed-up by Gordon, has much incensed the great number of people who made fortunes from the hated Traffic. The present [Mahdiist] rebellion is not wholly caused by that action against the slavers: it is the result of a combination of causes; but I do not think it would have broken-out, had we not determined to suppress the slave-hunting *in toto*.

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* Such an institution, Mr. Allen states, 'was previously advocated by the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, in *The Times* of 25th December, 1883. The Institution was shortly afterwards founded in Cairo, with money collected by the Society, and is still doing good work there.' Indeed, most of the reforms in this respect have been due to the persistent advocacy of the Anti-Slavery Society.

'It is a frightful difficulty, which persons in England can hardly appreciate. The entire Sudan is in favour of slavery. The Egyptian Government is against it, simply through pressure put upon it by England: thus, the Government is against the people. Unjust administration, combined with the action against the Trade, and the anarchy produced by Arabi in Lower Egypt, prepared the opportunity for a movement organized by the Mahdi.

'If the British Government insist upon the abandonment of the Sudan, all our past efforts will have been in vain; and the unfortunate natives will become a prey to a host of demons uncontrolled by either laws or force.'

'28th December, 1883.

. . . 'People talk of giving-up the Sudan as though it were an old hat. But should it be evacuated by Egypt, and all control withdrawn, it would become one vast field for slave-hunting. People are very ignorant of African geography; and they require rousing to the gravity of this question.'

Finally, we take the following extracts from a letter addressed by Baker to Lord Cromer (then Sir Evelyn Baring):

'Paris: 2nd May, 1892.

'I can trace distinctly [in a recently published book] the stories of Abu Saúd, which he concocted to deceive Gordon, making out, to defend himself, that he was hardly and unjustly treated by myself. Gordon discovered quickly that all such reports were false; and I have his letters to that effect: but he was so deceived at his first interview with Abu Saúd, in Cairo, that he actually believed his assertion, "that he had never been in any way connected with the Slave Trade"! As is well known, the firm of Akád & Co. (represented by Abu Saúd, the son-in-law of Akád) was the largest slave-hunting establishment on the White Nile: they paid one thou-

sand purses (£5,000) annually to the Governor-General of the Sudan, as a free license to trade in Central Africa. This meant "to take, burn and destroy," and to bring down any number of slaves from countries far beyond Egyptian jurisdiction. The annual payment closed the eyes of the Government; as a large revenue was derived from the sale of such licenses to the numerous bands of slave-hunters which devastated the White Nile regions.

. . . 'At that time [1870–1873] peace had been established throughout the newly-annexed territory; so that Colonel Chaillé Long (who was here a few days ago, and gave me his account) marched from Gondokoro to Uganda *with only two of my old soldiers* as his escort' [together with M'tesa's return-envoys].

In short, Baker had planted in the countries annexed to Egypt the rudimentary structure of an administration, which had for its object the creation of law and order, of legitimate commerce, and of havens of refuge against the slave-traders. It remained for his successors to strengthen and consolidate the work he had initiated, or, by inaction, to allow it to be overthrown by the subversive forces that were struggling for supremacy in the Sudan.

CHAPTER XIX.

SANDFORD ORLEIGH.

[1873–1874]

When Baker returned to Cairo, and subsequently to London, he found that, during his long absence in the interior of Africa, many world-stirring events had occurred of which he had received no intelligence:

'You must feel,' said the Duke of St. Albans, in a letter to him, 'like Rip Van Winkle, at finding the enormous changes taken place in Europe. What wars to read up! The Prince of Wales' illness; and the national feeling it evoked! Births, deaths, and marriages; boys grown into men; and the changes which the Wheel of Time produces! You will have, too, the rare satisfaction of assisting at the *post mortem* examination of your character which the Press made when your fate looked so black.'

His arrival in England evoked a demonstration of popular applause, which the appreciation of the Press did much to foster. On all hands, he and Lady Baker were received with heartfelt congratulations and sympathetic interest; and for a period they suffered almost as much from the fatiguing effects of being 'lionised' as from the hardships of Central Africa.

The Prince of Wales had, on behalf of himself and her Royal Highness, sent him the following telegram:

'We both heartily congratulate you on your safe arrival at Cairo, after all the dangers you have been exposed to during your long and arduous journey.'

This may be accepted as an example of many other greetings that reached him. From among his letters, we select the following from the Empress Eugénie:

[*Translation.*]

Chislehurst: 6th April, 1874.*

'I have received your letter; and am greatly touched by the sentiments you so cordially express. I appreciate them all the more, because, amidst all my sorrows, they recall ever-present memories.

'When last we met, at Cairo, you and Lady Baker were starting on an expedition full of perils and difficulties. Your energy has triumphed over the obstacles; and a useful end has been attained. At the Tuileries, as at Chislehurst, we were interested in following the progress of your work; and we appreciated your success.

'I see by your letter, that you sympathise with our misfortunes. I should have replied before, but have been unwell; and have consequently been prevented. My son thanks you for your good wishes. I, too, trust that the Divine Providence may protect him and smooth the difficult path he has to tread.

'With kind remembrances to Lady Baker,

'Believe me, Sir Samuel,

'Yours sincerely,

'EUGÉNIE.'

* Napoleon III. died at Chislehurst on 9th January, 1873.

A Cabinet Minister wrote to him:

'Whatever may happen about the Slave Trade, your expedition cannot fail to have extended British influence in Egypt. How long will it be before we have steamers running on the great Lakes, and a line of regular communication between them and Cairo? I know nothing that is going on in the world just now so remarkable as the steady and rapid progress which we are making in opening-up Africa; and it is evident, that the road must lie mainly through Egyptian territory. The Khedive is well-intentioned, I believe; and he has done considerable things: but I fear he is not always well-served.'

At that time, Great Britain had not been spurred-on by the rivalry of Foreign Powers to make the most of her position in Africa. And as regards her responsibilities, though these were keenly felt by individuals, they were not sufficiently appreciated by 'the brain of the nation' —meaning her Majesty's Government—or by the unconscious cerebration of Parliament.

Though much occupied in delivering lectures and addresses, Baker, shortly after his return home, devoted his leisure moments to the preparation and production of his book, *Ismailia*, dealing with the results of his expedition for the suppression of the Slave Trade.

His first public appearance was before the critical audience of the Royal Geographical Society, who received him with an enthusiasm which the Society is ever ready to accord to a successful traveller, and which, on the occasion of Baker's reception, was perhaps never before sur-

passed. Sir Bartle Frere, the President, occupied the Chair; and amongst those present were the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Edinburgh.

Baker spoke without making use of his notes, and with an eloquence equal to the occasion; and his first words were an expression of regret at the void left by his old friend, Sir Roderick Murchison, 'the father of the Society,' whose death had occurred during his absence in Africa. At the close of his address, the Prince of Wales gave expression to the cordial feelings of the audience; and the President made some appropriate references to Lady Baker, who was accorded 'three hearty cheers' on the conclusion of the meeting, after Sir Samuel had acknowledged the services of some of his companions.

The Times observed:

'The crowd which yesterday evening [December 8th, 1873] besieged the Royal Geographical Society, and filled the theatre of the University of London [Burlington House] from floor to ceiling, bore witness to the intense interest which Sir Samuel Baker's achievements have aroused among his countrymen. The Expedition he has conducted is unique in modern times. . . . Sir Bartle Frere, in his introductory remarks, happily compared the occasion to the return of some Sea King or Crusader, and the narration of his exploits to a wondering audience.'

A week later Baker lectured to the United Service Institution upon 'Savage Warfare.' This was a subject upon which he had had considerable experience,—an experience that might have been of service to the War Office, had they consulted

him, before despatching Sir Garnet Wolseley to Ashanti. At least, this was the view expressed at the meeting by the Chairman, the Duke of Cambridge. Gordon's opinion that field-guns were of no practical use, under such circumstances, since they retarded the advance through, or tactical evolutions in, a difficult or unknown country, was fully shared by Baker, who, moreover, advocated the rifle for the open, and the smooth-bore or buckshot guns for the bush, at close-quarters.

The month of January, 1874, was spent at Brighton, where Baker was entertained at a public banquet given by the Mayor and Corporation. The speech which he delivered on that occasion was an admirable summary of the events of his expedition. It was during his residence at Brighton that he first made the personal acquaintance of Gordon.

In March, Baker was presented with the Freedom and Livery of the Turners' Company; and in the following month with that of the Grocers' Company, who also entertained him at a banquet.

In the early part of 1874 news of the death of Livingstone reached England; and Baker had the melancholy satisfaction of hearing that, had the great missionary-pioneer reached Uganda, the provisions made for his relief would have helped him to continue his journey to Khartum.

Sir Samuel and Lady Baker, on their return to London, dwelt for a period in Seymour Street, until an estate in the country, which promised most of the advantages they sought, was

eventually found. In November, 1874, Sandford Orleigh was purchased.

This estate is situated in South Devon, near Newton Abbot. The house, built of Bath stone and granite, somewhat in the modern Gothic style, stands on a terrace which commands a fine view of the picturesque estuary of the Teign.

From the year 1875 to the day of his death, Sandford Orleigh was Baker's home during about five months of each year; and upon it he lavished all the attention which might be expected from a man of his temperament and activity. Under his close supervision the rough fields were broken-up, and gave place to plantations, which at the present day are well-grown and flourishing. As in Central Africa, where, whenever he pitched his camp for a long stay, the gardens were his own special care, so also in his English home, they provided for him an occupation of which he never tired.

The gardens and lawns, laid-out with admirable taste, bear evidence of the unremitting supervision of one who must have taken more than an ordinary delight in them. Every accidental feature of the land has been taken advantage of, in order to enhance the varied character of the scenery. From the upper terrace, on which the house stands, a charming vista is obtained of an avenue of fir trees (*cupressus macrocarpa*) ending with a thatched 'palaver-house,' built in the style of Central African architecture, though somewhat more substantially, as, happily, slave-traders do not flourish in Devonshire. Charming shady

walks and seats abound, giving ample scope for exercise and opportunities for rest.

Trophies of the chase and memorials of foreign travel abound in every room of the dwelling-house, which reflects throughout the taste of its late owner, and is retained in the same condition by Lady Baker. In the hall, the billiard-room, and on the walls of the staircase, may be seen a wonderful collection of weapons, gathered from various parts of the world; suits of Japanese mail-armour; and a splendid array of heads, skulls, and horns of wild animals that fell to Baker's rifle. The Library, which Baker made his study, contains his collection of books: narratives of travel (in particular, those dealing with Africa), works on science, history, Imperial politics, and naval matters; together with a modest sprinkling of classic authors and works of fiction. There is also a framed photograph of Gondokoro, under which Baker wrote these words:

'Although Gondokoro was the head-quarters of the Central African Slave Trade, and had been visited by several Europeans, Sir Samuel Baker was the first Englishman to arrive there, Captains Speke and Grant next, and Mr. Petherick the fourth. The movement against the Slave Trade dated from the advent of Englishmen upon the Central African sanctuary.'

In this new home Baker now settled; and here we may leave him, whilst we take up the thread of our narrative from the time that he parted with Gordon at Brighton, after a very brief but satisfactory interview.

"Sandford Orleigh."

CHAPTER XX.

BAKER'S SUCCESSOR.

[1874–1876]

In the early part of 1874, Colonel Gordon proceeded to the Upper Nile, in order to take over his duties as Governor-General of the so-called Equatorial Province.

The correspondence in this chapter between himself and Baker gives, in broad outline, the leading features of his three years' administration, during which he carried-out the Khedive's original programme of establishing a line of stations between Gondokoro and the Lakes, and of placing a steamer upon the Albert Nyanza. This correspondence tells its own story, and requires but few prefatory remarks.

The extracts have been selected with the object of illustrating the progress of the work initiated by Baker. It will be seen that Gordon followed conscientiously, though not always with conviction, in the footsteps of his predecessor. His marked individuality and freedom from conventional restraints frequently led him (like Baker) to question the *cui bono* of his mission; but his conscience was salved by that inherent tendency towards the doctrine of fatalism which was so

striking a characteristic of his mind and so powerful an arbiter of his actions. He regarded himself as a humble instrument in the hand of an Omniscient and Personal God, sent to ease the yoke which, in the pre-ordained course of events, Egypt sooner or later was bound to impose upon the inhabitants of the Sudan. His endeavour was, therefore, to mitigate the severity and the suffering that were certain to ensue upon the first intimate contact between a barbarous people and their semi-civilised task-masters.

This was Gordon's first visit to the Sudan; and, as he did not speak Arabic, he was in need of a *wekil* whose knowledge of the countries and people under his command might prove helpful to him. It was for this reason that, contrary to the strongest dissuasion, and in spite of the gloomiest prophecies, at Cairo, Suakin and Khartum, he selected Abu Saúd as his right-hand man and made him Governor of Gondokoro (Ismailia). Everybody warned him of the dangerous and unreliable character of this man: but Gordon was determined to have his own way in the matter, knowing full well that he could dismiss him at a moment's notice, should Abu, as a Government servant, prove unworthy of confidence. In the end, as will be seen, Gordon made some use of his *wekil;* and turned him adrift directly he discovered his treacherous conduct: no sooner, in fact, had Abu Saúd been placed in a responsible position, than he resumed his old practices,

and endeavoured to stir-up a revolt against the Government.

The following letter of dismissal* was addressed to Abu Saúd by Gordon, as early as September, 1874:

'Abu, when I took you up at Cairo, there was not an Arab or a foreigner who would have thought of employing you; but I trusted to your protestation: and did so. When I got to Gondokoro, you were behaving properly, and I congratulated myself on the high post I gave you. Soon, however, I came little by little to repent my action, and to find out my fair treatment was thrown away. You tried to deceive me about . . ., about . . ., and about . . .; you misstated . . .; you told me falsely about . . .; etc., etc. To come to more personal matters, you strangely forgot our relative positions: you have forced your way into my private apartments at all times; have disputed my orders in my presence; and treated all my other officers with arrogance: showing me, that you are an ambitious, grasping man, and unworthy of the authority I gave you. If you do this under my eyes, and at the beginning of your work, what will you do when away from me? Now, hear my decision. Your appointment is cancelled; and you will return to Gondokoro and wait my orders. Remember, though I remove you from your office, you are still a Government officer, subject to its laws, which I shall not hesitate to put in force against you if I find you intriguing.'

'I then,' says Gordon,† 'went on to say, that his scheme to cause the troops to revolt had never alarmed me; and that I felt confident, that they would [as they

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* See Dr. Birkbeck Hill's *Colonel Gordon in Central Africa* (4th edition), pp. 45, 46.

† *Ibid.*, p. 46.

did] see their interest lay with me and not with him. So it ended with my saying, that I would be merciful to him, and let him go away on leave, not to return.'

And that was the end of the Abu Saūd *imbroglio*, out of which some English newspapers, with an imperfect knowledge of the true facts of the case, had endeavoured to draw inferences that reflected upon Baker's conduct towards as plausible a knave as the Sudan ever produced.

Gordon, it will be seen, had many things in his favour when he took-up, where Baker had relinquished, the reins of government: in particular, the removal of the *Sudd*, by which free communications had been re-established on the Upper Nile. On the other hand, the long interval between his assumption and Baker's resignation of office had allowed things to drift into disorder both at Ismailia and Fatiko. His experiences coincided in a remarkable degree with those of Baker, as may be supposed; and, arriving at very much the same conclusions, he achieved corresponding results.

The two following passages, extracted from the letters written by him on the spot, will be read with interest:

'There is no comparison between the difficulties I have had here, and those I had in China. These are infinitely greater and more wearisome.'*

'It certainly is the most difficult work, the administration of these countries. No one can have an idea of it except those who have been here.'†

* *Colonel Gordon in Central Africa*, p. 122.
† *Ibid.*, p. 144.

He, himself, unsupported by any personal ambition, and regarding with indifference the world's verdict on his work, was deeply affected by the intolerable strain which, in those early days of chaos in the Egyptian Sudan, necessarily bore heavily upon a conscientious and energetic European. But he was supported by the conviction, that all was pre-ordained and ordered for the best; and his courage enabled him to bear his burdens with a stoical heroism that was the predominant note of his character.

Gordon, it appears, had formed too hasty an opinion of the supposed severity of Baker's rule on the Upper Nile; and it was not until he himself succeeded to the Governor-Generalship, that he was in a position to appreciate the true facts of the situation. He then acknowledged to Dr. W. H. Russell, that he had entirely changed his opinion in this respect, adding: 'I am convinced that, but for Baker's energy in dealing with the slave-traders and their friends along the river, and the fear he inspired among the natives, I should have encountered the most active opposition.'

These introductory remarks will be found to be substantiated by the following correspondence:

[*Gordon to Baker:*]

'21, Cecil Street, Strand: 10th January, 1874.

'Thank you very much for your kind letter and the information with respect to the latest dates my stores have to be at Khartum.

'In my interview with the Khedive, he evidently wanted to restrict his expenditure to a *minimum;* and, as he only is responsible, I did not choose to debate the matter. If, through his economy, the Expedition fails, the blame is his: *i.e.*, if, as I intend doing, I have used my utmost exertions to render it successful. I have told him, if he found that the outlay exceeded very much the expenditure, after a trial of two years, he had better give it up. Not being able to speak from my own experience, I prefer leaving any large demands till I go up and see the countries. . . . One of my reasons for not taking a large staff—in fact, not more than one European—is, that I do not wish more persons to undergo the inevitable hardships which have to be undergone—hardships which, I dare say, will be much augmented by my not pressing the Khedive to provide ampler means.'

[*Gordon to Baker:*]

'Gondokoro: 17th April, 1874.

'On my arrival here yesterday, I found some men from M'tesa had arrived the day before. They had two letters from Cameron, dated Unyanyembé, August 21st, and November 1st, 1873. The former says that, being at Unyanyembé when your letter to Dr. Livingstone arrived, he (Cameron) had opened it; and the letter says, "Livingstone was dead." As these letters are addressed to Commander of Forces, Egyptian Government, in Central Africa, I have sent them to the Khedive.

'We got here in forty-eight days from Cairo, including eight days' stay at Khartum; and I must admire the perseverance which took you through the Bahr Ez Zeráf in a sailing-boat. You know the *Sudd* was opened about a month before I arrived at Sobat?'

[*Baker to Gordon:*]

'London: 8th July, 1874.

'Your letter of 17th April reached me here. I am delighted to hear that M'tesa sent Cameron's reply to

Gondokoro. You will find that M'tesa, if you assure him (as I did) that his territory will always be inviolate, will be a firm and most useful ally. I am trying to get our Government to send him a present in recognition of his endeavours to search for Livingstone, according to my request.

'I am very sorry to hear that Abu Saúd has been sent up to you. This is the most plausible villain that ever lived. [Here follows a statement of his misdeeds.] . . . My book will be published in September. I will send you a copy at once, as it will inform you of all the chief incidents of the Expedition.

. . . 'I wrote on 31st August, 1870, to the first Minister and afterwards to the Khedive, to impress upon them the absolute necessity of clearing the great White Nile without delay. If the work had been begun at that time, the steamer would now be on the Albert Nyanza; but during Jáfer Pasha's administration nothing was done. I quite envy you your work, now that the river is clear; and I long to commence another private exploration, with a nice little decked steam-launch of about twenty tons, which a few camels and carts would soon run up from Gondokoro to Afuddo.'

[*Gordon to Baker*:]

'Gondokoro: 18th November, 1874.

'Thanks for your letter dated 8th July, which reached me yesterday. I have been moving about a great deal since I came; and it is only the last two months that I have spent here. Rauf Bey [whom Baker left in command at Ismailia] has gone on leave for nine months; and I have had no trouble with the slavers.

. . . 'You ask me why I took Abu Saúd at all, after what you had said of him; and my answer is: that I saw the man, and mentally weighed him; and saw he was not a redoubtable being, and that I could manage him, or at any rate crush him without difficulty.

I also considered all your trouble up here arose from the unfortunate contract made at Khartum with Musa Akád; and that Abu Saúd then, and Abu Saúd as lately a Government *employé* and completely under me, were very different people to deal with. Everyone said, "Do not take him, because he will ruin your expedition." From Nubar Pasha and many high people I had many warnings against this man; but based on the grounds that he was a dangerous fellow. I do not think it, from my experience of him: he is a despicable sort of man, a great liar, and altogether insignificant. By his lies he might succeed for a time; but it could only be so for a time. I alone was responsible for his coming up here, which was at my own urgent suggestion.

'I have re-established relations with the Longwi tribe, and hope to do so with the Mugi people before the month is out.'

[*Baker to Gordon:*]

'Sandford Orleigh: 14th January, 1875.

'Last night's post brought me your welcome letter of 18th November, 1874—a quick passage of fifty-six days from Gondokoro, which rejoices me by the fact of this great advance of communication, and gives much hope for the future.

'Do not let us speak any more of that fellow Abu Saúd. I am glad you have got rid of him; as I always feared he would intrigue against you. My book will, I hope, have reached you by this time; and it will tell you much, though not all. Of course, this wretched man was always contemptible; but even a mosquito may cause you annoyance: and minute vermin are more troublesome than more important animals. The unfortunate contract with Akád, to which you allude, was the affair of Jáfer Pasha; and I had no power to annul it, without rendering the Government liable to an action for breach of contract, for which I should have been responsible.

. . . 'Your position and mine are totally different. I had the brunt of the beginning: the river impassable, and the authorities and slavers determined to prevent the Expedition from taking root. With God's help, it *did* take root; and under your management I trust it will bear fruit. On my return to Cairo I proposed to the Khedive, that he should annex Dar-Fur, and form a great African empire; and thus totally suppress the Slave Traffic. I am glad to see that this is in progress; and that such good men as Purdy and Mason (Americans), whom I know personally, are sent up to survey the country.'

[*Gordon to Baker:*]

'Station Beden: 5th May, 1875.

'Yesterday I received your letter of 14th January, 1875.

. . . 'I have no pretensions to being an administrator, or a geographer, or a conqueror, or to be overwise; and what is more, I do not care one jot whether the public may at its end consider my mission a failure or not. All I try to do is, to get a regular communication * from Gondokoro to the Lakes, with as little annoyance from the tribes as I can avoid. There is enough misery in the world to induce me to do no more than seems imperative to the opening of the roads; therefore, if I find a *sheikh* who refuses to let me pass, I worry him into submission: when he submits, I make court to him—for I enter into his spirit, and quite feel for the loss he endures in the passage of strangers through his land.

. . . 'Excuse such an egotistical letter; but I want you to understand that, from my own Government or that of his Highness, I want nothing; from the world I want nothing in the way of reputation, for that world

* At that time, Gordon states that, to send a letter, 'upwards of 60 soldiers must go with it'; and that Kabréga was 'as strong as ever he had been.'

is not capable of forming an opinion, not knowing the details or circumstances.

. . . 'Why come here? Well, I thought that, sooner or later, these lands must be annexed to Egypt; and that, if I went, I might so soften the yoke as not to make the animal suffer much; little by little the yoke may be heavier, but then stronger will be the shoulders which bear it.

. . . 'You may rest assured that, whatever may be said to the disparagement of your proceedings, there will remain the fact that, you have done more for these countries than any living man can or will do hereafter; and history will never put my puny efforts in any way near your own.'

[*Baker to Gordon:*]

'Athenæum Club: 27th Oct., 1874.

. . . 'People in Egypt are profoundly ignorant of what they call the "commerce" of the White Nile, which the Egyptian papers declare is "reviving"! As you will yourself have discovered by this time, it is quite impossible to purchase ivory throughout the river-districts, except in exchange for cattle or slaves. Therefore, if the ivory-trade is reviving since I left the country, the *razzias* of the slave-hunters must have been renewed in the Interior. I established fair-trading * in Unyoro (or, as the traders called it, Magungo), where large quantities of ivory may be bought for merchandise. The natives were very good at Fatiko and throughout the Shuli country; but they were still in hopes that the old custom might be renewed, when ivory would be purchased in exchange for cattle. This I had strictly forbidden.

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* In a letter to Lord Cromer, dated 2nd May, 1892, Baker says: 'Trading-stations never existed; only slave-stations, falsely termed trading-stations. . . . There were never any Government trading-posts on the White Nile [which at that time was regarded as being] outside the jurisdiction of Egypt.'

. . . 'Now that the Nile is open to navigation, you will be able to cruise your steamers, unexpectedly, about the Sobat and above Fashoda;* and lay hold of any slavers who may attempt the old plan of bribing the Governor to let the cargoes pass the station.

. . . 'I hope poor Higginbotham's grave is still neat and in good order. He was an invaluable man.

'I shall be anxious to hear of the safe arrival of fifty camels at Gondokoro; and to see you well on the road with your iron carts towards Afuddo [Ibrahimia]. I never had the slightest difficulty with the natives on the march from Gondokoro; and the ground in the dry-season is hard and good for carts.'

[*Gordon to Baker*:]

'Bohr (*en route* to Sobat): 29th Jan., 1875.

'I received your letter, 27th October, yesterday; and am much obliged for your kind intention of sending me your book, of which, however, I received a copy by the mail that brought your letter. . . .'

[*Gordon to Baker*:]

'Lado: 25th June, 1875.

. . . 'About the beginning of June, the water rose at Beden; and I passed three *nuggars* up the east channel, and went along the east bank to Kirri. . . . I hope to make a station midway between Kirri and the Asua, distant thirty-three miles; and have already one at Madi: then the road to the south will be complete. I only leave sixty or seventy men at each station; but they are strong positions. The Mugi must give-in, for they are between us and the Lango, who, however, are friendly enough now.'

* Fashoda was one of the best, if not the best, of the strategic points from which the Slave Trade of the Upper Nile could be held in check; but, as we have seen, the Egyptian Governors at that station too often connived at the Traffic, thus rendering abortive many of Baker's efforts at its suppression. Gordon, therefore, established at Sobat, a short distance above Fashoda, a station to fulfil the functions of the latter.

[*Baker to Gordon:*]

'Sandford Orleigh: 18th September, 1875.

'Your two letters of 25th June and 25th July, by same enclosure, reached me the day before yesterday, and afforded me immense interest and pleasure. I wish with all my heart I could be with you, if only to give a haul on the rope in tugging the vessels up the Cataracts.

. . . 'I think you are quite right in making use of the river, so as to form a chain of stations above the various Cataracts; as it will be impossible to depend upon the natives as carriers by land.

. . . 'It always struck me that, eventually, when vessels shall be numerous, it might be possible, after much trouble and patience, to keep certain *muggars* above each Cataract, in order to traffic permanently upon each navigable channel above the obstructions: so as to ascend or descend the steps, by simply transporting the cargo by land from ship to ship at the various impediments. [This was the method adopted by the African Lakes Company between Kiliman and Lake Nyasa.] Ivory is so valuable and so easily carried, that it could bear the expense; and the natives would not object to the short journeys from above to below a Cataract.

'I admire your patience and perseverance amazingly. You will, I am sure, by this time have experienced that terrible strain upon the nervous system, caused by the constant and annoying delays in Africa, when your spirit is craving to advance. It is this perpetual fretting that saps both health and strength.

'If you can establish your line of vessels above each Cataract to the navigable river beyond Jebel Kuku [west of the Asua junction] you will certainly have achieved an immense success. I cannot tell you how thankful I am that you are my successor; as I was always afraid that no one would take the same enthusiastic interest in the work which I have felt. When

a steamer shall be on the Albert Nyanza, there will be a grand development; and if your health remains, I feel quite confident in your ultimate success: as I am sure the river is free from cataracts between Afuddo and the Lake. [This we now know to be the case: that is to say, above the Fola rapids.]

. . . 'When you arrive in Unyoro, let me implore you not to trust Kabréga. There is no country, that I have seen, where such treachery and cunning are to be found as in Unyoro. Falsehood and treachery are reduced to a science; and no kindness or good intentions are appreciated. . . . My experience bears out the fact that, wherever the slave-hunters penetrated, the natives, if bad, became ten times worse; and if originally good, they became bad. When I first visited Unyoro, in Kamrasi's time, I had only thirteen men; and the natives had me at all times in their power—*before* they had been bullied by the slave-traders.

. . . 'If it were not for my wife, who has worked for me for nine years in Africa, and now deserves rest, I would begin again; although, perhaps, at fifty-four, I should not be so fit for the rough life. I should not do it so well as you; and I can only thank God that some seed has fallen upon good soil, since you have the work in hand.'

[*Baker to Gordon*:]

'Sandford Orleigh: 8th July, 1875.

'You must, I know, have many heavy hours of anxiety in that vile country, where the obtuse character of the natives retards all progress, and where those who should assist you are too often leagued in intrigues against you. . . . You will be exposed to the worst of all dangers, the treachery of pretended friends. Let me give you, my dear Colonel Gordon, a hint about a man whom I trusted implicitly and to whom I gave an excellent character, believing in his integrity. I have since had unquestionable proofs of his duplicity:

I mean the Greek, Marcopolo, who was always the bosom friend of Rauf Bey. My great stand-by was young Julian Baker, who was the soul of chivalry and honour; he is now the first-lieutenant of the *Undaunted*, on the India station. You will have found some good men among the "Forty." . . . Whenever I or Julian took a personal share in firing, it was simply to sustain the prestige of the rifles.

. . . 'When writing my book, I was foolishly very careless; and, getting hot with excitement at the recollection of past incidents, as the scenes came before me, I scribbled away, *currente calamo*: and in only sixty-four days' writing, I completed the manuscript.

. . . 'I worked with heart and soul for the suppression of the Slave Trade; but I really believe that the English public are almost tired of the Negro Question. They are never tired of geography.

. . . 'From what you say of Kabréga's present position, I imagine that Rionga was not properly supported by our people after I left. It was a sad pity that so long an interval elapsed before you took the command, after my departure. The Government should have sent you up to take the command from my hands; and I could then have explained my position and have answered every query on the spot.'

[*Gordon to Baker*:]

'Laboré: 1st Oct., 1875.

'Your letter, dated July, came to-day; and I will answer it anon.

'Marcopolo was your true foe; and I spotted him after the first six weeks trying the same game with me. I sent him down to Khartum, on a mission, as I had a year's contract with him; and, on his return, hurried him off. He it was who worked-up the officers and troops against you; and I believe he was the cause of most of your troubles. However, he has got his deserts from me; and is quite dumbfounded at his dismissal,

which will not add to the chance of his employ elsewhere. He felt detected by me, and made no effort to try and change my purpose. He was mixed up with selling things to the troops; and I rejoice my instinct prevented my taking him with me at first.

'I wrote to you, I think, from Mugi, since which time I have come up some fifteen miles further; and am now *vis-à-vis* and a little in advance, south, of Laboré. (Sir H. Rawlinson will have the map up to this.) The river is good; and, as you will see from the map, there are few rapids. I feel convinced that the river is not worse ahead: so now I feel comfortable about the establishment of this line of Posts—which gives me letters five days from Lado—and also about the river. I hope to get *nuggars* up to this spot next month; and next rainy season I hope to get the *Khedive* and "No. 9" steamers into the Lake. The *Khedive* is now at Mugi. I have quelled the three tribes on this, the left, bank; and I wait till the grass is dry enough to burn, to quell the Mugi by a combined move on all sides. I have gone through much trouble; and can now appreciate the worries you had with one-tenth of my means: it is heart-breaking work civilizing the civilizers. Rauf Pasha [when at Ismailia] let all discipline go to the dogs; and I do not wonder at it: for unpaid and uncared-for soldiers will never be amenable to discipline. I have, I think, broken their stubborn necks for a time; but they are the poorest lot I ever came across. I can see how you were thwarted; and on my return, D.V., if ever I return, I will state my opinion publicly about your mission, so far as I can judge it.

'Having completed my Posts, thus: [Sketch appended, showing the position and number of Gordon's proposed stations between Lado and the Victoria Nyanza] and having quelled the Mugi, I propose to move on to M'ruli and then on to Magungo. By putting Rionga at M'ruli, and troops at Aufina or Patwan [below Rionga's] island and Magungo, I do not think that Kabréga can

hold-out long. . . . I hope to quell Mugi and to be in possession of M'ruli, Aufina, and Magungo, in March; then to come back and take up the steamers and *nuggars* to the Lake [Albert]. I have written to the Khedive to say, that then I consider my work finished; but that, if he does not think so, he must fix a term of time or a specific work, and afterwards let me go. The specific work would be, to place a flotilla on the river between the Ripon Falls and Fauvera, and a steamer (the small one) on Lake Victoria. The Karuma rapids are some thirty miles in length; and, according to Linant [de Bellefonds], between Murchison Falls and Patwan isle, the river is navigable. [This is not the case: there are rapids the whole way.] Linant says, that the Victoria Nile is said to discharge into Lake Albert by another outlet than Magungo, which outlet is navigable. [This explanation is somewhat involved. The Nile enters the Albert Lake by one channel, and leaves it by one channel. Gessi, who, in 1876, was the first to circumnavigate the Lake, plotted on his map two channels of effluence.]

'I feel so beaten-down by my worries in the opening of this route, that I have lost spirit,—not in the way of neglecting my work or not pushing it on, but all pleasure has gone from me: it is *hopeless, hopeless* ever to do anything with these people.'*

[*Gordon to Baker*:]

'Mugi: 21st Nov., 1875.

'Samuda will be glad to hear some news of his steamer. She is now at Lado, and is a capital boat. She was put-together without plans; but I heard that, when finished, the plans were brought to the engineer, who was requested not to mention who gave them. I named her *Ismailia*. I always suspected these plans were detained to stop me. . . .'

* At about this date, Gordon wrote to his niece: 'No one can form any idea of the worries here. I have to see to the execution of each order: to follow them up as the harriers follow the hare.'

[*Gordon to Baker*:]

'Mugi: 15th Dec., 1875.

'Thanks for your letter, 18th September, received 13th December. I am detained here longer than I expected, owing to the extent of the Mugi tribes, who are being *subdued*. I hope to get away in a week or so; and in four months to have the steamer put-together on the Lake.

'That this expedition is likely to be any good to the people, I do not believe; and it is absurd to talk of its civilizing effects. I cordially disapprove of the whole affair; and if I were not bound to get the steamer on the Lake, I would leave at once. I am only putting these ignorant fellows in a position to do harm. The Shilluk, driven to desperation, have risen: killed the Mudir and a heap of soldiers; taken and burnt Kaka; and would have captured Fashoda, if Gessi had not arrived there.

. . . 'Do not be under the impression that I am going to examine the Lake. Most positively I will not do so. I am not going to box myself up in that little steamer or in the life-boats, to solve any geographical problems for anyone whatever. Let those who are interested come and do it; and I hope they will enjoy the trip. You may look on my decision as quite decided on that score; and let the Royal Geographical Society know, that they must not rely on me for any exploration of the Lake. . . .

'29th December [Dufli].—The steamer is now in sight, with life-boat, *i.e.*, the porters who carry them; and that horrid work is over. I wish you had never brought these things up; for they have given me endless trouble. However, it is over. Your big steamer is put-together at Khartum; and generally I have cleared-up a mass of work you left me: . . . and now I am going to say good-bye! I start for M'ruli to-morrow. I ought to be home in July or August at latest.

. . . 'Beke and Findlay *both know now* the sources of the Nile and all connected with it, and many other

things besides. In a few years all members of the Royal Geographical Society will know all about it also: patience is a great virtue, they say.'*

The following extracts from letters addressed to Baker by Giegler Pasha give particulars that properly belong to this section of our subject.

[*Giegler to Baker:*]

'Khartum: 1st March, 1876.

. . . 'The new steamer *Ismailia*, which you brought out, performs the voyage between Khartum and Gondokoro (or, rather, Lado) in ten days. Colonel Gordon writes from Fatiko (3rd Feb.) that he is quite well; he has been at Fauvera and M'ruli, and has not been annoyed in the least by the natives. He has left troops at M'ruli, where he formed a station, and is going to push on others to the Victoria Lake. The work is going on well; and in a couple of months the Colonel hopes it will be completed. We have now telegraph-communication with Kordofan and Sennar. A cable is laid across the Blue Nile to connect Khartum with Berber; and has worked well for two years. I am about to lay another cable [in his capacity as the Director of Telegraphs] to connect Khartum with El Obeid, across the White Nile; and we have all the material for continuing it to El Fasher, in Dar-Fur.'

[*Giegler to Baker:*]

'Khartum: 30th May, 1876.

. . . 'Colonel Gordon is expected here in a few weeks. He will remain about a month; and then return to Egypt. As to who shall succeed him, we are entirely in the dark: probably you will be better informed.

. . . 'Gessi, an Italian, one of Gordon's people, has lately returned from the Albert Nyanza; but, as he sent a letter to you, I need not refer to the results of his

* Gordon's ill-health at the time this letter was written may account for the somewhat acrid tone of his remarks.

expedition. Gessi goes into ecstacies about the grandeur of what he saw; and, if I am not mistaken, the affair will cause considerable interest in Europe.

. . . 'Ismail Pasha Jakub [the Governor-General] returned from Dar-Fur a month ago, after an absence of two years; and met with a most enthusiastic reception. . . . He is much liked in the country, which he governs with determination and justice.

. . . 'Khartum is undergoing a good many changes for the better. New and broad roads are being constructed throughout the town; the place is becoming altogether pleasanter, and, what is more important, healthier. Mr. Hansal [the Austrian Consul] was much pleased that you still remembered him. He often tells of the happy hours he spent in company with yourself and Lady Baker; and of the fine English songs you sang, with so powerful a voice that the windows rattled.

. . . 'Poor Hussein Khalifa, who was Governor of Berber when we met there, has fallen into disgrace. I pity him very much: as I believe him to be innocent of all the charges brought against him. He is now at Esna, awaiting his sentence, which probably will be "Fashoda." Sheikh Hamed, your old friend, is now *sheikh* of the Korosko Desert—a post formerly held by his brother, Hussein Khalifa. Abu Saúd is in Khartum: he dresses like a European, and is a great swell.'

[*Giegler to Baker:*]

'El Fasher: 28 Nov., 1876.

. . . 'I came here to survey the route for our telegraph-line; and find there are many difficulties to overcome. I am living with Colonel Purdy and Major Prout in the palace of the former Sultan of Dar-Fur. There are still some vestiges of splendour; but Zubeir's hordes destroyed nearly everything two years ago. The people are a poor and miserable lot; and the country is so unhealthy, that I have grave doubts as to the wisdom of the Khedive in annexing it. The death-rate among

the Egyptians is fearful. Hassan Pasha Halmi, the Governor, told me the other day, that, out of 5,000 people, 1,300 died in three months (during the best season of the year, too). Over two-thirds of the soldiers and artisans who came here, after the conquest, have succumbed to the climate.'

Gordon returned to Cairo in December 1876; and reached London three weeks later.

On leaving his post, he placed Major Prout, an American, in command of the Equatorial Province. He had determined not to return to the Upper Nile; but circumstances proved too strong for him: the Khedive over-ruled his objections: and, in the end, he reluctantly retraced his steps to Khartum.

CHAPTER XXI.

GORDON'S GOVERNOR-GENERALSHIP.

[1877-1878]

GORDON'S administration of the Equatorial Provinces had been much obstructed by Ismail Pasha Jakub, the Governor-General at Khartum. Consequently, on agreeing to return to his post, he stipulated that Ismail should be removed from office. The Khedive promised to take this necessary step; and appointed Gordon, himself, as Governor-General of the Sudan, placing under his jurisdiction all the Egyptian Territories, from the Red Sea to the desert, and from Khartum to the Lakes, including the recently-annexed Province of Dar-Fur,* which was in a state of anarchy.

Before proceeding to Khartum, Gordon, at the request of the Khedive, went first to Massawa, in order to use his offices between King Johannis and the rebels in revolt against Abyssinia, and to endeavour to patch-up a treaty of peace. A war with Egypt had been brought-about, as Gordon asserts, by Munzinger's annexation of Keren; and a disastrous campaign was being conducted in a half-

* Dar-Fur means 'the Land of the Fur.' Dar-Fertit bears a corresponding signification. The Fur and Fertit were the indigenous Negro tribes of those countries.

hearted manner by the troops of the Khedive. On this and subsequent occasions Gordon exercised his great personal influence to bring King Johannis to terms, and to pacify the powerful rebel-chief, Walad El Michael: but circumstances frustrated all his efforts.* Continuing his journey, *viâ* Kassala, he reached Khartum; and, as soon as possible, proceeded to Dar-Fur, in order to relieve the Egyptian garrisons and to quell the revolt.

In one of the letters included in this chapter, Gordon gives some interesting details as to the origin of this *impasse*. A few months later, he, with a mere handful of men, succeeded in relieving the strongly-garrisoned posts under Hassan Pasha Halmi, Governor of Dar-Fur, and his lieutenants, who, though commanding a large number of troops —variously estimated at between seven and sixteen thousand—had allowed themselves to be hemmed-in at El Fasher, and other posts along the line of communications towards Wadai. Zubeir's son, Suliman, a mere lad, with an army of 5,000 men and boys, meanwhile threatened the situation in the south, at Shaka, hesitating whether to defy, or to submit to, the Government. The revolt extended even to Kordofan.

Whilst Gessi was waging a successful war against the slave-traders of the Bahr El Ghazal, ending in their total defeat and the execution of

* When, in 1879, Tewfik was raised to the Khediveat, Gordon, before returning to Lower Egypt, to relinquish his office, made a final attempt to adjust the outstanding difficulties; and paid a formal visit to Johannis: but he was treated with contumely, and experienced some difficulty in escaping from Abyssinia.

Suliman, Gordon passed rapidly from one spot to another, dealing-out stern justice, capturing slave-caravans; and, in the intervals of rest, roaming through the empty palace at Khartum, 'mending clocks' and adjusting the finances of the Sudan. During the years 1877 to 1879, it is estimated that he travelled, by camel and mule (the latter only in Abyssinia) as much as 8,500 miles. To the natives he appeared as a Liberator. His was the one-man rule: like a prophet of Israel, he was a law unto himself, defying even the Khedive and the Council of Ministers, if need be, on a point of conscience. 'It is only,' he said, 'by hard camel-riding that I hold my position among the people.' His path was strewn with released captives, deposed governors, and defeated enemies; but directly his back was turned, the old abuses sprang up again.

The loss of life in Dar-Fur and the Bahr El Ghazal, during the years 1875–1879, was terrible: Gordon estimates it at 81,000 natives and Egyptians, and as many or more slaves and slave-traders. In round numbers, some 180,000 lives were said to have been sacrificed.

Gessi, on the termination of his campaign, remained in the Bahr El Ghazal Province, and really succeeded in introducing a semblance of law and order; but, after Gordon's resignation, Rauf Pasha,* Baker's insubordinate lieutenant, was

* Gordon turned Rauf Pasha out of Ismailia; and sent him as Governor to Harar, from whence he subsequently chased him, for his 'tyrannical' proceedings. Yet, Rauf Pasha succeeded Gordon!

created Governor-General of the Sudan, and revived the old Pasha-rule, under which Gessi found it impossible to administer his province: and he consequently abandoned the task. In fact, the net result of Gordon and Gessi's work may be said to have amounted to nothing more than a righteous scourge upon wicked governors and evil-doers, the effect of which was evanescent.

It is not, therefore, surprising that Gordon, foreseeing this result as inevitable, in the absence of himself or of a suitable European successor, felt, with Baker, that all his labours were as those of Sisyphus, against the strain of which his spirit revolted. Even Ismail, the Khedive, at last withdrew his moral support, finding that he could neither bend nor break the independent spirit of his Governor, whom some people nick-named 'the little Khedive' and whose fearless honesty was ever a bar to the rapacity of Egyptian Finance Ministers. Gordon, in fact, resolutely refused to permit the Revenue of the Sudan to be diverted to Cairo, as occurred in the old days. On the other hand, 'when Goschen's scheme was made,' he states,* 'Goschen was told that the Sudan gave a tribute of £143,000 a-year; which was false: for the Sudan always cost Cairo money—never gave any. It is only since I have been Governor, that nothing has been given on either side.' By strenuous efforts and close personal attention to details, he managed to reduce the

* *Colonel Gordon in Central Africa*, p. 317.

annual-recurring deficit in the finances of the Sudan. Nevertheless, he exclaims:* 'The Government of the Egyptians in these far-off countries is nothing else but one of brigandage of the very worst description. It is,' he says, 'so bad that all hope of ameliorating it is hopeless: so I do the only thing possible,—that is, vacate them.' He had, in fact, 'withdrawn from more than half the country formerly held at the Equator.'

The following correspondence between Gordon and Baker deals principally with the incidents of the year 1878, which was one of comparative peace and of stern preparation, ushering-in the stormy events to which in the preceding remarks we have directed the reader's attention:

[*Gordon to Baker:*]

'*Zeila*: 15th April, 1878.

'I met your nephew, Lieutenant Baker, R.N., at Aden, on the 10th April; and am very sorry I did not meet with him before. He kindly came over from Aden to Berbera and *Zeila* with me; and goes back to Aden to-morrow. . . . Rauf Pasha is at Harar, out of which I mean to turn him, when I get up there. As your nephew will tell you, I have avenged you. If you come out to Egypt, mind and see H.H. [the Khedive], who has never used any expressions which should vex you. I wish I could persuade you to take over these parts, independent of me, and rule them; but your nephew says you never would do so. . . . You will excuse my not writing a long letter; but I have such a lot to do.'

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* *Colonel Gordon in Central Africa*, p. 349.

[*Baker to Gordon :*]

'Sandford Orleigh : 5th May, 1878.

'Your letter, dated 15th April, from Zeila, arrived this morning; and I am very glad to hear that Julian had the good fortune to meet you while the *Undaunted* lay at Aden.

. . . 'Some little time since, I received a letter from M'ruli, from a certain Emin Effendi, the chief physician of the Equatorial forces. I was much gratified; as he wrote at the instance of some of the people who served under me, to give their "salaams." I have since heard from Mr. Giegler, from Khartum, that Emin Effendi is a German; and that you think very highly of him.* He also said that Emin Effendi had been to visit

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* The letter to which Baker refers reads as follows :

[*Giegler to Baker :*]

'Khartum : 21st Feb., 1878.

'Some time ago, a steamer arrived with a number of Kabréga's men, to interview Colonel Gordon, and in order to bring-about an understanding. Kabréga has for years been the deadly enemy of the Government; and has annoyed them whenever he had a chance. When Col. Gordon pushed his stations farther south, something had to be done : Kabréga had either to be conciliated, or crushed. The latter had always been considered the better course, and must have succeeded, had it been seriously tried. But I believe more troops would have been required, which the country could hardly have supported : and "the game is not worth the candle." Kabréga was surrounded on all sides ; and the agreement that was made is the best possible, under existing circumstances.

'It happened in this way. There is now only one European, in the Government service, in the Equatorial Provinces. He is known here as Emin Effendi ; but his real name is Dr. Schnitzer, a German : a very accomplished man, who, if he lives, and Col. Gordon continues to support him and is in a position to do so, will make a name for himself. Emin Effendi went last year to M'tesa; stayed with him for some time; and then returned here. Colonel Gordon received him, and was much pleased with his work : he therefore sent him back to M'tesa, for the purpose of definitely settling the Kabréga question. Emin reached M'ruli, where he found some of Kabréga's men, who told him that their chief desired an interview with an accredited representative of the Government. Emin decided to go ; though the garrison endeavoured to dissuade him from running the risk of falling into Kabréga's clutches.

Kabréga; and that he was well received. He must be very careful in that quarter, as the Wanyoro are treacherous people.

. . . 'I should be very sorry if you were to leave your present command. You must by your present experience have proved how impossible it is to develop the country quickly, and how long a time must elapse before the people can understand our European ideas of improvement and civilization. It is only by devoting a life to the task that any permanent good can be done; and, in the wish to benefit the country, one is certain to offend individuals and to incur hostility. It is only yourself who can fight against *climate* as well as other difficulties.'

[*Gordon to Baker*:]

'Suakin (*en route* to Berber): 26th May, 1878.

'Thank you very much for your kind letter, 5th May, received yesterday, on the eve of my departure for Khartum. Your nephew is a first-rate fellow; and I regret deeply I did not meet him before. Admiral Corbett wrote me, and spoke of him in the highest terms. Rauf was with me, *en route* to Cairo, when your letter came.

'I dare say you heard that four missionaries have arrived at Cairo to go to M'tesa, *viâ* the Nile. I do not know, but I expect M'tesa has not over-well treated Wilson: it is only a surmise, which I gathered from a letter of Emin Effendi's. Wilson [the missionary: Dr. Felkin's companion] sent letters to London, secretly, by the same occasion, M'tesa not liking him to do so. I

He took two unarmed servants with him; and, after 5 or 6 days' travel, reached Kabréga's. There he was entertained hospitably for 33 days; after which he was conducted back to M'ruli by a mission of 25 of Kabréga's people, whom he had induced to accompany him, in order to confer with Col. Gordon. These men returned to their homes last week; and it is to be hoped that, in future, the country between Gondokoro and the Lakes will be more settled; and that ivory (money) will soon be finding its way here, as it is sadly needed.'

telegraphed the four missionaries, to wait and see what Wilson says, before they determine to take the Nile route. You must know we could "wipe-out" M'tesa if we wished it; for, since the break-up of Zubeir's gang, I have two or three thousand troops—*i.e.*, Bazingers, *alias* armed slaves—at my disposal; but I have no wish to touch him. I wonder if he (M'tesa) has ever given the missionaries the letters I addressed to them from M'ruli, or shown them the treaty I offered him. *Watch closely events at M'tesa's.* I need not stir in the matter. Emin Effendi went there and saw Wilson; he is now coming down to Khartum. . . . To my mind, M'tesa will father the mission till he finds he cannot get what he wants; and then will throw them over: it may take two years, but come this will.' [About a year later, the Nyanza Mission were prisoners at M'tesa's.]

[*Gordon to Baker:*]

'Khartum: 1st September, 1878.

'How I wish you were here in my place, with all my worries, and bored to death! I told Giegler to write you all the news from here, and to tell you about the elephants, which are doing first-rate.

'I have written to get Rivers Wilson to move; so as to get a Mixed Tribunal here of Europeans and natives, to try native cases against the Government. If a tribunal were established, and natives could appeal to it, against the injustice of the *employés*, it would not be possible for a bad Government to exist. As it is now, it all depends on the individual character of the governors; and supposing a good one is removed, his successor, if a bad one, will destroy all his predecessor's work in a week. Besides which, no *employés*, however well-disposed, will implicate themselves too much in the ways of a good governor, for fear of hereafter consequences: when a bad one comes, they know they will be spited. This is one of my great difficulties

and anxieties; for I fear for my Faithfuls (there are but few of them) if I died, or if I left.

'You know full well, H.H. [his Highness, the Khedive] never punishes anyone whatever, unless the offender does something against H.H. personally. *So convinced am I of this*, that I never ask him to punish anyone: I take the law into my own hands, so far as I can; and never trouble myself with a "journal" or court-martial, unless I am on the spot to make them give the verdict I wish. If these Tribunals were once established, no bad governor could exist; and as H.H. would have been their (unwilling) creator, he could not complain of foreign interference: and H.H. would be forced to listen to them. Now H.H. puts my reports quietly away; and overlooks the offences.

. . . 'The screw-steamer *Khedive* has been completed and is on the Lake Albert. It took $3\frac{17}{30}$ months: the boiler was rolled up from Mugi to Dufli. Now we have two steamers on the Lake. If you could come out, how glad I would be to see you! . . . Kabréga is all right with us. M'tesa is half-and-half. I sent up three missionaries the other day; and did my best for them. I have given-up all idea of going to or putting steamers on Lake Victoria.

. . . 'Now for the slave-traders. I am carrying on a hot war with them. I have caught 23 caravans in three months; but still they keep on. The *mudirs* of Equator and Fashoda [stations] are both in prison for this work. (Will H.H. punish them? I will not give him the chance; for I will do it myself, and am still hesitating whether I shall not shoot one of them, without asking him.) I hanged one man for mutilating a boy; and did not ask him [the Khedive].

'I will now tell you my remedy against the Slave Trade:—Vacate the Bahr El Ghazal, Makraka, Rohl, Shaka; and leave the slave-traders up there to perish: cut-off all communications with them, and punish all who try to go up or come down from them. Zubeir's

son [Suliman] is in revolt again; and I cannot leave this place to go after him. I will blockade them, and let them perish. Each *cantar* of ivory we get costs £80. The trade is not worth it.

'Tell me, if you do not think my scheme will cut at the root of the Slave Trade. You see, I want to deal a final blow. It is of no use for me to stop caravans or to hang the men: my successor will renew the same game [conniving at the Slave Trade]. But if I vacate the Negro proximity, it would be too flagrant an affair for my successor to re-occupy it. We owe all our bothers to—[naming the pioneer slave-traders]. It is they who pushed the Dongolawi [inhabitants of Dongola, and slave-traders] into these lands, which I cannot reach. I shall keep the Nile up to M'ruli; but vacate Latuka and all the rest.

'You will be well received by H.H., if you went to Cairo. I think he would be quite glad to have you here instead of me; and pray do not think I should be in the least degree vexed.

'I tell Giegler to write to you; for I have a lot to do. I have four small steamers, in sections, to put together; and mean to open-up the Nile from Berber to Wadi Halfa. We have put-together the two 30 *h.p.* engines and boilers; and thus have used up all your things. . . . All the steamers are in first-rate repair: as good as new.

'Come up and see the south end of Lake Albert. You could get up here from Suez in 19 days. I would send a steamer to meet you at Berber. From here you could go to Lado in 15 days, in the *Ismailia*, your own boat (such a picture she is!). From Lado to Dufli—by steamer to Kirri, and by elephant to Dufli—in eight days. And then, up and round Lake and back to Dufli in ten days at the outside. . . . Come up; and write another book. . . . Telegraph to me that you will come; start at once: Cyprus will keep!' [Baker was then preparing to start for Cyprus.]

[*Baker to Gordon:*]

'Sandford Orleigh: 16th October, 1878.

'Your letter of 1st September arrived yesterday. . . . I should like immensely to come and see all the great changes you have made, and to have a look at the Albert Nyanza; and both Lady Baker and I thank you very much for your kind invitation. I should not hesitate for an instant, personally; but she is, I know, afraid that, if once I should get into the old groove, my visit would be prolonged: and she rather dreads a return to savage life. Nevertheless, I shall not give-up the hope; and, *Inshalla!* I may yet be able to manage it.

'Your letter has interested me deeply; and I can fully sympathise with all the worries and heart-burning disappointments inseparable from your position. It is truly the stone of Sisyphus that rolls back, and will not remain upon the summit in Central Africa!

. . . 'Your suggestion of cutting-off the slave-hunters from all communication is a good one, as they must be utterly powerless when short of ammunition; but I do not exactly understand the present position on the White Nile. When I was there, these slave-hunting companies leased from the Khartum Government the right of trading in certain defined districts: they accordingly fed their stations with annual reinforcements—ammunition and *matériel.*

'In those early days of operations against the Slave Trade, I had no power to close the White Nile to traffic: since these companies held contracts beyond my jurisdiction. As you now hold supreme power, you can, of course, prohibit all traffic on the river, if you determine to blockade the slavers; and by a strict supervision of the Kordofan routes, no ammunition can possibly reach the rebellious companies. It is dangerous to hint to the native tribes, that their [the slave-traders'] total disappearance would not offend the Government: because a Negro success in a conflict with the slavers might

encourage them to resist the Government troops at some future time.

'It is a difficult affair to manage: because all these Dongolawi, who are now mere brigands in those districts, have innumerable relatives and friends in the Sudan. If the Government troops came into collision with them, a number would be killed: a cart-load of petitions and lying statements would be sent up to H.H., at Cairo; and your name would be blackened. I therefore think, that your idea of cutting-off all communications is the safest and best, as it will relieve you of *active* responsibility; and the refractory companies will have only themselves to thank for the dilemma.*

'I do not know how you have prospered, in establishing trade with the natives. During my time, Kabréga's people were the only natives who would exchange ivory for goods. All other tribes refused to deal, except for cows. I resisted; and never exchanged a single cow for tusks, although I possessed thousands. I adopted this course, because I hoped that I might then induce them to traffic in a legitimate form, and barter for European commodities. In this I never succeeded.

'This was the pull which the Dongolawi had over the Government. They could steal the cows and kidnap slaves, with which they could purchase ivory and hire carriers, for no other outlay than that on ammunition expended in the capture. At the same time, the slaves were sold to the men who composed the company; and the so-called soldiers received them against their pay, instead of dollars. As you have seen, the Dongolawi are

* Gordon, it is scarcely necessary to state, was absolutely indifferent to consequences in adopting any line of action his conscience dictated; and assumed any and all risks with a light heart, since he shifted his personal responsibility upon a Divine Providence, whom he regarded as the *ipso facto* Governor-General of the Sudan: 'I cannot tell you the relief it is, since I acknowledge Him to be the Governor-General,' he wrote to his niece. The Bahr El Ghazal slave-traders were blockaded by November, 1878.

passionately attached to this mode of life; and so long as they possess ammunition, they may retreat before the Government troops, and establish themselves wherever they think fit: it would be a waste of time to follow them over so vast a field as Africa. Under these circumstances, I feel sure you are right to cut them off from all communication; which you can easily effect.

'I always anticipated a good ivory-trade, by radiating from the Albert Nyanza as a common centre [in Colonel Gordon's opinion at that time, the Albert Nyanza was a better centre than Uganda for missionary effort], because the transport should not be expensive by the river-route northwards. When you read Sanderson's experiences, I think you will make a trial at elephant-catching; as they would be of immense use in those countries, where they could subsist upon the natural foliage and grasses. The natives would readily assist in digging the necessary trenches, as it is a work they understand by their old mode of sinking pitfalls; and they would take an interest in the object.

'Your great difficulty must, of course, lie in the absence of all honest administrative material. This is the curse of Turkey, and the cause of her ruin; it is the same in Egypt: there is hardly a person on whom you can thoroughly depend, if placed in a position of authority.

'Then again, there exists throughout Egypt, a hatred and horror of the White Nile, which has been a place of fatal transportation for many, and is regarded as the "Botany Bay" of older times.* There is no love of country or feeling of pride in working for a future development: in fact, patriotism does not exist. Under these circumstances, the Government of the Sudan is an uphill game; and that inherent affection for the Slave

* Gordon, who had many secret enemies in Egypt, once threatened the Pashas, that, if they intrigued against him, he would recommend the Khedive to nominate the one who was found-out as his successor in the Sudan!

Trade will always occasion a relapse whenever vigilance shall be relaxed. There is no doubt, that the authorities will connive at it, if they dare; and so long as they wink at its continuance, the slave-hunters will endeavour to evade the laws.

'It stands to reason, that a severe blow at a high authority would do more good than the hanging of a dozen little men like the *reises* [captains] of vessels or the *wekils* of stations. But, on the other hand, how would such a blow as the execution of a Bey or Pasha be regarded by H.H., and by the world of Lower Egypt? I am afraid they would make political capital out of it; and would bribe some low and reptile Europeans to write garbled accounts to the English Press. If you try a Pasha or a Bey by court-martial, they are certain to acquit him upon a charge of slave-dealing, as the officers would sympathise with his crime. If I were you, I would imprison a delinquent of rank, with *hard labour*, instead of shooting him. A treadmill, to work a *sakia* or to turn cotton-gins at Khartum, would be a healthy recreation for these gentlemen; and you could punish *ad libitum*, without exposing yourself to newspaper-attacks by their friends in Lower Egypt, or to any charge of undue severity by H.H. A *heavy fine* and imprisonment, with the treadmill accompaniment, would, I think, quickly establish the fact of your authority, and cut-off the hope of an appeal to the clemency of H.H. by a transportation to Cairo. (——— will feel the loss of his £1,000 more than any disgrace, which these fellows are too thick-skinned to understand.)

'I like your idea of a Mixed Tribunal of Europeans to try native cases, as there can be no doubt that those who have been faithful to you would certainly be ill-treated should your protection be withdrawn, either by your death or absence. On the other hand, it is difficult to obtain Europeans for any position except by salaries that are very expensive to the State; as the climate of the Sudan is fatal to so many constitutions. Men like

Giegler, who are acclimatised,* and can be depended on, are few and far between; and those are the kind of men required.

'You have done work which nobody else could have accomplished; and if you could devote your whole life to the development of the country, you would, no doubt, effect a marvellous change: but then, for whom? If H.H. showed a deep appreciation for a man's devotion (which, no doubt, he does), there is always a pleasure in carrying-on the administration, even though full of worries and annoyance. Still, there must remain the feeling, that perhaps your work may be paralysed and your labours ruined by some idiot or impostor who may succeed to your position. A native Governor would purposely upset all that an English predecessor had accomplished [that is to say, under the then-existing conditions]. There is this comfort in your case: that not only your personal friends, but all your countrymen, give you full credit for great self-sacrifice and perse-

* To speak of a European being 'acclimatised' after a few years' residence, even half a life-time, in the Tropics, is to use a relative expression—synonymous with 'a salted horse'—because we now know, that no northern European, at least, can become thus acclimatised, in a strictly scientific sense; nor is there much hope of his immediate descendants, if any, by a European wife, attaining that end: though, under the most favourable circumstances, children of the third and fourth generation may possibly develop a constitution and mental balance more in consonance with the conditions of life in the Tropics, at the cost of losing, by atrophy, the distinctive characteristics of a higher civilization. These remarks apply with special significance to the strictly tropical regions of Africa. Moreover, mere elevation above the sea-level, with its corresponding decrease of temperature, does not compensate for the absence of marked seasonal changes and the prevalence of high relative humidity in the Tropics. For instance, to reach a climate at all comparable to that of London, so far as temperature alone is concerned, one would have to ascend to 10,000 feet above the sea-level. There are no plateaus and few mountains of that elevation in Africa. In fact, popular ideas of the 'acclimatisation' of Europeans receive little or no support from the latest dogmas of science. Acclimatisation proceeds no faster than the development of racial characteristics, with which it is inseparably associated.

verance in a good cause. This is always a reward.' [Gordon, however, was profoundly indifferent to public opinion.]

[*Gordon to Baker:*]

'Khartum: 24th September, 1878.

'A steamer came down yesterday with the unpleasant intelligence that the route to Lado was stopped at A. [position, at junction of Bahr El Ghazal, marked on sketch-map in the margin of Gordon's letter] and that it was with difficulty, when she turned back, that she passed at B. [a few miles below, where the channel is not more than 40 yards broad, and the banks, concealed by high grass, are mostly invisible]. The places marked *Sudd* are where the stoppages existed in your time: these were seven in number. I am sending up to have them removed. It appears, that these stoppages take place in very high Niles. This year has been an exceptionally high Nile—26½ *kerats*. Generally, a good Nile is 23 *kerats*. Cairo never wants more than 23 *kerats;* besides which, the rise of the Nile is very late, and I fear it will do as much harm to Lower Egypt as a low Nile would. The Korosko Desert is covered with grass, and the whole country has been well deluged: heavy rains, doing a deal of damage, have fallen at Assuan and Wadi Halfa. It would be a splendid season for you to come out.

'It is a great pity I was so occupied, that I could not send and explore the Bahr Ez Zeráf. It is by far the best channel; and there is plenty of wood for three-quarters of the route between Sobat and Rabat Shambé [*i.e.* as compared with the alternative White Nile route]. The only difficulty would be, in keeping it open.

'In 4 months I have captured 30 caravans of slaves; but I feel sure that, until you prevent or render illegal the possession of new slaves by the people, you are only nibbling at the branches: to uproot the Trade, in my opinion, the only way is to register all slaves, to keep the Register books open for, say, 8 months, and then to close

them for good. The books to be these—*A*, being kept at Mudirieh;' and *B*, being given to owners of slaves:

A.—MUDIRIEH.....	*B.*—MUDIRIEH.....
No.... Name of owner.....	No.... Name of owner.....
„ „ slave.....	„ „ slave.....
Age, etc. of slave.....	Age, etc. of slave.....
N.B.—*To be freed in A.H.* 1366.	N.B.—*To be freed in A.H.* 1366.

'(Seize all slaves whose masters could not produce papers. All slaves, born after closing of Register, to be free. The N.B. remark will keep always before the people the general enfranchisement of slaves in A.H. 1366 [A.D. 1888], in the Sudan, and in A.H. 1361 at Cairo.)

'I would legalise the sale and purchase of slaves, if registered; the sale, etc., to be inserted on the papers and in the Register book. If we did this, no man would buy a slave, when the books were closed. The newly-bought slaves would soon know if they were registered or not: and there would be no chance of a row when the year of Jubilee arrived.

'To my mind this is the only way to stop the Trade. Of course, it would be a deal of bother to carry-out; but it is a reasonable and possible thing to do: no one could object to it, and it entirely prevents a new slave being added to the present multitude. The Registration should be gratuitous. As it is now, I may quench it; but only for a time. The moment I went, it would recommence. This Registration would put it out of the power of my successor to let it be renewed, if a few Consuls were there to look after it. My plan is a definite one; and it is easy to check its not being followed. Now, it is merely a question of who is the sharpest, the slave-dealer or the Government: the one, pecuniarily interested to carry-out his work; the other, only lukewarm to prevent it. I think if this can be carried-through, we shall have no trouble.

'H.H.'s slaves must also be registered: there must be no exceptions. The slaves are sharp enough, and would soon look after themselves; but I think the mere fact, that none but registered slaves would be acknowledged by the Government, would do more than anything else to frighten-off the dealers from the Trade: for the fact of unregistered slaves being in their possession would be damnatory to them, even if these were in a town or not. As it is now, according to my reading of the Slave Convention,* the selling, purchase, and possession of slaves is legal for 7 years, and 12 years, in the Cairo and Sudan Governments, respectively. It is not distinctly stated so; but the Convention says:—"The sale, etc., of slaves is prohibited," etc., etc.; and again—"This prohibition is to take place," etc., etc., "after 7 and 12 years." Consequently, as the prohibition is not to take place till after 7 and 12 years, therefore, *I say*, until 7 and 12 years are over, it [viz.: slave-holding] is legal,—at least, that is my deduction; I am not alluding to the open slave-markets. (See *London Gazette*, 'Slave Convention,' 17 August 1877.)

'Look at my position. Now, I say it is legal to buy and sell slaves from family to family till the expiration of 7 and 12 years. Well then, A. can buy a slave from B. at Cairo; he can do the same at Khartum, and in any part of H.H.'s dominions. If it is legal for A. to buy one, it is legal for A. to buy 12; yet, if I catch A. coming from Shaka or the Bahr El Ghazal, he is tried for his life.

'Here is another fault in the Convention. Art. I. says, he is to be tried for *Stealing with murder*, the punishment of which is death, by military law. Yet, Art. II. of the Decree of H.H., putting this Conven-

* Gordon, however, misread the Slave Convention of 1877, which merely prohibited the sale of slaves from family to family on and after certain dates. At the same time, his system of Registration, if it could be carried-out, would be an effective step towards the gradual abolition of the legal *status* of Slavery.

tion in force, says, the punishment is to be imprisonment for from 5 months to 5 years!!

'A. can buy a slave (after my reading of the Convention) from B. at Khartum; yet, he is a criminal if he buys the slave at Shaka. You know also, it is not A. (who is *caught*) who is the greatest scamp: it is B., who sold him to A.; or it may be C., who sold him, still further in the Interior, to B.; or it may be D., a native *sheikh*, who captured him and brought him, for sale, into Egyptian territory, and then legally sold him to C., who sold him to B., who sold him to the not-to-be-much-blamed A., who gets hanged for it. You know all these difficulties; and, bad-tempered as I am, I hesitate to hang the "A's."

'Eighteen months ago, I recommended the Registration scheme, before the Convention was made; but it was not liked by ——.

'Well, there is another matter. Have the Egyptian authorities been made to publish these conventions and decrees? I do not think anyone bothered themselves further about them, when once the Convention was signed. On 1st November, 1877, I had the whole thing printed, and published on the walls of *every Mudirieh* in the Sudan; and I am going to give them a revival every year of the same thing. You will see the necessity. The people must be informed of the year of Jubilee; or else you will act unfairly to them: and there will be difficulties when the year of Jubilee comes.'

[*Gordon to Baker*:]

'Khartum: 29th October, 1878.

'I have just made out the Sudan accounts. They are:

Receipts	£676,000
Revenue	£579,000
Deficit	£ 97,000
Floating Debt	£327,000

'This is a settler! and I mean to evacuate Unyoro, except Fatiko, and only keep Lake Albert. I mean

to evacuate Latuka, Makraka, Rohl, Bahr El Ghazal, and part of Dar-Fur. Every *cantar* of ivory costs us £80; and it is not worth it.'

[*Gordon to Baker*:]

'Khartum: 20th November, 1878.

'I received to-day your very kind letter of the 16th October.

. . . 'I am in distress. The *Sudd* still exists at the Bahr El Ghazal junction; and I have no news of my expedition, which went to remove it two months ago. Again, Rossit, a German, (who has been 3½ months in Dar-Fur, as Governor, putting-down the Slave Trade and cutting-off all communications between the revolted slave-dealers, under Zubeir's son, and El Obeid, &c.) died four days ago. It is terrible, the deaths this year! The Catholic Mission [in Uganda] have lost 5 or 6 Europeans.

'Again, my finances are now my entire charge. I have been obliged to take them in hand, myself, entirely; and have at last got them out of chaos: and know I owe £327,000 to the people of the Sudan, and that the present Revenue is less than the present Expenditure by £97,000. I shall, I hope, make them balance and pay-off the debt in time.

'Harar, Zeila, and Berbera bother me. I want a first-rate man, a European, to send there as Governor, at £1,200 or £1,500 a-year. They are always howling for troops.

. . . 'Of course I have heard nothing from the Equator for several months. I mean to evacuate M'ruli, Fauvera, Masindi, Latuka, Rohl, and Makraka: they are not worth keeping. Rohl and Makraka are slave-traders' nests.

. . . 'I have steamers here to put on Victoria Nile, between Fauvera, M'ruli, Urondogani [below the rapids on the "Somerset" river] and the Ripon Falls; but I shall use them otherwise. In the present state

of affairs, I shall do much better in concentrating my forces on Lake Albert, south, east, and west. . . . M'tesa's men never could beat the Wanyoro people: they are fearful cowards; and 300 men would do for him and his kingdom. Why, I occupied his capital with 200 men, in 1876, for 4 months—did you know? —and I withdrew them on account of the unhealthiness of the country.'

[*Gordon to Baker:*]

'Khartum: 27th November, 1878.

'Thank you for your kind letter, 16th October [acknowledged in former letter]. How well you write! I fear you have difficulty in reading my scrawls. [On the contrary: Gordon's handwriting was admirable, and easy to decipher, though he was rather reckless in punctuation.]

. . . '1. *Cairo Affairs:* I feel vexed that no one of those princes and noblemen of all lands who have received hospitality, land, presents, &c., have not said one word in favour of H.H. I think the same object would have been obtained if the *Cours d'Enquête* had omitted, in their Report, all the hard sayings against H.H. and his family. . . .

'2. *Slave Trade:* Wylde [head of Slave Trade Department in the British Foreign Office] tells me, that no slaves have come to Jeddah [Jidda]; and that the people are in despair. You must know that I ordered the seizure of three *dhows,* belonging to the Turks of Jeddah, who came over with water and food, evidently for slaves. We annexed the *dhows* and sent the crews to Jeddah. This has stopped those people; but it is quite illegal: and what will Turkey say to it? I have told Nubar what I did: but *no answer.*

'The Slave Companies' contracts have been dissolved: and now no one can go up to the Bahr El Ghazal. I can keep the relations of the slave-traders, who are in the Sudan, in order; and, in fact, I have

seized the property of some of the absentees as a punishment for their rebellion.

'Do you realise what this affair is? *It is an emigration of the Dongolawi, etc., en masse to the Equator, to avoid payment of taxes, and to be free to rob, etc.* You must understand (*vide Heart of Africa*, by Schweinfurth, about Zubeir, etc., and his history) that when you went to the Equator, Jáfer Pasha sent-up Kutchuk Ali with two companies to the Bahr El Ghazal. Zubeir Effendi was then the *wekil* of one of the Slave Companies; and he was the most influential of the *wekils* up there. He called the *wekils* together; and they agreed to oppose the Government by passive resistance. Kutchuk Ali died: a white captain and a man, Belal, a black captain, quarrelled with each other for the command. Zubeir and Co. aided the white captain; and, in a row—about the black, Belal, taking food from the natives—a fight took place. Zubeir was wounded, and Belal killed: and then Zubeir wrote his account, etc., and the white captain wrote *his* account, and made out that Belal was bad, etc. Well, things remained like this for some time. But Belal had been once in the Sultan of Dar-Fur's service; and the Sultan heard, that he had gone up with Egyptian troops to the Bahr El Ghazal. The Sultan, who before had been on good terms with Zubeir, was angry; and would allow no one to go through his country to Zubeir. Zubeir, however, wanted *dhurra* in exchange for slaves: so he began forays on Dar-Fertit. The Sultan sent against him a lot of troops. Zubeir defeated them, and advanced. He reported all this to Khartum. The Egyptians did not know what to do with him: so they condoned the death of Belal, and made him a Bey. Then came more fights between Zubeir's armed slaves and Dar-Fur. H.H., seeing Zubeir would conquer Dar-Fur, if he 'lay low,' sent troops; and, with Zubeir's people, they conquered Dar-Fur, and killed the Sultan, who fell dead at the head of his troops, his two sons being killed over his body. Zubeir was made a Pasha. His troops are

boys whom he has brought-up from 8 or 10 years of age. They were capital shots, and carried tripods to rest their guns on; they would lick any number of Egyptians: it is they who conquered Dar-Fur.

'After the fall of Dar-Fur, Zubeir was discontented, because H.H. would not make him Governor; and he had rows with Ismail Pasha Yakub [Gordon's predecessor as Governor-General of the Sudan] about the spoil, &c. He telegraphed to H.H. that he would come to Cairo. H.H. said, "Come." He went; and is not coming back again, if I can help it.

'I then, in 1877, became Governor-General. Dar-Fur, being pillaged and devastated by the Bashi-Bazuks, rose in revolt and hemmed-in all the garrisons. Zubeir was at Cairo, a semi-prisoner. His son was at Shaka; for, after the conquest, Zubeir was ordered with all his people to leave Dar-Fur for the Bahr El Ghazal, his old haunts. There is some suspicion that the son of Zubeir [Suliman] and his party excited the revolt in Dar-Fur: at any rate, when I got to Dar-Fur, they refused to co-operate; and acted in a semi-hostile manner. I went to Dar-Fur; had two fights; relieved the wretched, cowardly garrisons; and put things quiet in a general way. Any man of energy would have done it long before: for there were 16,000 troops there. However, before I came, the rebels had killed two columns of 300 to 400 each, and taken 2 guns.

'Well, when Zubeir's son heard that Egypt was getting the upper hand, he marched up with his men; and, after some ticklish work, when he was as near as possible attacking me, he and all his people, quarrelling among themselves, gave-in. I distributed them about in different places; they numbered 6,000. Well, then I left Dar-Fur; and when at Aden, I heard that the son of Zubeir had again coalesced with the others; and that they were in revolt. Then I said, "I will not pursue you: I will cut-off your roads." I had gone to Shaka, the then head-quarters, and could have taken Zubeir's son

prisoner; but I trusted him and his people: and I reap the consequences. [Gessi afterwards, in 1879, captured Suliman, and shot him: thereby raising a blood-feud between Zubeir and Gordon.]

'I now occupy Shaka, with Regulars, and I have a strong force on the Rohl,—not to fight, but to await events. They [the rebels] cannot fail to fall-out ere long. (There are £60,000 worth of ivory there.) We are raising the tribes against them.

'We never want to go there again: it is a complete desert. As for trade with the Blacks, or any hope of getting more ivory, it is over, each *cantar* having cost us £80: and nothing but misery.

'I hope you will come out. As for Mixed Tribunals, this has been a terribly unhealthy year, and I doubt if any European could stand the climate. You know the demand for high salaries and compensations which these men [Europeans] would bring forward—I think, justly—and it makes me quail to think of the bother and expense.'

[*Baker to Gordon:*]

'Cairo: 16th December, 1878.

'We are here for a few days, waiting for a good opportunity for Cyprus.

. . . 'I should have much liked to run up and see you at Khartum; but Lady Baker has had so many years of the Sudan, and, after all she has endured there, it would be selfish of me to persuade her. Thus, I regret much that we cannot meet.

. . . 'I have thought much about your plan for registering the domestic slaves. The plan would be simple and excellent for any compact and civilised nation; but I do not think you could work it throughout this unwieldly and semi-savage country. The people would conceal their slaves, and would trick the authorities in a thousand different ways. I can see no other method than the actual stoppage of the kid-

napping in the interior of Africa. This, as you know, is extremely difficult; as so many routes exist which avoid the White Nile.

'The love of slave-dealing is so thoroughly engrafted on the native mind, that it appears impossible to eradicate it. Even Europeans who have been long resident here cease to regard it with the horror expressed by Englishmen at home.

'This increases the onus of responsibility in your position and in that which I previously occupied. If you had two-thirds of public opinion against you, and one-third only in your favour, you would have some hope of a good result. But when *all* are against your work, the most sanguine must look to the future with serious misgiving. If I were in your position, I should certainly issue a proclamation, that I would hang the *wekil* or leader of any slave-caravan, or the *reis* of any vessel with slaves on board. I believe this severity alone will destroy the Trade. If two or three should be executed, it would be impossible to find leaders who would run the risks. So long as the punishment is simply imprisonment or flogging, they will take the chance of escape; and the gambling propensities of the Arab render the risky employment attractive. As you say, it seems hard to hang A. when C. is guilty; but the punishment of A., the active agent, is the only way to get at the employer C., at Cairo, who suffers by A.'s defeat, and the confiscation of boats, cargo, &c.

'I was visited here by Zubeir Pasha, who is on parole. These people, I have no doubt, imagine that I intend to return to the Sudan. I told him at once, that this was not the case; and that I had no interest of any kind in the country beyond the wish for its ultimate prosperity. At the same time I advised him to use any influence he might possess with his son, Suliman, to persuade him to submit unconditionally and immediately to your government. These people are so deep, that it is impossible to know their real intentions.

. . . 'H.H. received me with much warmth of manner; and I am glad I remained long enough in Egypt to pay my respects to him, instead of passing direct from Alexandria to Cyprus.

'It was very kind of you, my dear General Gordon, to invite Lady Baker (with myself and Julian) to come and see you; and she begs me to thank you much: but she hopes some day to see you in our own home in England, instead of in Central Africa.'

It is unnecessary to direct the attention of the reader to the points of resemblance and divergence between the relative tasks of Baker and Gordon, or to the manner in which they undertook them: besides, when Gordon returned to the Sudan as Governor-General, he exercised powers with which no predecessor had been invested. Nor need we attempt to compare and contrast the two men, who did more for the Sudan, in those early days of chaos, than could be appreciated at the time, and who laid the foundations of a beneficent rule which were quickly wrecked by their Mohammedan successors. Both succeeded up to a certain point, but failed in the end to set a definite limit to the subversive forces in the Sudan. Both were sanguine, that by their individual exertions they could check or, may be, suppress the Traffic in Slaves. Finally, the difficulties of both were not so much those on the spot, created by the corruption of Egyptian rule; but were chiefly caused by the uncertain character of their official support and the unreliable nature of their Native subordinates.

Baker formed a high estimate of Gordon's capacity for administration, in which the personal factor counts for so much in countries like those of the Sudan; and greatly admired his character as a man: as may be seen from the following letter, addressed to Stanley:

'Sandford Orleigh: 1st June, 1878.

. . . 'Do not doubt Colonel Gordon for an instant. I have never seen him for more than fifteen or twenty minutes; but I am convinced that he is a man so thoroughly superior to the generality of what are termed "the world," that you may rely upon him in every way. He may be peculiar and unlike other men; but this is a very grand distinction, in my opinion, when the peculiarity is exhibited in self-sacrifice for a noble object. Those exceptions, who are unlike the common herd, must be misunderstood: as the million cannot appreciate their enthusiasm. I don't think *you* are quite like everybody else; and I have no doubt you have sometimes felt, in secret bitterness, that you were misunderstood; and, with an instinct of self-defence, have felt inclined to curl-up, on hedgehog principles, with the points to the whole world.

'All men who have devoted themselves to some great work, in which they may have outstripped competitors, must be exposed to "envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness": frequently, they have been betrayed by some Judas in whom they have innocently trusted. But troubles are merely the adverse winds of life; and a man who is really great will always be appreciated in the end: close-hauled, with head to wind, like a good ship, he will attain his destination in spite of storms.

'Believe me, Colonel Gordon is most thorough. You will have seen how he is working alone, without a single European from his formerly-numerous staff. Everyone has tailed-off—either dead, invalided, disgusted by the

climate, or worn-out by fatigue. Still, Gordon works on. And I have a profound respect for him: as I know by painful experience how much he must have suffered from worries, disappointments, and various troubles—*immense to him*—which the world can never appreciate.

. . . 'If you were to write frankly to Colonel Gordon concerning your wish to explore,* you may at all events depend upon a most sincere response.'

* This was in reference to Gordon's expression in a letter to Stanley, written in 1875: 'If you think of approaching the Egyptian territory, you should be cautious; as the soldiers have orders to prevent strangers from entering our lines, and are likely to shoot.'

CHAPTER XXII.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

[1875–1879]

In the year 1867, Baker wrote these words to Sir Roderick Murchison:

'The Eastern Question must shortly be solved. . . . Should the Foreign Office support Egypt in determining her independence, we have nothing to fear from the Eastern Question. Egypt would remain intact, and the route to India undisturbed. . . . It is of paramount importance that English influence should be restored where it is now weakened by French tactics. Nothing would restore that influence to such an extent as our support in declaring Egypt independent of Turkey, and our furtherance of Egyptian interests by the Expedition proposed—under English guidance.'

The proposed Expedition, to which he alluded, followed, in its main lines, that which he undertook three years later as Governor-General of the Equatorial Provinces. He, himself, as we have mentioned, was the first to establish the precedent by which British subjects were selected to fill high offices under the Egyptian Government; and his successor, General Gordon, went still farther, by establishing Egyptian rule in the Sudan upon a permanent basis, and in asso-

ciating the mutual interests of Great Britain and Egypt. Although Gordon's successor in the Sudan was 'a Turk of the Old School,' British subjects were appointed to other high posts under the Egyptian administration. In fact, a new era had dawned on the banks of the Nile, in which British influence stood-out in greater relief.

In October, 1875, Baker wrote to Mr. Douglas Murray:

'I have no Turkish bonds, happily; but I have Egyptians, which I shall always hold, as I believe in the future of that country . . . [*i.e.*] if the Khedive will throw-off the Turkish yoke, and claim the protection of England,' when 'he would be controlled in his expenditure. . . . There can be no doubt that the Khedive *means* well; but he has been perplexed by a dozen Consuls-General. I believe the collapse of Turkey will be the starting-point of Egypt.'

With the fall of Ismail—who had 'borrowed very recklessly, though with good intentions, and for public objects,' as a high official wrote to Baker at the close of 1875—and the accession of Tewfik, a more malleable Khedive, Egypt entered upon a legitimate career of self-development, though under European tutelage. The year 1880, which began with many signs of outward prosperity and internal peace, closed, however, with an outbreak of political disorder, which rapidly spread to the Sudan and culminated in the Mahdiist revolt.

Meantime, the Eastern Question, with which the destiny of Egypt is so closely associated, had entered upon so critical a phase, that it

practically monopolised the attention of nearly every Foreign Office and *Chancellerie* in Europe.

Whilst Baker was at Sandford Orleigh, leading the secluded life of a country gentleman, his mind was actively engaged in studying all the ramifications of this complicated International Question. His experience of Orientals and Eastern countries, his close personal relations with Egypt, and his sturdy patriotism led him to follow public events with the closest attention. He was ready at a moment's notice to undertake any duty, and did not hesitate to express and enforce his views on any salient subject, where the interests of his country were at stake. He was entirely in sympathy with the Mediterranean policy of Great Britain, in its main provisions, by which the maritime route to India *viâ* the Suez Canal shall be maintained at all hazards and at any self-sacrifice; and he regarded Egypt as the keystone of that policy. He was for giving-up nothing; and advocated a bold progressive policy in the East.

In September, 1875, he wrote to Lord Wharncliffe:

'The disturbed state of Turkey [insurrections, etc. in the Balkan Peninsula] makes me very anxious concerning our future policy. Some time ago I wrote to Lord Derby suggesting a plan to secure a position for England, should it become necessary to counteract the intrigues or movements of Russia, in the event of the Eastern Question being forced upon Europe.

'The Turks, being hard-pressed for money, will require a fresh loan. I want to lend them the money,

from England, upon the security of the Revenues of Crete. Crete would then become *pledged* to us, for a certain advance, upon the condition that an English Governor-General should be appointed, who would not only ensure the just collection, but would also increase the revenue of the island. Nothing could be safer than such a loan (to the bondholders) as it would be guaranteed.

'In the event of the Eastern Question becoming acute, England would at once assume the Protectorate of Crete, and occupy the island with a powerful military force, in order to guard her vested interests. We should form an impregnable coal-depôt, by fortifying the harbour [Suda Bay]; and we should then secure the Mediterranean by a chain of coaling-stations to Egypt and India: *i.e.*, Gibraltar, Malta, Crete. We could re-occupy Corfu at any time, and command the Adriatic. By the occupation of Crete, we should paralyse Russia, even if she were in possession of the Dardanelles. You may depend upon it, that before two years elapse there will be a general scrimmage, in which we may be forced to take part. . . . I do not believe we are prepared with any decided plan; but if we do not possess both Crete and Egypt, we shall some day be cut-off from India. . . . If the approaching winter should be chilly, I think I shall run out to Crete, and gather information.'

Lord Derby, to whom Baker submitted the above scheme, as he tells his friend, Lord Wharncliffe, had replied (June, 1875):

'I will think over what you have said about Crete. You must see as clearly as I do, that a great change must take place, both in external circumstances and in opinion here, before your ideas could be acted on.'

In fact, it required the Russo-Turkish War to bring about that change of circumstances and

of opinion, the sequel to which was—so far as Great Britain was concerned—the occupation of Cyprus, and not of Crete, under conditions far too favourable to Turkey and most perilous to Great Britain, apart from the veiled Protectorate which the latter Power assumed over the Turkish Provinces of Asia Minor. That, however, is a topic to which we shall have occasion to return.

In December, 1876, or four months before the Tsar threw down the gage of battle near Kisheneff, Baker wrote to Mr. Douglas Murray:

'I think there *must* be war between Russia and Turkey; and, if I were the Turk, I should fight *at once*—the only chance for Turkey. I do not love the Turkish Government, but I like the Turkish soldier and peasant: with good rule, they would be splendid fellows.'

Into the history of this war, the leading phases of which are dealt with in Baker's letters, we need not enter. Baker's interest in it was the greater, because his brother, Valentine, had entered the Turkish service, with the rank of Major-General.

Towards the close of the war, General Valentine Baker specially distinguished himself at the affair of Tashkessen (1st January, 1878), where, with little more than five good battalions (2,000 men) of the Turkish troops, who bore the brunt of the fighting, and 2 guns, he covered the retreat of Shakir Pasha's army in the Balkans (Kamali). By the skilful disposition of his small force, he

held the Pass and kept Gourko's army of about 40,000 Russians at bay for ten hours, thereby enabling Shakir Pasha to retire in safety. So stubbornly did he hold his position against the picked troops of Russia, and so courageously did the Turks fight, that nearly two-thirds of Valentine Baker's entire force were killed before the remnant retired, with their object effected. This was one of the most effective, if not the most brilliant, of rear-guard actions on record.

At the outset of the negotiations for a European Congress, which were prolonged from March to May, 1878, and about a fortnight after the British fleet had forced the passage of the Dardanelles, Baker wrote a letter to the Duke of Somerset, which elicited the following reply:

'London: 5th March, 1878.

'Your suggestions would be of great value if the [British] Government really meditated war; but I never believed the preparations meant more than a display of strength in the Mediterranean. Perhaps if the Russian Bear had put its paw on Egypt, the British Lion would have roared, and roused even ——— from his pacific somnolency. As it is, we shall do nothing.

'I fear that a Congress under the presidency of Bismarck, if we go into it, without a previous understanding and limitation of questions to be discussed, will not terminate to our advantage.'

The Conference met at Berlin on the 13th June, and a month later the famous Treaty was signed, with regard to which Baker wrote to Lord Wharncliffe:

'Dartmouth: 4th September, 1878.

'I feel sure that, considering the divisions in the Cabinet, and the conflicting interests of the European Powers, Lord Beaconsfield has done as much as perhaps could have been accomplished. . . . The Congress, therefore, at its termination, leaves England and Russia in the position of knights in a tournament who have challenged and accepted.

. . . 'Our first duty is to make friends for ourselves, throughout all Asia. It was therefore a good move to assume the Protectorate of Asia Minor; but I do not think it went far enough. I know the Turks so thoroughly, that, when I first heard of this British Protectorate, I felt sure the Porte would not think of consenting to the appointment of British administrators to the Provinces, without which all ideas of reform are a mere farce. I accordingly wrote to a very great Turk for his opinion; and I have his reply—which is precisely what I expected. The English were counselled to "form a model state in Cyprus, as an example which Turkey might imitate; but were advised not to raise the suspicions of the Turks by any interference in Asia Minor." [Witness the present state of Armenia.]

'Now, I think we should have *insisted* upon the permanent right of administering the various districts in our Protectorate; and I am certain that, eventually, we must assume that position, either with or without the Porte's sanction. But then comes the difficulty. We have allowed Russia to hold Batum, Kars, and Ardahan: thus, she has a *pied-à-terre* as a conqueror, which exalts her prestige throughout the East. Our so-called Protectorate cannot and will not be understood by Orientals; they worship force, and they see Russia in possession.

. . . 'Russia will beat us in the game of diplomacy; and we shall find that the Turks, instead of becoming our firm allies, in the event of a rupture, will probably join Russia, or extort from us some hard

bargain by coquetting with the enemy in the hour of our necessity.

'I would never believe any Oriental or trust to any promise made by the Turks. They can never carry-out practical reforms, because they do not possess the administrative materials. All patterns of reformation may be framed and exhibited at Constantinople; but they cannot be worked in the Provinces, which will be administered, as before, by dishonest governors, who are liable to become pliable instruments in the hands of Russia.

'Our policy should be to prevent this: and we have a grand opportunity now, if we strike whilst the iron is hot. We should *insist* upon the immediate appointment of certain English Governors in the chief provinces of Asia Minor. Such a decision would save the Ottoman Empire from destruction, and would at the same time check the influence of Russia. We must always preserve the existence of Turkey, and tutor her to become a valuable ally.

. . . 'There would be little difficulty in raising a magnificent army, at a minimum expense, as the populations of Asia Minor are, from their youth, accustomed to arms, and are already inured to the laws of conscription. Under British officers, they would rival the best troops of Europe.

. . . 'I cannot help reflecting with satisfaction upon the changes that have taken place in Egypt, and the immense increase of British influence, which has dated from 1869, when the Khedive first employed an Englishman with supreme power for the suppression of the Slave Traffic in Central Africa. This step laid the foundation of the reforms that have since been effected. When my term of office expired, in 1873, Gordon became my successor, and carried-on the work I had begun. The action against the Slave Trade opened the door for British interference: Malcolm became a Pasha in the service of the Khedive to suppress the Traffic, on the

Red Sea. McKillop was also made a Pasha. Thus, we find four Englishmen endowed with a rank that had never before been bestowed upon our countrymen.

'We have now taken the lead; and we must keep it. It is useless to make a political *coup de théâtre*. We must insist upon the reforms we desire; and we must be prepared to enforce our demands, if necessary. Should Turkey, Egypt, and even Russia, know that we are *determined*, the chances of actual conflict will be diminished.

. . . 'The fact is, that an aggressive country (such as England has always been) can never stop when and where she may wish. We are driven onwards; and, by the force of circumstances, are impelled to extend our frontiers, even if against our own desires. This is a serious position, which demands not only the highest abilities of statesmen, but also the concentrated energies of a united country.'

A month later he wrote to the same correspondent:

'Sandford Orleigh: 2nd October, 1878.

'I was always under the impression, that the occupation of Cyprus was to complete our line of coaling-stations in the Mediterranean, and to command Egypt. . . . I have never liked the arrangement for tenure: it is very unbusiness-like. We ought to have purchased Cyprus outright.

. . . 'The fact is, that half-measures will not answer. . . . Our Government does not take the active and secret measures that are adopted by Russia, and are so necessary to support our influence in the East. We should make an arrangement to afford secret support to the Chinese, and allow English officers to discipline and organise their troops, to act against Russia. We shall soon find that the Afghans [against whom a British army was then concentrating] are led by Russian officers, precisely as the Servians were supported before any

declaration of war was made against Turkey. If we permit Russia to play her own game, whilst we on our side are satisfied with passive remonstrances, we shall be utterly ruined in the end.

'You know the Indians; and of course you are aware, that not an instant must be lost in an advance upon Afghanistan, unless we are content to throw-up our prestige. We should march direct upon Herat, by Kandahar and Quetta, and occupy that important position at once; whilst the various divisions should concentrate upon the frontier, ready to pierce the passes—Khyber, Bolan, &c. in the spring. [By about November 16th, a British army was concentrated in three divisions—at Quetta, Peshawur, and Kuram: five days later, it advanced.] Any indecision or delay will afford Russia time to supply the Amir with arms and officers.

'Altogether, we are rather in a mess; and are not unlike Mr. Pickwick, when he woke-up in his wheelbarrow, in the pound, exclaiming: "Where are my friends?" The boys in the crowd shouted: "You haven't got any friends! Hurra-a-a!"'

Five days later, he adds:

'Events are moving rapidly in the East; and I only trust, that our Government really have some defined policy and a pre-determined plan of action. Something active must be done, or the Ottoman Empire may become a chaos of anarchy: and we should then be helpless to remedy the evil. [On the 24th October, the Sultan accepted, in principle, the reforms proposed by Great Britain; but the definitive Treaty of Peace with Russia was not signed before February, and the Russian troops did not evacuate Turkish territory until August, 1879.] Whilst we are considering [with a British fleet in the Sea of Marmora] Russia is moving, and Turkey is falling to pieces.

'I have always declared that our Statesmen "legislate for Turkey, but forget the Turks"; they really do not

understand the character of the people and the ignorant fatalism that renders them insensible to argument.

. . . 'The fact is, we have no claim to love or gratitude from the Porte; and we must remember, that, although the Ottoman Empire is apparently crumbling into ruin, there still exists an enormous fighting-power, if its legions are properly organised, paid, and led. The question is, for whom will they fight? You may depend upon it, that there will be more fighting before the Eastern Question—now *beginning*—can be solved.

'Our Government should guarantee a loan, secured upon the revenues of Crete, with the distinct agreement, that an English Governor should be appointed with full powers for five years. We should also guarantee a loan upon the revenues of Cyprus. Money *must* be had, and at once: the officers and troops of the Sultan must be paid. If they, poor devils, were to receive their long arrears, and learn that their pay was English gold, we should gain more influence in a month than by the preaching and fond advice of years.

'There is a sad lack of action on the part of England. We govern fifty million Mohammedans in India; and we make no use of our position. Russia has attacked Mohammedanism; and England should declare herself the Protector of the faith throughout the East. A loan of money to Turkey, on the best security (Crete), and the declaration of a Protectorate—not over Asia Minor, but of *the Mohammedans*—would instil an energy into every Mohammedan race that would bring an overwhelming force to bear, morally and physically, against Russia. By the Kandian Treaty we protect the Buddhist religion in Ceylon—I have seen British sentries on guard, before the great temple at Kandy—why, therefore, should we hesitate to protect the religion of those millions whose allegiance or desertion may govern our destinies in the East?'

Baker, it will be observed, was firmly convinced that a struggle for supremacy in Asia

between Great Britain and Russia, though it may be postponed, cannot be averted. The national development and political tendencies of the Russian Empire, on the one hand, and the vested interests of Great Britain in India and the Far East, on the other hand, must, he thought—and there are many who think likewise—meet in a decisive struggle for supremacy under the natural ramparts of northern India.

That political boundaries, which for centuries may march amicably together in the plains, should cause friction by their contiguity in the most intricate and inaccessible mountain-barrier of the whole world, is certainly not a fact deducible from the reading of history. But the *idée fixe* of a Russian invasion of India cannot be eradicated by argument, so long as it finds support in the many aggressive acts of Russia's encroachment upon its confines.

That an invasion of India, as a measure demanded by military strategy, in the event of a conflict between Russia and Great Britain, with regard to issues that centre in Europe and not in Asia, is a contingency most likely to occur at some future date, few would be prepared to deny. But that Russia should embark upon so perilous an undertaking for the acquisition of India as a Colonial possession, is not a proposition that can be so readily granted by the serious student of politics. Her national development demands ports in Asia south of Vladivostok, and, perhaps, others nearer to her military-base than the Pacific:

in particular it demands, what practically amounts to, the possession of Constantinople and the Black Sea. Consequently, the Eastern Question, for Russia, is in the main a European Question, though it may be fought-out chiefly in Asia. The British frontiers of India are protected by buffer-States, to deaden the shock of the first impact of armed forces in collision; and the Russian frontiers are creeping towards them by the apparently natural process of territorial accretion: when these meet, there will be friction, which may very easily generate the spark that shall ignite all the combustible political elements in Central Asia. Against this danger—and a very real one it is—Great Britain has taken-up an apparently impregnable position, and acts strictly on the defensive. Her fighting-base is practically the enemy's lines: for a serious reverse on the North-West Frontier would be a vital blow to British prestige, upon which the integrity of India largely depends.

We must apologise for this slight digression; but Baker's political writings, during the latter half of his life were so largely concerned with the discussion of the Eastern Question, though dealing chiefly with Egypt, that the reader may excuse the attempt we have made to reduce it to its elements, so far as India is concerned. Baker was opposed to a passive policy, on account of the advantages it gives to an enterprising enemy. And as regards the ultimate relations between Great Britain and Russia, in the Far East, he held common-sense

views, such as the following, which he expressed in a letter to Lord Wharncliffe:

'Yokohama: 8th March, 1881.

'The Russians are very strongly represented in the Japan Seas; and I think they mean to establish themselves in the Korea, having no port further south than Vladivostok, which is frozen, like the Baltic, for several months during winter. I think we should not offer any objection to their move: but we should make a counter-move, by asking Japan for a right of settlement in the island of Tsu-shima, where there is a lovely harbour, situated between Korea and Nagasaki. This [or, under present circumstances, some other suitable island] would make a dockyard for the refitting of our vessels in those seas. Our authorities here do not share my opinion; but they are in the growling old groove of opposing, and therefore irritating, Russia at every footstep; although they dare not fight her. In my opinion, this is a false policy. Either fight Russia, and have done with it; or be friends, and work-out a mutual Eastern programme.'

The solution of the Eastern Question (for Great Britain) lying almost exclusively within the basin of the Mediterranean, as representing the shortest route to India and the Far East, the supremacy of British influence in Egypt and of British sea-power in the Mediterranean became the absorbing subject of Baker's thoughts. He had, as he states in a letter to Lord Wharncliffe, everything that life could give him, except *work*: and he could never be entirely happy without an occupation of some kind. Probably, he would have preferred an administrative post under the British Government: but the British Government has not the

art nor the courage to free itself from the fetters of red-tape, and so to utilise the best talent at its disposal, outside of public offices and in defiance of precedents. In default, therefore, of an active career, Baker threw himself with ardour into the discussion of Imperial and Egyptian Questions.

The year 1879 was spent by himself and Lady Baker in Cyprus. They explored the whole island; and, at the close of their visit, they spent three peaceful months in the monastery of Truditissa, where Baker wrote his book on Cyprus. In particular, he turned his attention to irrigation, upon which the internal economy of the island so largely depends.

The value of Cyprus as a naval and military station, the resources and capabilities of the island, and a host of administrative details into which he delighted to enquire, were among the subjects studied by him on the spot.

'An Englishman's first idea is improvement,' he says; 'and I believe that, upon entering Heaven itself, he would suggest some alteration.' Improvement and development were certainly the predominant ideas in Baker's mind, wherever he went; and he found ample scope for the exercise of his faculties in Cyprus.

Of course he condemned the loose terms of the Cyprus Convention (4th June, 1878), by which Great Britain pledges herself to uphold the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, by force of arms, in return for the promise of reforms

(which could not possibly be carried-out by the Turks alone) and the cession of Cyprus under conditions most favourable to Turkey. His opinion of the strategic value of Cyprus is given briefly in the following paragraph:

'There can be no doubt that Cyprus or Crete was requisite to England as the missing-link in the chain of our communications with Egypt. As a strategical point, Cyprus must be represented by Famagusta, without which it would be useless for the ostensible purpose of its Occupation. Many persons of great practical experience [himself included] would have preferred Crete, as already possessing a safer harbour in Suda Bay, with a climate superior to that of Cyprus; while, according to our assumed defensive alliance with Turkey, in the event of a renewed attack [in Asia Minor] by Russia, we should have acquired the advantage of Cyprus whenever required, without the expense or responsibility; and we should, in addition, have established a station on the coast of Asia Minor at the secure harbour afforded by the Gulf of Ayas at Alexandretta.'*

Moreover, Baker considered that the value of Famagusta as a defensible outpost and coaling-station had been underrated; and that British troops were largely unnecessary in Cyprus, because for the most part their place could be taken by Turkish levies under British officers, which he regarded as affording the best fighting-material in the world.

Lord Wolseley, the first Commissioner for Cyprus, expresses his opinion in the following letter to Baker:

* *Cyprus as I saw it in* 1879, p. 159.

'26th November, 1882.

. . . 'My views about Cyprus have never changed. I believe its Occupation was the result of foresight on the part of the late Cabinet, with Egypt in their thoughts.

'It has great capabilities, which only require money to develop. If we could spend the Revenue of the Island upon the wants of the Island, it would soon become a real Garden; but, out of a Revenue of about £172,000, we have to pay £100,000 per annum to the Turkish creditors.' [At the present day, Cyprus costs us £30,000 a-year.]

In fact, as Baker wrote to a friend, in 1879: 'The Turks have done us thoroughly, by misrepresenting the great surplus Revenue—which is *gross*, instead of *net:* as at least £80,000 a year should have been expended upon public works, which have been allowed to fall into absolute ruin.' Moreover, the capitalist, he says, will naturally ask one simple question: 'Is Cyprus a portion of the British Empire, upon which I can depend; or is it a swallow's-nest of a political season, to be abandoned when the party-schemes have flown?'*

Perhaps, however, the true value of Cyprus has never been better stated than in the words of an ex-First Lord of the Admiralty, who said: 'If we are supreme at sea, Cyprus is not wanted; if we are not supreme, Cyprus will be an encumbrance.' In the meantime, the Cyprus Convention hangs as a millstone round the neck of the leading Maritime Power, whose avowed policy is to avoid alliances with Foreign States.

Baker had no faith in the 'Euphrates Valley Railway' scheme, on account of its cost; and he

* *Cyprus as I saw it in* 1879, p. 231.

believed, that 'we can never have a safer route to India than that through the Suez Canal, provided England assumes the Protectorate of Egypt —which sooner or later,' he thought, 'must be done.' Consequently, we are not surprised, when he speaks of 'a retreat from Egypt' amounting, in effect, to 'a national suicide.'

CHAPTER XXIII.

'EGYPT FOR THE EGYPTIANS.'

[1880–1882]

WHEN, at the close of the year 1879, Gordon relinquished his Governor-Generalship, and Mohammed Tewfik, the new Khedive, reigned in Egypt, a brief period of peace and prosperity prevailed in the Nile Basin. Gessi was Governor of the Bahr El Ghazal, Emin was Governor of the Equatorial Province (Hat El Istiva), Lupton commanded at Latuka, and Slatin was the Mudir of Dara, in Dar-Fur. But Rauf Pasha was Governor-General of the Sudan; and the Nemesis of Ismail Pasha's extravagances was disturbing the tranquil minds of European Consuls-General at Alexandria.

Although Egypt had extended her *ægis* almost to the Equator, had crushed rebellions, and come out of a war with Abyssinia with little material damage to herself; although she had established telegraphs and railways, and laid the foundations of responsible government, in the Sudan; although she had obtained ports on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and secured comparative independence from her vassalship to Turkey: nevertheless, her apparent integrity was based upon a false con-

ception of her real position and upon insecure foundations for her solvency.

In an address delivered at Newton Abbot, in 1884, before the Conservative Association, Baker said:

'His Highness, Mohammed Tewfik, succeeded to the difficulties occasioned by the Dual Control of England and France, under the disastrous conditions of Egyptian finance resulting from excessive expenditure during the excited reign of Ismail Pasha. A host of European officials occupied the lucrative posts which formerly had been held by native officers; and general discontent pervaded the ranks of the upper classes. Jews, Greeks, and Syrians had lent money at usurious rates to the thriftless Fellahin; and, having foreclosed their mortgages, the land had passed away from the original possessors into the hands of strangers. The dislike to foreigners was general; and a favourable opportunity was presented for a public agitator.'

The occasion produced the man: Arabi Bey, a colonel in the Egyptian army, whose dominant war-cry was 'Egypt for the Egyptians,' but whose support emanated mainly from Constantinople. Of him and his deeds we shall have occasion to speak in another place.

It was Baker's opinion that, under the rule of Ismail, the 'bloodless revolution' of February, 1881, could never have occurred. In some rough notes for a public speech, Baker thus expressed himself, with regard to Ismail:

'When I look back to the year 1869, and remember the position of Egypt under the rule of the Khedive, comparing it with the disastrous picture of the present day [probably 1884: but the MSS. is undated] I fail to

see the benefits that were promised by European intervention. I can only recognise a change from orderly government and general security to anarchy and insurrection. I do not presume to criticise the actions of the Khedive I served: but if I declare, that his intelligence and energy, when ruler over those who were apathetic and inert, forced him to exertions which were a century in advance of the Egyptian age, I trust he will excuse my audacity, and accept the compliment which his industry so justly merits.

'The railways which intersect the Delta and connect it with upper Egypt; the telegraphs which form a network of communications throughout the distant provinces of the Sudan, and, at the approach of inundations, transmit the warning of the rising Nile to Cairo; the magnificent harbour of Alexandria; the factories throughout the Delta; the extension of cotton-cultivation; and the grand improvement at Cairo resulting from the raising of the level and the development of the beautiful quarter known as Ismailia: all these are works that have raised Egypt from her humble state, and ranked her progress with that of a European Power. These great works emanated from the brain of Ismail Pasha, who accomplished in seventeen years more than had been achieved in Egypt since the days of the Arab Conquest. It may be said, that they were costly schemes of progress! I will not enter into the argument of expenditure: no one can deny the fact, that the change in the features of Egypt during the reign of Ismail, the Khedive, was the greatest example of intelligence ever exhibited in the history of the East.

'Not only was there physical progress throughout his reign, but a moral stride was taken such as never before had been attempted by any Oriental Power. . . . His Highness the Khedive Ismail was the first ruler in the history of the East to direct a determined blow at that abominable Traffic in human lives—the Slave Trade. . . . Few persons can appreciate the difficulties of

that task, or the risks of wavering popularity which the Khedive thereby encountered. . . . Nearly five years were expended in this work [by Baker himself]; and the foundations were securely laid. No country had been annexed to Egypt by the greed of conquest, because no native territory that had not previously been over-run by lawless bands of slave-hunters had been invaded: these countries were simply delivered from their worst enemies, and placed under the Egyptian flag, which for the first time represented Freedom.

'There were jealous detractors who assumed, that this great work was insincere. . . . But, what was the conduct of the Khedive? He knew that the popular opinion among all classes of his people was dead against his work; he knew that he was risking an insurrection by defying the brigandage of the Sudan: therefore, when my term of office expired, it gave him an opportunity, had he been insincere, of appointing a native officer in my place, who would turn his gaze to the right when slave-gangs were passing on the left. Instead of doing this, the Khedive remained faithful to the assurances he pledged by appointing Colonel Gordon as my successor.

'Five years passed away. Steamers were trading on the Lakes. Peace and prosperity reigned in the Equatorial Provinces. The horrible Slave Trade had been reduced to small proportions. But, when Gordon returned from his arduous task, where was the Khedive? He found his master had been deposed by the united action of England and France, and was an exile at Naples. All Ismail's good work had been ignored; his great deeds had been forgotten. Not even the thanks of the British Government had been expressed for his determined action against the Slave Trade: the hypocrisy of our philanthropy was exhibited by silence.

'The scene is now changed. England is in Egypt. With all our egotism, let us compare the present picture with the past.

'In the reign of Ismail, the Khedive, there was a feeling of general security throughout his dominions: from Alexandria to Khartum a Christian stranger was as safe or safer than a Londoner in Hyde Park after dark. In spite of extravagant outlay in a career of material progress, the financial position of Egypt [though discounting the future] had been reformed. The Sudan is in widespread revolt; and a rising in Cairo against British rule is only suppressed by the presence of British bayonets. Gordon, the emblem of British chivalry, the envoy of the British Government, is a prisoner at Khartum, invested by the rebels who, in the latter days of Ismail's rule, were his loyal subjects. This is not the end: it is only the beginning of the end. Gordon has been abandoned to his fate by the Government he risked his life to serve.

'This sad metamorphosis is the change I see since the day upon which I bid farewell to the Khedive Ismail, when he placed this star [the *Osmanié*] upon my breast; and I cannot but recall to memory the terrible dissolution which that interval has wrought.

. . . 'By the special Law of Succession granted to the Khedive Ismail by H.M. the Sultan of Turkey [in 1866, in consideration of two-and-a-half millions sterling, by way of *bakhshish*, and an increase in the annual Tribute from 80,000 to 150,000 purses*], Mohammed Tewfik now occupies the throne of Egypt. Throughout the disastrous years that have clouded his youthful reign, succeeding to the dangerous and uncongenial position of an exiled father, fettered in independence by Foreign control, borne-down by internal revolution, and eventually over-ridden by the ordeal of Foreign military Occupation, his empire dismembered against his will [at the bidding of a Power which assumed and presumed to govern him], and the Sudan in a blaze

* The purse may be taken at £5 2*s.* 6*d.*; but the value fluctuates.

of insurrection,—his Highness, Mohammed Tewfik, has exhibited qualities of patience, fortitude, and loyalty that should be deeply appreciated by the British nation, which has determined to uphold his authority. We can only trust, that the British Government may initiate a policy that shall restore confidence in the sincerity of our support.'

This warm tribute to the patriotism, energy, and capacity of Ismail does Baker credit, as an old servant of the ex-Khedive; and, it may be added that, his views were largely shared by Gordon: thus, the two men who best knew the Sudan, believed that Ismail had been unfairly treated.

In the Confidential *Report on Egypt*, compiled by the Intelligence Branch of the War Office, and issued in 1882, the following passage occurs: 'Ismail's abdication was brought about by pressure from the British and French Governments, in consequence of his misrule, the dismissal of the English and French Ministers, and the dismissal of the members of the Financial Committee' (p. 49).

We may now carry-on the thread of our narrative, from the year 1881, through those disastrous webs of anarchy and chaos which enmeshed and crippled the development of Egypt and the Sudan. This state of affairs issued from the uncertain dictatorship of the Dual Control, and subsequently of the British Colossus, leading to the Arabi revolt, the Mahdiist insurrection, the death of Gordon, and the loss of the Sudan Provinces.

Baker's correspondence deals with the salient events throughout this dark period of Egyptian history. In February, 1882, he wrote to Mr. Douglas Murray:

'I do not believe any reports about fanaticism in Egypt. I believe in a movement which originates in Constantinople; and I think Halim Pasha [who, according to Mohammedan law, apart from the *Firman* of 1866, which infringed it, should have succeeded Ismail] is intriguing to upset the young Khedive, and to occupy his place. Arabi Bey is, I think, pushed forward as a cat's-paw to produce distrust in the Khedive. Eventually, Arabi will be sacrificed by the real rival of the Khedive, unless England shall interfere. . . . Our Government should insist upon Arabi's recall to Constantinople by the Sultan [merely as a test of the latter's sincerity and *bona fides*]. . . . The whole affair would then dissolve. . . . It is too ridiculous, that we should allow Egypt, when so flourishing, to be thus wantonly disturbed.'

But Arabi, the rebel, was not summoned to Constantinople; on the contrary, he received a decoration from the Sultan, in June, 1882, and wrote a defiant letter to Mr. Gladstone a few days later. The British and French Admirals having merely protested against the fortifying of Alexandria, Baker writes to the same correspondent:

'6th July, 1882.

'I wish our Admiral would knock the forts into toothpicks; land a lot of marines; blow-up the arsenal; and destroy all the defensive arrangements. I would hang or shoot Arabi without the least hesitation.

'You will see a Joint Occupation of Egypt; and I think we should cut her adrift from Turkey, as the Sultan has behaved disgracefully throughout the whole affair.

There will never be rest in Egypt so long as it remains a portion of the Ottoman Empire: it will ever be a nest of intrigue kept warm by Constantinople.'

Three days later, the bombardment of Alexandria took place. After the abandonment of the city by Arabi, who retreated into the Interior, and the conflagration, chiefly caused by incendiarism, followed by the landing of British troops, Baker writes to the same correspondent:

'24th July, 1882.

'It is quite impossible to predict the future, when we see such gross mismanagement upon our side. The folly of England for the last six years, in both Administrations, has been a theatrical belief in the exhibition of our fleet of ironclads. . . . We knock down the forts in a few hours; and if we had had only 3,000 men prepared to land the moment the forts were silenced, we should have cut-off Arabi's retreat, and perhaps secured the villain himself before he could have quitted the city walls. Instead of doing this, we cause general destruction; and we shall be hated accordingly by everybody. Worse than this, we have allowed Arabi to escape, and to occupy a position which commands the water-supply of Alexandria. We are now preparing an army at an enormous cost, when the whole affair could have been settled for nothing at the commencement.'

The hands of her Majesty's Government were, of course, somewhat tied at this time by the susceptibilities of the French under the Dual Control, and by the engrossing difficulties of Home politics; but it was clearly understood, that the protection of the Suez Canal was a matter of vital importance to the British Empire. Baker did not hesitate to offer them advice; and his advice was duly

pigeon-holed. Still, Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, admitted to Baker that 'no one has a better right than yourself to give an opinion on Egyptian affairs'; whilst Lord Morley, the Under-Secretary for War, wrote to him:

'House of Lords: 17th July, 1882.

'As you say, things are in a pretty mess in Egypt: Alexandria in ruins; and Arabi with an army of some kind hovering about in the neighbourhood! I wish, with all my heart, that measures could have been taken immediately after the bombardment to secure him and his troops; but I am not quite behind the scenes in Diplomacy, and I presume there were strong reasons against doing so. Events have shown how strong were the reasons for acting. . . . Gold would, as you suggested, have been more effective than iron in destroying Arabi's influence: but our Western conscience is too soft.'

A month later, Lord Morley wrote, with regard to the employment of Turkish troops:

'45, Rutland Gate: 12th August, 1882.

. . . 'The Turkish Convention appears still to hang-fire. Personally, I wish it may miss-fire altogether; but, in any case, I believe that the conditions under which the Turk is to be allowed to land will be very stringent. I wish he could have been kept out of it altogether; but I assume there are political reasons in relation to Islam and the European Powers which render a show of co-operation with us advisable.'

A hastily-summoned Conference having in August agreed to the International protection of the Suez Canal, Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Alexandria and assumed the supreme military command. He had then at his disposal a force of over 30,000 men, of all ranks, which was shortly

afterwards recruited by the arrival of Indian troops. General Willis was entrusted with the protection of the Canal.

The first affair at Kassassin took place at the end of August; and on the 13th September the rebels were totally defeated at Tel-el-Kebir. Arabi sought safety in flight: and there were great rejoicings at Cairo. Before the end of the month the Egyptian army was disbanded; and Valentine Baker Pasha was entrusted with the task of raising a new army of 10,000 men.

Gordon's opinion of the Arabi *imbroglio* differed from Baker's:

'Cape Town: 13th April, 1882.

'I cannot agree with you,' he wrote to Baker, 'in the views you express in *The Times* [December 29th, 1881; January 5th, 18th, February 13th, March 25th, 1882] taking it, that you disapprove of the National movement. Whether this actual phase is spurious or not, it is something to see life in any people; and I think the people are being roused by degrees to stand-up against the Circassian oppression.

'Do you know Lord ———'s Secretary? He has my ideas on Egypt, written between 1874 and 1882: it is called "Israel in Egypt," but is not a musical paper. It may amuse you; but I have given up, for the present, the publication of anything: it is nothing to me, and also it is quite against your idea, that these movements ought to be put-down with an iron hand. You know the Sudan. Even if we annexed Egypt, we must have our laws. How could you govern the Sudan with those laws?'

'Off Isle of Wight: 7th Nov., 1882.

'As far as I can judge, it seems that the Government have taken-up a policy to re-instate those Parasite

Pashas, when they could have got rid of the Ring altogether. As for Sherif working with Riaz, it is quite impossible; also Nubar working with the other two. Add to that, a weak Khedive; and one must despair. . . . However, it is not my business; and I shall not bother about it. As for the trial of Arabi, by Ismail Eyub, *whom I know*, and Rauf, *whom you know*, it will be a farce.

'I may meet you in London. I wish they would send you to the Sudan. I shall tell anyone I see, that you would settle the affair. Where is Zubeir? He is pulling the strings of the Mahdi revolt, I expect.

'I shall not stay in England over two months, and shall go to Mount Carmel, and live. I hope Lady Baker and you will come there. I have no wish for further employment [having returned from the Mauritius, and after attempting to settle the affairs of Basutoland] nor would I take it.

'*Entre nous*, Leopold asked me to take-up Stanley's Congo work; but I was then engaged to the Cape Government: so I refused. The King will do *nothing* unless he gets a charter from some regular Government: and I told him that two years ago.'

'Southampton: 12th Nov., 1882.

. . . 'As for Egypt, I look on it as inextricably entangled—regularly mulled; and I do not myself see how they will get out of the bungle. Our present state is the fruit of a series of blunders which began with the Cave Mission [1876] and have been ripening ever since. I am very glad I am quite out of it.'

But Gordon was not so secure, as he imagined, of his peaceful retreat to Mount Carmel: for, though he succeeded in escaping for a time to Palestine, his Calvary awaited him at Khartum.

One of his last letters, from the Holy Land, to Baker, read as follows:

'Jerusalem: 8th February, 1883.

. . . 'I am sorry for the people of the Sudan; but good will come of it.

'I hope Lady and Miss Baker will come on here with you. It would do you all good to come and live out here, for a year or so. A land which teams so with history! I am three miles from the Holy City; and am not bothered with invitations to dinner. Then my theories about the sites of Golgotha and the Temple! Wilson [now General Sir Charles] will tell you of them. . . .

'P.S.—I do not write about Egyptian affairs: for there is a small nest of sleeping devils in me on *that* subject; and I do not want to awaken them.'

Gordon returned to England, *viâ* Brussels, in December 1883.

CHAPTER XXIV.

'THE SUDAN FOR THE SUDANESE.'

[1882]

CLOSELY associated with the subversive forces in Lower Egypt were those in the Sudan, which led to the political and social upheaval commonly known as the Mahdiist revolt.

The following letter, addressed to Baker by Giegler Pasha, is a fitting introduction to this subject*; and gives a trustworthy account of the rise to power of the false Mahdi. Giegler Pasha, a German civil-engineer, had gone out to the Sudan in the company of Dr. Junker, the distinguished explorer, subsequently serving under Gordon. At the time that the events recorded in his letter occurred, he was the Superintendent of Telegraphs, but had been appointed Inspector-General for the Suppression of the Slave Trade in the Sudan. After the recall of Rauf Pasha, and until his successor arrived, Giegler Pasha acted as *interim* Governor-General of the Sudan, or, to be precise, as *wekil* of the *hokmdarieh* in Khartum.

'El-Kaua [on White Nile, in Kordofan, above Khartum]: 18th Nov., 1882.

. . . 'Now that Arabi has been put-down, I suppose some more interest will be taken in the affairs of the

* See illustrative Map at the end of this chapter.

Sudan. Though Egyptian affairs were of greater interest and importance to the world at large, and to England in particular, the state into which the Sudan has been thrown by the False Prophet, or Mahdi, deserves to be more noticed than has hitherto been the case.

'I shall give you a short sketch of the principal events of this remarkable movement from the beginning, as I know you will feel much interested in it.

'About the middle of July, 1881, quite an obscure man, living on the island of Gesiret Abba [Abba Is., about 150 miles above Khartum] on the White Nile, proclaimed himself as the Mahdi, or the Mohammedan Redeemer. This man, whose name is Mohammed Ahmed, lived at the village of Abba for some years, in a subterranean abode. The fact was well known to the men on our boats and steamers; but Ahmed was considered to be a harmless idiot, such as the country abounds in.

'When the news first reached Khartum, that this man pretended to be the Mahdi, the matter was considered rather as a good joke. But when the man wrote letters to different people in the country, and to the *Ulema* at Khartum, inviting them to join him, it became a more serious matter: and Rauf Pasha [Governor-General of the Sudan] took it up.

'Accordingly, Abu Saúd [Aide-de-Camp to the Governor-General] was sent up to make enquiries. When Abu Saúd arrived at the place, he found some men armed with swords guarding the Mahdi. Abu Saúd was allowed to enter, and see Mohammed Ahmed. He asked him to give some proofs that he really was the Mahdi; upon which Ahmed replied, the time was not yet come for these. When Abu Saúd said, that the Government would probably arrest him for causing a disturbance, Ahmed confidently rejoined, that if soldiers were sent by river they would be drowned, and if they were sent by land the earth would swallow them up. He declined to go to Khartum with Abu Saúd. The latter therefore left him behind; and reported his experiences to Rauf Pasha,

who then sent 300 men (infantry) with a gun, by the steamer *Ismailia* and an iron boat.

'Now, if a proper man, with a little common-sense, had been in command of this force, nothing would have been easier than to take Ahmed. But the affair was sadly mismanaged. There were three men, including Abu Saúd, each of whom believed himself to be the chief in command. They quarrelled on their way up; and when, at last, they arrived on the spot, the troops were disembarked before daybreak (without anyone knowing the locality), about half-a-mile below the village. Then, like sheep, they walked towards the village.

'By the time the first man arrived, the last had not disembarked. The result was, that the Arabs, who were concealed in high grass, rushed upon the soldiers—who scarcely had time to fire a round—and killed them. A few fugitives threw themselves into the river, and were picked-up by Abu Saúd, who was safe on board.

'The steamer then went up closer to the village. At that spot, Mohammed Ahmed, with 50 followers, was not 60 yards distant; but no man had the presence of mind to fire a shot. The captain and Abu Saúd shouted to the man at the gun (which was on board the iron boat) to fire; and, after fumbling about a good deal, in his excitement, he managed to fire a shot—which, of course, went a trifling 200 yards too far to the right and about the same distance too high. A single, well-directed grape-shot would have settled the whole affair; but everyone had lost his head. The steamer then returned to Khartum, to report the failure of the expedition.

'Now, I had forgotten to mention that, while all this happened, I was in Kordofan. I only heard of the business when Rauf Pasha telegraphed to me to send troops. I sent four companies as soon as possible to Duem under Mohammed Pasha Said, the Mudir of Kordofan. Rauf Pasha also sent some troops from Khartum; but instead of pursuing Mohammed Ahmed, they were kept at Kaua: and so the False Prophet, with all his followers, who had

increased in number, escaped across the White Nile and settled at Jebel [= Mount] Gedir, which is situated [in Dar-Nuba, south of Kordofan] five days' march in a north-westerly direction from Fashoda. The troops returned to Kordofan; and Mohammed Ahmed was left undisturbed at Jebel Gedir. In November [1881] I returned to Khartum.

'In December, Rashid Bey, Mudir of Fashoda, who, without orders, had attacked Mohammed Ahmed at Jebel Gedir, was defeated. Rashid Bey himself, the Shilluk King [Kaiknu] and nearly the whole force of 400 men were killed.

'When this news reached Khartum, I went at once with troops to Fashoda, as we feared the rebels might try and take the place. I remained there some time; fortified the station; and then—as I had positive orders not to undertake action against Mohammed Ahmed—I returned to Khartum. Rauf Pasha would do nothing against Ahmed until troops should arrive from Cairo; though I pressed him hard to let me go with the troops at our command, as I was convinced that, if the affair were properly managed, Ahmed would be defeated. But Rauf Pasha was disheartened, and would not listen to me.

'What everyone could now foresee, happened. In February of this year [1882] Rauf Pasha was removed; and Abd El Kader was nominated in his place. [In the interval, Giegler Pasha took charge of the affairs of the Sudan.] I telegraphed at once to Cairo, proposing what should be done; and, my advice having been accepted, I fitted-out two expeditions—one to start from Khartum, the other from Kordofan—consisting, altogether, of about 13 companies of infantry and 1,500 Irregulars. The expeditions started from Khartum and El Obeid, respectively, on the same day; and were placed under the command of Jusef Pasha—the same who had been engaged against Suliman during the revolt in the Bahr El Ghazal.

'This was at the end of March. Without previous warning, I suddenly received a telegram from the Mudir of Sennar, stating that about one thousand rebels were only a mile or so distant, and threatened to attack the town. That news was enough to take my breath away, as nothing had, up to then, transpired to render me uneasy about Sennar or any other place. The Mudir telegraphed again in the evening for permission to attack the rebels, who were led by a man named Amer El Makashif, styling himself *Wekil El Mahdi* [Deputy of the Mahdi]. I replied to the Mudir, that if he had a force sufficient to ensure success, he might make the attack in the morning; but I advised him to wait, and hold his own, until I could send him reinforcements. He, however, made the attack the next morning. At the very first shot, the rebels rushed upon and captured the gun; and then they drove back the soldiers, and pursued them into the town. Happily the treasury and ammunition were quickly transported to the barracks, which are situated near the *mudirieh*. Thither everybody fled, and took refuge. The soldiers climbed on to the roofs and fired upon the rebels who were below. At the gate there were still some soldiers on guard; and when Amer El Makashif entered, the officer in charge fired his revolver at him. He was so badly hurt that he had to be lifted over a wall, in order to gain the street, and carried to a neighbouring village. The rebels were therefore without a leader; but they sacked the town and killed a good many people. As the roofs of the barracks commanded the *mudirieh*, the rebels were driven-off, and ultimately left the town.

'Next day, the whole Province appeared to be up in arms. Some 40,000 men surrounded the town. The Blue Nile was so low that at many points children could walk across: so from all sides people flocked towards Sennar.

'You can imagine in what a state of mind I was! From Cairo, no hope of help; at Khartum, no troops to

spare! The nearest point from which troops could have been withdrawn was Galabat [on the upper Atbara, Abyssinia]. I telegraphed there at once, to send 8 companies to Abu Haraz. The telegraph to Sennar was cut: so that I was quite in the dark as to what was going on there. When the news leaked-out at Khartum, there was a great scare; and I had to put forth an iron-hand to prevent a panic. I had to be specially severe with the Consular Agents, who, in their insane fear, wanted to send ridiculous telegrams to Cairo. I checkmated them in a manner they will not easily forget.

'Happily, I still had some 260 Irregulars at Kaua, on the White Nile, belonging to Jusef Pasha's force, who were on the point of starting for Fashoda. I ordered them to start at once across the desert to Sennar; and this handful of men relieved and saved Sennar. They had a most determined leader in Saleh Aga—now Saleh Bey—who deserves to be known far and wide. He reached Sennar after five days' marching. From sunrise to sunset his men, formed into a square, repulsed every attack. There would not have been the slightest hope for his success in saving Sennar, if the rebels had had a proper leader; but El Makashif was wounded, and there was nobody to take his place. When, at last, Saleh Bey entered the town, at sunset, he found the Mudir, soldiers, and some of the inhabitants on the roofs of the barracks, where they had remained for seven days, in despair of being saved.

'Now, before the news of Saleh Bey's success reached me, I had myself left Khartum for Sennar, in one of the small steamers Colonel Gordon brought out. I had two hundred Irregulars, hurriedly collected together, and carried on one of the flat-bottomed iron-boats. With them I made my way to Abu Haraz, there to await the troops from Galabat, and with the intention of proceeding to Sennar—as I had no hope of Saleh Bey being able to do anything. Fortunately, my fears were unfounded; though I had trials of my own, as you shall see.

'Between the date when the rebellion broke-out at Sennar and the date I left Khartum (15th August), another man turned-up at a small village—three hours' distant from, and to the north of, Abu Haraz—who styled himself *Wekil El Mahdi*. His name was Sherif Mohammed Taker. When I arrived at the nearest point to this village, I sent an officer with some 80 men, with orders to invite him to come and see me: if he refused, he was to be taken by force, unless he happened to be powerfully supported—in which case my men were to retire quietly to the steamer. Instead of doing this, the soldiers, on arriving near the village, fired on the people, who rushed upon them, including the officers. As soon as I saw some officers running across a sand-bank, I knew what was up. I remained some time to pick-up stragglers; and then went on to Abu Haraz.

'There I remained for twelve days (when the soldiers arrived from Galabat), expecting any moment to be attacked by Sherif Mohammed Taker, who was beating his *nugara* [war-drum] day and night, to collect people. It was now out of the question to go to Sennar before this man was defeated, as he intended to cross the river, take Messalamieh, and then march on Khartum.

'On the 4th May, by the time I had arranged everything, the attack was made. Six companies of Infantry and 100 Irregulars (cavalry) went out with one gun, and —were beaten. The gun was lost, and nearly all the officers perished in defending it.

'Imagine yourself in my position! Fortunately, most of the fugitives had saved their Remingtons. On the following day (Friday) I appointed deputy-officers from the non-commissioned officers, whose places were filled by men from the ranks; and I promised them that, in the event of their success, their promotion should be confirmed. In the evening I had four companies looking something like soldiers; and at 1 a.m. on Saturday the attack was renewed. This time we were successful.

Mohammed Taker was killed; whilst his people, who had stood by him to the last moment, fled towards the river, and were nearly all shot-down by the Irregular troops. During these two days, some 1,500 people lost their lives. The gun had been retaken; and I was in a position to push-on to Sennar.

'Both banks of the river were blocked by the Danagla* Arabs, who, however, gave-in as soon as they heard of Mohammed Taker's death. I took 200 men with me, by river; and sent the others by land. For twelve days we dragged the steamer and iron-boat over sand-banks, during which time I often thought of your troubles on the Bahr Ez Zeráf. At last I gave it up; and, obtaining a few camels, I went on to Sennar by land.

'On arrival there, I heard that the rebels were at a place called Abu Shoka, about four hours' journey [south] from Sennar. They were under a man named Mohammed Isen, who styled himself *Wekil El Wekil El Mahdi*. As soon as the steamer arrived, I attacked him: and this man was killed. But it was a hard fight: once our formation in line was broken-up, but order was re-established; and, on another attack being made, we drove the rebels down to the river. A friendly Arab *sheikh*, whom I had posted on the right-bank of the river, killed all who attempted to cross.

'This affair being successfully concluded, I expected the rebels to give-in. But they collected again at a place called Tekin, and were joined by all the Baggara Arabs. Tekin was the place were Amer El Makashif had his head-quarters; though he himself, owing to his wound, was unable to assume the command. I sent Saleh Bey, with all the available troops at Sennar, to make an attack on the rebels. This took place on the 4th June; and ended in the complete defeat of the

* Plural of Dongolawi: slave-hunters from Nubia.

enemy. Amer El Makashif managed to escape during the confusion, and, gaining the White Nile in safety, reached Kordofan.

'Things now began to look more hopeful. Still, some 5,000 lives had been sacrificed in the campaign, from the time I left Khartum. It is to be hoped the rebels have learnt a lesson.

'I then returned to Khartum; and found Abd El Kader Pasha, the new Governor-General, had arrived from Cairo to take-up his post. If I had been left alone, I think I should have succeeded in putting-down this movement. As it was, I had little further control over affairs. More troops arriving from Galabat and Senhit, they were despatched to Kordofan, where also a *Wekil El Mahdi* had turned-up.

'On the 4th June, news reached Khartum, that the whole force under Jusef Pasha, which had been despatched to Jebel Gedir, had been defeated by Mohammed Ahmed, the Mahdi. Jusef Pasha himself, Mohammed Bey Suliman, all the officers, and the majority of the men, had perished. Only a remnant reached Fashoda. Some fifty men fled to the Mek El Fakeli, under whose protection they now are. Four guns and some 1,500 Remingtons were lost.

'You may ask: how was it possible that such a force could be annihilated by men armed only with swords and lances? The answer is, that, in spite of the inequality of arms, there was carelessness and feebleness on the one side, and vigilance, determination and courage on the other. If Mohammed Ahmed and his men had made the attack at Tel-el-Kebir, he would have succeeded, just as the British forces succeeded. If ever a force left Khartum equipped in every essential respect, it was this force under Jusef Pasha. Not being able to go myself, all I could do was to put it in good fighting-order. I called all the officers to the Divan before the expedition started from Khartum, and warned them that the task they had before them was no easy one. I told them we had done all that

was possible for them; and it rested with them to do the actual work.' And how have they done it? When only two hours' march from Jebel Gedir, knowing full-well that Mohammed Ahmed had a strong force with him, they all lay down to sleep—incredible as it may appear—and in no order whatever: horses unsaddled, no guns in readiness, etc., etc. At four o'clock in the morning, they were surprised in their sleep by the Arabs, who rushed upon them and massacred all, with the exception of the few who escaped to Jebel Tekem and Fashoda.

'Affairs in Cairo were in such a critical state, that help from that quarter, as everyone in the Sudan knew, was out of the question. The disturbances in Kordofan therefore assumed serious proportions. In Sennar I had so completely crushed them, that, even after this affair at Jebel Gedir, they did not venture to rise again. In Kordofan the Homr Arabs were the first to rise. They drove some 200 Regulars back to Abu Haraz. There the soldiers remained for some time; but, owing to the disaffection of other tribes in the neighbourhood, they had to retire to Obeid, repulsing several attacks that were made on them during the journey thither. In fact, all the officers and soldiers in Kordofan are good: otherwise the Sudan would have been lost by this time.

'The next move of the rebels in Kordofan was on Bara [north of Obeid]. They attacked this place with 20,000 men, but were driven-off with a loss of 3,000, killed.

'Now, after having defeated Jusef Pasha's force, Mohammed Ahmed left Jebel Gedir in order to himself conquer Kordofan, since his *wekil* had failed at Bara and at Jebel Abu Senun [west of Obeid]. At the latter place the rebels had made a similar attack on an expedition that had been sent against Takir [near by], and had lost 1,000 men, killed. As soon as it was known that Mohammed Ahmed was marching on Kordofan, all the

Egyptian troops were concentrated at Obeid, with the exception of the Bara garrison. Obeid was strongly fortified; and awaited the attack.

'Mohammed Ahmed arrived before Obeid in the beginning of September. He had with him a force of some 150,000 men, including, practically, all the native tribes. With these he delivered his attack; and lost some 6,000 men, in killed alone. There was a critical moment, during that terrible day, when the rebels actually got inside the fort; and the place would have been surely lost, but for the presence of mind of Mohammed Pasha Said, who turned the guns round and fired upon the mass of Arabs who had got mixed-up with some companies of soldiers. Though some 300 soldiers were killed, it was the only way to save the place: all the Arabs in the fort perished.

'For three successive days the rebels persisted in the onslaught; but at last they gave it up as hopeless, having lost some 15,000 men, in killed alone.

'Prior to these events at Obeid, Ahmed El Makashif —the brother of the Sennar man, of whom I have told you—had attacked Duem, on the White Nile, with 14,000 men, the garrison of which place numbered only 500. For four hours the attack on the fort lasted, without a single soldier losing his life; and it was not before 3,000 of the rebels had been killed, that the remainder retired from their hopeless task. The bodies of the rebels were thrown into the river.

'What fanaticism! All this will appear to you, who know the Sudan, strange enough, perhaps even incredible. Yet, these are the very people who, but eighteen months ago, bowed in the presence of a *tabush;* when a whole village could have been frightened out of its wits by a rusty old flint-lock—the only danger in which was, that it might kill the man who fired it. But so it is. All those who sacrificed themselves really believed that Mohammed Ahmed was the Mahdi. They were told that those who were killed would go at once

to Paradise; and they were led by *Dervishes*, who were always in the front ranks, ready to throw away their lives by the thousand.

'Some two months ago, troubles again having broken-out on the White Nile, I took the field once more. Mohammed Ahmed had heard, that people in these parts had no longer any confidence in Ahmed El Makashif, since the latter's signal defeat at Duem; and had appointed Abd El Basas in his stead, as chief of this district. For some time I watched this man's movements. Last week he arrived at a spot only one hour's march from Duem; but I ascertained, that he had orders not to attack the fort, and had been told simply to govern the country and collect taxes. He, himself, was so confident that I, with my small force, dare not attack him, that he had the audacity to approach almost within gunshot of Duem.

'On Friday night last, I gave orders to have everything in readiness by 1 p.m., to deliver a *sortie*. All turned out well. A great many Arabs were killed; and Abd El Basas was taken prisoner, being wounded by some horsemen who had pursued him. When I had him safe at Duem, he confessed many things, and gave me some valuable information, in the hope of saving his life. But over that [his life] I had no control. I sent him to Khartum, where, a few days ago, he was hanged.

'Abd El Basas was the first rebel chief taken alive; and this caused great rejoicing in these parts and at Khartum. At the latter place, people were terribly scared, believing that this man would be able to cross the river, rouse the country, and march against them. In fact, things look brighter now. Our news from Kordofan is, that most of the Arabs have deserted Mohammed Ahmed, seeing that his star is going down. There is even a rumour here that he has been taken. Troops are now on their way from Cairo; and I hope order will soon be restored. [Ten thousand of Arabi's men were

sent; and Colonel Stewart was despatched to Khartum to institute enquiries.]

'You will see, from the foregoing, that if people in Egypt have their troubles, we in the Sudan have had our full share of them, and more. You should not place too much importance on the fact of the Arabs having secured guns and Remingtons, because they do not use them: they either break them up to make lances, or put them in store. All the arms taken at Jebel Gedir are there still; and it would indeed be a wonder if they made use of them, considering our own soldiers have not learnt how to do so. No, they say: "we shall fight the Turks with lances and swords."

'My *Times* and other papers, up to 7th October, have reached me. It is sad to read those unjust Palace-attacks [from Cairo] on England coming to Egypt. I do not see who else could have put-down that arch-impostor, Arabi: neither France, Italy, Spain, nor any other country. But the English, having had the pluck to do it, deserve the gratitude of the whole civilized world.

'I scarcely find any mention in the papers about the Mahdiist movement.' . . .

That was to come. In the meantime, this long and interesting letter from Giegler Pasha, although containing few points that are not now known to the public, gives a valuable summary of the inception and development of the insurrectionary movement in the Sudan which resulted in the downfall of Egyptian rule. It brings-out into relief facts that are now universally admitted: such as the comparative insignificance of the first symptoms of revolt, the incredible blunders of the Khartum authorities, and the carelessness of its deputies, which led to the automatic growth of the movement. It illustrates the ignorance in Lower Egypt

and in Europe of the danger into which the Sudan was steadily drifting; and, in particular, the unquestionable fact, that Egyptian misrule, corruption, and tyranny had driven even the tractable people of the Sûdan into a state of revolt.

With the hour came the man. Even an impostor, who usurped the name and functions of the Mohammedan Redeemer, offered the Sudanese a fair chance of delivery from the intolerable fetters with which Egypt had bound them. That, in addition to these predisposing causes of anarchy, the action of Egypt in encouraging the Slave Trade, on the one hand, and in the severe suppression of it, on the other, had also a determining influence on a people to whom the Traffic appeared quite legitimate and in whom the idea of slavery is firmly rooted, cannot be contested: but this was far from being the main incentive to rebellion. The subsequent history of the Mahdiist rising proves, that the followers of Mohammed Ahmed were at least capable of devotion to a cause, in which for a time they placed implicit faith; and that they were willing to die for it or for freedom from the contemptible rule of effeminate Pashas. Had the Sudanese been governed with the merest show of justice, the provinces in the Sudan might have remained an integral part of Egypt to this day. As things were, had Mohammed Ahmed not raised the standard of revolt, another Reformer, Redeemer, or Liberator, would probably have appeared in his stead: for the people of the Sudan were and are superior to their Egyptian task-

masters in all the essential attributes of manhood. Zubeir was a far stronger man, individually, than the so-called Mahdi; but, then, he and his son had to deal with Gordon, and not with Egyptian Governors. When Gordon re-appeared on the scene, it was too late to arrest the movement: it became only a question of saving the garrisons.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION.

[1883–1884]

Lower Egypt was occupied by British troops, with the ostensible object of 'restoring the authority of the Khedive.' The Arabi revolt having been crushed, the Egyptian army disbanded for the purpose of re-organisation upon a better footing, and amnesties having been proclaimed, it remained for Great Britain to make good her promises. But her Majesty's Government had no definite programme to propound: they had incurred responsibilities, against their will, and sought for the easiest possible escape, consistent with their obligations. At the close of 1882, the Anglo-French Control was abolished; and Lord Dufferin appeared upon the scene as the *deus ex machina*. His famous *Report* [Egypt: No. 6, 1883] published in March, was a masterly review of the political situation; and made certain definite proposals: but it was the Report of a Diplomatist, and avoided the harsh though wholesome scrutiny of the Dictator. Egypt, in her extremity, demanded the stern and rigid rule of a Cromwell.

In sending a copy of his *Report* to Baker, who was spending the winter in Egypt, Lord Dufferin wrote:

'Cairo: 25th April, 1883.

'I send you a copy of my Report, which you were good enough to say you would be glad to have. If you analyse the "Institutions," you will see that they leave the Executive very strong,—indeed, legally, almost as absolute as before. Where the views of the Ministry are really sound, and founded on common-sense, they will always be able to have their own way. The Council or the Assembly will only be able to control them when they are disposed to use the power still left to them in a pernicious manner.'

Baker's reply to the above included the following paragraphs:

'*Dahabia* "Osprey" (on the Nile): '27th April, 1883.

. . . 'In your "Conclusion" (page 83), there is a passage which attracts my keenest sympathy and awakens my regret:

> '"Had I been commissioned to place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an Indian subject-State, the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of a Resident would have quickly bent everything to his will; and in the space of five years we should have greatly added to the material wealth and well-being of the country: by the extension of its cultivated area and the consequent expansion of its Revenue; by the partial, if not the total, abolition of the *corvée* and slavery; the establishment of justice; and other beneficent reforms."'

'I can only regret that her Majesty's Advisers did not boldly adopt this course, which, in my opinion, is

the only one that can ensure a permanent solution of the Egyptian difficulty.

'Although I fully understand the delicacy that is necessary to avoid offence in many Diplomatic quarters, I feel confident that the present reforms, although so ably planned, will gradually dissolve through the hostile inertia of the Egyptians, which is more difficult to combat than active resistance. Another act will follow the rising of the curtain: and the final scene of the drama will be that in which the "masterful hand of a (British) Resident" will represent the authority of England, and "bend everything to his will." . . . I trust our Government will insist upon the railway development of the Sudan, without which it will be a heavy millstone upon the neck of Egypt.'

Baker was a true prophet. His views, too, were shared by Lord Dufferin himself, if we read between the lines of his *Report*, and were largely espoused by General Gordon, who, in 1884, is reported to have said:

'I should like to see a competent special Commissioner of the highest standing . . . sent-out to put Nubar [whom he then regarded, and rightly, as "the one supremely-able man among Egyptian Ministers"] in the saddle; sift-out unnecessary *employés;* and warn evil-doers in the highest places, that they shall not be allowed to play any tricks. If that were done, it would give confidence everywhere; and I see no reason why the last British soldier should not be withdrawn from Egypt in six months' time.'*

When Gordon spoke those words, it was a question of saving Khartum, which her Majesty's Government were urging Egypt to abandon; and

* *Events in the Life of Charles George Gordon*, p. 307.

consequently his mind was turned upon the Sudan in relation to Egypt rather than Egypt herself. His opinion is explained by the context:

'How he [Nubar] will deal with the Sudan, of course I cannot profess to say. I should imagine that he would appoint a Governor-General at Khartum, with full powers, and furnish him with two millions sterling —a large sum, no doubt, but a sum which had much better be spent now than wasted in a vain attempt to avert the consequence of an ill-timed surrender. . . . Sir Samuel Baker, who possesses the essential energy and single-tongue requisite for the office, might be appointed Governor-General of the Sudan; and he might take his brother [Valentine Baker] as Commander-in-Chief.'*

We find Gordon repeatedly urging the appointment of Baker to the supreme command in the Sudan, and as frequently himself trying to escape from that office, whenever there was a question of its being filled by a European. On his side, Baker felt that Gordon was the only man for the post: for, on January 16th, 1884, he wrote to *The Times*, 'If General Gordon were in command in the Sudan, he would solve the difficulty.' . . .

But the British Government skilfully evaded all snares that might eventually involve themselves in responsibility, either directly for Egypt or indirectly for the Sudan; until the force of circumstances and the irony of their equivocal position drove them into accepting responsibilities that

* *Events in the Life of Charles George Gordon*, p. 301.

grew with every attempt to escape them. To speak of 'upholding the authority of the Khedive' in Lower Egypt, and of permitting rebels to overthrow it in Upper Egypt, was, of course, an antithesis of political jugglery that could not be comprehended by simple Orientals. Nevertheless, the Egyptians, not being masters in their own country, had to submit to the sacrifice of the Sudan, in consequence of the impotence of herself and of her Protector to save it from the ravages of a justly-incensed population; although both were prepared at a later date to invite even Turkish troops to over-run those lands, and to punish patriots for their misdeeds.

In May, 1883, Major Evelyn Baring (now Lord Cromer) was nominated British Resident in Egypt. The 'strong man' had been found; but too late to save the Sudan, and too early to make his full influence felt.

Two months after Giegler Pasha penned his sanguine letter to Baker, Bara and El Obeid surrendered to the Mahdiists. Under the command of Abd El Kader, the Egyptians achieved one or two successes, which were promptly wiped-out by fast-succeeding reverses. Abd El Kader was recalled; a civil and a military governor were sent-out to replace him at Khartum; and Hicks Pasha (nominated on the recommendation of Valentine Baker) was despatched on a forlorn-hope, to save the situation.

The fate of Hicks Pasha and his foredoomed army, on their march to El Obeid, is still fresh

in the public memory. Lord Dufferin had left Egypt five months before the annihilation of this army; and Major Baring arrived too late to avert a fate which experts (including Baker and his brother, Valentine) were unanimous in predicting: Hicks had, in fact, already left Khartum for the conquest of Kordofan.

Baker had urged the authorities to send the green-turban *sheikh*, a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, with the army under Hicks Pasha, with the object of allaying the susceptibilities of the Mahdiists against a Christian commander. On the other hand, Gordon maintained, that the mainspring of the revolt was not to be found in religious fanaticism, but in political and patriotic unrest. Moreover, the Egyptian authorities were not so eager at that time to identify the interests of the two countries,—at least before the people of the Sudan. Consequently, this measure of precaution, which might have proved one of safety, was never taken.

Baker advocated the complete abandonment of Dar-Fur; also, 'that Kordofan should be left to itself until Sennar and all the Arab tribes should have been thoroughly subdued, and the power of the Egyptian Government consolidated. The Egyptian Minister of War,' he added, in a letter to Mr. Douglas Murray, from which this extract is taken, 'is entirely responsible for Hicks Pasha's orders to advance: and yet, Lord Dufferin, when in Cairo, accused me of taking too gloomy a view of the Sudan position!'

That was before the disaster. Lord Dufferin's subsequent views are given in the following letter:

'Constantinople: 30th Nov., 1883.

'It is quite true, that I thought you took a gloomier view of what was likely to occur in the Sudan than the circumstances of the case warranted. However, what we were then discussing was not the conquest of Kordofan, but the establishment of Egyptian authority over Sennar. Though there was no denying, that there was a certain amount of risk, as there must always be in such cases, the advantage of commanding the two rivers [Blue and White Niles] appeared to me to increase the chances very much in Hicks' favour; and the result proved the justice of these anticipations: for Hicks completely cleared Sennar of the Mahdi and his adherents. Had the question been the risking of Egypt's one small army in a desperate venture across the waterless wastes of Kordofan, my prognostications would not only have been as gloomy as yours, but I should have absolutely stopped so mad an expedition. I quite agree with you, that after having shewn our superiority in the field, and having driven the rebels beyond the White Nile, a favourable opportunity of negotiating might have arisen. [This was a course which Baker and Gordon had advocated, as being preliminary to extensive military operations in the Sudan.] But you must remember, that Hicks had been something like nine months in the country; and was quite in a position to judge for himself [though not at first empowered to act independently on his judgment of] what was the best mode of proceeding. Your brother selected him; and he was [ultimately] given great liberty of action,—at least, when I was in Egypt: and we could only hope that he would evince sound judgment and good sense. Poor fellow! he seems to have missed the mark; but how or why I cannot imagine. All along, I protested against military operations beyond the left-bank of the Nile, until the

establishment of a just and good administration at Khartum should have given the Egyptian Government time and opportunity of judging what their future policy should be. I entirely agree with you, that the situation has now become quite as serious as you predicted.'

So serious, in fact, had it become, that the order which had been given for the withdrawal of a large number of British troops had to be countermanded. The destruction of Hicks' army sealed the fate of the Sudan. Not that the position was even then irretrievable; but that, in spite of repeated warnings, Great Britain and Egypt permitted things to drift into a hopeless *impasse*, out of which even Gordon was unable to save them.

On the 2nd September, 1883, or two months before the annihilation of Hicks' column, Gordon wrote to Laurence Oliphant, at Haifa:

'Her Majesty's Government, right or wrong, will not take a decided line, in *re* Egypt and the Sudan: they drift, but at the same time cannot avoid the onus of being the real power in Egypt, with the corresponding advantage of being so.'*

On the 24th October, the War Office telegraphed to Gordon, refusing to sanction his employment on the Congo [by the King of the Belgians, to whom he was pledged]. In short, the British authorities would neither themselves employ him nor allow others to do so, at that time. Had they intercepted him at Jaffa, on his way home, *viâ* Brussels, in December, 1883, instead of reluctantly giving their consent and concurrence when it was too late, Gordon would

* *Events in the Life of Charles George Gordon*, pp. 281–2.

in all probability have saved the situation, or at least have rescued the garrisons of Khartum and Sennar.* Lord Granville did actually propose to the Egyptian Government, at the critical moment, that Gordon should be sent to Khartum (where he might have arrived, from Jaffa, on 1st January, 1884): but the latter—or was it the British Resident?—refused to entertain the proposal. Gordon, himself, was in too great sympathy with the down-trodden people of the Sudan to have roused their increased enmity; and was prepared to renew his relations with them, as a Liberator rather than as an Avenger. When, however, in February, 1884, he once more entered Upper Egypt, he made the fatal mistake—a mistake which he himself had said would be fatal—of announcing the abandonment of the Sudan: and consequently, he encouraged, instead of allaying, the *sauve qui peut* that ensued on all sides.

To return to Lower Egypt, from whence we have drifted in the chronology of events, as a natural result of treading in the path of British policy.

The disaster to Hicks' army in Kordofan made a profound impression upon all classes in the Delta. Cairo was in a ferment. Instinctively and unanimously, public opinion now called

* A correspondent remarks, in a letter to us, regarding this passage: 'Had Great Britain continued to permit Egypt to drift, Gordon *might* have saved the Sudan; but her Majesty's Government tied him hand-and-foot; and, after, promising him a free-hand, ignored his requests: and then they expected him to work miracles.' That was precisely the situation.

upon the man who was then regarded as their best military leader: Valentine Baker. But the *Gendarmerie* which he commanded had been divested of its military *status*—greatly to the loss of its *esprit de corps*—and was a mere rabble. The irony of the situation may be detected in the following remarks addressed to his brother by Baker:

'Sandford Orleigh: 28th November, 1883.

'I see they [the Egyptians] have fallen back on the *Gendarmerie* as their only available force! I also see that the men [the Turkish recruits, and not the officers, as was falsely reported] have refused to proceed to the Sudan. Let nothing persuade you to attempt the passage of the Suakin Desert with such troops: otherwise you will share the fate of Hicks.

'Indian troops should at once occupy Suakin [British gun-boats were then defending Suakin and other Red Sea ports]; and water from Suez should be sent there in tanks, to be held in readiness.

'The proper way to manage in this emergency is, to telegraph instantly to the Mudir of Berber to at once subsidise the Arab tribes—Bisharin, Jaalin, Shukrieh, Hadendowa—and to take hostages for their good behaviour. A large force should be sent to Dongola and to Berber without loss of time. If the great *sheikh* of the desert, Hussein [who in 1870 assisted in the transport of Baker's steamers] is alive,* he should be promised £500 a-year extra pay; and he will then get the troops through the Korosko Desert to Berber direct. Money and

* Hussein Pasha Khalifa, an *abbadi* of the Melikab, and head of the Melikab and Fogara, sections, was the *sheikh* at Berber entrusted with the supervision of guides from that town to the frontier. On the 15th December, 1883, he was re-appointed *Mudir umum* (Governor-General) of Berber and Dongola, having previously filled that post in 1871.

decorations will do more than fighting; but the force must be at hand. You can never catch Arabs in the desert; but they will flock towards dollars as sparrows fly towards corn. The force prepared at Suakin should secure the wells towards Berber by bribing the allegiance of the *sheikhs*. The force at Berber would be doing the same. And, as each set of wells was secured, the positions should be fortified, the wells being *inclosed by the redoubt*. In this way the route would be worked simultaneously from both ends. I have a great mind to come over to Berber to effect it: at this season the climate is charming.'

Other recommendations of detail followed. Baker, it is thus evident, fully appreciated the situation; and was prepared with effective strategic plans, which, had they been put into execution, might have saved the garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat, for the relief of which Valentine Baker had been commissioned with plenary powers. But political circumstances at Cairo were not favourable to the adoption of rational measures: Mr. Clifford Lloyd held the stage.

The following extracts from a private diary, the authorship of which is sufficiently indicated, gives a vivid picture of the circumstances attending this rash enterprise on the part of Valentine Baker, and of the conditions which, from the first, rendered it foredoomed to failure:

'Shepheard's Hotel, Cairo.

'*November 25th*, 1883. Val. is overwhelmed with work, in consequence of this terrible disaster to Hicks in the Sudan. He looks thin and ill, and is very anxious about Hermione [his daughter, who was dangerously ill].

'*November 27th.* On Sunday, strong pressure was put upon Val. to go to Suakin; and he was most depressed at

having to leave his daughter at the crisis of her illness. He saw the Khedive at ten o'clock; and, of course, said he would go. The Khedive told him, he was "deeply touched by his devotion." There was work all day; and at five p.m. he managed to rush home. The sitting-room was then besieged with officers. At seven o'clock, a Turkish officer [afterwards killed at El Teb] dashed in to say, that the Turks to a man had refused to march. Everyone had hoped that the Turks would have acted as a backbone to the invertebrate Egyptian troops. It was a terrible blow! "Oh that I should have lived to see this day!" exclaimed the Turk, after making his report. Val. said: "I would give a great deal, if I could make a good speech in Turkish." Whereupon, an officer remarked: "I will find you an eloquent person."

'Val. sent for this "eloquent person"; and went at once to harangue the troops. We saw him no more until midnight, when he returned to tell us the result.

'This is what happened. First, the Turkish troops explained their case: they had been engaged to remain in Egypt Proper; and they would fulfil their contract, and defend Egypt to the last man; but they would not go to the Sudan. This was quite true, as Val. told us. They were all married men; and the British Authorities had insisted on their serving as civilians, not as a regular military arm of the service. The "eloquent person" then addressed them: but his exhortation fell flat. The Turkish officers then addressed their men: with the same result. Finally, Val. spoke to them, saying: he knew the Turks were brave, and he could not believe that his own men were cowards. "I myself must go," he added: "shall I go alone?"

'There was a pause, during which Val. thought that he, too, had failed to make an impression: "I'll give you five minutes to think it over," he exclaimed: "the brave men will fall-in on the right; the cowards on the left."

'A handsome Bosnian—not one of the Egyptians—at once went over to the right; then two or three

more; then a good many. Then, those who had first crossed over, rushed back to the ranks, and seized the hands of their special friends among the waverers, pulling them forcibly towards the right: until more than half were ranged upon the "brave" side. The remainder were allowed the night for reflection.

'Some of the Ministers were anxious that those who refused should be shot: which, as they are not soldiers, would have amounted to murder.

'F. [Mrs. Valentine Baker] felt very sad; and begged Val. not to go; but he reassured her, saying: "Wood [Sir Evelyn: Commander-in-Chief] will forward supplies." All sorts of promises have been made to Val. "They have given me *carte blanche*," he said. "But," his wife rejoined, "what is the good of *carte blanche*, if you have troops without courage?"

'Yesterday morning, some of the Egyptians marched past Shepheard's. They were a fine body of men; but the Arab women who crowded, wailing, after them, made it a most melancholy sight. We hear that at the railway station [when the troops entrained] it was dreadful. This evening the Turks are to start. They nearly all consented to march; the rest were dismissed; and there have been volunteers since.

'On Monday night, Val. said, as if thinking aloud: "I wish Burnaby were here! He shall know this."*

'*December 3rd.* The British Government have given Val. a mere handful of these poor frightened creatures. Plenty of English officers wished to go with him; but are not permitted. General Stephenson is indeed good to

* Colonel Fred. Burnaby was a devoted friend to Valentine Baker. He sought him out whenever and wherever a dangerous enterprise might be shared with him. Thus, we find Burnaby and Baker together at Tashkessen, and again in the two engagements at El Teb. Speaking of the former occasion, Valentine Baker remarked of his companion-in-arms: 'When I had no time to think of my personal requirements, my good friend, Captain F. Burnaby, used to watch over me like a child, always ready with some sustenance, to prevent my strength from failing.' (*War in Bulgaria*, Vol. ii., p. 293.)

us; so are many others; but it is too bad to have a man like ——— to make "confusion worse confounded" in every Department.

'*December 15th.* To-day we saw a long line of *misérables* chained together: recruits for the Egyptian army!

'The Barings are most kind: Sir Evelyn will, we think, see that food and fodder are sent to Suakin; for starvation is one of the perils of this expedition. It is a comfort to think that Colonel Burnaby is to arrive shortly.

'Val. had to leave by an early train to-night; and Luigi was determined that the last dinner should be tempting. There were no guests; and we were trying whether we could decipher and write the code by which we were to communicate, when Zubeir Pasha was announced. We knew how anxious Val. was to have this notorious Arab with him, his influence with the tribes being at that time very great. It was etiquette for the ladies to at once retire: but, as we left the room, we glanced-back with interest at Zubeir and his Staff. His appearance was striking: his high-caste Arab features and slight angular frame contrasted with his dusky complexion. The interview was most friendly. To our surprise, also, he appeared at the station, and assured F., that he hoped soon to join her husband, when he would "watch over his safety." [Zubeir, however, was not permitted to join General Baker at Suakin.]

'The enthusiasm at the station, in which even the natives took part, was a popular ovation that has never been surpassed here. There was an enormous crowd; and all were deeply stirred by the leave-taking.

'*January 14th*, 1884. We learn that 2,500 Turks had volunteered to accompany Val.; and were waiting to embark at Volo: but the Government would not allow them to start. Val. writes:

"Suakin, 8th January, 1884.

"They have sent down nothing—no boats, no telegraph, no Turks, no anything! Nor have I any

news of Zubeir's men, who have not arrived. The telegraph I want above all things: and you know the promises that were made. It really is too bad!

"On the other hand, it is quite refreshing to have such a man as [Admiral] Hewett here: he is the personification of kindness, hospitality, and straightforwardness. There is nothing I can think of, that is not done directly by him. I am getting on rather better than I expected with the friendly chiefs; but Sinkat and Tokar are a source of great anxiety: for what *can* I do for them, if I get no support from Cairo."

'*January 28th.* We have had an exciting week. Colonel Harrington came from Suakin, to hasten-up men and supplies. He hopes the affair will be over in three weeks, as probably Tokar and Sinkat will be relieved at once or not at all. Then Colonel Gordon and Colonel Stewart arrived. We knew the latter well before. He has a charming manner; but I could see, in his eyes, when I expressed to him my good wishes, that he never expects to return from this hazardous expedition [with Gordon to Khartum. He and his companions were massacred near the Fifth Cataract, before the close of the year]. We dined at the Wood's on Saturday; and it was a dismal occasion. Gordon and Stewart, who both were depressed, left before the dinner was over. Gordon, before his departure from England, went to Sandford Orleigh [with the object of inducing Baker to accompany him]; and he expects Sir Samuel out at once. Gordon left his coat and waistcoat with Lady Wood, to sell for the poor: but I expect they won't fetch much.

'Gordon had a most stormy interview with Zubeir at the Agency. Zubeir accused him of having unjustly destroyed his relatives [in particular his son, Suliman, whom Gessi executed] and got into a state of great excitement. Gordon as angrily denied having killed any but traitors. Whereupon, Zubeir threw himself upon the ground, and cried: if he had wronged

Gordon, and it could be proved that he had wronged him, he would in that attitude implore his pardon. Then, rising to his full height, he said: "The charge is true: the blood-feud is between us; and I cannot aid you."

'*February 3rd.* At last, the telegraph is open to Suakin. Val. wired: "Delighted to hear your good news [of his daughter's health]. Despatch me a message often. Send me some cigarettes." The next morning we heard, that he had been successful in a reconnaissance, in force; and was hopeful as to the relief of Tokar.

'*February 11th.* You can imagine what an exciting time we have had. [On February 4th, Baker Pasha, with 3,500 men, was defeated by the rebels at El Teb, near Tokar. A remnant of his demoralised force, about 1,000 men, escaped to Trinkitat.] Val. said, in his last letter, written the night before the fight—or, rather, disaster—he "hoped for success, so far as the utterly-worthless character of the troops permitted; but that the proclamation of the abandonment of the Sudan had naturally won all the wavering, and even the friendly, tribes over to the Mahdi." Nubar came here three times; and he assured F. that, but for Val., every man must have perished. Sir Samuel and Lady Baker arrived here on Saturday.

'An expedition of British troops, under General Graham, has been organized. How strange it all seems! You can tell by the faces of the Englishmen whether or not they are allowed to go to the front: those who are preparing to start look so radiant.

'Mr. Goodall came; and gave us details of the carnage. He says, if the troops [under Valentine Baker] could have been induced to stand for ten minutes, instead of scattering like frightened sheep, all might have gone well. Val. rode, at a foot's pace, along one side of the square, with the excited men all blazing away at him—long before the enemy was near enough to hit. It was a

marvel he was not shot. Colonel Burnaby went out to battle in plain clothes, armed only with a small revolver and an umbrella.' *

Although somewhat of a digression, we do not grudge the space devoted to the transcript of this private diary, depicting, as it does so vividly, the demoralisation in Lower Egypt at a time when Gordon and Stewart left for Khartum to carry-out the belated programme of the British Government.

Valentine Baker, after his reverse, was temporarily attached to the Intelligence Department, acting as Guide to the British troops under General Graham. He took part in the victory at El Teb, where, with Burnaby, he was severely wounded. Shortly afterwards, he returned to England, for medical treatment. Whilst he was still lying ill of his wound, Sir Samuel, Fred. Burnaby, and Mr. Douglas Murray one day called upon him, when the conversation turned upon the earlier history of the campaign in the Eastern Sudan.

When first he went to Suakin, Valentine Baker was under the impression that her Majesty's Government really intended to administer the Eastern Sudan. In consequence, he had gathered around him the *sheikhs* of the neighbouring districts, who, at that time, were eager to swear allegiance to

* Sinkat, with a garrison of 400 men under a gallant soldier named, we believe, Tewfik, held-out as long as possible. When provisions failed, they sallied-out, with the intention of cutting their way through the enemy's lines: but the attempt failed; and every man perished. Tokar surrendered to the enemy on the day before General Graham entered the town, after his victory at El Teb.

Great Britain. But, shortly before a general meeting which he had arranged to take place, he received a telegram, acquainting him with the definite decision of her Majesty's Government to evacuate the Sudan. Bitterly disappointed, one course only was open to him. He at once sent for the principal *sheikh;* and explained the position. The *sheikh* insisted upon leaving at once, declaring that all would follow his example. 'Why must you leave?' asked Valentine Baker. 'Don't you see?' was the reply, 'we must serve one master. If it is not to be your Government, it must be the Mahdi: otherwise, what will happen to us? Our flocks and herds will be taken away; our wives and children will be sold into slavery; and we shall all have our throats cut.'

These rejected allies left Suakin the same night. Compelled, by force of circumstances, but much against their will, to join Osman Digna, they afterwards fought against British troops. As Valentine Baker remarked to a relative: 'The friendly *sheikhs*, upon hearing the proclamation, melted away like snow. Not a man remained with me. I thus lost the control of several thousand brave fighting-men, all of whom joined the Mahdiists, in consequence of our fatuous and suicidal policy.'

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE NILE CAMPAIGN.

[1884]

A FORTNIGHT after the disaster at El Teb—a disaster which was retrieved a few days later, and almost on the same ground, by British troops—Gordon arrived at Khartum, and was received as a Deliverer.

We have seen, that he returned from Palestine with the object of entering the service of King Leopold, on the Congo; but that the War Office in London had withheld their sanction to this step. How this obstacle was overcome, is recorded in his brother's work.*

The following messages from Gordon to Baker trace his journey from Brussels to England, and thence to Khartum, giving particulars that may be worth preserving in a permanent form:

'Bruxelles: 2nd January, 1884.

'I got here on 1st January; and only received your letter of 28th December to-day. I can do nothing about Sudan, I feel sure; though, as you say, the step they meditate is fatal. I have not seen the King yet; but shall do so to-night. He does not know H.M.G. [her Majesty's Government] have refused me leave to go to

* *Events in the Life of Charles George Gordon*, p. 290 *et seq.*

the Congo. I do not want to go; but neither do I want to go to the Sudan: it is too late. *Zubeir will get taken prisoner*, and will join the Mahdi, and take command of his troops; but he will abstain from attacking Lower Egypt. Of course the Slave Trade will flourish again in full force. If H.M.G. sent up Wilson [Sir Charles, R.E.] they would come to some terms with the Sudanese.

. . . 'This Arab movement will extend to Damascus, where, even before Hicks' defeat, proclamations were put up, saying, "Drive out the Turks": *à la* Arabi. It will spread all over the Hejaz and Syria: the beginning of the end. We ought to head it, not be opposed to it; and we ought to support the Sherif of Mecca, allowing Ismail [ex-Khedive] to come back, and Arabi to come out of Ceylon. [Gordon, it has been pointed out, viewed the revolt as a popular rising against Egyptian oppression.]

. . . 'I will not go to the Sudan; for I feel it is too late. I quite agree, that if H.M.G. sent up a Commission, it might do good. Rauf [Pasha, ex-Governor-General of the Sudan] did all the harm.

'I will write again soon, when I see the King. *I have promised him to go to the Congo;* and must keep my word.'

'Bruxelles: 4th Jan., 1884.

'Thanks for your kind letter, received to-night. *Glad you are going to Egypt.* At any rate, we shall have one man there who knows his own mind and has decision.

. . . 'Egypt, backed with money, will regain the Sudan—not by fighting but by biding her time: for the Arabs, especially the Beduin, will not keep the field long; and dissension will break-out *if Zubeir is kept away, and not taken prisoner wilfully, which I fear.* Your brother [Valentine] may *foresee this.* I should warn him by telegraph. *You and your brother* could work wonders: for you are well-known to all as just. The Mahdi has no backbone: and if not molested in a rash way, will fall to pieces. Promise the Sudanese: governors from their own

people, amnesty, the appointment of regular tribunals, the spending of their own Revenue, including the revenue of the ports, Suakin and Massawa, in transit-dues which [on account of diversion of traffic] are now taken at Suez. Proclaim, that the Registration of Slaves shall be the order of the day—not their liberation, which would be unjust [to the owners]. . . . Give Bogos back to the King of Abyssinia. I fear Zubeir's advent very much. Your brother can raise an "Ever-Victorious Army," buying slaves for the purpose, and officering them with the riff-raff or refuse of Europe. Only give him the Kurds; and you and he will be all-powerful. If you will do this, and let me give you a proclamation, in my name, to the Sudan people, I will give it. Your going to Cairo, where all is confusion, will settle matters. Ask for Kurds, and nothing more; and take your time: you as Civil Governor, and your brother as Military Governor [at Khartum].

'In *re.* my affairs: I shall retire; and go to the Congo on 5th February. At some future time I shall (*D.V.*) take the Equator and Bahr El Ghazal Provinces. The King will pay my loss [for his Army commission] on leaving H.M.G. . . .

'My respects to Ismail. I wish they would put him back. If you can afford it, telegraph this to Tewfik: "*Regretting state of Sudan, and feeling for your Highness' position, I am coming to Egypt; and will engage, D.V., that, if you will entrust me with the civil government of Sudan and my brother with command of troops, I will restore the provinces* [*to Egypt*]. *I feel sure H.M.G. will not deny funds to raise an Irregular force for the purpose. I feel convinced that the revolt, if unchecked, must endanger Lower Egypt. All, therefore, I ask is funds; and freedom to promise Sudan fair reforms in future. Gordon begs me to ask you this, in the interests of Sudan people.*"

'Also ask H.M.G. to let Conder or Kitchener go out as Commissioner,—H.M.G. not to enter the first line [of defence], but to be at hand to report home. Send someone to Abyssinia to choke-off King with presents. [A British

Mission was well received four months later at Adowa; and a treaty with Abyssinia was signed.]

'Get Ismail back if possible. *Do not delay a moment.*'

'Southampton: 8th January, 1884.

'I got over here at 11 p.m.; and read your letter at once. I will come [to Sandford Orleigh]; but I will let you know when, by telegraph. Having only fourteen days in England, I can of course stop only one night. . . .

[Gordon visited Sandford Orleigh; but failed to induce Baker to go out to Khartum, or to adopt his proposal. His own intention of going out to the Congo was frustrated by the action of her Majesty's Government, who, finally, commissioned him to proceed to Khartum, in order to provide for the evacuation of the Sudan.]

[*Post-card*]

'Southampton: 13th January, 1884.

'Very many and true thanks for your and Lady Baker's kind reception [at Sandford Orleigh]. I avoid worries of all sorts. I leave England, *D.V.*, Tuesday.' . . .

[*Post-card*]

'Bologna: 20th January, 1884.

'When I wrote you "eventuality" [meaning, probably, that, in the event of his appointment, he would like Baker to accompany him] the question was in embryo. I came to London on the 18th January, at 6 *a.m.* Nothing was decided till 4 *p.m.*; and at 8 *p.m.* I was off: so I had no time to write; and I hope you will excuse it. *Under no circumstances* will Government guarantee future. The only thing now is to get the Sudan to settle-down.'

[*Post-card*]

'Bologna: 20th January, 1884.

'I hope to be back in four months. I do not go through Cairo, but by Canal. [He was, however, obliged to go to Cairo, to receive his *firman*.] Stewart is with

me. I hope we may meet; and that you are all well. Any hints will be thankfully received.'

[Gordon arrived at Berber on 11th February, where he issued that fatal proclamation regarding the evacuation of the Sudan, although he held an alternative *firman* in which no mention was made of this step.] *

[*Telegram*]

'Khartum: 26th February, 1884.

'By your letter, 26th January, you are at Cairo. Hope all well. Sorry Suakin business. Tell your brother, heads or tails up here! but will trust.'

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* Gordon stayed three days at Berber. He informed Hussein Pasha Khalifa, the Governor, that the object of his mission was to withdraw the Egyptian garrison at Khartum, as Egypt had abandoned the Sudan. Hussein received this intelligence with every sign of consternation; and at once sought the readiest means for safe-guarding his own position. The Mahdi had repeatedly invited his former master, Mohammed El Kheir, a *fiki* at Berber, to join him; and succeeded in gaining his adherence after the fall of El Obeid. Hussein, knowing this, now began to temporize. It was agreed between him and Mohammed El Kheir, that the latter should return to Berber, in the event of Mohammed Ahmed proving himself to be the true Mahdi; and should then fill the post of Judicial Governor of the *mudirieh*, leaving Hussein to act as Political Governor. It was arranged between these two men, that in any case Berber should not be handed over to the Mahdiists before the fall of Khartum. The *fiki* left, to study the situation; and Hussein remained at his post at Berber. After visiting the Mahdi in Kordofan, the *fiki* returned to Berber, full of enthusiasm for the *Jehad*, and with a commission appointing him the Mahdi's representative at Berber. Hussein dissenting, the *fiki* gathered the tribes under his standard and lay siege to Berber. Hussein refused to surrender; and was supported by the officers of the garrison. The town was captured by the Mahdiists on the 19th May, 1884. Hussein was wounded; but his life was protected by the *fiki*. Two months later, having obtained 'pardon' through the intercession of the *fiki*, Hussein visited the Mahdi at Rahad, clothed in the *Dervish* costume, with dust on his head and an iron chain round his neck. He subsequently became a valued adviser to the Mahdi, who treated him well. But as time passed, and the fraud of the *Dervish* movement became exposed, Hussein seceded, and effected his escape from Omdurman. On arrival at Cairo, on 12th July, 1885, he was tried by court-martial, and acquitted. He died there, a few months later, after filling a post in the Ministry of the Interior.

[*Telegram*]

'Khartum: 29th Feb., 1884.

'Thanks; we are all right up here, for present. You and Lady Baker would enjoy the excitement. It is a question of weeks [?] but hope to pull-through.'

'Khartum: 11th March, 1884.

. . . 'We are about to be hemmed-in here: for the Shukrieh and the tribes north of this have risen. And it is not to be wondered at, when they know we are going to evacuate. This they know by the sending-down of the Cairo *employés*, sick, etc. They will not attack Khartum, I think, but will cut-off the roads; and, though we have plenty of provisions—say, for five or six months—we must eventually fall. With Khartum all other places must fall. It was a petty affair, had we any forces; but we had not. *The loyal tribes were driven into rebellion, to save themselves.* [The italics are ours.]

'I have no time for more; and doubt whether you will get this: for we may expect the roads cut to-day or to-morrow. If the Nile were high, it would be far easier [to withdraw the garrison, etc.]; but now the Nile is very low.'

When Baker himself arrived at Cairo, it was not with the intention of following in Gordon's footsteps. He describes his impressions and expresses his views in the following letters to Mr. Douglas Murray:

'Cairo: 17th February, 1884.

'Come out here if you can, as the time is interesting. There is an intensity of hatred against us—most deservedly—and I think no time should be lost in despatching three or four battalions to Alexandria, to replace those sent to Suakin. The crushing defeat of my brother's force will have the good result of opening the eyes of our Ministers to the real truth [that Egyptian troops were, at

that time, useless against the Mahdi's followers]. British troops proceeding to Suakin; and action at last commenced, after the cruel apathy which has entailed the massacre of thousands.' . . .

'On board *Dahabia* "*Hermione*": 24th March, 1884.

. . . 'Precisely as I foretold, that events would prove too strong for the British Government, so are we now committed to an Arab war of a most sanguinary character, although our Ministers assured the world, that "no British forces" or "any officers on the Active-List" would be permitted to interfere in the affairs of the Sudan.

'In only two engagements, we have lost 400 men, in killed and wounded—one-tenth of the entire force; and nobody here knows why we are fighting. No object has been declared. At the same time poor Gordon demands aid; and complains that he is at a dead-lock, because England will not declare a permanent policy for the Sudan.

'The idea of Zubeir as Governor of Khartum and the Central Sudan is only equal to the policy of "setting up Satan to govern the world": but Gordon must be in serious difficulties if these enforce such a disastrous suggestion. [Gordon's chief reason for requesting the co-operation of Zubeir was, that he could not trust him out of his sight. Moreover, he had been instructed to vest the future government of the Sudan in the descendants of the ancient families removed by Mohammed Ali; but these not being forthcoming, Gordon selected Zubeir as a *pis aller*. Zubeir was a strong man, exercising enormous personal influence in the Sudan; like the Mahdi, too, he was a Jaali. Had he been so minded, he might have helped Gordon, and controlled the situation: but his blood-feud stood in the way of personal co-operation. The alternative, that Zubeir should be banished, was unheeded by the authorities, in spite of Gordon's request to that effect.]

. . . 'The only excuse for our slaughter of the Arabs, who have been encouraged to rebel by the British proclamation that the Sudan was to be abandoned, would be the necessity of opening-up the route to Berber [from Suakin]. This cannot be effected without Indian troops (none have been ordered from Bombay, and in another fortnight or so the heat will be so great as to completely overpower Europeans) in conjunction with friendly Arab tribes. Such allies cannot be obtained, if we declare our intention to abandon the Sudan; but if we proclaimed our determination to permanently hold Khartum, Sennar, and Berber provinces, the Arabs would see the necessity of joining us as the stronger party.

'If once the route were opened from Suakin to Berber the whole question would be solved. This Gordon allows; and I cannot conceive why he does not press the Government to employ our Indian forces. There will be a disastrous loss of life if British troops be kept at Suakin during the hot season.'

[On passing through Cairo, on his way home, Baker received, from the hands of the Khedive, the Grand Cordon of the *Mejidié*.]

'Rome: 26th April, 1884.

'If Berber falls, I really do not see how a Relief Expedition [preparations for which were not undertaken before the end of August] will procure the supplies necessary for an army after crossing the desert. . . . I hope nothing mad will be attempted by sending troops across the desert in the hot season.

. . . 'I am in despair about Gordon. You will see, that the troops at Khartum are almost certain to follow the example of the Berber people [and join the Mahdi]. It is all nonsense for newspapers to talk of Gordon's "magnetic eye," and to make him out as something superhuman. He is not in command of Englishmen, but of a mixed lot of fanatical semi-savages. The only chance of success lay in the advance to Berber of 5,000 Indian troops from Suakin, directly

after Graham's victory [29th February, at El Teb]. That would have saved Berber [which fell on 19th May]. If Khartum falls, the rebels will shoot Gordon.

. . . 'I shall be very glad to see Dicey again. He knows, that I had very little belief in Gordon's success, because he set-out like a missionary, instead of as the practical Governor of a Province, with an army of 5,000 men at his back, to enforce respect to his wishes.

'I am quite sick with absolute disgust at the manner in which the Government have behaved. Gordon will be forced to retreat by Gondokoro [that was his intention] to Zanzibar. No volunteer force can be of any use. People are very good and willing in England; but they do not understand the true position. A considerable army is necessary at the present moment; and every delay will increase the necessity of a larger force.'

So convinced, indeed, was Baker, that the relief of Khartum could be effected only by the employment of a large and well-equipped force, that he felt himself all but powerless to respond to the following pathetic appeal from Gordon, who despaired of ever seeing British troops within the walls of Khartum:

[*Telegram*]

'Khartum, N. D. [received by Baker, Cairo, 18th April, 1884. This was the last Telegram Gordon ever sent.]

'I have received a meagre telegram from Baring, to the effect that it is not intended to send British troops to open road to Berber, but that negotiations are going-on with Arabs for opening the road. You will be able to judge of the value of such negotiations with the Arabs, and also of the time any such arrangement would last, after the withdrawal of the British from Suakin. [Gordon could not understand the use of holding Suakin, if the Sudan were to be abandoned.] I am in this position. We have provisions for five months; are hemmed-in by

some 500 determined men and some 2,000 rag-tag Arabs. As you know, our position will be much strengthened when Nile rises. Sennar, Kassala, Dongola, and Berber are quite safe for the present. Do you think an appeal to the millionaires of America and England for the raising of, say, £200,000, would be of any avail? With that sum you might get the permission of the Sultan, on certain terms, for the loan of 2,000 or 3,000 Nizams; and send them up to Berber. With these men, we could not only settle our affairs here, but also do for the Mahdi, in whose collapse the Sultan will necessarily be interested [by preventing the spread of the revolt to Arabia]. I would not send many Europeans with them, as they cost too much; and I would put Zubeir in command. You know that, by the *firman* granted to Mohammed Ali in 1841, Egypt was given to him and his family; while by a second *firman* the Sudan was given to the individual, Mohammed Ali. Thus, the Sultan kept the nomination to the Sudan Pashalik in his own hands. These *firmans* are considered by the Foreign Office as abrogated by the *firman* [1866] by which Ismail was made Khedive, with succession in the direct-line. I feel sure that if it were known, the loyal way in which the townspeople and troops here have held to me, under such difficult circumstances, and the way my lot is involved in theirs, I should be justified in making this appeal. I should be mean indeed if I neglected any steps that occur to me for securing their safety. Rumour says Zubeir is at Korosko; but I have no official information of this from Cairo: if true, it is remarkable that I am not informed of it. I leave you full discretion to put forward this appeal or not, as you think fit; but unless it is likely to be carried-out, it would do more harm than good.'

As, during the month of May, 1884, a movement was set on-foot in England to raise public subscriptions for the relief of Khartum, it is probable that Baker initiated it. The Baroness

Burdett-Coutts also made a direct appeal to the English people. Although these appeals came to nought, they may have had the indirect effect of rousing the British Government to a fuller sense of their responsibility for Gordon's position: since it was simply the pressure of public opinion that finally induced them to organize an expedition, which should have been undertaken months before.

As regards the subject of Turkish *firmans* to Egyptian viceroys—which is of sufficient importance to excuse a digression—Baker's views are expressed in the following paragraph of a letter (17th August, 1891) addressed to Lord Wharncliffe:

'I argue that the Sultan [who, it was at that time reported, intended to depose Tewfik, the Khedive of Egypt] sold his right of interference when he altered the Mohammedan Law of Succession to the eldest son of the Khedive [Ismail] for the sum of £344,000 a-year, as an increase of the Egyptian Tribute. I do not know whether the fact has occurred to Lord Salisbury [then Foreign Secretary]; but it is clear that the Sultan could not sell this positive right, for coin, and then assume his original position, at his own discretion.'

This is certainly a point open to discussion by International jurists, and one of supreme importance to Great Britain in her further dealings with Egypt.

To revert to the subject of the Nile Campaign, with the preliminary stages of which we need not concern ourselves.

Lord Wolseley, who arrived at Wadi Halfa on the 5th October, taking over the supreme

command, had some correspondence with Baker on the subject of Nile-navigation, prior to his departure from London:

'War Office: 8th May, 1884.

'I hear you are daily expected at home, where I hope you will arrive all the better after your recent visit to Cairo.

'If you come to town soon, I should very much like to have a chat with you regarding the navigation of the Nile above Wadi Halfa, especially regarding that stretch of 140 miles from Barkal-en-Nurri [Fourth Cataract] to Abu Hamed.'

'War Office: 23rd August, 1884.

'Many thanks for your kind and very flattering letter of yesterday.

. . . 'I think if you had seen the rivers ascended and descended during the Red River Expedition [in 1870, under Lord—then Colonel—Wolseley] you would admit, that the same class of boats then used could be taken anywhere on the Nile—which is a mild affair, when compared with the North American rivers, along which the whole trade of the Hudson's Bay and North-West Companies has been conveyed in boats for the last century.

'The Nile boats can only be successfully used above Barkal-en-Nurri, when the river is full or tolerably full; whereas our row-boats can go anywhere, no matter how low the river may be: indeed, the lower it is, the better for a boat-expedition. We have delayed so long in making preparations for the despatch of any expedition, that, should we be forced to send a force south of Wadi Halfa—for which no orders have yet been issued—it would be impossible to reach Khartum, by water, at all this coming winter, except by [English-built] boats of the description we are using.

. . . 'Before this boat-expedition had been determined upon, in the event of its becoming necessary to send troops south of Halfa, a number of officers who took

part in the Red River Expedition were consulted. They were given all the recent reports we have had on the Nile Cataracts to read: and all concurred in the opinion, that the Nile presented less difficulties than those encountered during the journey to Fort Garry in 1870.'

Baker, himself, would have preferred *nuggars* for the transport of British troops above Wadi Halfa, as being more suitable in every way. Moreover, he wrote to his brother, Valentine:

'Sandford Orleigh: 31st Aug., 1884.

. . . 'Why on earth is the Suakin-Berber route to be neglected? If Suakin is to be left in its present condition, there is little use in the Nile Expedition. It stands to reason, that Osman Digna must be stamped-out. If so, Graham's battles of past spring [El Teb, Tamai, and Tamanib] must be repeated.

. . . 'They should march four or five thousand men across the desert to Berber, to meet the force advancing by the Nile and that under Kitchener from Dongola. Such a movement would crush the insurrection at once: as the arrival at Berber would relieve Khartum; and Gordon's forces, added to the relieving-army, would be all-powerful.'

The value of Berber and Dongola as general depôts, in connection with the base at Suakin, for military operations in the Sudan, is examined in some detail by Baker in a Paper, hitherto unpublished, which we give in the first *Appendix* to this book. (*Vide*, 'Military Routes towards Berber.')

The position in June was very serious, as Sir Stafford Northcote confesses to Baker:

'London: 30th June, 1884.

'I have only time to thank you for your letter, and to say that I thoroughly agree with it from beginning to end. The position is a very alarming one; and those

who blame us for attacking the Anglo-French Agreement at once, instead of waiting for the conclusion of the Conference [London, 28th June, 1884], show that they do not appreciate its real gravity.'

In the first days of November, Lord Wolseley reached Dongola (Commander Julian Baker accompanying the Expedition); and Gordon reported: '*All well at Khartum*,' having, a few days before, defeated the rebels outside the town. Gordon then writes to Baker:

'Khartum: 5th November, 1884.

. . . 'Remember, the Expedition [under Wolseley] comes up for "*relief of garrisons*," which I failed to accomplish: it does not come up for *me!* . . . Are you coming out to Cairo this year? I shall not return to England: I cannot stand it; but shall go to Brussels.

'On 18th Sept., at full-Nile, Stewart [Colonel J. D.], Power [British Consul], and Herbin [French Consul] left here in a small ironclad, with a gun on her, and a good force, to go down to Dongola. [Major] Kitchener says (14th Oct.), the steamer was captured, and all were killed [at Wadi Garna, Fifth Cataract, on 6th Oct.]. It is terrible! How it happened I cannot make-out. Either the steamer was captured by treachery, or she struck on a rock. [She went ashore; and those on board were treacherously murdered.] I had put in wooden buffers to prevent that. If it is true—and I fear it is: for our steamers escorted her past Berber—then the *Journal of Events* [at Khartum, which Stewart had kept] from 1st March to 10th Sept., 1884, is lost: it was a large volume full of details. [This volume was taken by the Mahdiists to Omdurman, where it is now supposed to be.] The general opinion here was, that it was a certainty the vessel would get down safe.

'I have placed five steamers at Metemmeh, to await arrival of the force to *relieve* garrisons.'

'Khartum: 26th Nov., 1884.

'Thanks for your kind letter of 10th August, received yesterday. I am glad you and Lady Baker and your daughters are coming to Egypt. I thought you would come! The people of Khartum are well aware of your efforts to help.

'There shall be no truce between me and the [British] Government: not that I shall attack them [though he bitterly felt his abandonment]. I shall never go to England again. I will accept nothing whatever from them [the Government] to pay my expenses; but will get the King of the Belgians to do so. [King Leopold had offered to refund the value of Gordon's commission, upon entering his Majesty's service, which caused the British Government afterwards to make a similar offer on his retirement from the Army.]

'Many thanks on my part and on the part of the people here for your kind efforts on our behalf. Tewfik telegraphs that Baring is coming up. How he will enjoy being bumped along on a camel!

'I am afraid—sorely afraid—about Stewart, Power, and Herbin: but we have no definite news.

'It is disgraceful about Suakin being besieged. *What is the use of Suakin, without the Sudan?*" [The italics are ours.]

This is the last letter which Baker received from Gordon, so far as we have cognisance. The letter which precedes it was sent in reply to one from Baker, on the envelope of which were these words: *Communications avec le Soudan interrompées.* 'I should think they were *interrompées! ! !*' comments Gordon, in his *Journal* of 4th Nov., 1884.

Poor Gordon! He had a keen perception of humour, which went far to brighten those dark days when he foresaw the doom that threatened his people at Khartum.

He fell at his post on 26th January, 1885.

Two days later, Sir Charles Wilson, after a gallant and determined attempt to join hands with Gordon, arrived in a steamer off the ruined and sacked metropolis of the Sudan; and was received by a storm of bullets from the Mahdiists, who were by that time in possession.

He was too late. Khartum had fallen. The British Expedition, after heroic sacrifice of men's lives, had failed to accomplish its object.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE COLOSSUS AND THE SPHINX.

[1885–1892]

'WHAT has been the use of all this fighting, from the bombardment of Alexandria to the present time?' asked the Duke of Somerset, in a letter to Baker, dated 22nd January, 1885.

This was the riddle of the Sphinx. Should an Œdipus appear, let us hope he may be a British subject. Then shall the Sphinx efface herself, and the Colossus of British Power be set-up, in Egypt. Perhaps Mr. Rhodes, or some other prominent Imperialist, may be prepared thus to promote British interests?

With the fall of Khartum, Baker threw down his pen in disgust. 'I shall never publish another remark concerning Egypt,' he said, in his haste, to one of his friends. 'Now that poor Gordon is sacrificed, I unstring my bow; and remain a passive spectator of the misery and shame that have been the result of British interference.' But it was not in the nature of Baker to be a passive spectator of stirring events, far less of any concerning Egypt: for he confessed that Egypt was his 'shrine,' of which circumstances had constituted him a guardian. If some of his prophecies had

been fulfilled, if he saw his own and Gordon's work swept-away by a few months of anarchy, it was natural that he should give-way to a feeling of despondency: but, after a decent interval of sackcloth and ashes, humiliation and bitterness of spirit, he resumed his advocacy of common-sense views for the welfare of Egypt.

The early part of 1885 was spent by himself and Lady Baker in India. Shortly after his return home, he wrote to Lord Wharncliffe:

'Sandford Orleigh: 1st July, 1885.

. . . 'I only trust that we shall lose no time in making a firm alliance with the Sultan, through whom we should negotiate a special treaty with Egypt that would rivet our influence. This can only be done by England agreeing to defend Egypt from all danger, external and internal, and by accepting the position of guardian of Turkish interests, upon the condition that Egypt shall remain under British protection as an integral portion of the Ottoman Empire. . . . If England be united with Turkey in thorough earnest [the Cyprus link did not appear to Baker to be strong enough to bear even Diplomatic pressure] and in the event of war with Russia, we should be in a position to attack the enemy by way of the Caucasus. Every tribe would rise against the Russians, from the Circassians to the Turkmans.

'I believe thoroughly in Tewfik, provided that he is certain of England's permanent support; but I would not place faith in anyone—black, white, or grey—who suspects he may be deserted.*

* If, during the early period of our Occupation, the Khedive appeared to waver between British and French influences, his vacillation was entirely due to the see-saw, shilly-shallying, half-hearted conduct of the British Government. No sooner did our attitude become more decided, than Tewfik became our loyal friend and firm ally.

Baker's scheme of an Anglo-Turkish Alliance, the chief feature of which was a British Protectorate over Egypt, was partially exposed in a letter to *The Times* (30th June, 1885). Moreover, he also wrote to her Majesty's Government on this subject: in a letter to one of his sisters, he says:

'Sandford Orleigh: 16th January, 1885.

. . . 'If [as then appeared probable] the European Powers should insist upon a joint-guarantee for a loan of ten millions to Egypt, we shall be checkmated. I have written direct to Gladstone, suggesting an *immediate alliance* with Egypt, through special treaty with the Sultan, by which England shall engage to defend Egypt from all danger, internal and external, guaranteeing the integrity of the country as a portion of the Ottoman Empire: this alliance to be permanent. The British military Occupation to be *sine die*, as the protecting Power. The British Government to guarantee a loan of fifteen millions to pay-off [Alexandrian] indemnities and to carry-on the Administration. The interest on the entire Egyptian Debt to be reduced by one-half per cent.—that half to be paid in special paper, redeemable in 1891. If he will boldly do that, he will save our influence [and our credit for statesmanship].

But Baker made the mistake of supposing that the British Government may have had a definite, other than a negative or an opportunist, policy in Egypt at that period. Perhaps we shall hear something more of such a scheme, when the harassing persecution of France shall drive the British Government into the declaration of a policy which can be heard beyond the precincts of Downing Street. At the same time, the failure of the Special Mission (1885–1887) under Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff, owing apparently to the oppo-

sition of France, does not lend encouragement to its realization under existing circumstances: the Sultan's name is not, in fact, one to conjure with. The only visible result of that abortive Mission, and of the insincere attempt made at that time by Great Britain to prescribe for Gallic hysteria, is that Mukhtar Pasha, Sir Henry's colleague, was left stranded on the banks of the Nile—like Moses in the bulrushes—but with no specific or accredited functions in Egypt. The consequence is, that the Turkish Commissioner, much against his will, represents a nucleus for incessant intrigue. By the Convention, which would have been ratified by Turkey but for French intervention, Great Britain undertook to retire her troops within a period of three years, reserving to herself the right of re-entry under certain legitimate circumstances. The blind jealousy of France, who occupies Tunis under conditions analogous to, though more binding than, those controlling the Occupation of Egypt by Great Britain, now makes it incumbent on the latter to remain in the land of bondage 'until Egypt can stand alone': that is to say, until the Greek Kalends.

Many of our readers will be prepared to agree with Lord Rosebery, who, on the 7th March, 1886, wrote to Baker:

'The situation indeed demands all the firmness and statesmanship of this country. I would rather, therefore, not look back at the unhappy past; nor am I anxious at present to administer any more nostrums to sorely-overdosed Egypt.'

That, however, the political situation will remain precisely as it is to-day, is not to be expected: consequently, we may, with some profit to ourselves, learn what Baker had to say regarding the future of Egypt and of her lost Dependency. The following is Baker's rough-draft of a letter addressed to Lord Rosebery:

'Bath: 4th May, 1893.

'You have kindly invited me to express my ideas on the future of Egypt.

. . . 'My journeys were devoted during nine years to the basin of the Nile; therefore, my special work, although extending the influence of England, collaterally, through personal command, was directly in the interests of Egypt, which depends for her existence upon the river, and the regularity of water-levels.

. . . 'My own belief is, that Egypt, under British permanent protection, would become one of the most wonderful countries in the world, as a productive power. The wealth of the world emanates from the earth, in various forms: and there is no other country which possesses the advantages that Egypt insures to the agriculturist—"a certainty of success, provided that irrigation is secured."

. . . 'There is no man more thoroughly aware of these important capabilities, or of the general position in Egypt, than Lord Cromer, whose long and arduous experience has rendered him the most dependable authority. But all hope of development is paralysed by the equivocal *status* of the British Occupation.

'I am sure you will excuse me for stating my opinions very frankly; as I feel satisfied that, personally, you have the enviable position, as Foreign Minister, of possessing the complete confidence of the country, inclusive of all Parties; and that both Liberals and Conservatives rely upon your patriotism and good judgment

to the fullest extent. With this happy consensus of public-opinion, the difficulties occasioned by opposition cease to obstruct; and, although the plan which I should adopt would at first sight raise a terror of responsibility, there would actually be no risk whatever in that respect to Great Britain.

'Before I submit that plan for your consideration, I must, with all humility, suggest the difficulty that thwarts a British official in obtaining a true knowledge of the opinions or desires of the Egyptian people, all classes of whom are afraid to express their real sentiments to any official. I have served Egypt; and I know, and have known intimately, Egyptians of the highest rank: Ismail Pasha, the first Khedive; Mohammed Tewfik, the late Khedive, and all his brothers, from their boyhood; also the Ministers, Sherif Pasha (now dead), Nubar Pasha, and Riaz Pasha. There cannot be a more able man than Riaz Pasha [then Prime Minister]. He is perfectly sincere in his endeavour to work for the true benefit of Egypt; he is strong, and he is determined.

'Although I am not at liberty to quote from private conversations that I have held with the late Khedive, Prince Hussein (his brother), Riaz Pasha, and others, I have a perfect right to believe in their sincerity. They have assured me of their gratitude to England for her intervention in the Arabi insurrection. They have declared their willingness to follow the dictation of England. They have acknowledged that, after Tel-el-Kebir [which crushed the Arabi revolt] England had the power to exercise the *droit de conquête:* and they were astonished, during Lord Dufferin's short but able administration, to hear the British declaration of immediate evacuation. In contradiction to this, General Hicks' disaster was immediately followed by England's forced intervention. When the "abandonment of the Sudan" was thrust down the unwilling throat of the Khedive, Sherif Pasha, who was Prime Minister, at once

resigned. He and his colleagues foresaw the ruin that would ensue. They could not harmonize England's action with her declaration "that the Occupation was only temporary," nor bring it into accord with Lord Hartington's emphatic announcement, "that the British troops would be withdrawn within six months' time." That was nearly twelve years ago: and we are still in Egypt!

'The good and faithful Mohammed Tewfik is dead. His young son reigns in his stead. At nineteen, his inexperience renders him a mere tool in the hands of discontented Pashas and intriguing Frenchmen, who din into his ears: "*Perfide Albion!*"—"England, who has lied!"—"England, who pretended to be the friend of the late Khedive, only to gain her object of possession!"—"England, who, like the 'old man of the sea' in 'Sinbad the Sailor,' would sit upon your accommodating shoulders, but who, once there, could never be dislodged!" etc., etc.

'I can assure you, that the accusations conveyed by these taunts are credited by every native official in Egypt, though they dare not confess themselves openly. In vain have I endeavoured to allay their suspicions; in vain have I assured them, that we were not clever enough to originate such an astute policy, and that we have merely drifted before the wind into our present unforeseen position [on a lee-shore]. The very highest authorities have laid their case before me, in almost these words:

"When your cavalry rode into Cairo from Tel-el-Kebir, Egypt was *conquered* by England. We were at your mercy. You befriended us; and we were grateful. We were prepared to do your bidding in any form. But, you renounced all right of conquest; you asserted, that you only interfered with the desire to 're-establish the authority of the Khedive,' and that in a few weeks you would retire from Egypt.

"You have broken your promise. What reason

existed for binding yourselves by such declarations? We were at your feet.

"We cannot believe any further assurances, after our past experience. We confess to a bewilderment; and we cannot foresee our future. We are prepared to obey, and to submit to the power of England: but there is a lack of confidence among all classes of society. We simply implore England to tell us the real truth; and to terminate our anxiety, which cripples all our energies and paralyses all development: since, as matters stand, no person will risk his capital in any new undertaking.

"Tell us, we beseech you, to whom do we really belong? Are we subjects of the Khedive? If so, give him the power of control: at present he cannot bend his little finger. Or, are we subjects of the Sultan? If so, we shall fold our hands across our breasts, and, with a deep sigh, yield to destiny. Or, are we subjects of Queen Victoria? If you declare that we are British subjects, we shall acknowledge a momentary shock; but that will rapidly pass away: and we shall accept the position with a certain pride, that we are incorporated in the vast British Empire, and that, like the millions of India, we shall enjoy the rights and the security of British citizens.

"Only let us know, once and for all time, our true position; and relieve us from this miserable uncertainty." *

'I can assure you, that this is a close translation of the expressions made to myself by some of the highest personages in Egypt.

'During my visit to Egypt, last year, before the death of Mohammed Tewfik, I turned-over in my mind certain

* One is forcibly reminded, in this connection, of the poet's couplet, engraved upon a dog's-collar:

'I am his Highness's dog at Kew:
Pray tell me, Sir, whose dog are you?'

ideas: and these resolved themselves into a plan, which would, I believe, meet with no opposition in Egypt, and would give England a free-hand by abolishing the Capitulations.*

'It must be remembered, that England cannot expect to obtain the Sultan of Turkey's sanction to remain in Egypt unless she is prepared to accept a certain amount of responsibility.

'I would approach the Sultan upon the terms of the Cyprus Convention. By that Agreement, England occupies Cyprus under certain fixed conditions. She pays £92,000 annually [out of the Revenue of Cyprus] to the Sultan; and she is bound to defend Turkey by "force of arms," should Russia encroach in Asia Minor from Batum, Ardahan, or Kars. This engagement was made, in 1878, in order to obtain a *place d'armes* in such a position that the approach to Port Said could be commanded. At that time, the wildest dream would not have suggested the military occupation of Egypt by England; and consequently, the possession of the Suez Canal.

'I would propose to cancel the Cyprus Convention, on the condition, by treaty, that the island should never be transferred to any other Power. And I would suggest to the Sultan the following terms of a treaty that would transfer England from Cyprus to Egypt:

"I. England to guarantee the integrity of Egypt as a portion of the Ottoman Empire.

"II. England to guarantee the Debt of Egypt, and to reduce the interest to three per cent. (This reduction would save Egypt over a million Sterling, per annum.)

* All the European Powers possess Capitulations with Turkey, which are consequently binding upon Egypt, where they have been much abused by the Consular Body, and are not altogether in-line with modern ideas of civilization. At the same time, their total abolition would, in consequence of the long series of Treaties growing-out of them, appear to be impossible, except, it may be, under a transfer of suzerainty.

"III. Egypt to increase her Tribute to the Sultan by £270,000 yearly, to be obtained from the annual saving through the reduced interest upon her Debt. (This would raise the Tribute from £730,000 to £1,000,000. At present, the entire Tribute is hypothecated: it is therefore placed beyond the Sultan's reach; but the extra £270,000 would be actually *his own*, and would be a tempting inducement at the commencement of Diplomatic action.)

"IV. England to defend Egypt, in the event of invasion, by force of arms, in conjunction with the forces of the Sultan, which would be supplied on demand.

"V. In return for the assistance afforded by England, the Sultan to yield to Great Britain that portion of the Sudan extending between the Equator and the 20th degree of north latitude,* including the entire basin of the Nile, from 6 degrees west of the valley to and including the Red Sea Littoral: in other words, the entire Egyptian Sudan, now lost to Egypt."

'The increase of Tribute by £270,000 would not increase the burden of Egypt, as she would be saved, annually, after that payment, about £750,000, through the reduction of interest on her Debt. The entire Administration of Egypt would then be in the hands of Great Britain, by special treaty with, and under the sanction of, the Sultan. The Capitulations would cease to exist [with the consent of the Powers?] The surplus Revenue would be expended on irrigation-works, to extend the cultivable area of Egypt, instead of being

* This is about the latitude of the Third Cataract; whereas the natural and strategic frontier of Lower Egypt is the Second Cataract (Wadi Halfa).

locked-up by a transfer to the *Caisse de la Dette publique* as at the present day.*

'Should the position of England in Egypt be thus defined, and secured by Treaty with the Sultan, her right of Occupation would be unquestionable; confidence would be immediately established; and a new field would be opened, not only for British capital, but also for the British settler. The Nile affords the cheapest transport; the soil has always been Egypt's source of wealth: and the contemplated system of *barrages* would insure an unlimited supply of water, in addition to the undeniable advantage of the whole water-power of the river for working mills and every necessary requirement of machinery. With such a base, and with British influence in active operation at the Nile-sources [Uganda, etc.] the Central Sudan would quickly yield to the change of circumstances.

'The chief obstacle to the success of our operations in the Sudan has been the want of confidence in the native mind, occasioned by that fatal policy of retreat and evacuation. We cannot expect to gain faithful allies if they suspect us of desertion: they are well aware that, should we leave Egypt, they would become the first victims of a misplaced trust in the support of England. If, on the other hand, the Arab tribes are confident in the permanent occupation of the country by Great Britain, they would flock to our

* 'This [relief of taxation or fresh expenditure] is a question on which the best authorities are divided. But there is one point about which it would be difficult to have two opinions, and that is the claim of the Egyptian Government to dispose, with greater freedom than it at present possesses, of its surplus Revenue. The provisions of the Convention of London, which have the effect of obliging Egypt to pay twice over for new items of Expenditure, are utterly indefensible under existing conditions [1893]. . . . As things stand to-day, it would be immensely to the advantage of Egypt to accept a heavy annual charge for amortization, on condition of being free to deal with the rest of her Revenue as she pleased. Nothing could be fairer than such a proposal.'—*England in Egypt*, by Alfred Milner (pp. 267–8).

standard, when assured of our protection and of just government.

'I do not pretend to infallibility; and this outline of a Diplomatic scheme may be modified in regard to its details. My hair has whitened in Egyptian service, and in experience of the country—where my chief endeavour was to work for the interests of Egypt, at the same time that I sustained and advanced the influence of England. General Gordon, who succeeded me, was actuated by the same desire, and died in the hope that England would reach Khartum.

'This is a long letter to intrude on your leisure; but I write with no other object than to propose what I conceive to be a possible solution of a great difficulty. Should we retire from Egypt, all the good work that we have accomplished there would crumble into ruin within a short period of six months.'

Furthermore, Baker's views on this Question are amplified in the following letter to Mr. Moberly Bell:

'Bath: 4th April, 1890.

. . . 'As you know, I have never for one moment swerved from my opinion concerning the Sudan, since the first symptoms of disturbance in the Arabi movement. I am still of the same opinion: there cannot be a question concerning the necessity of the possession of Khartum and the Sudan by Egypt.*

'You know Egypt so intimately,† that you must be aware how unanimous the Egyptian authorities would be upon this point. The English people know nothing

* Lord Dufferin writes to Baker, under date 17th January, 1886: 'Everything in Egypt points to the fact, that you were perfectly right in deprecating the abandonment of Khartum. I am glad to think that my voice was also raised against that policy.'

† Mr. Moberly Bell is the author of *Khedives and Pashas* and *From Pharaoh to Fellah*. He was for many years correspondent of *The Times* in Egypt; and he resided in the country for nearly 25 years.

about it. . . . I have always declared, that a railway from Suakin, crossing the Atbara river, south of Berber (by a bridge combining the irrigation-principle of a *barrage*), and terminating above the last Cataract, above Shendi [100 miles from Khartum], would make the Sudan a mine of wealth: because it would bring an area of thirty million acres of the most fertile soil [Meroé, etc.] under cultivation; and supply England with cotton, thereby making her entirely independent of America.

'I don't believe in profitable results from Equatorial regions [British East Africa, etc.]. Savages won't work regularly; but Arabs will, as they are fond of dollars.

'You may remember my first Expedition (entirely at my own cost) from April, 1861, to September, 1865. . . . I thus traversed all the wonderful regions of fertility, where *dhurra* of the finest quality cost twelve *piastres* the *rachel* (of two *urdeps*), and cotton grew like a weed.

'I quite agree, that England should assist Egypt to regain Khartum and the Sudan. I wrote to Sir Evelyn Baring twelve months ago upon the question of a religious movement [by the Senussi, whose head-quarters are at the oasis of Jerbub, but who are inimical to Egypt, as well as to the Mahdiists] backed by the Khedive, by sending the highest *fikis* from Mecca to stir-up a counter-action against the Mahdi, and to split-up the Arab tribes. [This has already happened, by the natural disintegration of a Hierarchic rule that was, and is now to a greater degree, based upon oppression: as a result, the Jaalin tribe, from which the original Mahdi sprang, is wavering, while the Baggara Arabs—the chief supporters of the movement—are probably the only so-called Mahdiists who would not at the present day welcome the advent of British, though *not Egyptian*, suzerainty.] This, in my opinion, should be the first steps from Suakin [and Jerbub]. But a military force must be prepared, ready to advance when called-upon, in order to insure security

and protection to all those tribes which should join the Government. A proclamation should be issued, declaring the abolition of all taxes, and giving Home Rule to every tribe, the *shcikh* of which would pay merely a nominal tribute to Egypt. [In other words, the constitution of the Sudan as a congeries of tributary Native States—say, on the lines of Gordon's scheme, which was admirable, as far as it went.]

'With proper management, all this might readily be effected, provided the Arabs had implicit confidence in the official representatives. This is the great difficulty, as England has deceived them.

'I know the opinion of the British authorities so well, that it is quite hopeless to push them towards a military advance upon Khartum; but I think they might sanction the experiment of a religious movement [seeing that the Senussi* project has long been favourably entertained at Cairo]. The great danger is, that they would not be prepared for the absolute necessity of military support, without which no action of any kind can possibly succeed. You know what Orientals respect, and nothing else: FORCE.

. . . 'If the re-occupation of the Sudan, or at least of Khartum, is to be preached as a Crusade [or Crescentade], it must be managed with extreme delicacy.'

The Senussi, however, are Mohammedan reformers; and their zeal might lead them beyond the confines of the Sudan: their power is great; and they maintain intimate though scattered relationships with the whole of North Africa, and with many parts of Europe and Asia. Such a movement, therefore, once set in motion, might endanger many vested interests, notably those of

* *Vide*, an admirable account of the Senussi sect, its aims and its power, in *Blackwood's Magazine* for July, 1894.

the Ottoman Empire, and might tax all the strength of Great Britain to keep it within bounds. Consequently, since the Mahdiist movement has long since been at a standstill, and is crumbling to dust by reason of its inherent corruption, it would scarcely require so great and so uncontrollable a power as the Senussi to obliterate its remaining features. Moreover, it is useless to 'thrash a dead donkey.'

The following letter from Lord Cromer to Baker should inspire confidence in a good many of his countrymen who are under the impression, that the pacification, not to speak of the reconquest, of the Sudan is a subject the importance of which is not sufficiently realized by her Majesty's Government:

'Cairo: February 28th, 1889.

. . . 'I am pleased to think that your views about the Sudan coincide very nearly with my own and with the policy which is being pursued here.

'As regards the system of collecting taxes, this *was*, without doubt, a very potent cause of discontent, and contributed, with other causes, to bring about the rebellion against Egyptian authority. But this cause has long since ceased to exist: [there being no taxes to collect, in the Sudan].

'There is now no difficulty in ascertaining what the greater portion of the tribes really want. They want to be rid of *Dervish* domination, which they find much more oppressive than Egyptian rule, with all its defects. The remedy is, obviously, to come to terms with them, somewhat in the sense suggested by you. This is the policy which I have persistently advocated for a long time past—indeed, ever since I learnt of the Hicks'

disaster; and I think that it is now generally accepted by everyone who has paid attention to Sudan affairs. The whole difficulty consists in carrying it into execution. There is not, I fear, much chance of negotiating with the *Dervish* leaders; whilst the non-*Dervish* party, who are numerous, but from a military point of view less powerful than their opponents, naturally say: "Come and deliver us from the *Dervishes*, and we will then make any terms you like." The Egyptian Government cannot do this; and the British Government, for reasons that appear to me very valid, decline to employ British troops in the re-conquest of the Sudan.

'All we can do at present is to wait; and to take every opportunity of carrying into execution the policy you recommend. In time, it may be possible to carry it out. Osman Digna has retired from before Suakin [to seek fresh levies]. The *Dervish* rule appears to be becoming more and more unpopular, thus increasing the prospects of forming an effective anti-*Dervish* coalition. In the meantime, we hear of movements of one of Senussi's followers in the west [the attack on Wadai] which may eventually modify the situation in the Sudan considerably.

'There has been, from time to time, a good deal of wild talk about the Sudan: but the essential facts of the situation have always seemed to me to lie within a very small compass.'

Quite so: but those who wait for dead men's shoes, or even Arab sandals, may be disappointed to find others step into them. And it was precisely to provide against this danger that Baker so persistently urged her Majesty's Government to formulate a practical programme which might be carried-out at the first favourable opportunity, or, in the event of rival action on the part of European Powers, one that could be put into instant

execution, in order to save the Sudan for Egypt. Inalienable proprietary rights are apt to be disregarded with the lapse of time; and rights-of-way are created which grow rapidly into vested interests. If Egypt has definitely abandoned the Sudan, there is no reason why another Power should not take her place. If, on the other hand, she has not definitely abandoned the Sudan, then it becomes a nice question as to how long a truce other Powers will, or should, grant to her for the purpose of screwing-up sufficient courage for an attempt at re-conquest. Baker, himself, did not hesitate to say, that if Great Britain, on behalf of Egypt, should refuse the undertaking, he saw no reason why other Powers—notably Germany—should be discouraged from it. In fact, he could not understand why the dog-in-the-manger policy of 'waiting and watching' should be permitted to condemn the Sudanese tribes to the continued oppression of the Mahdiists, when, as all authorities admit, the majority of them would welcome almost any change of mastership.

In a letter to Sir Auckland Colvin, Baker says:

'16th February, 1889.

. . . 'I wish our Government would decide upon some tangible policy for Egypt. They never would believe me, in Gladstone's time, when I impressed upon them the fact, "that, if we abandon the Sudan, there can be no peace for Egypt." They have found it out now: and still we go on with the same disastrous policy of standing on the defensive. "Masterly inactivity" will never do in a struggle with Orientals. If you fight, you must conquer. If you conquer, you

must subdue. [If you run away, you are beaten.] To subdue, you must establish yourself to rule those against whom you have contended. Every advance has been followed by retreat, which is an inducement to the enemy to renew their attack.

. . . 'In one season the Sudan could be re-conquered; and the Arab tribes could be governed easily, by allowing them the same freedom as the independent States of India.

'One of the chief causes of revolt has been the suppression of the Slave Trade, coming on the top of a frightfully bad administration—which was simply pillage by the soldiers, made under the plea of collecting taxes. Personally, I think our interference with the Slave Trade a mistake in such countries as do not belong to England. All Africa is now of this opinion.'

Colonel (now General Sir H. H.) Kitchener, whose knowledge of the military position is perhaps unrivalled, expresses confidence in Baker's views regarding the re-conquest of the Sudan:

'Cairo: 1st May, 1892.

'I am immensely obliged to you for your Notes, which, no doubt, give the key to the whole question of the re-occupation of the Sudan. I only hope it may fall to my lot [as *Sirdar* in Egypt] to use your Notes, and to recover the country: there is no doubt that some day it must be accomplished.

'I wish something could be done to clear-up the Slavery question, which, I believe—now that the religious mania of Mahdiism is dying-out—is the main cause that prevents the Sudanese from driving-out their present oppressors. They dread the general freedom of slaves, which, they believe, would be bound to follow a re-occupation of the country.'

As to the *net* result of British interference in the Sudan, Baker expresses himself very forcibly

and lucidly in the following letter to Mr. Charles H. Allen, the Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society:

'Sandford Orleigh: 30th July, 1884.

'I regret that my absence from London will prevent me from attending the Anti-Slavery Jubilee [to celebrate the fiftieth Anniversary of the Abolition of Slavery in British Possessions]. At the same time I cannot believe that any one of her Majesty's Ministers would be willing to present himself before your Society in the present disgraceful position of the Sudan. [The Society, however, is non-political.]

'By the despotic order from the British Government to the Khedive, enforcing the abandonment of Khartum and of the Sudan *in toto*, a death-blow has been struck at all our efforts to suppress the Slave Trade. Not only is that horrible Traffic directly encouraged by such a policy, but the power of protection has been completely withdrawn from all those who had assisted in the good work of Gordon and myself; and the field has been triumphantly occupied by the wrong-doers. This has been the determined action of the British Government: to yield-up the fruits of the struggle to the victorious slave-hunters, and to vacate the contested battle-ground,—precisely as we retreated from the Transvaal before the stubborn Boers.

'I cannot conceive how Englishmen can hold-up their heads, and congratulate themselves, as Abolitionists, at an Anti-Slavery Jubilee. It appears to me to be rank hypocrisy. We not only have yielded all to the slave-hunting element in Central Africa, but we have abandoned Gordon to his fate. . . . With this horrible and disgraceful picture of cowardice and cant before me, I do not understand the meaning of a Jubilee in England.

'I regret, also, that, in the *Report* of the various endeavours to suppress the Slave Trade, there is no

mention whatever of his Highness, Ismail Pasha, the ex-Khedive. He was the first Oriental ruler who ever struck a decisive blow against the Slave Trade; and it must be remembered, that both Gordon and I were the Khedive's officers, and the credit of our work was due entirely to his Highness.'

This very characteristic protest sounds the key-note of Baker's *Nunc Dimittis*, when, during the last years of his life, he turned his face away from the desolate land in which he had spent the most vigorous and useful years of his manhood.


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CHAPTER XXVIII.

A POSTSCRIPT.

[1892–1893]

AFTER darkness, light: the years of gloom, of storm and stress under conditions of anarchy and divided counsels, have given birth to a new era of peace and prosperity for Egypt. The *pax Britannica*, which passeth all understanding, prevails in the Land of Paradox. The dominant cry is no longer 'Egypt for the Egyptians!' or even 'Egypt for the bondholders!': it is 'Egypt for Civilization!'—Egypt that shall be the connecting-link between West and East, in sympathy with both, deriving benefits from both, and thereby becoming internationalized.

This is not the place to show how honourably, and on the whole disinterestedly, Great Britain has retrieved her position as the guardian of Egypt. In the face of difficulties scarcely credible, and of opposition most unreasonable, she has raised Egypt to a position among the nations to which by herself alone she could never have attained; and, by her continued presence in Egypt, Great Britain guarantees that position. If,

however, the hand of the Architect were withdrawn, at the present juncture, the entire structure of Egyptian solvency and Egyptian integrity would, in the opinion of all experts—other than French, and a few representatives of the Pashalik—fall to the ground. This is the deliberate opinion of the chief Adviser of her Majesty's Government, to whom, more than to any other single individual, the prosperity of Egypt under British guidance is due: namely, Lord Cromer, who, in a letter to Baker, thus expresses his conviction:

'Cairo: 13th April, 1892.

'I am very glad to know that you agree with me, that the Sudan ought to be left alone for the present.

'There has certainly been great progress [in Egypt]; and, if the English nation be true to itself, and persevere in the work it has taken in hand, that work will be permanent. If, on the other hand, the work be prematurely abandoned, the whole edifice will tumble down like a child's house-of-cards.'

Of the continued advancement of Egypt there can now no longer be any doubt, provided Great Britain prove true to herself and to her engagements; but of the future of the Sudan, for which Great Britain is equally responsible, in spite of protestations to the contrary, grave apprehensions are felt in many quarters, that the policy of non-intervention, as at present pursued, may lead to a repetition of history. Egypt cannot dissociate herself from the Sudan, which, whether in the hands of a hostile Power or of irresponsible bandits, must be a constant menace to her: in a word, the integrity of Egypt remains incomplete without

the pacification of the Sudan. Time changes most things, but it does not affect general principles, of which none are truer, with regard to the development of nationalities, than these: (1) artificial frontiers are a cause of war; and (2) navigable rivers do not separate, but *unite*, peoples. And, although it is true that deserts are the most formidable barriers to migration and inter-communication, the deserts which interpose such obstacles in the valley of the Nile are not of a kind to prevent marauding Arabs from constantly threatening the peace of Lower Egypt, nor of an extent to bar the passage of troops sent-out against them.

The Pacification of the Sudan, whether by reconquest or by the arts of peace, is, therefore, an issue vital to Egypt. It is vital for two reasons: first, because Egypt owes her existence, and must look for her continued prosperity, to the river Nile, throughout its entire course from Source to Delta; and secondly, because military strategy, though satisfied with the defensible character of Wadi Halfa as the southern frontier, demands stronger guarantees for the immunity of Egypt from invasion than those presented by a turbulent and warlike people, who, under the guidance of a hostile European Power, might readily become a formidable enemy. Both these considerations deserve a few words of comment.

As matters stand, Egypt is able to defend her southern frontier, though at considerable cost, against any Native coalition. But, considering

the progress and tendencies of the partition of Africa among the European Powers, it is rational to assume, and it would be folly to deny the fact, that the Sudan cannot long remain a No-Man's-Land. Sooner or later, in defiance of Treaties or by reason of such documents, the Sudan, if left unoccupied by Egypt, will be annexed by one or other of the European Powers. What, then, would be the position of Egypt?

In the first place, a European Power in possession of the Upper Nile would seek to develop the resources of the country by extensive irrigation in time of peace, thereby crippling the water-supply of Egypt: whilst, in the event of hostilities, she would be in a position to cut-off that supply entirely or to flood Egypt at her pleasure, merely by erecting regulating-sluices across the outlet of the Victoria Nyanza. In fact, as Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff, our highest authority on the subject of Irrigation in Egypt, remarked in a recent lecture at the Royal Institution: 'The civilised possessor of the Upper Nile Valley holds Egypt in his grasp'* In, perhaps, a lesser degree, any European Power in the basin of the Blue Nile might, by diverting the course of the Atbara towards the Red Sea (a scheme which, we confess, is very problematical, and, even if practicable, would be very costly to effect), or by otherwise tampering with it, seriously endanger the first principle of Egyptian agriculture: since, with-

* *The Times*, 26th January, 1895.

out the rich alluvial deposits of that river, the soil of Egypt would become sterile.

In the second place, as regards the safety of Egypt from invasion, a distinguished British officer, who has held high commands in that country and whose experience extended over a considerable number of years, writes to us as follows:

'Egypt has no frontier to the South except Wadi Halfa, which commands the Nile. To the east and west of it are extensive deserts leading far into the very heart of Egypt, which frequently have been used by the *Dervishes* for the purpose of making raids and even for more important movements. It is true, that these attempts at aggression have one and all been checked, and the enemy driven back with loss; but, if Khartum were in the hands of a European Power, who would naturally utilise the splendid fighting-power of the *Dervishes*, backed-up by European troops, science, and the appliances of modern warfare, the safety of Egypt would be seriously endangered.'

The Power which controls the *régime* of the Nile as a river-system, and the Power which controls the warlike people of the Sudan, is, in short, physically and politically, the arbiter of Egypt's destiny.

'The great question,' says Baker in a letter to Major Wingate, giving an account of an interview he had had, in May, 1892, with *Z*ubeir, 'is to gain the confidence of all such people. This cannot be done by a *coup-de-main*: it can only be effected by personal influence. If they learn to trust implicitly to your word, they become most faithful; but if they have the slightest suspicion that they are only to be made use of, as cat's-paws, they quickly make use of you: and in the end it is they who win the game.'

It was by personal influence alone that Emin Pasha held for many years, throughout the whole period of the Mahdiist revolt, and for long after, the Province of Hat El Istiva (= Equator), with the government of which Gordon had entrusted him. With its fall, Egypt lost her last hold on the Sudan, or at least her last legitimate footing.

The so-called relief of Emin Pasha is an affair of yesterday. Baker followed Stanley's efforts with interest and admiration. When grave doubts were publicly expressed as to the safety of the Expedition, he professed full confidence in its ultimate success, remembering that he, too, and Lady Baker, not to speak of other African explorers, had, in past years, been 'massacred' by a sensational newspaper-press. Like others, he had some difficulty in understanding the real objects of the Expedition, or why it should have taken so circuitous and difficult a path to attain them. To him, as to others, Emin was a 'mystery': but he could not regard with equanimity the loss of the Equatorial Province. As General Kitchener wrote to him:

'Cairo: 22nd Nov., 1889.

'I knew you would feel keenly the loss of the Equator. It seems difficult to understand exactly what happened: but I am afraid Emin allowed discipline to get very slack amongst his troops; and a sort of mutiny was the precursor of the Mahdiist invasion. I wrote, when at Zanzibar in 1885–1886, that what Emin wanted was *officers and rifles*.'

Precisely; that was all he wanted: munitions of war, to protect himself against invasion; reliable

officers to assist him in the administration of the Province; and a safe road to the *East* Coast. Cast-off by Egypt, with no means to pay his soldiers, surrounded by enemies, secret and open, he nevertheless maintained his position on the Upper Nile for about ten years. What wonder, then, when all hope of relief appeared to be gone, and the Mahdiists renewed their attack, that mutiny at last got the upper-hand? Had Emin received in time the support for which he had so long and so fervently prayed, the Equatorial Province would have owned as master the hand that succoured it. In spite of the disparagement so commonly cast upon him, the fact remains that, by personal influence alone and by an administration that was as rigorous as his miserable circumstances permitted him to enforce, Emin Pasha was the last Egyptian Governor in the Sudan to fall before the wave of anarchy that swept away every vestige of Pasha-rule. He alone, and the remnant who held faithful to him, escaped the fate of thousands of victims, and maintained their position at the most advanced Egyptian out-post, under conditions scarcely less difficult to meet and no less honourable to support than those which Gordon himself experienced at Khartum. His name was equally deserving of the highest honour: but it has been riddled with ridicule, against which he did not condescend to defend himself.

After Emin reached Bagamoyo, in the train of his triumphant rescuers, he wrote to Baker:

'Bagamoyo: 1st April, 1890.

'DEAR SIR,

'If only to-day I am able to acknowledge the receipt of your very kind note, I trust you will forgive me, severe illness being the cause of my delay. Now that I am able to move again, it is my first and most grateful duty to address those kind friends who enquired after me. As I always had the greatest admiration for the splendid work you did in our Provinces, and as I had the privilege of following your tracks through comparatively remote countries,—Latuka, for instance,—I was most naturally delighted to have some lines first from you. You were not forgotten amongst my men, who never wearied of telling their young comrades the story of Sir Samuel (as they call you) and of his daring feats. In Unyoro, also, you are always remembered: and many times old Rionga, whose country has been annexed by Kabréga, and even this latter, have spoken to me about you. If I may be permitted to revive the impression your work made on me, I should say: it is a pity you did not stop some years longer in Africa.

'I feel deeply obliged for your kind invitation to come and see you; and I should feel proud to be permitted to do so. I fear, however, such pleasure will not fall to my lot. Things here have taken such a different turn from what I fondly hoped [when he wrote repeatedly to Dr. Felkin, asking for British help], that I am obliged to look-out for some opening: and a visit to England will therefore scarcely be possible; although many kind friends have asked me to come, and I was accustomed to look to England as my adopted home [being discarded by Egypt, and not being fully aware, whilst at Wadelai, of the new-born colonizing zeal of his own countrymen]. The day will come, I hope, when I shall be permitted to see it.

'May I ask you to pay my deepest respects, and to give my kindest regards, to Lady Baker. The natives of Unyoro have very often spoken to me of "the Morning Star," as they call her up to this day; and my men were

delighted in sounding her praises as a kind intermediary between yourself and their duty.* At M'tesa's, I saw a picture of Lady Baker and yourself, taken from *The Albert Nyanza*—and M'tesa told me you had sent it to him.

. . . 'You are quite right in supposing the Danagla to have counted for something in the revolt of my men.† Ten officers (Egyptian), forced upon me by Abd El Kader Pasha (not your Abd El Kader), and the Danagla, had secret correspondence with the Mahdiists; and did not like—as they expressed it—to be sold to the English.

'I dare not tire you any more. Permit me again to express to you my sincerest thanks; and let me hope you will not forget,

'Yours very faithfully,

'DR. EMIN.'

Such a letter as the above does not lend support to the charge so constantly levelled against him of his ingratitude for favours bestowed. Indeed, Emin Pasha was a much-maligned man, and was totally misrepresented in the country to which he had always looked as his 'adopted home,' the language of which he had studied to such good purpose:

'I cannot help thinking,' wrote Baker, in a letter to Mr. Douglas Murray, commenting on that which he had received from Emin, 'that some unfortunate misunder-

* Some of these men told Mr. Jephson, on the occasion of his visit to the Equatorial Province, how delighted they were to receive news of Sir Samuel and Lady Baker. 'We don't care for Gordon or Emin,' they said: 'Baker is our man. When he fought, he was always to the front; when he fired, he never missed: he was indeed a man! If we did not obey orders, he shook us: then our teeth dropped-out.'

† We are not aware what opinion Baker expressed to Emin; but writing on the same subject to Stanley, he said: 'I am much distressed that Emin has lost the Equatorial Province. I fully expect that the Hotteria (Irregulars) revolted. These fellows are nearly all Danagla,—the most intriguing set of scoundrels: and if they thought the Mahdi's forces would reach Wadelai, they would certainly join them.'

standing has taken place; and that Emin has been placed in an awkward position. . . . What can have changed his determination [to look to England as his adopted home]? The situation requires some explanation; as I cannot conceive any man having behaved in the manner reported of him, respecting the distribution at Zanzibar of leaflets offensive to our representative.'

Then, with regard to the Colonial rivalry between Great Britain and Germany in East Africa, Baker goes on to say:

'If England and Germany are to race for acquired territory in Africa, there will be complications. I think we should arrange a *joint*-expedition with Germany; and send out a steamer of 200 tons for the Victoria Nyanza. A Joint-Commission, representing the two Powers, should then navigate and survey the entire Lake; and amicably arrange boundaries for this gigantic robbery of territory. Four Maxim guns on the steamer would be their passport. If the boundaries are thus determined, all friction will disappear for a certain number of years.

'The Germans [who promptly engaged Emin's services] will beat us to a certainty: as they will support their representative, tooth and nail.

'Our Government is quite certain to give-way, should Germany *insist*: they will never honestly support any British enterprise, whether through a Company or an individual. I pity any Company [*pace*, the British East Africa Company] or person who trusts to the support of a British Government! We may swagger over Portugal; but we should eat humble-pie from Germany, France, or Russia.'

Baker, for reasons that are not very clear, was a very luke-warm supporter of chartered enterprise in Africa, at the same time that he acknowledged —indeed pointedly emphasized—the shortcomings of the British Government in advancing national

interests. 'All these African Companies,' he said, in a letter (16th August, 1892) to Major Wingate, 'will come to grief. I have always predicted this: and they are hurrying towards the bitter end. The Arab combination against the Congo State is a serious forerunner of future complications.' But perhaps he was thinking, in particular, of the British East Africa Company, which, deserted by the Government, was at that time engaged in a hot race with Germany, for Uganda as the prize, and for bankruptcy as the guerdon.

To Mr. Moberly Bell, Baker expressed his opinion of this hapless contest, the need for which was shortly after removed by Diplomatic action:

'Bath: 1st May, 1893.

'I felt sure that the British East Africa Company was racing with Germany for *Hinterland*, when their policy should have been to crawl forward by slow degrees: as the first steps of such a Company should be cautious and tentative.

'I think Lord Rosebery has been wise in sending Sir Gerald Portal to Uganda [to report on the situation, and to set-up a working administration]; but the ideas of African potentates, when making "treaties," are always the same: you are expected to fight their enemies, and to supply your allies with arms and ammunition. These will be turned against you on the first disagreement.

'If we are in alliance with Uganda, we must extend our influence and "treaties" to Unyoro; and we must re-occupy the Albert Nyanza, and all the country which I annexed to Egypt, even to Lado—now said to be in possession of the Belgian Expedition (by what right, I cannot conceive!). *The whole of the Central African Question should depend upon our policy in Egypt.* [The italics are ours. Baker, of course, refers exclusively to the problem

of Uganda and British East Africa.] If we settle-down at the head-waters of the Nile, we command Egypt; and a *barrage* at a narrow pass, where the Nile cuts through a rocky defile only eighty yards in width, below the exit from the Albert Nyanza, would raise the level of the great reservoir of the Nile [the Albert Nyanza] by fifty feet, and entirely control the water-supply of Egypt.' [*Vide ante*, page 365.]

To Stanley he wrote (25th May 1890), regarding the total absence of any apparent policy in Africa:

'England is a queer country, as you are well aware: great in many things, but always too late for action. There should be a well-concerted plan, thoroughly determined, for an African policy. Instead of this, we vacillate and procrastinate, while the Germans march forward.'

The result of Sir Gerald Portal's *Report* was the declaration of a British Protectorate over Uganda, within territorial limits which had, as everyone expected, to be immediately enlarged, and under conditions which render such a Protectorate futile and dangerous in the absence of the only means by which it could be rendered safe and remunerative—namely, by the construction of a railway between Mombasa and the high-plateau, if not to the Lake itself.

Whilst the question of retirement from Uganda was being discussed by the Press in condemnatory terms and being coquetted-with by her Majesty's Government for purposes of their own, Baker wrote to Major Wingate:

'Sandford Orleigh: 20th August, 1892.

'It is difficult to offer an opinion worth having upon a retreat from Uganda. I never could understand what

right we had to go there. We certainly had no right to Unyoro: as I myself annexed it to Egypt, and took steamers out for the Albert Nyanza. The steamers belonged to the Khedive, and are there still.

. . . 'The possession of Uganda and Unyoro would, in my opinion, be absolutely useless to any Power that does not possess Egypt. [One cannot sufficiently emphasize this fact, which is far from being recognized as it should be: but we forbear from italics.] With steamers on the Lakes and on the White Nile—exactly as I originally planned, and carried-out—a direct communication was established with Khartum; and the cost of transport was trifling. The basin of the Nile *in its entirety* belonged to Egypt, as it evidently should do.

'Our action will [or should] depend upon British policy in Egypt. We have no right to allow any encroachment upon the basin of the Nile by France or any other Power. On the other hand, the Powers may say, "It was *England* who forced the abandonment of the Sudan upon Egypt: if you *abandon*, you cannot at the same time claim possession." The whole affair is, in fact, plunged into an anomalous position, through our ridiculous policy of Sudan abandonment. If we intend to remain in Egypt, as a Protectorate, it will be worth our while to create a policy for Uganda and Unyoro; but if we are going to "scuttle," then the less we have to do with any Equatorial possessions in Africa, the better it will be for the British tax-payer. It is all very well for enthusiasts to declare that coffee, &c., may be grown there; but the natives *won't work!* Therefore, improvements upon an extended scale must remain impossible.

'My opinion is, that the Arabs will settle the matter by raising the native kings and chiefs against the Europeans; and that the missionaries will be exterminated, if left to themselves, unaided. I believe thoroughly in the ultimate success of the Arab "traders," "slave-hunters," "ivory-hunters,"—or whatever other name they may assume. These people are indefatigable; and combine

a power of intrigue with great courage and audacity, which has always prevailed against the natives, who do not appreciate European methods. As to Christianity! the name is profaned by coupling it with the Negro.

'All these Companies expect financial success: but, instead of confessing this, they advance under the high-sounding names of Christianity, Suppression of the Slave Trade, and *Civilization*. They will end in ruin,—to the natives and to themselves.'

On the death of Sir William Mackinnon, the principal founder and the President of the British East Africa Company, Baker wrote to Mr. Douglas Murray:

'Sandford Orleigh: 14th August, 1893.

'Poor Sir W. Mackinnon is a sad loss. I can thoroughly appreciate the disappointment and mind-weariness that must have overpowered his strength. He had built-up an imaginary empire, which was, in fact, a *château en Espagne*. The ruin was real, however.

'As you know, I always foresaw a collapse of the first attempt to introduce a practical, *paying* wedge into the heart of Tropical Africa.'

With regard to the projected railway from Halfa to Shendi, Baker once wrote to Gordon:

'Sandford Orleigh: 5th May, 1878.

. . . 'I should like to know what you think of Fowler's railway to Shendi?

'It has always struck me, that the expense of so long a line without any Branch-traffic would be a great objection. The last year's bad Nile reminded me of my plan for creating a series of weirs, so as to *bury* the Cataracts below the increased level of the water. This would render the Nile navigable by locks and water-gates at each weir; at the same time, from high-levels, the water could be led into natural depressions in the desert, and confined by dams: so as to ensure a supply for

Lower Egypt (as did Lake Mœris, in ancient days). Such a work would be far less costly than a railway, and would at the same time bring vast areas of the desert into value by the deposit of mud. At present the Khedive's finances are at a low ebb; but should confidence be established, the work could be accomplished by a public company. All the fertile area of the Sudan, from Kassala and Gadarif to the Blue Nile, must remain undeveloped until a regular line of communication shall have been established.'

A few months later, he wrote to Gordon on the same subject:

'Cairo: 16th Dec., 1878.

. . . 'I hear, among the changes that have taken place is the stoppage of Fowler's line of railway to the Sudan. It has often occurred to me that a railway for locomotive-engines is too expensive for the resources of such a poor country, especially by the Nile-route of enormous length and desert, with a sparse population. I should have made a simple tramway of light steel-rails, similar to those used in mines; and I should have drawn my train of light waggons by camels, between Berber and Suakin. [Baker consistently advocated the Suakin-Berber route, in preference to the Nile-route, for opening-up the Sudan to commerce. But the Egyptian Authorities naturally preferred the latter route: since, by the former, the diversion of traffic would not benefit Lower Egypt to the same extent.]

'As you are aware, there are three routes from Suakin to Berber, one of which offers no obstacles to engineering that cannot be overcome with slight expenditure, if mining rails and small waggons are used. The chief difficulty would be that of bridging the very numerous *khors*, some of which, although very small, become torrents of magnitude during the few heavy rainstorms of the season. This would be serious for an ordinary

locomotive line'; but for a light tramway there would be one-tenth the expense and risk.

'Without some means of transport, I feel sure the Sudan can never be developed. The immense cotton-producing power must remain as a sealed book. Altogether, the question of development is one of extreme difficulty. Europeans die; natives cannot be trusted; whilst money and outlay are absolutely necessary. Where is the money to come from? . . . Until confidence is restored in Egyptian affairs, no one will invest money in any public undertaking: therefore, the country remains at a dead-lock for the present.' . . .

It remained for British financiers and British administrators to show, that Egypt herself has ample internal resources with which to meet any pressing demands for public works. From no department of the British Administration has Egypt derived greater benefits, and in none can she more profitably invest a part of her surplus Revenue, than in that concerned with the irrigation of the Nile-lands and Delta: thus, the new scheme of a *barrage* and reservoir at Assuan, providing for the state of the river at all seasons, has not been pigeon-holed for want of funds. But all talk of a railway to the Sudan is out of place until the question has been decided as to who shall be the future masters of the country? This is a subject which cannot be shelved for an indefinite period. At any moment it may become a pressing question: and it would certainly be easier to answer it now rather than a few years hence, when France shall have obtained vested interests in Central Africa, very difficult and perhaps impossible to over-ride.

CHAPTER XXIX.

QUESTIONS OF THE DAY.

BAKER'S interest in Public Affairs was by no means confined to Africa. All national and Imperial questions appealed to his love of country. He was a patriot in the true sense of the word: for he was willing to make any self-sacrifice in order to ensure, not only the inviolability of British shores from foreign invasion, but also of every national and Imperial interest beyond the Seas. He regarded the invincible supremacy of British sea-power as affording the only basis for the strategic defence of the Empire, long before Captain Mahan impressed this maxim upon the intelligence of the masses. His loyalty and his enthusiasm took little account of the public discussion of subjects which interest Federationists; but led him to accept their general principles as being practically upheld by the union that obviously exists between the scattered forces of the Empire. His practical mind induced him to pay attention to the first line-of-defence rather than to less apparent dangers, arising from questions that have never been seriously asked: in a word, he accepted the loyalty of the Colonies to the mother-country as a fact sufficiently proved.

With Home Politics he did not very closely concern himself, except in their broad, national issues. Though an ardent Tory, the strife of Parties, for Party-ends, rarely claimed his partisanship. Occasionally, he delivered speeches and wrote letters to the newspapers in support of Conservative doctrines; but at no time does he appear to have seriously entertained the prospect of a Parliamentary career: as a man of action, he had little sympathy for campaigns of verbiage. Moreover, he objected to what he termed 'the nocturnal habits of the bat and owl, combined.' Writing to Lord Wharncliffe, on the 11th December, 1881, he said:

'I share deeply the humiliation of our unfortunate country. There is a Radical sentiment abroad which is quite un-English; and nothing but some grave national disaster will awaken men's minds to the true position. London always disagrees with me: otherwise I would stand as Conservative for some borough, and throw my spear into the fight.'

Details of Naval, Military, and Colonial organization and administration were passed under review by his busy pen, whenever he wrote to friends whom he knew to be interested in these matters, or to the public prints when such subjects were being discussed by them. Responsible Ministers, too, frequently had the benefit of his advice.

Baker's opinions on the Eastern Question and British Imperial Policy, generally, having been outlined in former chapters, there remain a few side-issues and questions of detail for which we

may claim the attention of the reader. The only subject in Domestic Politics to which we need refer is that of Home Rule for Ireland.

'The Constitution of Great Britain is a mixture of Aristocracy, Democracy, and Hypocrisy' was a libellous statement, by a lady-student of New York, which Baker quoted in one of his Political Addresses. On this and many subsequent occasions he raised his voice against the shallow subterfuge of a certain Political Party which endeavours to reconcile its programme of Home Rule for Ireland with the national needs of the so-called United Kingdom. He could not, of course, understand how the stability of the Empire could be upheld, if one of the corner-stones were removed, or even temporarily replaced by one of less durable quality: in fact, he had no sympathy with the jerry-builders. His interest in the Irish Question led him to enquire, how it was 'that Ireland was more difficult to govern than any other portion of the British Empire?' And, in order to answer that question—together with its corollary, Is it the fault of England?—he commenced, but left unfinished, an enquiry into the past relations between the two countries. Into this academic labyrinth—which he entitled *Outlines of Irish History*—we need not follow him. His views on the broad aspects of the Irish Question are stated with sufficient force in the following general summary:

'Although Great Britain rules a vast Colonial Empire, and somewhat intermeddles with the administration

of other countries, the remark is made by strangers: "If she can thus rule the savage and the civilized in far-distant lands, why cannot she govern Ireland, close to her shores?"

'At the present stage of English History we acknowledge, that the great military strength of European States necessitates a general Federation [or Confederation] of the British Colonial Empire throughout the world; and that the firm cohesion of the various units will constitute a Power capable of defying any probable hostile coalition. Notwithstanding this accepted fact, there are Englishmen who would actually propose, instead of cohesion, a general dislocation of the Empire, by the establishment of a separate Parliament in Ireland, which must inevitably lead to separation,—to be followed by other portions of the Empire, through the force of example and by the contagious process of disintegration.

'Throughout the course of Irish History, we have seen the people turbulent among themselves, difficult to govern, prone to agitation and intrigue, and chronically hostile to this country. There have been faults on both sides: but England forgets her wrongs: by Ireland these are never forgiven, nor forgotten. We have thus to face a difficulty: that, no matter what may be the form of Government, Ireland will remain as Ireland, and will never become incorporated (like Scotland) in what Mr. Gladstone calls "the union of hearts" with England. If she were to obtain a separate Parliament, she would become a separate country, torn by conflicting factions between the North and South, and "a thorn in the flesh" of England. She would repeat the past: and intrigue with our enemies in time of war, causing more disquietude to our country than an openly hostile Power. The poor would be separated from the rich: there would be neither capital nor confidence, in Ireland.

'In fact, such a separation would weaken every link in the vast chain of our Possessions. Our great Colonies would no longer be proud of a Mother verging upon

imbecility: they would assert their independence, and abandon her. As America shook-off the British yoke, so also would Canada, Australia, and the Indian Empire be shaken in their allegiance. The grand fabric that has been erected by the valour and perseverance of Englishmen, in the last century, would, in short, be over-turned.

'There is a character in Englishmen that binds all men together when menaced by a common danger: we sink our minor differences, and unite to uphold the interests of our country. The two great Parties of the State—the Liberal and the Conservative—have joined in the "union of hearts," under the name of Unionists.'

With less important subjects of British Domestic Policy we need not concern ourselves.

Baker's travels in India, during seven visits (1879–92), led him to take a close personal interest in the administration and defence of our great Eastern Dependency. As regards its internal administration, he had no patience with those faddists whose imperfect acquaintance with the character of Orientals inspires the advocacy of sentimental measures that, however well-intentioned, are liable to weaken the hold of the Sovereign Power. He was in favour of a robust paternal government for the natives of India: to admit them to equal rights with Europeans, was, in his opinion, to insert the thin end of a wedge which, on being thrust home to its logical conclusion, would overthrow the prestige of Great Britain. Caste-prejudices cannot be overcome by a vote of Parliament: but all Orientals bow to an irresistible Domination, any failure in the exercise of which is regarded by them as a sign of inherent weakness. Baker, himself, was convinced that, sooner or

later, Great Britain must fight for her permanent position in India, upon the issue of which her existence as an Imperial Power would depend. But he looked for invasion from the north, and not for disruption from within. Our Frontier-policy failed, he thought, in so far as it was, and is, too strictly defensive and inactive: he was for a forward policy, and for seizing every strategic advantage that should guarantee the integrity of our Indian Empire: and so avert war, rather than court it.

In short, Baker was not the man to shirk the responsibilities of Empire: these never frightened him, as they do the Little Englanders. In Further India, he viewed with equanimity, not unmixed with satisfaction, the annexation (or, as he must have regarded it, the absorption) of Burma. Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy, wrote to him:

'17th January, 1886.

'I am glad you approve of our Burma Expedition. Prendergast deserves great credit for the way in which he managed it. We knew all along, that, after he had taken possession of the river and the capital, many troubles, unexpected by the outside world, would begin to embarrass us. It took two years before Lower Burma, after its conquest, was quieted; and the races of Upper Burma are braver and more lawless than their southern neighbours.

'I am now on my way to Delhi; but, immediately after seeing our army there, I am off to Burma with my wife, in order to determine on the spot what will be the best *régime* for the future. Unfortunately, we have to take into account external as well as purely domestic considerations in dealing with this question.'

This letter appears to have elicited from Baker a reply, not in our possession, in which he expressed his views regarding the pacification of the conquered country: for, a few months later, Lord Dufferin refers to the subject:

'Simla, 14th Oct., 1886.

'Your plan for Burma would have answered admirably, if there had been any chief, or Territorial aristocracy, or party-leaders: but our great difficulty has arisen from the fact of the whole population being like a disintegrated heap of sand, without any commanding influences to hold them together. We tried at first to rule them pretty much in the way you describe, through such leaders as appeared to exist; but we soon found that they had no real influence. Most of the *dacoit* chiefs are merely wandering robbers, preying upon their own countrymen rather than attacking us. However, the plan you propose is the very one we intend to pursue in regard to the Shan States, as these possess a *régime* which, I trust, will render its application quite feasible.'

Baker's first visit to India was in the winter of 1879–1880, on the occasion of his journey round the world. Whilst at Simla, he received the following letter from Gordon, who was at that time engaged in a pacific mission of his own to China:

'Tien-tsin: 4th August, 1880.

. . . 'I hope you will come on to China, with ears open, and give these people an idea of what they should do. You ought to come here at once. India is a *pays épuisé*.

'We shall meet, I have no doubt. I do not mean to stay in China for more than four months: since I foresee I cannot do any good. You will like Li Hung

Chang: he is a splendid Barbarian, and likes to hear the truth.*

. . . 'Your ideas of India quite coincide with mine. . . . India has been a Capua to England: and a wretched Capua it is!

'Kind regards to Lady Baker and yourself. Come on to China at once. You are wasted there [in India]: for you will speak out.'

Baker did, almost immediately after receiving this letter, visit China; but he does not appear to have closely interested himself in the internal or external affairs of that country. After a stay of two months, chiefly in the Treaty Ports, he went on to Japan, from whence he wrote to Mr. Douglas Murray:

'Yokohama: 18th March, 1881.

'It is expected that China and Japan are going to war. This will be like the quarrel of a couple of tea-pots: both will be cracked by the collision.'

[The greater portion of this letter, however, deals with a totally different question:]

. . . 'Like almost everything else, this South African business has been full of mismanagement: and I much fear the result, if timid counsels prevail. I think the annexation of the Transvaal was unjust; and there can be no doubt, that we should not have persisted in the act, if we could have foreseen an armed resistance. This was cowardly. The only justification for our interference in the Transvaal would have been through a plebiscite

* On the 6th August, Colonel Gordon writes: 'The only thing that keeps me in China is Li Hung Chang's safety: if he were safe, I would not care; but some people are egging him on to rebel, some to this, and some to that; and all appears in a helpless drift. There are parties in Pekin who would drive the Chinese into war for their own ends.' [The majority, headed by Prince Chun, were for war; the peace-party was headed by Prince Kung and Li alone.]—*Events in the Life of Charles George Gordon*, pp. 148–9.

favourable to our rule. We have now, as usual, commenced with the stereotyped error of despising the enemy.

'In the *Pall Mall Budget* of 21st January, it is written: "Can anybody really believe in his heart that our flag has been disgraced, or our military honour tarnished, because a handful of farmers have caught a detachment in an ambush? England has not sunk quite so low in the world as that!" It is precisely this sort of writing that exemplifies our errors. In the American Revolt, which terminated in the successful War of Independence, the "handful of farmers" (all good rifle-shots) were victorious. A "handful of farmers" have now destroyed Sir George P. Colley's detachment, thus heaping defeat upon disaster: but probably the writer above quoted and others who think like him cannot perceive, that "our military honour has been tarnished."' . . .

Baker then proceeded to elaborate a scheme of Confederation, in which Holland (not the Boers) bore a prominent part; but the present political situation in South Africa renders the publication of such a scheme superfluous.*

The topics which, next to Egypt and the Sudan, Baker chiefly discussed in the correspondence-columns of the newspaper-press, were those concerning the Navy, maritime defence and strategy. His frequent periodic outbursts of indignation must have fallen upon the ears of a distressed Admiralty like so many minute-guns. No department of their work escaped his scrutiny. He wrote with considerable knowledge of his subject, and with a freedom of expression that would have been reprehensible in an official, though permissible to an independent critic who took

* It was published at the time in more than one English newspaper.

things seriously. That Great Britain should risk her very existence as a first-class Power for fear of adding an occasional penny to the Income-Tax, was a proposal that struck him as being both illogical and short-sighted. Writing to Mr. Moberly Bell, he says:

'26th November, 1893.

'I would go in at once for [a Naval Defence Loan of] sixty millions, and a twopenny Income-Tax, to be reduced in twenty years. I would lay an embargo upon all vessels now built, or building, in private yards for Foreign Governments; and purchase for the Navy all that should be selected by a Committee of experts nominated for that purpose. We did this in 1878; and I believe I was the first to suggest the step, in a letter which I wrote upon the subject to *The Times*. We then bought the *Independencia* (now *Neptune*) from the Brazilian Government; and the present *Sultan*, *Superb*, etc., from Turkey.

. . . 'There are many ways of raising the money in this country of enormous wealth, provided that our Government will act without delay and with determination. . . . I regard it as a question of national existence; not one of politics.'

'27th November, 1893.

'Your finance is better than mine. Since I wrote, last night, I have been looking into your figures; and I think *you* should propose the plan. If a Naval Defence Loan of thirty millions were raised upon a penny-in-the-pound Income-Tax, specially devoted to ship-building and armament—but quite independent of all other Naval Expenditure—the system might be carried-out, consecutively, from 1894–1895 (thirty millions) to 1896–1897 (thirty millions). This would make an Income-Tax of one penny up to the end of 1895; and twopence to the end of 1897. The Sinking Fund would apply equally, to pay-off in twenty years two thirty-million Loans [bearing interest

at three per cent.]. . . . This plan would enable England to employ all the private yards and the Government Dockyards to produce a great fleet in 1894–1897; and in less than four years we should have a Navy that would surpass those of all maritime Powers.

'Lord Charles Beresford suggests that we should spend twenty millions in building. . . . I would urge a much larger programme; and let the world know, that England was determined to be supreme.'

Writing to Lord Wharncliffe, Baker propounds a scheme that is now partially covered by the system under which armed cruisers, belonging to the great steamship-lines, are placed at her Majesty's disposal in time of war:

'13th June, 1888.

'I have a scheme for the organization of the Mercantile Marine for purposes of self-defence, to render them independent of her Majesty's vessels in time of war. The Article will appear in the July Number of the *National Review*. I would raise a most formidable Mercantile Marine (Navy) through the organization of all the principal steamship-companies during peace: so that they should be ready as ships-of-war, immediately, by telegraphic orders, in every portion of the globe.

'The plan is too long to explain by letter; but the outline is this:

"1. All crews to be British, instead of partly Lascars, as at present.

"2. Every steamer to be armed, and thoroughly equipped—as 'letters-of-marque' were in the last century.

"3. Each Company to be subsidized, according to number and size of vessels.

"4. All Companies to arm their own vessels with guns of pattern and calibre determined by the Admiralty.

"5. A special Code of Instructions to be framed for the guidance of the Mercantile Navy, as ships-of-war,—the ships bearing a special flag, to distinguish their character."

'By adopting such an arrangement, we should provide a fleet of two hundred steamers, armed with five- and six-inch breech-loading guns, that would (in time of war) sail in squadrons from India and China, and defy any of the enemy's cruisers. Most of the steamers would carry eight or ten five-inch guns; and the smallest would carry six guns with ease.

'Such an organization would relieve the Queen's ships from duty in protecting our commerce; and the Mercantile Marine, already superior in speed to most vessels of her Majesty's Service, would be effective, not only for defence, but also for offence, when called upon.'

Baker's fertility of resource was surprising: he was a born organizer and administrator. The following letter, addressed to Lord Wharncliffe, is the last we shall quote under this section:

'Sandford Orleigh: 12th Sept., 1875.

. . . 'We spent last week very agreeably at Plymouth, on a visit to Sir H. and Lady Keppel.

'I went over the *Iron Duke* and a number of other Naval monsters. I cannot help thinking, that every one of our huge ironclads should always be attended by two vessels—*i.e.*, light but powerful and immensely fast rams of about 1,500 tons. These attendant bull-dogs would be "the hounds" of the ironclad: to worry an enemy, and to rush down and ram her directly the big ship should engage her attention.

'The question of raising the *Vanguard* is most interesting. I have submitted an idea to Sir H. Keppel, which perhaps may be practicable. It appears that the divers can work under-water for five hours. I would thus thoroughly secure the doors and slides of all the

water-tight compartments of the vessel. These would then represent cases filled with water. I would then drill screw-holes of several inches diameter into each compartment, to which I would connect brass screw-nozzles attached to leather hose 150 feet long. Steam-pumps, working upon lighters above, would quickly empty the compartments: and the *Vanguard* would then rise of her own accord. I cannot see any difficulty in this, if the compartments are really water-tight. [It is scarcely necessary to add, that this method of raising foundered ships is now universally employed; though the implication, that Baker was the first to devise it, cannot be established.] A hippopotamus sinks directly he is shot dead; but the gas generates in the stomach an hour-and-a-half after death: thus, the body rises to the surface. This is the same principle [observable also in the case of the drowned]; and it suggested to me the idea of its application as above. Pumping the water out of the compartments were equivalent to the distension of a body by gas.'


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CHAPTER XXX.

TRAVEL AND SPORT.

BAKER'S fame as a 'mighty hunter' may possibly have transcended, in the estimation of the general public, his reputation as an explorer, administrator, and publicist. Brilliant as was his record in the former capacity, his title to be remembered by his countrymen rests, however, upon a more substantial foundation: though we are by no means disposed to under-estimate one aspect of his career in order to aggrandize the other. Baker, himself, considered, that the training necessary for the equipment of a hunter of dangerous game was the best possible guarantee for the development of those manly attributes of mind and body which we all are taught to emulate and admire. He remarks:

'I would always encourage the love of sport in a lad: guided by its true spirit of fair-play, it is a feeling that will make him above doing a mean thing in every station of life, and will give him real feelings of humanity. I have had a great experience of *thorough* sportsmen; and I can safely say, that I never saw *one* who was not a straightforward, honourable man, and who would scorn to take a mean advantage of man or animal. In fact, all *real* sportsmen whom I have met have been really tender-

hearted men—men who shun cruelty to an animal, and who are easily moved by a tale of distress.'*

Again:

'Wild sports in hunting dangerous game are the best possible training for the soldier. To succeed in this noble pursuit, a man must possess those qualities that are essential to a general. He must be keen, but calm; he must have a correct eye for country, and at the same time he must thoroughly comprehend the character of his adversary, to know the position of his haunts and the secrecy of his retreat. He must understand the nature of the animal most thoroughly, in order to contend successfully with a vast superiority of physical strength, that must be matched by a master-mind. Intelligence must overcome weight of bone and muscle. A thorough sportsman should be sound in wind and limb, sharp of hearing, and quick of sight. His nervous-system should be under the most perfect control, to enable him to seize an immediate advantage without an instant of irresolution or delay. In the moment of danger he should become preternaturally cool, instead of yielding to excitement. The art of a stealthy approach should be reduced to a science.

'If a general in command of troops should be opposed by an adversary who has a high reputation as a wild-hunter, the best advice I could give him is, "to sleep but little, and to keep both eyes open."'†

In Europe, Asia, Africa, and North America, Baker gained an experience as a hunter and sportsman which was probably unique, and a reputation that has rarely, if ever, been surpassed. His means enabled him to freely indulge in the passion for sport; and his personal

* *The Rifle and the Hound in Ceylon*, p. vi. (Introduction.)

† *True Tales for my Grandsons*, pp. 176–7.

qualifications ensured a success that never was abused: he, in fact, condemned, in unmeasured terms, the indiscriminate slaughter of animals by merciless 'gunners,' and preferred a light bag to a heavy conscience:

> 'My pleasure is not in slaughtering,' he writes to Sir Auckland Colvin, whilst in India; 'but I like to be in a country abounding in black-buck and cheetah, and to restrict my shooting only to specimen-heads.'

In Africa, which was the scene of his chief exploits, he never shot for the sole gratification of shooting, but chiefly for the prosaic needs of the commissariat; and, if at times he appears to have had liberal notions in this respect, it must be remembered that he was always accompanied by a considerable number of attendants and followers, whose daily rations were frequently dependent on the game that fell to his gun. His skill as a marksman, his cool daring and presence of mind, and his profound knowledge, not only of the habits of the animals he hunted, but also of the probable effect of every bullet he lodged in them, contributed to his self-confidence, and enabled him to kill with a certainty that was rarely misjudged. Moreover, his exceptional physical strength permitted him to use with ease a battery of rifles against which no animal could stand.

Baker had a most interesting collection of sporting-rifles, which he kept near his writing-table in the Library at Sandford Orleigh, upon the merits of which he would readily discourse

(with an authority that had been tested by results) and illustrate by the trophies he himself possessed. His general theory provided for a big-bore rifle and a solid projectile for all thick-skinned animals; and a lighter weapon with an expansive ball (capable of checking a charge by the severity of the shock by impact, or the results of bone-breaking) for thin-skinned game, or even for *Felidæ* that were not over-dangerous. For ordinary use he carried a double ·577 Express—firing a 660-grains bullet of pure soft lead, driven by 6 drams of powder—which to him was no more embarrassing than a ·450 rifle would be to most men. He ascribed most of the fatal accidents to hunters, who were at the same time first-rate sportsmen, to the fact of their carrying too light a weapon for the purpose of stopping a charge or for the dangerous task of promptly killing a wounded and infuriated animal.

Baker's courage and self-confidence occasionally led him to face risks the courting of which he would have condemned in calmer moments than in the heat of the chase. For example: on one occasion, in Africa, two lions having killed a buffalo and dragged the carcase into dense jungle, Baker coolly followed in their track—a natural tunnel—as affording the only access to their temporary lair. Approaching cautiously upon his hands and knees, he heard the lions crunching the bones of their prey; and presently he came face to face with one of them, which he promptly shot dead, with a bullet through the

brain. What became of the other lion, our informant, Colonel James Baker, does not say.

Lord Wharncliffe has been good enough to contribute, at our request, the following reminiscences of Baker:

'I made the acquaintance of Mr. Baker—as he was then styled—at Newera Eliya, in the highlands of Ceylon, in October or November, 1854; and joined him on a trip into the jungle, together with the late Valentine Baker and Mr. Edward Palliser. The trip lasted three weeks or a month, and is fully recorded in Baker's *Rifle and Hound in Ceylon*. We killed no less than fifty elephants, and experienced many exciting incidents.

'The most conspicuous elements in Baker's character as a sportsman were, his extraordinary coolness in face of danger, and his great aversion to the destruction of animal-life without sufficient cause or justification. He was a man of very powerful build: not above, I believe, 5 feet 9 inches, or 5 feet 10 inches, in height; with very broad shoulders and deep chest. His capacity for enduring fatigue was extraordinary.

'When I first made his acquaintance, he had had many encounters with elephants and buffaloes, out of which he had come without receiving any serious injury; but the risks he had run had taught him to be cautious. On two occasions he saved my life, by his indomitable coolness at the critical moment, on one of which he placed his own life in danger.

'On the first, he was close to me in the jungle, at the moment when an elephant, which I had not seen, on account of some smoke issuing from a discharged rifle, charged down on me. Baker, perceiving my danger, stepped forward; and fired two shots, instead of one, at the elephant's head: with the result, that the huge animal fell dead almost at our feet.

'On the other occasion, he and I were chased by an elephant down a very narrow path in the jungle. The

vegetation was thick; and the pathway was not more than two feet wide. It would have been folly to have turned, and fought the elephant there: because, if the first shot had failed to kill, the brute would have trampled us to death. We therefore made our way as quickly as possible towards a large tree. Baker called to me, to slip round the trunk; and followed my example, at the very moment that the elephant was upon us. There we were: the elephant on one side of the tree, and Baker and I on the other. The angry brute tried to reach us with his trunk; but Baker rapped the proboscis smartly with his rifle, and caused it to withdraw. After dodging round the tree for some time, Baker said to me: "The elephant will kill us, if we can't get rid of him." He then made me lean forward, whilst he held me firmly by the girdle, telling me at the same time, to feel for the elephant's head with the rifle, and, when in contact, to fire both barrels. I did as I was told: whereupon, the elephant, on hearing the report, trumpeted loudly, and bolted. We then plunged into the jungle; reloaded our rifles; and renewed our pursuit of the discomfited elephant. But, in the meantime, Mr. Palliser, having arrived, had killed the enemy. But for Baker's coolness, and knowledge of elephant-hunting, we must both have lost our lives on that occasion.

'I have mentioned his aversion to the indiscriminate destruction of animal-life. Apparently, this would appear to be in contradiction to the statement regarding the large number of elephants he killed in Ceylon, and may require explanation. The elephants in that island have no tusks, but short grubbers; and are therefore not valuable from a commercial point of view. At that time, Ceylon was over-run with elephants; and the Government had found it necessary to offer rewards for their destruction, until, shortly before my arrival on the island, they recognised the fact, that English sportsmen would be willing to kill the elephants without such recompense. The reward had, in fact, been offered for the purpose of

protecting the rice-fields (upon the produce of which the Singalese mainly rely for a subsistence) from the destructive incursions of the elephants, which, in addition to trampling-down the grain, constantly destroyed the small irrigating-channels upon which the country largely depended for the supply of water. At the present day, however, the killing of elephants in Ceylon is prohibited, as these animals are employed by the Indian Commissariat.

'It is sometimes imagined by people who have not engaged in big-game shooting, that the stories told by men like Baker are exaggerated or highly-coloured: but I, at least, can bear testimony to the accuracy of his descriptions with reference to the trip on which I joined him in Ceylon. I recollect, that when his book, *The Rifle and the Hound in Ceylon*, first appeared, I read it most carefully; and I was delighted to see how strictly conscientious he had been in recording the incidents of our expedition, the narration of which was most attractive to his readers.

'Baker was a very remarkable man. One of the most warm-hearted and faithful of friends, he was devoted to his family and relatives; and I hardly ever knew a more loveable character than his. Perhaps one of the best proofs of this statement was the extraordinary attachment shown to him by the people of the sporting districts of Ceylon, and the alacrity with which the Mohammedan inhabitants responded to his call to accompany us on our elephant-hunting excursions: they used to crowd round him, with every demonstration of satisfaction at his re-appearance, and show him every sign of devotion. No greater proofs can be given of his firmness and decision of character, his determination of purpose in overcoming all obstacles, and his indomitable courage, than the results of his expedition to discover the Albert Nyanza. What he then underwent, the trials he endured, the opposition he encountered and overcame, were facts known only to himself, to their fullest extent. He was a noble and

typical Englishman; and by his death, before his physical and mental energies had been in any way impaired, our country has sustained a great and appreciable loss."

As a young man, Baker not only gained very considerable experience as a hunter, but embraced every opportunity of observing the habits of wild animals, in the dense jungles of Ceylon. In his work, *The Rifle and the Hound in Ceylon*, he gave for the first time a comprehensive account of all the sport, both hunting and shooting, in the Island. Hunting with hounds over such difficult country, swarming with game, both large and small, tried his powers of endurance to the utmost. His strength, at least of arm, at that time may be judged from an incident of the chase, recorded in his book, in the course of which he succeeded in severing a hunted boar almost in-half with a single stroke of the knife.

In the last book which he wrote, *Wild Beasts and their Ways*, Baker evinces a profound knowledge of the habits of the animals he hunted, and gives first-hand information invaluable to naturalists. The instincts of the true sportsman are therein displayed to a remarkable extent; whilst his powers of graphic description are a proof of his close observation of the *minutiæ* of animal-life. As regards natural phenomena, he has shown in all his writings how much he delighted in studying the smallest detail: his descriptions are marked by a felicity and accuracy of expression possible only to a sympathetic and trained observer of Nature. Indeed, nothing

seemed to escape his alert attention, whenever he was bent upon exploration or in hunting-down his quarry. He was thoroughly at home, and perhaps nowhere happier than, in the wild parts of the earth where Nature and natural forces were unchecked by the controlling hand of man.

To within the last few years of his life he was able to take the field, and to endure great physical fatigue, in the hunting of big-game in India. In all, 22 tigers fell to his rifle, during his various visits to the Central Provinces; and not one escaped his unerring aim. He also went in search of bears in the Rocky Mountains, and of game in all parts of the world where the prospects of sport attracted him. He visited India seven times; voyaged round the world during 1878–1881; spent three winters on the Nile, and constantly paid visits to Egypt; besides passing through most of the European countries. Wherever he went he tested the sporting-capabilities of the locality in which he temporarily settled. For northern climates he had no predilection: his sympathies were all with the south. Movement and change of scene were necessary to him, the benefits of which he extols in the following letter to his sister:

'Sandford Orleigh: 27th May, 1888.

'I am sure that travelling about the world, and especially avoiding British winters and springs, stave-off the approach of age. People who adhere to one locality, and who pass their wretched existence in hoping for fine weather, while they cough and sneeze away their three-

score-and-ten years, become old before middle-age; while others enjoy their lives in sunshine, like the swallows. We shall always fly towards the brighter South at the approach of winter. Keep your drains clean; avoid the chills of a cold climate; wear woollen clothes; discard doctors and lawyers: and live for ever!'

That is a prescription the efficacy of which many might be disposed to try, if their circumstances permitted them the choice. As illustrating this section of our work, we may, in conclusion, venture to insert the following excerpts from letters addressed by Baker to various correspondents:

[*Baker to Mr. Douglas Murray:*]

'Bombay: 21st February, 1880.

'From Cyprus we went to Beirut, Baalbek, Damascus; and rode through to Jerusalem and Jaffa, where we caught the French boat for Port Said. We left (7th December) by the *M.M.* large steamer *Irrawadi* for Galle. There we transhipped for Madras, seeing Pondicherry *en route*. From Madras we took the rail; and spent some days at Poona, on the way to Bombay, 800 miles across country. From this, after a short stay, we went to Baroda (247 miles); and were very kindly received by the young *Gaikwar*. Although they must have been tired of the recent festivities upon the *Gaikwar's* marriage, they most kindly entertained us with sports in the arena, where elephants, rhinosceros and rams butted each other for our diversion, and well-trained parrots loaded and fired small cannon without any assistance.

'We were sent 18 miles from Baroda to the hunting-seat of the *Maharaja*, with the royal falconers, hounds, and hunting-leopards. Here we passed a few days, hawking, shooting, and coursing black-buck with the highly-trained cheetah. The descriptions I had read of this style of hunting had given me a very faint idea of the reality. The cheetah does not bound, as commonly sup-

posed, but runs: and several courses in the open offered a fair trial of speed between the buck and his pursuer.

'The best run we had was upon a dead-flat, extending for a long distance, like a race-course. Upon this we observed black-buck in the close vicinity of about twenty females. We had three carts (which are formed with bars, like cages); and upon the top of each platform, a cheetah was held by a chain, ready to be slipped at the proper moment: thus, three carts were attended by as many cheetahs. Each animal was masked, similar to the hood of a falcon. Our horses were partially concealed by the row of carts, behind which we rode as stealthily as possible. The black-buck are exceedingly wild upon these extensive flats; and it would be impossible to approach them without a native bullock-cart, which forms a screen for the stalker.

'We had gained a position of about 300 yards, and were speculating upon the chances of a nearer approach, when two bucks suddenly commenced fighting, and were quickly absorbed in their own quarrel, to an extent that entirely occupied their attention. This gave us the opportunity of marching forward, unobserved, except by the ladies of the herd, who were witnesses of the fight. When we had reached a position of within 90 yards, the leading cheetah was unmasked. The cart halted; and the quick eye of the leopard no sooner took-in the situation, than the bucks, seeing their predicament, started-off at full-speed in opposite directions. The cheetah's head was held for an instant by both the hands of his trainer, his gaze being directed towards the right-hand buck, which, about 100 yards' distant, was flying like an arrow.

'Springing, with the lightness of a cat, from the high platform of the cart, the tall, long-legged cheetah appeared to be at full-stride almost immediately; and made straight-running, like a greyhound, coursing the fleet black-buck with a determination of purpose that showed no sign of faltering. There was no "bounding"

in the cheetah's action; but the extreme lightness of its body, compared to the length and power of limb and the great length of tail, produced an effect between the swinging gallop of a monkey and the long, steady stretch of a greyhound at full-speed.

'Although the black-buck is one of the fastest antelopes, the cheetah gained fairly in the first 200 yards; and as both animals were going their best pace, over a surface that resembled an English lawn, the course was perfection, and the conditions equally favourable. At about 300 yards from the start, when the speed was at its maximum, the cheetah reached a position within about 20 paces of the buck. At that moment the antelope doubled, like a hare. This was effected so suddenly, that the cheetah was unable to cut across the angle at once, and thereby gain an instant advantage; but, with rare dexterity, assisted by its huge tail, it doubled almost as rapidly as the buck: and the end-on race was then renewed. Once again the buck tried a double: but this time the cheetah was prepared for the attempt, and came round at the same moment, without losing an inch of ground. About 400 yards had thus been fairly contested, at the highest speed of which the animals were capable; and the interval between the cheetah and the apparently-doomed buck had been reduced to ten or twelve paces. The critical moment had arrived: and the cheetah appeared to fire-up, like a rocket, as he neared his prey. Only a few short feet separated the eager jaws from the black haunches: the dry dust rose in a sharp, spray-like cloud, as the animals strained every sinew to gain an advantage. Suddenly, there shot-up a heavy cloud, in the midst of which we discerned two wrestling figures: the paw of the cheetah had struck the right haunch of its victim, and both animals were rolling upon the ground. When we galloped to the spot, we found the noble buck upon its back, and the cheetah crouching, like a cat over a mouse, fixing its relentless grip upon the throat of its prize. The race was over.'

'We had several good hunts; and after enjoying the *Gaikwar's* hospitality, and that of our kind host and charming hostess, Mr. and Mrs. Knox Hill, we left the quaint old town of Baroda, and went to Ahmadabad (63 miles further north). There we were put-up, with true Indian hospitality, by Mr. Phillpotts, the Judge; and, with the assistance of Mr. Sinclair, the Collector, we were enabled to organize a fortnight's trip into the Interior. The country was most interesting, as it is the garden of this portion of India. . . . I gave my new rifles a trial; and bagged 21 head of antelope.

'We returned to Bombay on the 16th instant; and we propose starting for Allahabad and Delhi about 1st March. After Central India and the Northern Province, we shall go on to Calcutta, and thence to China.

'I gave-up the Bagdad journey, by the Euphrates Valley, as we heard, when in Syria, that a severe famine had compelled many of the nomadic Arabs to assemble on the river's bank, owing to a dearth of water in the wells and want of food. Under these circumstances there would have been no pleasure in such a journey. India is most interesting: but there is a sharp contrast between the magnificence of the great cities and the general aspect of the Interior. The native villages are squalid and unsanitary; and very inferior to those of some tribes of savages in Central Africa.' . . .

[*Baker to Lord Wharncliffe:*]

'Jabalpur, C.P.: 27th April, 1880.

. . . 'I have been working very hard, in intense heat, for the last month; and in all my experience I never saw such a disappointing country. Lovely jungles, glades, forests, deep ravines, are so meanly tenanted by game, that one hardly hears the report of one's own rifle! How different from Ceylon or portions of Africa!

'I killed two tigers last week. They were regular fighters: one killed a man, and seriously mauled two

other beaters, in dense jungle. This was just before I was introduced to him; and in less than two minutes from the moment I heard the first roars of his attack upon the line [of elephants], I rode at him upon old Mula-Bok, the tusker *shikari* elephant, and was met with a splendid charge. My new ·577 double-rifle (bullet 648 grains: six drams powder) is a beautiful weapon: and closed his account on the spot.

'A couple of days later, I received intelligence, that a tiger had killed a cow. I therefore went out on old Mula-Bok; and searched all the deep *nullahs* in the neighbourhood. An hour and a half passed fruitlessly: I kept all the men in the rear, whilst I searched the *nullahs* with the elephant. Suddenly, the staunch old tusker threw his head round as a tigress sprang from the ravine and, with a succession of roars, approached in rapid bounds direct for his trunk. It was impossible to fire whilst the elephant pirouetted at the moment of being startled; but, on his recovering quickly, I got a shot at about 80 yards, as the tigress, having passed directly under the elephant's hind-quarters when it turned, dashed across the ravine, and went off at full-speed on the other side, up a lawn-like slope of grass. The shot was one of those pretty accidents that are remembered with pleasure for a lifetime: the bullet struck the back of her neck, smashing the spine at the first vertebræ, or junction with the skull, and utterly destroying the brain and cranium. You can imagine the pretty somersault she made, going at full-speed, like a rabbit! She never moved a muscle afterwards.'

[*Baker to Lord Wharncliffe:*]

'Lake Biwa, Japan: 30th Nov., 1880.

. . . 'We stayed a fortnight at Hong-Kong; then went to Canton; thence to Shang-hai: and took a house-boat for a trip of fifty miles into the Interior, visiting the curious old Chinese walled-cities, Ka-Shing and Ka-Zai. From Shang-hai we came to Nagasaki [Japan

being the objective-point of his journey] and through the beautiful Inland Sea to Kobé. We have lately been making a trip to the northern end of Lake Biwa, and thence to Tsuruga, on the western coast; as I wished to see the harbour from whence a railway is in process of construction. . . . Lake Biwa is very beautiful, and the scenery is now at its best. . . . The coasts are mountainous, rising from two to five thousand feet above the lake-level. I have been climbing to the summits of these pine and *Cryptomeria*-covered heights, on the outlook for deer; and have worked 10 and 11 hours a-day, without getting a shot.

. . . 'Game is very scarce, owing to the dense population. The Japan species of deer approximates to our fallow-deer in size and colour; but the horns are not palmated, and have eight points—four on each antler—never more. There are two species of pheasants: the well-known green tinsel, with blue neck, and the burnished copper, with extraordinary length of tail. The mountains are chiefly granitic, much decomposed and water-worn, and have been formerly covered with forests; but a great portion of the timber has been destroyed for charcoal-burning, or used for building-purposes. Nevertheless, magnificent forests remain, chiefly composed of the *Cryptomeria Japonica*, 130 feet in height: the dark foliage at this season contrasting with the bright red of the maples, and the varying tints of autumn leaves falling from the sweet-chestnut, oak, and yellow poplars. The pines of Japan grow in fantastic shapes, but attain great height and girth; and the deep gorges of the mountains are gloomily shadowed with their black-green boughs. For the last few days all the higher mountain-ranges have been snow-covered. . . . It would be impossible to travel with tents in Japan: there is barely room for a table-cloth to be spread upon any portion of level land I have seen: all is cultivated. These industrious little people work like ants, and reduce the art of horticulture to a science.'

[*Baker to Mr. Douglas Murray:*]

'Yokohama: 16th February, 1881.

'This mail has brought the very distressing news, that poor Frank Buckland is dead! I am sure you will be as much grieved as we are: he is indeed a sad loss to all his friends. I had hoped to have had long chats with him about the Japanese fresh-water salmon of Lake Biwa, which I have been examining, and which should be introduced into our lakes in England and Scotland.

. . . 'We have now been four months in Japan; and I have amused myself by studying the Art industries of these wonderful people—especially their porcelain and bronzes. It is astonishing to what an extent you become absorbed, when once you commence this kind of work; and the amount of money you expend in forming a collection. I wish we had been here ten or twelve years ago, before all the most valuable old pieces had been exported, and when one-third the present prices would have purchased them. . . . There is, however, an inconceivable amount of trash, specially manufactured for the English and American markets: really good things are costly here, as the Japanese prize them precisely as we do.'

[*Baker to his Grandson:*]

'Yokohama: 8th March, 1881.

'We went to a grand ceremony a few days ago, when the Mikado opened the Exhibition. On his arrival at the great hall, he was welcomed with the old-fashioned native music of Japan, in a hymn similar in meaning to our "God Save the Queen." But you never heard such a noise! If all the cats of London had been tied by their tails to as many puppy-dogs, and both parties had mewed and howled with all their might, aided by a chorus of sucking-pigs, they would have produced something similar to the harmonies of Old Japan.

'The other day, we went to see some single-stick playing and fencing, in which the Japanese are very clever; as, until quite lately, they all wore swords, with

which, and the aid of bows and arrows, they fought their battles. The women, who also are fencers, were very quick; and two young girls beat most of the men: whenever they marry, their husbands must mind their P.'s and Q.'s, or they will get broken heads as easily as broken hearts.

'The Japanese live almost entirely upon fish and rice; but they also eat every kind of trash that an English pig dare not indulge in without serious risk of dying from indigestion: among other things, shell-fish that are as hard as boot-heels. The octopus is a favourite food. I ate a piece of one. If you tie eight hunting-whip thongs to an empty bladder, and boil them, you will get a fair idea of cooked octopus. Seaweeds of all kinds are also articles of diet. We have tried some of them; but they are only food for such heroic persons as Robinson Crusoe, who may be shipwrecked upon rocks, and have nothing better to eat.'

CHAPTER XXXI.

PERSONALIA.

WHILST Baker was forging his political thunderbolts at Sandford Orleigh, he himself was leading a life of comparative seclusion, to which he always returned with pleasure after his winter-journeys abroad. He rarely went outside the house and grounds: the hours that were not spent in his study were chiefly devoted to the cultivation of his gardens and to making improvements on the estate. Occasionally, he went on his steam-launch to Teignmouth, paid visits to friends in the neighbourhood, or took part in some local function; but, as years passed, he withdrew more and more from general society—though at one time constantly visiting in England and Scotland—and cultivated the resources of home-life. Like most travellers of wide experience, he was very hospitable. His sociability, fund of anecdote, and generous sympathies made him an agreeable host. With children, in particular, he was a great favourite: he possessed the rare faculty of being able to enter into their thoughts, and to understand their small ambitions, whilst having at his command endless stories that delighted them. He was devoted to boys, to whom

he told anecdotes of sport and adventure: and he never 'talked over their heads.'

Baker rarely shot in his own neighbourhood, except at Stover, where he was often a welcome guest of the Duke of Somerset; and he did not ride. There is a pack of hounds that meets near Sandford Orleigh, *apropos* of which he recounts the following incident:

'15th March, 1890.

'We had another accident last week. The horse ran-away with the spring-cart; pitched the groom out; and smashed the shafts into splinters. This was one of the pair that dashed into the shop-window last year. The very big horse I sold for the price of cats'-meat; but I kept the other, as he was useful on the farm. This last accident proved, that he was too dangerous for the road. I therefore decided to part with him; and gave him, as a present, to the M.F.H., with the advice that he should be given a trial with the hounds. He went out with them; and never made a mistake: took every fence beautifully, and never was behind the pack. But, it was his first and last hunt: for he was *inside the hounds*. He had, in fact, been eaten-up the day before.'

Another story is worth recording. Whilst walking one day in the streets of Newton Abbot, Baker observed two itinerant singers—a man and a woman—engaged in their melancholy calling. He was impressed by the pathos of the woman's voice, the *timbre* of which suggested that, though in rags, she may have known better circumstances. Accosting the mendicants with words of sympathy, he invited them to Sandford Orleigh, where, he protested, he would be glad to listen

to their singing. Together, they walked the short distance to the house. The ladies being absent on their afternoon-drive, Baker entertained his guests at tea. On their return, they found him sitting in the conservatory, in front of the glittering tea-equipage, serving his humble acquaintances, and amusing them with all the resources of his entertaining small-talk. On the ladies expressing some little astonishment at this strange scene, after the artists had left, Baker said: 'Ah, well! never mind: I think they have had a happy afternoon.' He himself had wandered, sometimes disconsolately, in strange lands; and knew how to value unexpected testimonies of sympathy and fellowship.

His humanity may be further illustrated by another anecdote. He kept in his bedroom a large pair of conger-tongs—an instrument used by the local fishermen for keeping congers at a respectful distance after they have been hauled into the boats: for large eels are known to be very snappy. These implements are fitted with handles at least three feet long; and have powerful teeth, sharpened (like ice-tongs) in order to pierce and grip their slippery victims. Baker's tongs, however, were reserved for the capture of burglars, should any venture into his house during the night-time. A pillow rapidly tied and fastened round his left fore-arm with a couple of towels, to act as a shield and buckler, it was Baker's humane intention to sally-forth and seize any intruder with his formidable instrument; and

to lead his captive quietly away, to be dealt with in another place, in order not to disturb the household by an unseemly scuffle, or to be forced to resort to severer measures of ejection. His immense strength enabled him to undertake tasks of this kind: although this particular project was never put into execution. Even in the last years of his life he performed feats of strength and swordsmanship — such as cutting-through rhinoceros-hide shields with a Samurai blade— that astonished his visitors.

Baker's brothers possessed many of his physical and mental characteristics. Valentine, to whose brilliant record as a cavalry officer we have repeatedly referred, died at Cairo in November, 1887. His popularity in Egypt, and the high estimation in which he was held, may be judged from the following despatches and letter:

[*Sir Evelyn Baring to the Marquis of Salisbury*:]

'Cairo: 18th November, 1887.

'I had the honour to report to your Lordship, in my Telegram (No. 251) of the 17th instant, the sad and unexpected death of General Valentine Baker; but I think it may not be out of place to add a few remarks on one who has held so prominent a position in Egypt during the last five years.

'Baker Pasha was appointed to the command of the *Gendarmerie* and Police at a time when the restoration of public tranquillity and the formation of an efficient body of police was of paramount importance. Out of the materials at his command, Baker Pasha organised a force which has for the last five years carried-out the difficult task of preserving order, both in the towns and provinces, in a most satisfactory manner. The immu-

nities conferred upon Foreign residents by the Capitulations rendered this work more than usually delicate; but Baker Pasha, by the exercise of untiring care and tact, succeeded in avoiding the dangers threatened by this somewhat difficult position. Popular with his own men and with the community in general, no one knew better than he, how to develop the best qualities of his own officers; and no one was served with greater fidelity.

'The Khedive and the Egyptian Government will feel the loss of this distinguished officer very severely. For my own part, I have, I may say, been in almost daily communication with General Baker since my arrival in the country. Greatly as I feel the personal loss, I consider the public loss, both to myself and indirectly to the British Government, as a still greater one.

'The benefits General Baker has conferred upon Egypt, irrespective of his distinguished services elsewhere, are of themselves sufficient to show that, by his death, a man has been lost on whose courage, ability, and judgment, not only Great Britain, but the country which he was serving at the time of his death, could confidently rely in the hour of need.'

[*The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir Evelyn Baring:*]

'Foreign Office: 5th December, 1887.

'The announcement of the death of General Valentine Baker Pasha, conveyed in your Telegram of the 17th ultimo, was received by her Majesty's Government with great regret. They were well aware of the important services which the Deceased had rendered to the Egyptian Government, since his appointment to the command of the *Gendarmerie* and Police; and they felt the Khedive had lost in him a most valuable servant.

'It is a satisfaction to me to be able to place on record my entire concurrence in the opinions you express in your despatch (No. 532) of the 18th ultimo, as to the importance and difficulties of the task which was

entrusted to Baker Pasha, the high qualities he showed in surmounting those difficulties, and the devotion and fidelity with which the duties of his office were performed.'

[*Baring to Baker:*]

'Cairo: 25th November, 1887.

'My despatch [to Lord Salisbury] very inadequately represents what I feel. During the four years that I have worked with your brother, I had learnt to regard him, not only as one of my most trusted advisers on public matters, but also as one of my most valued personal friends. His loss is most deeply felt here, and by no one more than myself.'

Valentine Baker took the keenest interest in military organization; and attended, while on leave of absence, though without special permission, many campaigns in Europe, viewing the hostilities from both sides, as well as the annual manœuvres of various Armies: thereby gaining an experience that was subsequently placed at the disposal of his country.* During the Franco-German War, in 1870, he was taken prisoner by the French, on suspicion of being a German spy: but, fortunately, he was able to prove his identity by producing from his pocket a letter he had recently received from his brother Samuel, whose name and reputation were known to his captors.

Colonel James Baker, the youngest and only surviving brother of Sir Samuel, to whom we have made previous reference, shared several of

* He addressed several Confidential Reports to her Majesty's Government; travelled in Central Asia, in order to study strategic points in the Eastern Question; and published numerous papers and works, among which may be mentioned: *Clouds in the East* (1876), and *War in Bulgaria* (1879).

the campaigns with his brother, Valentine; and, in his earlier years, gained considerable military experience, which he turned to good account in various Reports to her Majesty's Government. He also greatly interested himself in the Volunteer movement, at its inauguration in this country, and in matters of Military education. In 1875, he retired from the Army; travelled and resided in Turkey; and subsequently published a work on *Turkey in Europe*. In 1884, he went out to British Columbia; and, shortly after his arrival, entered the Legislature. He at present holds the appointment of Minister of Education and Provincial Secretary in the Government of British Columbia, to which he was appointed in 1892.

CHAPTER XXXII.

LAST DAYS.

[1893]

ALTHOUGH Baker's general health was invariably good, he suffered, during the later years of his life, from severe attacks of gout. These attacks were brought-on by chills, to escape which, and the inclemency of English winters, he spent more than half the year in warmer climates. In the event of gout surprising him, whilst at home, he frequently sought refuge at Bath, where he derived considerable benefit from the local course of treatment for this complaint.

Contrary to his usual practice, he decided to spend the winter of 1893–1894 at Sandford Orleigh. In answer to an invitation from the Countess of Stradbroke, he wrote:

'Sandford Orleigh: 5th October, 1893.

'Although your most kind invitation to Henham is more than an ordinary attraction, I really *dare not* accept it. It sounds strange to me to say, at last, "I dare not": but I am thinking of others more than of myself. I will not bother other people, now that I am growing old. [He was in his seventy-third year.] If I were once

again at Henham, I fear I could not resist the same enjoyments which I had in olden times. This would most probably bring-on an attack of gout; in which case I should be a burden to my friends and an encumbrance to myself. Henham is too far off to get back here in case of such a calamity. We have, in fact, made-up our minds not to go beyond the limits of our own country this winter. We have given-up several other projected visits. I shall try "prudence" this year—a drug I have not always recognised through life.

'I cannot tell you how my heart sinks when I acknowledge, that "the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak." Those who were born in 1821 cannot be like those born at a later and more reasonable date. I have no fear of hot countries; but the cold keeps me in-doors. It is quite possible that I may be off next year, —perhaps to shoot lions in Somali-land, or on some such errand. Anyhow, an Ishmaelite was never seen outside the warmer regions of the earth.'

Up to the 17th November, when he went out shooting, Baker enjoyed his usual state of health. But on that day he complained of a pain in the chest, which did not yield to subsequent treatment. A severe attack of gout ensued; and on 11th December his medical attendant ordered him to bed. Three weeks of suffering, during which the gout diminished, greatly prostrated him; and a sharp attack of *angina*

pectoris, of which he had before experienced symptoms, surprised him in too debilitated a state of health to combat its fatal effect. He died on the afternoon of Saturday, the 30th December, 1893, in the presence of his wife and daughter.

The casket containing Baker's ashes was placed in the family vault at Grimley, near Worcester, on the 5th January, 1894.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

AN APPRECIATION.

THE Story of Baker's Life has now been told. Those who had previously read his books, and, in consequence, may have followed his career with interest, will have learnt little from us that is not already known to the world regarding the leading features of his life-work; but for them, as well as for others less familiar with the facts, we have endeavoured to convey an impression of Baker's individuality, and to appreciate the influence he exerted upon the history of his times. His Correspondence has been utilised for the purpose, either of carrying-on the thread of the narrative, or of illustrating some particular point.

Our task has been an easy one: for no man revealed himself more simply and frankly in his actions and writings than did Baker. The story of his life is the record of his work, outside of which, apart from excursions into sport, there is little to narrate. His home-life approximated to that of any other Englishman of his class and station; but the life he led before the world was singularly romantic and individualised: it was

worth the telling, if only to place on record an example, in modern times, of an Englishman to whom love of country was a cherished birthright, and national advancement a desirable ambition. Cheap sneers at patriotism, so characteristic of a Commercial and Utilitarian Age, cannot touch Baker: for he strove with all his strength to uphold the honour and to advance the interests of his country, without hope of reward or desire of compensation. He preserved his independence, both of position and judgment, in the course of a long career; moreover, he carried-through, entirely at his own cost, and without any material or moral support from her Majesty's Government, all the undertakings by which he hoped, apart from their direct objects, to promote British interests or to enhance the national honour.

Baker was a typical Englishman. He 'possessed in a marked degree the manly characteristics of our Anglo-Saxon forefathers grafted upon a mental vigour and receptiveness in complete harmony with the times in which he lived. He was inspired by the Past, but convinced by the Present. His character was cast in a heroic mould—a mould that, from its rarity, may be said scarcely to exist; and the circumstances of his life enabled him to perform the work for which he was most fitted, though they may not have developed his utmost capacities. His extraordinary versatility, amounting almost to genius, would have fitted him for other occupations than those in which he actually engaged: and it was

greatly to be regretted that, having finished his active work by the time he reached the meridian, the latter half of his life should have been passed in comparative seclusion, though, as our readers will have noticed, not without benefit to the counsels of the nation.

In the various sections of this book, we have endeavoured to estimate the significance and value of his various enterprises, and to illustrate his views on the leading questions of the day, with reference chiefly to Imperial interests and the history of Egypt and the Sudan. It will have been seen, that the dominant note in Baker's personality was a rugged independence of spirit, which chafed against the conventionalities and shams of a self-conscious Period, and was more in harmony with the simpler conditions of earlier times, when men were not half-ashamed of their humanity. This independence of spirit had its natural corollary: a fearlessness of speech and action, in which Baker permitted himself freely to indulge, being unfettered by the red-tape of office or by the artificial restraints of social bondage. He could afford to be honest and outspoken, because he was accountable only to his own conscience, which set truth and justice upon a pinnacle far above the conventional standards of personal compromise. He may not always have acted-up to his convictions; but throughout his life we observe a strenuous and single-minded attempt to follow them. Whatever he did, he did with all his might; whatever he put his

hand to, he carried-through, with a fertility of resource and a determination of purpose that bore down every obstacle in his path. He had no sympathy with malingerers.

Being singularly clear-headed and gifted with supreme common-sense, he did not juggle with words, in order to deceive the mind: he looked neither to the right nor to the left, but straight ahead; and his gaze went far. Whatever he saw, he instantly recognised, and boldly proclaimed: if it were a spade, he called it by its Anglo-Saxon name, and by no other. He had unbounded self-confidence, far removed from self-esteem; and, though open to conviction, yielded stubbornly. As an organiser, his powers were constantly exercised, and therefore highly developed: his genius for improving, or attempting to improve, everything he touched or examined, in the concrete or the abstract, has been illustrated in these pages. Whether he succeeded in all he undertook, or failed, and whether his views on controversial subjects were sound, or the reverse, readers of this Memoir are in a position to judge for themselves.

As a writer, Baker knew his own mind and expressed it in good, healthy prose. His manuscripts bear scarcely an erasure. He wrote without conscious effort, very rapidly; and he did not pause to refine a sentence, the meaning of which was unmistakeable, though occasionally capable of polish. At the same time, his style was marked by considerable grace of diction,

and was never lacking in vivacity: it flowed easily and smoothly, like molten lava, from his ever-active brain. A list of his works and polemical writings is given in our second Appendix. All his books have been in constant demand from the day of their publication; and have run through many editions, from which he derived an appreciable income. His works of travel met with a public reception that has been accorded to few explorers, and merit the position they have since achieved as classics in this department of literature. To them, and to *Wild Beasts and their Ways*, we have had occasion to refer. In *True Tales for my Grandsons* Baker exhibits the gifts that made him so admirable a companion, in social intercourse; and in *Cast Up by the Sea*, a story that, from its circulation, appears to have taken a firm hold upon the sympathies of his youthful admirers, he reveals the romantic tendencies in his nature which led him to embrace adventure for adventure's sake and to face dangers for the sheer love of overcoming them. His political writings bear the impress of an ardent patriotism, which was the ruling passion of his life: what they lack in depth of reasoning or breadth of view is redeemed by their transparent singleness of purpose and honesty of conviction, capable of taking by assault any waverers whose opinions may be unformed on the questions at issue. Baker, in fact, did not write on controversial subjects for the sake of scribbling, but because he could not help himself: his political

creed was so closely interwoven with his every-day actions, that the one gave the impulse to the other. Until he had unburthened his mind of some pressing opinion, or relieved his feelings by launching some stinging anathema, he could not turn his attention to the prosaic routine of life. In his private letters, even to members of his own family, there are constant references to topics of the day, which indicate an intense interest in national and Imperial affairs. For politicians who would sell their country for Party-interests, or prostitute their conscience for personal ambition, he had a contempt and abhorrence that were expressed in very un-Parliamentary language; whilst his denunciation of weak and vacillating diplomacy, in the conduct of Imperial affairs, occasionally verged upon the intemperate: he himself was not afraid of empire, but regarded it as a national inheritance upon which the glory of Great Britain rests and her future depends. He refused to sell his birthright for a mess of political pottage.

His prescience in all matters concerning Egypt and the Sudan was proved by the results. Major Wingate, the Assistant Adjutant-General for Intelligence, in the Egyptian Army, writes to us: 'Baker's African experience was unique. By his death England has lost her most valued adviser on all matters connected with Egypt.' His advice, however, remains; and is recorded in this book, for the benefit of any British Administration that has the courage to adopt it.

His friend, Lord Wharncliffe, makes the following appreciative remarks:

'It is sadly affecting to read the few lines written by Baker in the *Conclusion* to his *Rifle and Hound in Ceylon:* "The heavy guns will become useless momentoes of past days, like the dusty helmets of yore, hanging-up in an old hall. The belt and the hunting-knife will alike share the fate of the good rifle; and the blade, now so keen, will become blunt from sheer neglect." For many years after these lines were penned, the heavy guns, belt, and hunting-knife were in constant use by that great sportsman. But even his iron constitution gave-way at last. Disabled by gout, he used to welcome me and mine at Sandford Orleigh with the affection of old times; and, together, we spent many delightful hours reviewing past incidents and recalling past adventures. Gentle, warm-hearted, full of interest in life, beloved by all who knew him, he has passed-away: and now the rifle, belt, and knife indeed hang useless in the hall, conjuring-up melancholy thoughts and touching the hearts of those who knew and loved Sam. Baker.'

Baker was a brilliant speaker and conversationalist. His intellect was keen and alert: his sentences, well-turned and pregnant, fell easily and naturally from his lips; and his delivery was as impressive in manner as it was modest in style. His loyal and life-long friendships, his popularity with subordinates, and, above all, his tender regard for young children, who reciprocated his

sympathies ten-fold, are evidences of an open-hearted nature which a casual acquaintance would scarcely have anticipated from the somewhat stern demeanour he more commonly exhibited to the outside world.

Stanley says of him: 'He was a glorious Englishman: typically manly and straightforward. He did his work well: few could have done it so well. The task he was called-upon to undertake was unusual; and the success he achieved was solely due to his native masterfulness and his untiring energy. In olden times he would have been deified for his vigour, indomitable bearing, physical strength, and exploits. Now, we can only be proud that the race from which he sprang can still show specimens of the heroes about whom bards chanted in the brave days of old.'

Generous to a fault; open as the day; bold to conceive, and strong to execute: Baker was a true son of his forefathers, and deserves to be held in affectionate remembrance by his countrymen.

APPENDICES

FIRST APPENDIX.

'MILITARY ROUTES TOWARDS BERBER,'

BEING A MEMORANDUM

BY

SIR SAMUEL BAKER.

BERBER and Dongola may be regarded as the two objective-points, the possession of which would paralyse Khartum: as no trade could be carried-on from the Sudan were those positions in the hands of a hostile force. Dongola and Berber: objective-points.

Should the re-conquest of the Sudan be determined upon, there are three routes for an advance: Alternative routes.

No. 1.	From Korosko to Abu Hamed ...	230 miles.	
	,, Abu Hamed to Berber ...	142	,,
		372	,,
No. 2.	,, Suakin to Berber	275	,,
No. 3.	,, Kassala to Berber ...	350	,,

The route from Kassala would depend upon the possession of that point by a friendly Power; as it would be the base of a separate expedition. Route from Kassala.

Steel-steamers and barges would be transported from Suakin, 280 miles. These would be conveyed 52 miles from Kassala, through easy country, to Gorasi, on the Atbara river. When re-constructed, they would be ready for the rise of the river early in June; and they would descend with the stream to its confluence with the Nile, 24 miles south of Berber. Steel-Steamers and Barges for Atbara river.

The steamers, thus brought down from Kassala, would convey supplies from Gorasi, until the month of October; after which, the Atbara becomes unnavigable, and is absorbed by its sandy bed. Gorasi, the base of supply. River Atbara becomes dry, Oct. until June.

Steamers then serviceable for Nile.

At that season, until the following June, the steamers would be serviceable for an advance upon the Nile, from Berber.

Abandon route from Kassala; as the requisite conditions are, as yet, wanting.

The operations from Kassala would depend upon the possession of that base by ourselves, the Italians, or by friendly Arabs. For the present, that route to Berber may be abandoned, as the necessary conditions are non-existent: but it may be an important strategic position at some future time.

Practicable routes to Berber.

The routes towards Berber, at present feasible, are Nos. 1 and 2.

No. 1: Korosko Desert.

I shall deal with No. 1; as the possession of Abu Hamed on the Nile, at the southern terminus of the Korosko Desert, would enable us to select the season for an advance upon Berber.

Seasons.

Success must depend upon Seasons. No advance from Suakin should be made until 15th November; at which time the temperature is favourable for marching, and for active operations until the end of March, or the middle of April.

Korosko: waterless desert.

The desert of Korosko, for 230 miles, to Abu Hamed, is an immense saving of distance, as compared with the route by Dongola; but it is totally devoid of water, except

Well at Murat.

at Murat, about half-way across. The well at that spot is merely an excavation, seven or eight feet below the surface; and the water, in its ordinary state, is intensely bitter: it is quite undrinkable, though the camels are induced by extreme thirst to swallow it.

After phenomenal storms, which occur at intervals of several years, the heavy rainfall dilutes the salts held in solution by the wells; and the water, upon such occasions, can be used by man as well as beasts.

Condensers to distil water at Murat.

I suggest the construction of condensers, similar to those at Aden. Were such an arrangement carried-out, Murat might be made a central station, or depôt, for the supply of water. There is a rock-cistern, a few miles from Murat, which, at times of passing showers, retains the water brought down by torrents from small ravines.

This also should be guarded; and the water thus collected should be pumped into hermetically-sealed, galvanised-iron tanks, to prevent evaporation.

Murat should be supplied with such tanks, each containing from 2,000 to 4,000 gallons, and, collectively, amounting to 50,000 gallons. The condensers of Normandy & Co. supply 23 tons of water for a consumption of one ton of fuel. Iron-tanks.

In 1870 all my heavy weights of machinery, &c., were conveyed upon drays, each drawn by two camels, across the desert from Korosko to Abu Hamed, without any preparation of the route. Wheel-traffic of 1870.

At Korosko, there should be a filtering-station; and the clear water should be conveyed in flat, galvanised-iron barrels, of 20 gallons each, two of which would form a camel-load of 400 lbs. Filtering-station at Korosko.

The Transport-Corps should be Arabs, working, by contract, with their own camels. Water-transport Corps.

At the same time that the Korosko desert were opened, and a fort established at Abu Hamed, similar preparations should ensure the water-supply between Suakin and Kokreb; and the latter (which is a great oasis) should be well fortified: thereby becoming the base for future operations. Suakin route to Kokreb Oasis: base of operations.

There are many localities, in the various *wadis* throughout the route from Suakin to Berber, where water may be found by boring. This should be attempted without delay. Artesian-wells: Suakin—Berber.

When the route to Kokreb shall have been rendered practicable for wheel-traffic, and the stations completed, the water-depôts should be continued, by degrees, towards Berber. It must be remembered, that large numbers of cattle, sheep, and camels are pastured, permanently, at Kokreb. Route prepared for wheel-traffic.

By this gradual approach, friendship would be established with the tribes. Supplies for troops would be stored in the depôts at Kokreb, and at other spots along the route, in readiness for the advance upon Berber. Friendly relations with the Arabs.

The advantages of Abu Hamed and Kokreb, as two bases thoroughly prepared, would be enormous: as these Advantages of above stations for an advance in November.

would enable the forces to act together at the same season—November; and the winter months would be before them, for all necessary operations. They would be independent of the season of high-Nile, which coincides with the hottest period of the year; and the march upon both approaches to Berber would be made during the winter months.

Small outlay for such expeditions.

I feel sure, that the gradual development of these routes would be successful, and at a comparatively small outlay; moreover, the various tribes would be gradually propitiated, instead of being forced into a hostile attitude by the approach of a sudden military invasion.

Preparations at Wadi Halfa for advance upon Dongola, by river.

The advance upon Dongola would be comparatively easy; as the Frontier Force at Wadi Halfa would prepare the way, by passing-up steamers and all necessary vessels through the Cataracts, at the proper season; and these would be ready for service at the proper time.

Sudan practically regained.

When Dongola, Abu Hamed, and Berber shall have been occupied, the Sudan, up to Khartum, may be considered as having been regained. No permanent defence would be practicable.*

Cairo
29. 4. '92.

(Signed) SAM[L] W. BAKER.

* The covering-letter conveying the above *Memorandum* (passages of which are omitted, for political reasons), reads as follows:

'MY DEAR KITCHENER,

'As I feel sure, that the task of regaining the Sudan will fall to yourself, and, by its success, will sustain the good fortune which, I trust, will ever favour you through simple merit alone, I send you some remarks on "Military Routes towards Berber." These *Memoranda* may be of service to you, some day, when active operations shall be determined upon. My opinion is very strong upon the necessity of quietly preparing for the event, beforehand: so that, when the moment shall arrive, the success may be accomplished without loss of time. In all our recent expeditions, one notes a general absence of military science. You will have the opportunity of preparing for a blow, and delivering it with undoubted results—which will bring honour upon the force you command and to yourself.

'Ever sincerely yours,
'SAM[L] W. BAKER.'

SECOND APPENDIX.

A LIST OF THE PUBLISHED WORKS AND POLEMICAL WRITINGS

BY

SIR SAMUEL BAKER.

Works of Travel and Sport:

The Rifle and the Hound in Ceylon: First edition, 1853. Reprinted—1857, 1874, 1882, 1884, 1890, 1892. (*Longmans.*)

Eight Years' Wanderings in Ceylon: First edition, 1855. Reprinted—1874, 1880, 1883, 1884, 1890, 1891, 1894. (*Longmans.*)

The Albert Nyanza, Great Basin of the Nile, and Explorations of the Nile-Sources: Editions, 1866, 1867, 1869. Reprinted—1872, 1873, 1874, 1877, 1879, 1883, 1885, 1888; 1892. (*Macmillan.*)

The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, and the Sword Hunters of the Hamran Arabs: Editions, 1867, 1867, 1868, 1871. Reprinted—1872, 1880, 1883, 1886, 1894. (*Macmillan.*)

Ismailia: Editions, 1874, 1874, 1878. Reprinted—1886, 1890. (*Macmillan.*)

Cyprus as I saw it in 1879: First edition, 1879. Reprinted, 1880. (*Macmillan.*)

Wild Beasts and their Ways: Editions, 1890, 1890. Reprinted, 1891. (*Macmillan.*)

Fiction:

Cast Up by the Sea: Editions, 1868, 1869. Reprinted—1870, 1872, 1873, 1874, 1876, 1879, 1884, 1890. (*Macmillan.*)

*True Tales for my Grandsons:** First edition, 1883. Reprinted, 1891. (*Macmillan.*)

Addresses:

1866. 'The Sources of the Nile.' (Royal Institution.)

1867. Presidential Address to Geographical Section. (British Association for the Advancement of Science.)

1868. 'Abyssinia, or Ethiopia.' (Royal Institution.)

1873. 'Experience in Savage Warfare.' (United Service Institution.)

1874. 'On Slavery.' (Rede Lecture: Cambridge.)

1874. 'The Suppression of the Slave Trade.' (Royal Institution.)

1876. 'First Instincts of Adoration in Primitive Man.' (Literary and Scientific Institution, Exeter.)—Issued as a Pamphlet.

1878. Presidential Address to the Devonshire Association for the Advancement of Science.

1878. 'The Advance of a Half-century.' (Literary and Scientific Institution, Exeter.)—Issued as a Pamphlet.

1882. 'Japanese Art.' (Newton Abbot.)

1883. Anniversary Address: Mount Edgcumbe Training-Ship.

1884. 'Egypt and Political Influence.' (Conservative Association, Newton Abbot.)—Issued as a Pamphlet.

1887. 'The Political Position of the Empire.' (Constitutional Club, Newton Abbot.)

1887. 'Science and Art Education.' (School of Science and Art, Newton Abbot.)

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* These stories are based upon facts that came within the experience of the Author.

Pamphlets:

1878. *The Turks and the Ottoman Empire.*
1882. *The Affairs of Egypt.*
1884. *The Egyptian Question.* (Letters to *The Times* and *Pall Mall Gazette.*)
1887. *Maritime Routes to Eastern Seas.* (Letters to *The Times.*)
N.D. *Christ, in the Korán.*
N.D. *Cyprus, as a Strategical Position.*
N.D. *The Political Aspect of Great Britain.*
N.D. *The Vulgarisms of Creed.*

Papers:

1865. *The Albert Nyanza.* (Royal Geographical Society.)
1866. *Abyssinia.* (Royal Geographical Society.)
1866. *The Races of the Nile Basin.* (Ethnological Society.)
1884. *The Proper Frontier of Egypt.* (*Nineteenth Century.*)
1886. *Russia and England: Batum and Cyprus.* (*Fortnightly Review.*)
1888. *Maritime Dangers and Defence.* (*National Review.*)
1888. *Reflections in India:* 1880–1888. (*Fortnightly Review.*)
1894. *Biographical Sketch of W. Cotton Oswell.* (*Big-game:* 'Badminton Library.')
N.D. *The African Mania.* (*The United Service Magazine.*)
N.D. *African Development: the Sudan.*

Preface:

1884. *The Political Aspect of the Sudan.* (Introductory Chapter to *The Wild Tribes of the Sudan,* by F. L. James.)

THIRD APPENDIX.

SAMUEL WHITE BAKER.

Titles, Etc.:

Knight Bachelor (1866); Deputy-Lieutenant (Gloucestershire); Justice of the Peace (Devon); Major-General, Ottoman Army; Pasha; *Osmanié* (2nd Class); Grand Cordon of the *Mejidié* (2nd and 3rd Clasps); Gold Medalist (Royal Geographical Society, 1865); *Grande Médaille d'Or* (Paris Geographical Society, 1867); Fellow of the Royal Society; Hon. Master of Arts (Cambridge); Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society; Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society; and Honorary Member of the Geographical Societies of Paris, Berlin, Italy, and America (United States).

Chronological Memoranda:

1821. Born in London, 8th June.
1832. First School, at Rottingdean.
1833. Highnam Court.
1833. } At the College School, Gloucester.
1835. }
1838. Private tuition.
1840. At Frankfurt-*am-Main*.
1842. Lypiatt Park.
1844. } In the Mauritius.
1846. }
1846. } In Ceylon.
1855. }
1856. At Constantinople.
1857. In England.

Chronological Memoranda:—*cont.*

1859. } Construction of railway across the Dobruja.
1860. }

1860. } In Asia Minor.
1861. }

1861. } Journey to Abyssinia.
1862. }

1862. At Khartum.

1863. Meeting with Speke and Grant.

1863. } Discovery of the Albert Nyanza.
1864. }

1864. } Return-journey to Khartum.
1865. }

1865. } At home.
1869. }

1869. } Expedition against the slave-traders.
1873. }

1874. London.

1875. Sandford Orleigh.

1879. In Cyprus.

1879. } Voyage round the World.
1882. }

1883. } Winters spent in Egypt.
1884. }

1885. Winter spent in India.

1886. Winter spent in Egypt.

1887. Sandford Orleigh.

1888. } Winters spent in India.
1891. }

1892. } Winter spent in Egypt and India.
1893. }

1893. Death, on 30th December.

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